nÃo hà / O papel das instituiÃÃes no desenvolvimento econÃmico vem ganhando cada vez mais espaÃo nos debates acadÃmicos. Nessa discussÃo, o Estado desempenha uma funÃÃo fundamental. Mas, para entender melhor a relaÃÃo entre esses trÃs: instituiÃÃes, Estado e desenvolvimento, à necessÃrio conhecer o fator que os une, ou seja, a polÃtica.O principal objetivo deste trabalho à analisar a relaÃÃo entre a competiÃÃo polÃtica, a aÃÃo dos grupos de interesse e a oferta de serviÃos pÃblicos nos municÃpios do CearÃ. A competiÃÃo polÃtica foi medida por variÃveis que indicam alternÃncia de poder no executivo e legislativo, bem como o alinhamento polÃtico entre as diferentes esferas de governo. Os grupos de interesse foram denotados pelos doadores, Pessoas FÃsicas e Pessoas JurÃdicas, de campanha dos prefeitos e vereadores eleitos e a oferta de serviÃos pÃblicos foi medida pelo Ãndice de Desenvolvimento Social de Oferta (IDS-O).Montou-se um painel com os anos de 2005 e 2009 para todos os 184 municÃpios cearenses. Estimou-se um painel com efeitos aleatÃrios. Foram feitas duas estimaÃÃes, em uma delas excluiu-se o municÃpio de Fortaleza por este se destacar dos demais em termos de desempenho econÃmico. NÃo foram encontradas diferenÃas significativas nas duas estimaÃÃes. Os resultados mostram que, os municÃpios que possuem menor nÃvel de competiÃÃo sÃo os que apresentam maior IDS-O. Quanto à aÃÃo dos grupos de interesse, os grupos formados por Pessoas JurÃdicas, desde que sejam nÃo coesos, sÃo preferÃveis na medida em que impactam positivamente na oferta de serviÃos pÃblicos. / The role of institutions in economic development is gaining more space in academic debates. In this discussion, the State plays a key role. To better understand the relationship between institutions, State and economic development, it is necessary to explore the factor that connects them, namely, politics. The main objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between political competition, the action of interest groups and public provision of services in the counties. Political competition was measured by variables that indicate alternation of power in the executive and legislative branches, as well as the political alignment between the different spheres of government. Interest groups were denoted by donors, Individuals and Legal Entities, for the campaign of mayors and elected councilors, and the provision of public services was measured by the Index of Social Development of Supply (IDS-O). With information from the 184 cities in the state of CearÃ, for the years of 2005 and 2009, the data was assembled in a panel which estimated considering random effects. There were two models: the city of Fortaleza was excluded from one of them because its economic performance was superior to the other citiesâ; in the results, however, there were no significant differences. The results also show that the municipalities that have lower competition level are those with higher IDS-O. Regarding the action of interest groups, the ones formed by corporations, provided they are not cohesive, are preferable to society since they influence public services in a positive way.

No description available.

