Analysis of public institutions must be robust to the uncertainties facing agents within them, and the varying ways in which individuals cope with these uncertainties. This dissertation uses formal theoretical models to analyze the subjective and idiosyncratic nature with which most citizens face risk and uncertainty. This dissertation focuses on how different public institutions perform in specific settings based on the possibilities that agents may err in either their assessment of possible outcomes or the relevant choices and payoffs that are available. In the first chapter, I show that allowing for voter beliefs to feature ex-post error changes the incentives for candidates to set policy platforms, reducing the incentives for candidate convergence even with purely electorally-motivated candidates. Therefore, even if voters are on-average correct about political platforms and behavior, the distribution of imprecision will still change the incentives of political actors competing for their votes. This reopens consideration of how American political polarization may be driven by changes in the ways in which voters form beliefs about politicians, even as the distribution of political preferences may have remained unchanged. In the second chapter, co-authored with Keith N. Hylton, we determine that the incentives for potential litigants depend fundamentally upon the specific setting in which courts make determinations. We show that courts, facing only the facts concerning this particular decision, and not all the facts necessary to determine the global optimum, will be more likely to create incentives for socially excessive (i.e., defensive) care. In the final chapter, I modify a model of strategic communication to consider situations under which groups may be able to manipulate legislators who are uncertain which topics are most salient to said groups. Such uncertainty changes the incentives of interest groups, providing a new avenue of exploration for why different ideological groups take on different issues. I find that they must weigh the ability to “hide” their salient issue within a bundle of others with the possibility that taking on too many will cause the receiver to ignore their advice entirely.

This is a study on Spain´s path from dictatorship towards democracy in the period of 1975 to 1982. The examination is based on Robert Dahl´s theory of democratization, fundamentally describing three alternate paths, moving a society from one of the states closed hegemony, inclusive hegemony or competitive oligarchy into the state polyarchy. According to Dahl, polyarchy is the closest ideal of a democracy. Dahl´s transformation paths are based on two dimensions: political competition and political inclusiveness. Prior to 1975, Spain was a closed hegemony and transformation could have gone directly to polyarchy or by way of either inclusive hegemony or competitive oligarchy. The results obtained in this study demonstrates that political competition and political inclusiveness developed in parallel in Spain, which was the prerequisite for the rapid transition. Most crucial was that the elections and the referendums occurred within a very short period of time. According to Dahl, elections can be categorized as political competition as well as political inclusiveness. Therefore, it can be concluded that Spain followed the path moving directly from closed hegemony into polyarchy without moving via inclusive hegemony or competitive oligarchy.

