<p>Denna uppsats behandlar politisk förändring i svenska kommuner. Fokus är New Public Management-reformer och specifikt har andelen kommunal barnomsorg på entreprenad studerats. Studien är kvantitativ och består av datamaterial över Sveriges 290 kommuner som samlats av Statistiska Centralbyrån (SCB) under perioden 1998-2005. Teoretiskt utgår uppsatsen från en nyinstitutionell teori. Fyra hypoteser om politisk förändring i svenska kommuner har konstruerats och sedan operationaliserats genom sex variabler; politisk majoritet (blå/röd), kommunstorlek, skatteunderlag och andel barn- och äldreomsorg på entreprenad. Dessa har sedan analyserats genom en regressionsanalys och slutsatsen är att ideologi som variabel inte inverkar på en kommuns reformbenägenhet, utan visar främst att stigberoende, isomorphism och kommuners ekonomiska situation är avgörande för kommuner ska välja att lägga ut barnomsorg på entreprenad.</p>

This dissertation focuses on understanding and modeling how contracts function in practice. The existing principal-agent literature usually involves two players: a principal (investors) provides capital to an agent (managers or entrepreneurs) on a project subject to asymmetric information. However, many real financing arrangements between firms and investors are intermediated by another agent - a bank, a venture capitalist, or a fund family, etc. In these three-tier settings, there are two contracts to deal with two conflicts of interest - a framework that simply hasn't been studied thoroughly in the principal-agent literature. The first chapter is co-authored with my Ph.D. advisors Prof. Andrea M. Buffa and Prof. Lucy White. In this chapter, we consider a general economic setting in which a principal has all the bargaining power, and she has to hire two agents exerting complementary efforts on her project. The principal chooses from two contracting schemes - direct contracting and delegated contracting - whether to contract directly with both agents or instead to contract with one agent alone and delegate this agent to contract with the other agent. We find that delegated contracting can be optimal when contracts are private. With direct contracting, each agent fears that the principal will opportunistically reduce the other agents' bonus, muting incentives to exert effort. With delegated contracting, one agent observes the contract of the agent he hires, alleviating effort concerns, but allowing rent extraction. In delegating, the principal trades off the losses of control and rent extraction by the hiring agent against the gains from improved observability and effort. We find that it is optimal for the principal to delegate when the hiring agent is sufficiently skilled or the effort complementarity is sufficiently strong. The second chapter considers an entrepreneurial finance setting in which an entrepreneur needs two things - expert advice and capital - in addition to her own idea and effort. The entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, and she chooses to finance her project from two sources: angels and venture capitalists. Venture capitalists are different from angels in two aspects. First, angels are individuals investing their own capital, while venture capitalists are intermediaries investing on behalf of limited partners (LPs). Second, venture capitalists provide expert advice while angels don't. With angel financing, the entrepreneur obtains expert advice from a consultant who is independent of the angels. With venture capital financing, the entrepreneur obtains expert advice bundled together with capital from a venture capitalist only. I show that when contracts are private, raising capital directly from angels is more expensive because the entrepreneur has the incentive to cut down on expert advice to save money. Angels optimally set a higher cost of capital to be compensated for the lack of verifiability. On the other hand, LPs are able to infer the amount of expert advice through the venture capitalist's shares in the venture. I show that venture capital financing is optimal for the entrepreneur in competitive labor and capital markets. Moreover, convertibles arise endogenously as the optimal security held by the venture capitalist. Convertible securities have features of both debt and equity, allowing the entrepreneur to provide enough incentives to the venture capitalist while minimizing the cost of capital from the LPs. The third chapter further analyzes the entrepreneur's optimal financing problem in which venture capital is scarce relative to angel capital. Compared with competitive venture capital, the venture capitalist's compensation stays the same while the LPs demand a higher return. The entrepreneur and the venture capitalist share the extra cost of financing, and their expected payoffs and the project's profitability decrease in the scarcity level of venture capital. With venture capital financing, the entrepreneur trades off the loss due to the scarcity of venture capital against the gains from the improved transparency in contracting. I find that angel financing is optimal when venture capital is sufficiently scarce. Compared with angel financing, the investors as LPs demand a higher return than angels only when venture capital is scarcer than what it makes angel financing optimal.