The first chapter presents a theoretical model of electoral competition where two parties can increase campaign contributions by choosing policies benefiting a significant interest group. However, such decision will shrink their hardcore vote base where voters are well informed about the policy. The parties can then allocate the funds between campaigning and personal wealth. Different from the core voters, independent voters can be attracted by advertisements funded by campaign spending. Using a multi-stage extensive form game, I investigate how electoral competition interacts with diversions and policy distortions. My result shows that a higher level of electoral competition helps mitigate policy distortions but prompts the parties to divert more funds. Perfectly informed signal senders need to communicate their true type (productivity or ability) which is often private information to potential receivers. While tests are commonly used as measures of applicants' productivity, the accuracy of them has been questioned. Beginning with the framework of a two-type labor market signaling game, the second chapter investigates how tests of limited reliability affect the nature of equilibria in signaling games with asymmetric information. Our results show that, if a test is inaccurate and costly, only pooling PBE exists given certain conditions. Different forms of test inaccuracy may allow a separating PBE to exist. We also study the case of three types and find different PBEs. The central issue of siting noxious facilities is that the host community absorbs potential costs, while all others can share the benefits without paying as much. The third chapter presents a modified Clarke mechanism to facilitate the siting decision, taking into account all residents' strategies. Suppose that the social planner is able to reasonably estimate the possible costs, depending on the host location, to each resident created by the facility. Our proposed Clarke mechanism is characterized by strategy-proofness and yields an efficient siting outcome. The issue of budget imbalance is mitigated when the compensation scheme is fully funded with the tax revenue based on the benefits. We then use a simple example to show that a weighted version of the Clarke mechanism may yield a different outcome. / Ph. D. / People worry that lobbying may affect legislative decision-making in ways that disadvantage ordinary citizens. The first chapter presents a theoretical model of electoral competition where two parties can increase campaign contributions by choosing policies benefiting a significant interest group. However, such decision will shrink their hardcore vote base where voters are well informed about the policy. The parties can then allocate the funds between campaigning and personal wealth. Different from the core voters, independent voters can be attracted by advertisements funded by campaign spending. The result shows that a higher level of electoral competition helps mitigate policy distortions, but prompts the parties to divert more funds. Signaling games have been widely used for decades. Perfectly informed signal senders need to communicate their true type (productivity or ability) which is often private information to potential receivers. While tests are commonly used as measures of applicants’ productivity, the accuracy of them has been questioned. Beginning with the framework of a two-type labor market signaling game, the second chapter investigates how tests of limited reliability affect the nature of equilibria in signaling games with asymmetric information. Our results show that, if a test is inaccurate and costly, both high- and low-productivity workers voluntarily take the test given certain conditions. Different forms of test inaccuracy may allow the existence of a specific equilibrium where only high-productivity workers are willing to take the test. We also study the case of three types and find different types of equilibria. The central issue of siting noxious facilities is that the host community absorbs potential costs, while all others can share the benefits without paying as much. The third chapter presents a modified Clarke mechanism to facilitate the siting decision, taking into account all residents’ strategies. Suppose that a social planner is able to reasonably estimate the possible costs, depending on the host location, to each resident created by the facility. Our proposed mechanism motivates all citizens to honestly report their preferences and yields an efficient siting outcome. The issue of budget imbalance is mitigated when the total cost, including the compensation scheme, is fully funded with tax revenues. We then use a simple example to show that a wealth-weighted version of our proposed Clarke mechanism may yield a different outcome.

A proposta dessa dissertação é analisar a criação da Justiça Eleitoral em 1932 e avaliar seu impacto nas eleições para a Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1934. Na primeira parte destacamos a importância das instituições eleitorais para a competição política, buscando enquadrar o tema, na literatura sobre a governança eleitoral. Em um segundo momento, passamos para a análise contextual dos antecedentes da criação da Justiça Eleitoral no Brasil e as mudanças empreendidas com o Código de 1932. Já na terceira parte, o objetivo é olhar para o funcionamento da Justiça Eleitoral, através dos Boletins Eleitorais, durante as eleições que elegeram a Constituinte de 1934 incluindo o desempenho do TSE, como última instância decisória. Neste trabalho mostramos que a Justiça Eleitoral funcionou através de um desenho institucional centralizado no TSE e sua criação não evitou a influência do governo no processo eleitoral. / The propose of this dissertation is to analyze the creation of the Electoral Justice in 1932 and evaluate its impact on the election for the Constituency Assembly of 1934. In the first part we turn our attention to the importance of the electoral institutions for political competition, aiming to link the theme with the literature about electoral governance. In second place, we analyze the contextual antecedents of the Electoral Justice and the changes inserted at the Electoral Code of 1932. In the third part, the goal is to look at the running of the Electoral Court, through the Electoral Bulletins, during elections to the Constituent Assembly elected in 1933 - including the performance of the TSE, as the final decision-maker. In this text we show that the Electoral Justice ran through a centralized institutional design in the TSE and its creation has not prevented the government\'s influence in the electoral process.

A proposta dessa dissertação é analisar a criação da Justiça Eleitoral em 1932 e avaliar seu impacto nas eleições para a Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1934. Na primeira parte destacamos a importância das instituições eleitorais para a competição política, buscando enquadrar o tema, na literatura sobre a governança eleitoral. Em um segundo momento, passamos para a análise contextual dos antecedentes da criação da Justiça Eleitoral no Brasil e as mudanças empreendidas com o Código de 1932. Já na terceira parte, o objetivo é olhar para o funcionamento da Justiça Eleitoral, através dos Boletins Eleitorais, durante as eleições que elegeram a Constituinte de 1934 incluindo o desempenho do TSE, como última instância decisória. Neste trabalho mostramos que a Justiça Eleitoral funcionou através de um desenho institucional centralizado no TSE e sua criação não evitou a influência do governo no processo eleitoral. / The propose of this dissertation is to analyze the creation of the Electoral Justice in 1932 and evaluate its impact on the election for the Constituency Assembly of 1934. In the first part we turn our attention to the importance of the electoral institutions for political competition, aiming to link the theme with the literature about electoral governance. In second place, we analyze the contextual antecedents of the Electoral Justice and the changes inserted at the Electoral Code of 1932. In the third part, the goal is to look at the running of the Electoral Court, through the Electoral Bulletins, during elections to the Constituent Assembly elected in 1933 - including the performance of the TSE, as the final decision-maker. In this text we show that the Electoral Justice ran through a centralized institutional design in the TSE and its creation has not prevented the government\'s influence in the electoral process.

