The rise of right-wing populism has been identified as a major threat to multilateralism, and its negative consequences for climate policy have already materialised. However, its impacts on environmental policy have been less studied, especially so regarding policy outcomes. In this paper, I strive to narrow this research gap by investigating the impacts of right-wing populism on environmental protection expenditure. I employ a panel regression analysis to examine populist government participation in all European Union member states, and I also separate countries that have experienced a right-wing populist government to explore differences across the party family. The results show no profound effects, which is anticipated. Environmental concerns are more easily conveyed within the right-wing populist logic than climate change mitigation measures, and many European PRRPs express pro-environmental policy stances - they are so-called green patriotists. Based on previous studies, I expand on this concept. Finally, the results indicate green patriotism might be influential for policy outcomes, which is another contribution of this paper to the research field.

Literature on climate policy of political parties’ points to an emerging congruence between populist radical right parties and scepticism toward climate change and climate policy. This thesis explores this nexus via a case study of the Sweden Democrats (SD) climate policy over a period of twelve years (2010-2022). It examines if the Sweden Democrats have expressed variations of climate scepticism and whether this has varied over time. Idea analysis and a taxonomy of three categories of climate scepticism are used for analysing official policy material of the Sweden Democrats. This thesis finds that the Sweden Democrats have outcomes on all three categories of climate scepticism: evidence (i.e., whether human caused climate change is happening), process (related to bureaucratic and scientific processes, e.g., scepticism against dominant research paradigms and bureaucratic decision making), and response scepticism (related to policy choices dealing with climate change). Over time there has been a gradual migration of scepticism from evidence and process related scepticism toward more policy-oriented forms of scepticism that concerns type of policy and attitudinal responses to climate change. Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is primarily anchored in arguments related to desired levels of national response and issues of trade/offs, with climate scepticism frequently constructed through frameworks of the potential harm that climate mitigation may do to national sovereignty, national economy, and industries. Another finding is that the Sweden Democrats overall have a lower salience and prioritization of climate issues compared to other parties represented in parliament whose climate policy they criticize, presenting their climate policy as alternative to these parties. This thesis concludes that the Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is closer to an unconvinced stance toward climate change rather than strictly denialistic, with evidentiary sceptic arguments over time becoming less frequent and decreasing in the degree of scepticism.

This thesis deals with differences in the level of satisfaction with democracy between populists and non-populists in eleven Western European countries the past twenty years, with the common denominator that they all have experienced the electoral success of a populist radical-right party and a population increasingly expressing distrust and dissatisfaction with democracy. The thesis is based on a definition of populism in which it is regarded as a threat to democracy, and moreover, the thesis explores whether there are any significant differences in the level of satisfaction with democracy and whether these differences changes as time passes between these two voter groups.  The results of the analysis, which is carried out quantitively, strengthens the theoretical expectations, proving that there is a significant negative correlation between being populist and level of satisfaction with democracy, and that the effect becomes stronger as time passes. The results also align with the perception that societal changes such as modernization and globalization has contributed to the growth of new voter groups who express their dissatisfaction with democracy by opposing the establishment, thus turning to the political alternatives.

Populism is a phenomenon that impacts not only nation-states and their institutions but also the institutions of international-supranational organizations. This is the case of the European Union, where populist radical right parties (PRRPs) – the most predominant type of populism in Europe – reached the Parliament in 1984, consolidated in 2014, and have since then participated in the debates about the European legislation. Such participation has been mainly framed by the current functioning of the European Parliament (EP), which grants greater importance to alliances instead of individual Members of the Parliament, thereby, PRRPs cooperated among themselves in three groups: the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, and the Europe of Nations and Freedom.  Particularly in migration, a key area of interest of these parties because of their nativist and authoritarian characteristics, these alliances have specific positions and therefore, have promoted different strategies aimed at increasing the powers of member states by diminishing European integration, strengthening the EU external borders, and preventing the arrival of new immigrants, especially the illegal ones. This was particularly reinforced in the 8th parliamentary period that lasted from 2014 to 2019, which also coincided with the 2015 refugee crisis. In this context, the EP adopted and implanted various legislation to cope with the crisis, including the European Border and Coast Guard, the European travel document for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, the Entry/Exit System, the European Travel Information and Authorization System, and the reinforcement of the mandate of the EU-LISA agency.  In 30.905 words, this research aims at understanding whether PRRPs’ characteristics and positions have influenced the EU immigration legislation, measured by how successful have been the two common strategies they undertake to do so: influencing the voters’ attitudes and opinions and obstructing parliamentary proceedings. Data shows that these groups still have a minority in the Parliament, do not vote together as a bloc, some of them do not actively participate in parliamentary work, and therefore, have limited power to impact the legislation as they can only do it indirectly by shaping the behavior of their electoral force.