<p>The purpose of the thesis is to identify relationships between economic factors and the probability to vote on populist parties. The results are in turn based on the populist parties’ outcome in the 2006 Swedish election to parliament. Parties below the 4 percent margin, prior to the election, which is the percentage point required to enter the parliament, are defined as populist parties. Furthermore, based on theoretical and previous empirical research, seven economic variables are chosen; disposable income, income distribution, municipal tax rate, unemployment and higher education. In addition to these five, are the number of crime incidents reported, and the share of people born outside of the European Union also included. Moreover, the study is conducted at a regional, or more explicitly, at a municipal level, implying that 290 observations are used for each variable, in a total of five regressions. These are performed to test the diversity of populist parties.</p><p>The findings confirm that there are obvious relationships between the chosen variables and the probability of voting on populist parties, as the majority of the regressions explain 25 to 35 percent of the variation in the voting decision. These figures seem consistent, since ideological and factual issues are more important to populist party sympathizers.</p><p>Nevertheless, the results show that when it comes to the economic variables - unemployment, education, disposable income and consequently the municipal tax rate are the ones which concerns people the most when voting on populist parties. Additionally, as the share of people born outside of the European Union increases, the probability of voting in favor of Sverigedemokraterna also increases.</p><p>Finally, the growth of populist parties or of Sverigedemokraterna in particular, forces the conventional parties to adopt similar political standpoints in order to gain votes. Implying that if the present economic and political situation persists, populist parties’, especially Sverigedemokraterna’s policies will thrive in Swedish politics.</p> / <p>Avsikten med denna studie är att identifiera samband mellan ekonomiska faktorer och sannolikheten att rösta på populistpartier. Genomförandet är i sin tur baserat på 2006 års riksdagsvalresultat. Partier som innan valet befann sig under 4 procentsmarginalen definieras som populistiska partier. Grundat i tidigare forskning och teori, har sju ekonomiska variabler valts; disponibel inkomst, inkomstfördelning, kommunskatt, arbetslöshet och högre utbildning. Förutom dessa fem, är även antalet anmälda brott och andelen människor födda utanför den Europiska Unionen inkluderade. Vidare utförs studien på regional, närmare bestämt kommunalnivå, där 290 observationer används för varje variabel, i totalt fem regressioner. Detta med syfte att testa populistpartiers mångfald.</p><p>De empiriska resultaten bekräftar att det finns uppenbara samband mellan de valda variablerna och sannolikheten att rösta på populistpartier, då en majoritet av regressionerna förklarar 25 till 35 procent av variationen i röstningsavgörandet. Dessa siffror verkar stämma överens med verkligheten, eftersom ideologi och sakfrågor är viktigare för populistpartianhängare.</p><p>Gällande de ekonomiska variablerna är det arbetslösheten, utbildningsnivån, disponibla inkomsten och kommunalskatten som påverkar människor mest när de röstar på populistpartier. Det visar sig även att när andelen människor födda utanför den Europiska Unionen ökar, ökar även sannolikheten att man röstar på Sverigedemokraterna.</p><p>Till sist, tillväxten av populistpartier, speciellt av Sverigedemokraterna, har på senare tid tilltagit, vilket leder till att de konventionella partierna måste anamma likartade politiska ståndpunkter för att kunna få fler röster. Innebärande att om den rådande ekonomiska och politiska situationen består, kommer populistpartiers och i synnerhet Sverigedemokraternas riktlinjer att i framtiden få ett mycket större utrymme i den svenska politiken.</p>

Why do people run for elective office? Indeed, it is a central topic in political science that arguably is controversial to reveal, but always appealing since public authority remains in office. This study provides an explorative analysis to investigate local elites’ motives running for local parliament and village offices respectively in Kebumen, Indonesia. In examining individual’s motives, experiences and meanings of candidates are analysed using thematic analysis methods to capture emerging ideas of initial motives, enabling and constraining factors that affect the motives, and how both motives alter. The empirical findings of this study show that “people demand” and “community service” are both socially driven motives which act as a catalyst for the initial motives in candidacy process. In contrast, “monetary incentives” and “personal satisfaction” are both individually driven motives, which in turn replace the initial motives in response to high-cost political competition, that is so-called money politics. This study also captures the emergence of religious motive in the shifting process of the socially driven to the individually driven motives. Eventually, the study affirms that both motives, in combination, constitute a political motive as a desire of power to hold an elective office.