This study deals with the quality of democracy, and its purpose is to examine which factors affect the varying levels of the quality of democracy in the stable democracies in the world. The research question posited in the study is: what explains the varying levels of the quality of democracy in the democratic countries in the world, and do political institutions matter? Theoretically, the quality of democracy is distinguished from other similar concepts employed in comparative politics, and what the quality of democracy stands for is clarified. The quality of democracy is defined in this study as: the level of legitimacy in a democratic system with respect to democratic norms such as political participation, political competition, political equality, and rule of law. In total, four dimensions of the quality of democracy are included that are considered to be very important dimensions of the quality of democracy. These dimensions are political participation, political competition, political equality, and the rule of law. To explain the variation in the quality of democracy, an explanatory model has been developed. The explanatory model consists of five different groups of independent variables: political institutional variables, socioeconomic variables, cultural variables, historical variables, and physical variables. Methodologically, a large-n, outcome-centric research design is employed and statistical analysis is used to examine what effect the five groups of independent variables have on the four dimensions of the quality of democracy. Empirically, the results show that cultural variables and political institutional variables outperform socioeconomic, historical, and physical variables in relation to their effect on the quality of democracy. Consequently, cultural and political institutional variables are the two most important groups of variables when explaining the variation in the quality of democracy in the democratic countries in the world. In relation to the other groups of variables, historical variables are slightly more important than socioeconomic variables when explaining the variation in the quality of democracy. The physical variables constitute the group of variables that has the least importance out of the five groups of variables when explaining the variation in the quality of democracy. In summary, the findings from the study show that the best way of increasing the level of the quality of democracy may be to choose political institutions such as parliamentarism as the executive power system and a proportional system as the electoral system. To put this clearly, to increase the possibility of democratic countries achieving a high level of the quality of democracy they should avoid majority electoral systems and presidential or semipresidential executive systems.

While drawing electoral districts and its special type called gerrymandering (redistricting with a certain purpose in mind) has been present in American politics since the founding of the United States, it has recently received a lot of attention and criticism. Gerrymandering has been accused of ruining electoral competition, contributing to the gridlock in Congress, and hampering the spirit of American democracy. Moreover, legislators responsible for redistricting are frowned upon for choosing their own voters and thus ruining the purpose of the electoral process. Redistricting currently follows certain principles, the most important of which and the only two recognized at the federal level are population equality and minority representation. These principles were designed to limit the redistricting bodies when drawing districts. State legislatures remain the most common redistricting institution. However, for the criticism that they face various redistricting commissions with different powers were established. The current trend in the redistricting reform is to delegate the redistricting power to independent commissions which can adopt a redistricting plan without the consent of a legislature and whose members have no connections to politics. Competition and partisanship are the two most discussed...

[pt] Este trabalho pretende documentar o efeito de dinastias políticas em resultados socioeconômicos e políticos entre municípios brasileiros. O exercício é relevante para entender as consequências da concentração de poder político na sociedade, bem como para identificar se os efeitos nocivos já documentados nas sucessões familiares de CEOs estão também presentes na política. Com este intuito, a descontinuidade de eleições concorridas é usada como um quase experimento. Os resultados sugerem que sucessões familiares aumentam a probabilidade de o prefeito ser do sexo feminino, diminuem a idade média dos prefeitos e aumentam seu apoio legislativo. Entretanto, dinastias não afetam a escolha de políticas ou o bem-estar. / [en] This thesis aims to document the effect of political dynasties on socioeconomic and political outcomes among Brazilian municipalities. This topic is relevant to understand the consequences of the concentration of power in the society as well as identifying whether harmful effects already documented in the family succession of CEOs are also present in politics. For this purpose, the discontinuity of concurred electoral races is used as a quasiexperiment. The results suggest that family successions increase the probability of electing a woman, decrease the mayor s average age and increase mayors legislative support. However, dynasties do not affect policy choices or welfare.