The political party Sweden democrats became Sweden’s third largest party in 2014 after entering the Swedish parliament back in 2010 for the first time. During this time discussions about the party background and ideology have increased both from other parties and in the society. The controversy surrounding the party can partly be traced back to its foundation and the period before the party entered the national parliament in 2010. Sweden democrats was founded in 1988 by the remains of two right wing extremist movements, today the party has distanced itself from Nazism and calls itself a social conservative party. According to studies Sweden democrat’s ideology is considered as right-wing radical populism. This difference of identification is a problem, because it creates questions why it exists. Are the Sweden democrats really a social conservative party or is the party rendering a false image, and why. In this essay I will use ideal types of the two ideologies social conservative and Right-wing radical populism to evaluate which ideal type can describe the ideology in the party materials of the Swedish democrats most adequate. Additionally this essay will compare the ideal types to see how different the two ideologies are. The analysis and conclusion shows that the two ideologies differs from each other, but they share a few aspects. The evaluation of Sweden democrats party material does show that the party shares the fundamental value of right-wing radical populism and contains attributes from that theory, including etno-nationalism and etno-pluralism. The essays conclusion is therefore that Sweden democrats appears to be a right-wing radical populist party. That creates a question for future research, why the party identify itself as a social conservative party.

Since the 1990s the support for the populist radical right parties has steadily increased. This essay investigates if there is a common policy preference among this party-family that makes them successful, irrespective of each party’s national belonging. This is achieved by utilising a time-series cross-sectional data from the Comparative Manifesto Project. These data range between 1990-2018 and includes 13 different West-European countries. Five different hypotheses containing different policy preferences are tested through multiple regression analysis. The essay concludes that the previously commonly accepted winning formula containing a positive view on welfare, emphasis on authoritarian values and nativism does not hold up. Furthermore, the essay concludes that national context has a decisive role of which policy preference is successful. The common successful policy preference among the populist radical right is their promotion of authoritarian values together with an emphasis on eliminating political corruption and clientelist behaviour (populism). This is explained by societal value changes with major clashing groups in the society, making the authoritarian values a successful policy preference irrespective of national context.

In recent studies of Scandinavian Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties, a convergence of their socioeconomic and sociocultural politics have been emphasized. This evidence points towards them having tempered their more radical agenda as they have moved towards the mainstream. But the description of the Sweden Democrats, the Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party as a homogenous entity doesn’t fit their own perception. Across different channels, like printed media and debates, the Scandinavian parties have made clear statements about how they should not be equated with one another. Through comparative method this study wants to shed light on the Scandinavian PRR-parties dividing and uniting ideological features to discuss if they should be described as homogenous - or can we find divergence? Drawing on Cas Muddes theory of populism as a thin ideology, together with Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism as an ‘imagined community’, this study demonstrates how we can cover the full range of ideas that PRR-parties represent, and thereby present a more nuanced description of them.

This essay examines the recent electoral success of the Sweden Democrats (SD) in the Swedish municipal election in 2006 and 2010. By using statistical methods it aims to explain which of three contradicting theoretical frameworks best can explain how a populist radical right party could penetrate one of the most stable party systems in the world. The theoretical approaches tested in this essay are: a demand-side, an external supply-side and an internal supply-side approach. By using theoretically anchored proxies to determine the effect of the contradicting theoretical approaches this essay concludes that the internal supply-side explanation measuring the local party organizational ability of the SD had the most substantial effect when it comes to explaining their recent electoral success in the Swedish municipalities, as opposed to a more commonly believed demand-side driven explanation.

This thesis examines and explains how the three Scandinavian populist radical right parties, the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party approaches the climate issue in their latest manifesto, and how it has changed over a period of ten years. By means of a content analysis and categorisations of climate scepticism, climate omission and climate measures, this thesis finds explicit evidence of climate scepticism in the Progress Party whereas there is no such evidence for the Sweden Democrats and the Danish People’s Party completely omits the issue. On the other hand, there is evidence of measures to fight climate change in the Progress Party, and the same goes for the Sweden Democrats. However, the only relevant difference when comparing the manifestos over a ten-year period is a decreased usage of statement connected to both climate scepticism and climate action in the Progress Party’s manifestos.

The National Party was active in the Czech politics roughly from 2000 to 2009.Despite the fact that the party had great political ambitions, it did not make any major electoral gains. The National Party is described in detail in chapters devoted to the formation of the National Party, its political agenda, ideological classification, to individuals and organizations participating in the establishment of the National Party, its political marketing, and the results of the National Party in the elections and international cooperation. The thesis addresses the following research questions: Why was the party unsuccessful? Concerning political marketing, were the selected communication channels adequate and was the way the party communicated correct? and Is there demand for a similar party in the Czech Republic at the moment?. We will answer the questions raised by applying a theoretical framework based on Cas Mudde's publication Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe and Alina Polyakova's study Explaining Support for Radical Right Parties in New Democracies: The Limits of Structural Determinants and the Potentiality of Civil Society, and also by conducting a survey which will research citizens' stands on various political issues.