The purpose of the thesis is to identify relationships between economic factors and the probability to vote on populist parties. The results are in turn based on the populist parties’ outcome in the 2006 Swedish election to parliament. Parties below the 4 percent margin, prior to the election, which is the percentage point required to enter the parliament, are defined as populist parties. Furthermore, based on theoretical and previous empirical research, seven economic variables are chosen; disposable income, income distribution, municipal tax rate, unemployment and higher education. In addition to these five, are the number of crime incidents reported, and the share of people born outside of the European Union also included. Moreover, the study is conducted at a regional, or more explicitly, at a municipal level, implying that 290 observations are used for each variable, in a total of five regressions. These are performed to test the diversity of populist parties. The findings confirm that there are obvious relationships between the chosen variables and the probability of voting on populist parties, as the majority of the regressions explain 25 to 35 percent of the variation in the voting decision. These figures seem consistent, since ideological and factual issues are more important to populist party sympathizers. Nevertheless, the results show that when it comes to the economic variables - unemployment, education, disposable income and consequently the municipal tax rate are the ones which concerns people the most when voting on populist parties. Additionally, as the share of people born outside of the European Union increases, the probability of voting in favor of Sverigedemokraterna also increases. Finally, the growth of populist parties or of Sverigedemokraterna in particular, forces the conventional parties to adopt similar political standpoints in order to gain votes. Implying that if the present economic and political situation persists, populist parties’, especially Sverigedemokraterna’s policies will thrive in Swedish politics. / Avsikten med denna studie är att identifiera samband mellan ekonomiska faktorer och sannolikheten att rösta på populistpartier. Genomförandet är i sin tur baserat på 2006 års riksdagsvalresultat. Partier som innan valet befann sig under 4 procentsmarginalen definieras som populistiska partier. Grundat i tidigare forskning och teori, har sju ekonomiska variabler valts; disponibel inkomst, inkomstfördelning, kommunskatt, arbetslöshet och högre utbildning. Förutom dessa fem, är även antalet anmälda brott och andelen människor födda utanför den Europiska Unionen inkluderade. Vidare utförs studien på regional, närmare bestämt kommunalnivå, där 290 observationer används för varje variabel, i totalt fem regressioner. Detta med syfte att testa populistpartiers mångfald. De empiriska resultaten bekräftar att det finns uppenbara samband mellan de valda variablerna och sannolikheten att rösta på populistpartier, då en majoritet av regressionerna förklarar 25 till 35 procent av variationen i röstningsavgörandet. Dessa siffror verkar stämma överens med verkligheten, eftersom ideologi och sakfrågor är viktigare för populistpartianhängare. Gällande de ekonomiska variablerna är det arbetslösheten, utbildningsnivån, disponibla inkomsten och kommunalskatten som påverkar människor mest när de röstar på populistpartier. Det visar sig även att när andelen människor födda utanför den Europiska Unionen ökar, ökar även sannolikheten att man röstar på Sverigedemokraterna. Till sist, tillväxten av populistpartier, speciellt av Sverigedemokraterna, har på senare tid tilltagit, vilket leder till att de konventionella partierna måste anamma likartade politiska ståndpunkter för att kunna få fler röster. Innebärande att om den rådande ekonomiska och politiska situationen består, kommer populistpartiers och i synnerhet Sverigedemokraternas riktlinjer att i framtiden få ett mycket större utrymme i den svenska politiken.

Political scientists have sought to unify under a single theoretical umbrella the explanations for the patterns of public opinion in the electorate and the patterns of party policy. Yet, these models have not taken account of potential differences between left-wingers and right-wingers in the ways that policy preferences are bundled together across multiple dimensions of political disagreement. The dissertation examines the origins and structure of political opinions on three dimensions of left/right disagreement: wealth redistribution, social morality, and immigration. The overall argument is that the content and structure of opinions are fundamentally intertwined. As a result, left/right disagreement is multidimensional and asymmetrical. Left-wingers and right-wingers derive from different sources, and structure in different ways, their opinions about policy. These asymmetries appear in the patterns of public opinion, the preferences of party activists, and in the positioning of political parties.

Political scientists have sought to unify under a single theoretical umbrella the explanations for the patterns of public opinion in the electorate and the patterns of party policy. Yet, these models have not taken account of potential differences between left-wingers and right-wingers in the ways that policy preferences are bundled together across multiple dimensions of political disagreement. The dissertation examines the origins and structure of political opinions on three dimensions of left/right disagreement: wealth redistribution, social morality, and immigration. The overall argument is that the content and structure of opinions are fundamentally intertwined. As a result, left/right disagreement is multidimensional and asymmetrical. Left-wingers and right-wingers derive from different sources, and structure in different ways, their opinions about policy. These asymmetries appear in the patterns of public opinion, the preferences of party activists, and in the positioning of political parties.