在今日變動不居的時代，組織面對不確定且快速變遷的環境及需求，在功能、業務及目的方邵不斷更迭變動，因此組織結構亦須隨時因應，適時加以調整。但有時行政機關囿於各項限制因素，無法隨時調整其組織結構，因而使結構無法配合機關功能，形成機關目的達成的阻礙。在此情形下，即有了「畢其功於一役」的重組需求產生。 　　莫雪(F. Mosher)的組織重組定義指：對於組織之落後及不合時代的運作及組織間相互關係，無法以循序漸進的方式予以改變時，所施加的結構性改變。主要包括四大項：1.職位的增加，2.任務的重新安排，3.現職人員的更迭，4.預算的增減。行政機關重組的理論基礎主要建立於四方面：強調理性設計的行政正統論；外在環境影響的環境依賴論；政治互動的政治競爭論及內在價值的核心價值論。這些基礎奠立行政機關重組的各項影響因素，包括重組動力、重組目的、重組步驟、重組策略、重組各項阻礙因素及成功要件。 　　消防機關的重組，在結構方面主要欲設立隸屬於內政部警政署之下的消防署及省級消防廳，縣級消防局等，完整統一的消防體系。由消防機關重組過程可以發現各重組理論基礎的結合應用狀況，及影響因素的互動制衡情形，行政機關及立法機關之間的權力利益交錯更是最重要的要素，研重組策略及成功要件以減少重組過程所可能面臨的阻礙，是行政機關重組成功與否的關鍵。

Submitted by MICHELLE LISBOA TURU (michelleturu@gmail.com) on 2015-02-27T11:46:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MichelleTuru_150226.pdf: 293737 bytes, checksum: 1f3194078a7bfad8313ec1388f3d4d0f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2015-02-27T12:05:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MichelleTuru_150226.pdf: 293737 bytes, checksum: 1f3194078a7bfad8313ec1388f3d4d0f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-27T12:58:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MichelleTuru_150226.pdf: 293737 bytes, checksum: 1f3194078a7bfad8313ec1388f3d4d0f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-04 / Existem diferenças entre o trabalho no setor público e no setor privado no Brasil que podem abarcar desde diferenças entre os benefícios que cada setor concede a seus funcionários (setor público concede mais benefícios que o privado) até diferenças na remuneração que cada setor concede a funcionários com as mesmas características (experiência, educação, idade, etc). Outro tipo de diferença entre o trabalho nesses dois setores é relativa aos objetivos finais de cada um dos setores. Enquanto o objetivo do setor privado é claramente a maximização de lucros, o setor público tem como objetivo atender à demanda de bens públicos. O suprimento de bens públicos é de interesse de 3 grupos na sociedade: a burocracia, os políticos e a população. No entanto, esses 3 grupos tem interesses distintos, o que pode resultar em uma alocação sub-ótima de recursos destinados à oferta de bens públicos. Uma das hipóteses formuladas sobre esse problema diz que burocracia e a classe política se unem para atingir seus objetivos em detrimento da população. Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar a relação entre burocratas, políticos e população no que concerne os recursos disponíveis para a oferta de bens públicos nos municípios brasileiros. Para tanto, será verificada qual é relação entre o diferencial salarial público-privado e: 1) a competição política; e, 2) o calendário eleitoral. Os resultados não são conclusivos sobre a relação entre calendário eleitoral e diferencial salarial público-privado. No entanto, apontam para uma relação positiva entre competição política e o diferencial salarial público-privado. / In Brazil, there are differences between labor in the public sector and labor in the private sector that can range from benefits each sector concedes to their workers (public sect being the one that concedes more benefits than private) to differences in wages each sector pays to workers with same characteristics (experience, education, age, etc). Another difference between these two sectors relates to their final objectives. While the private sector objective is clearly the profit maximization, the public sector objective is to meet the public goods demand. The supplying of public goods is of interest to 3 groups in society: the bureaucracy, the politicians and the population. Nevertheless, these 3 groups have different interests, which can result in a sub-optimal allocation of resources dedicated to public goods. One hypothesis formulated about this problem says the bureaucracy and the politicians unite to achieve their objectives to the detriment of the population. This work aims to investigate the relationship between the bureaucracy, the politicians and the population concerning the available resources to the supply of public goods at the Brazilian municipalities. For this purpose, it will be verified what is the relationship between the public-private sector wage difference and: 1) the political competition; and, 2) the electoral calendar. The results were not conclusive about the electoral calendar and the public-private wage differences. Nevertheless, results point to a positive relationship between political completion and the public-private wage difference.