This dissertation explores the effects of democratic competition among political parties in India on natural resources and the ability of local communities to cooperate for natural resource management. A significant number of decentralization policies in developing countries depend for their success on local collective action for the provision of public goods. At the same time, democratization generates multiple impulses in society, and understanding its effects on the prospects for local cooperation is important for explaining the variation in success of decentralization policies for natural resource management. I use historical and ethnographic data to understand the influence of political competition on natural resource outcomes and local collective action. The descriptive analysis draws upon theoretical and empirical literatures on political competition, collective action, and property rights, and is used as the basis for generating hypotheses as well as specifying context-specific measurements of the relevant variables for statistical analysis. I test the hypotheses on two sets of dependent variables – local cooperation and forest condition – and three datasets covering community-based irrigation and forest management systems, co-management institutions for irrigation, soil conservation, and forest management, as well as state-managed forests as the null category without decentralized management. The findings show that an inclusive pattern of political mobilization and party competition have increased the salience of environment and forests in the public domain and democratic politics, with a positive effect on resource outcomes. Further, natural resources are better managed by decentralized institutions, compared to state management. However, communities located in highly competitive electoral districts find it significantly more difficult to cooperate due to interference from political parties. Moreover, communities that are heterogeneous along the salient issue dimension in democratic politics are the worst affected. On the other hand, better representation of sub-group interests in community affairs, prevalence of democratic practices, and linkages of community leaders to multiple political parties are associated with higher levels of local cooperation. In conclusion, the findings demonstrate that communities are better at natural resource management than state agencies, but the impulses generated by democratization can constrain the ability of local communities to manage natural resources. / Dissertation

In the last two decades, corruption has become a key concern throughout the world. Most of what we know about corruption comes from instances in which misdeeds become public, usually generating a scandal. Why do some acts of corruption become corruption scandals and others do not? This dissertation argues that scandals are not triggered by corruption per se, but are initially caused by the dynamics of political competition within the government. Government insiders leak information on misdeeds in order to increase their influence within the coalition/party in power. A powerful opposition, contrary to common beliefs, acts as a constraint for insiders, making corruption scandals less likely. In order to advance this central argument, this dissertation divides the temporal development of corruption scandals into four stages and proposes a formal model that analyzes the interactions of government insiders and the political opposition. The arguments and hypotheses generated are then evaluated using empirical evidence from two paradigmatic Latin American cases, Argentina and Chile, from 1989 to 2010. The findings support the notion that corruption scandals emerge as a consequence of political competition. / text

abstract: Political and economic competition, so goes the broad argument, reduce corruption because competition increases the cost of actors to engage in corrupt practices. It increases the risk of exposure, provides non-corrupt alternatives for consumers, and introduces non-corrupt practices into the political and economic domains. Why then, has corruption persisted in the Central Eastern European countries decades after the introduction of political and economic competition in the early 1990s? This dissertation asks how and why the emergence of competition in the political and economic domains leads to a transformation of the patterns of corruption. I define corruption as an act involving a public official who violates the norms or regulations of their office, receives some compensation in return, and thus harms the public interest. I argue that under conditions of a communist past and high levels of uncertainty, the simultaneous emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures of actors to engage in corruption. The resulting constellation of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption encourages political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Finally, the resource distribution between the actors in the corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges—legal corruption, local capture, or covert political financing. To test the causal mechanism, I employ intensive process-tracing of the micro-causal mechanisms of eleven corruption cases in Poland and Hungary. Using paired comparisons of cases from the same business sector but at different points in time, the dissertation examines how corruption patterns transformed over time in Poland and Hungary. The dissertation shows that the emergence of political and economic competition changes the opportunity structures of actors in favor of corruption. Moreover, the new constellation of incentives and constraints encourages political and economic actors to establish corrupt state-business relationships. Crucially, I find that the resource distribution within these corrupt relationships determines the type of corruption emerges—local capture where both sides have concentrated resources that balance each other out, legal corruption when a strong economic actor confronts a fragmented political actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong political actor. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Political Science 2018