[pt] Opções cujo ativo base paga dividendos devem ser apreçadas de maneira particular. Se os dividendos forem calculados como um percentual do valor de mercado do ativo, pequenos ajustes nos modelos como BSM e Método Binomial são suficientes. Entretanto, se o valor do dividendo for fixo, ou seja, independente do valor de mercado do ativo, há necessidade de modelagens mais complexas. A literatura disponível propõe soluções para este caso, porém com foco em ativos financeiros. Ativos reais possuem particularidades que demandam o desenvolvimento de metodologias específicas. O pagamento de dividendos ocorre quando existe um contrato privado de uso entre o detentor do ativo e outro agente. Por estar vinculado a um contrato privado, agentes externos não podem realizar operações de arbitragem. Três diferentes metodologias são descritas e avaliadas neste trabalho. Um exemplo de uma opção de venda embutida em um contrato de afretamento de 10 anos de uma embarcação é utilizado para análise dos resultados. A primeira metodologia se baseia em um dos modelos utilizados para opções financeiras e a segunda busca resolver a principal fraqueza do modelo anterior. No terceiro método é considerada a diferença entre o dividendo do contrato privado e o dividendo de mercado, que representa o valor que poderia ser recebido se firmado um novo contrato. Dentre as metodologias analisadas, a terceira é aquela que apresenta premissas e resultados mais consistentes. / [en] Options that pay dividends must be priced in a particular way. If dividends are calculated as a percentage of the asset s market value, then few adjustments in the BSM model and the Binomial Method are enough. However, if the dividend is fixed, which means that it is independent from the asset s market value, then the models are more complex. The available bibliography proposes solutions for this case, however with emphasis to financial assets. Real assets are different and demand the development of specific methodologies. The dividends payment happens when there is a private contract between the asset s owner and the other agent. Because it is related to a private contract, external agents can t make an arbitrage operation. Three different methodologies are described and evaluated in this work. An example of a put option included in a 10 year charter party of a vessel is used for analyzing the results. The first methodology is based on one of the models applied do financial options and the second aims to solve the first one main weakness. In the third method a difference between the private contract dividend and the market dividend is considered, which represents the value that could be obtained if a new contract is set. Among the methodologies analyzed, the third one presents more consistent premises and results.

La contratación administrativa sirve de instrumento para la concreción de los fines del estado, por lo que, desde un punto de vista doctrinario, el autor expone las principales teorías y clasificaciones que se postulan en torno a ella. asimismo, presenta un panorama completo sobre la evolución de la contratación administrativa en el  Perú  desde  su primer periodo en 1950, en el que por primera vez se intentó establecer un orden en el proceso de adquisición de bienes y servicios por parte de las entidades públicas, hasta la actualidad, con una participación cada vez más activa en los procesos de integración económica y comercial.Para finalizar, el autor realiza un valioso aporte detallando los diferentes tipos de contratos que celebra la administración Pública en el Perú, así como las diferentes modalidades de contratos de adquisición de bienes y servicios, los diferentes tipos de concesión y formas de iniciativa privada, incluyendo a las asociaciones Público Privadas.

[pt] A proposta desta dissertação é analisar a eficácia de contratos privados como mecanismos para um maior comprometimento da firma em relação aos seus acionistas minoritários. Para tanto, investigou-se uma amostra de empresas brasileiras de capital aberto no período de 1997 a 2001. Em dois testes econométricos, encontrou-se evidência de que o lançamento de ADR Nível II e a presença no grupo diferenciado de governança da BOVESPA foram relevantes para uma menor diluição dos acionistas minoritários e para uma performance diferenciada da firma em momentos de choques de retorno. Apesar da importância de uma legislação societária mais rígida também ter sido constatada, a conclusão desta dissertação caminha para a eficácia de contratos privados que realmente imponham regras mais rígidas de governança. / [en] This dissertation uses a sample of Brazilian firms in the period 1997 to 2001 to investigate the effectiveness of alternative corporate governance mechanisms. The data show that firms can commit to protect their minority shareholders by issuing Level II ADRs -American Depository Receipt- or joining the Novo Mercado -firms listed in the BOVESPA that agree with stricter governance practices-. In particular, firms with Level II ADRs and firms in the Novo Mercado have larger stock returns in times of turmoil, and they are more likely to pay dividends. The study shows, however, that changes in corporate law affect the ability of private contracts like ADRs to protect minority shareholders.As such, firms cannot completely overcome weaknesses in the Brazils legal system that harm minority shareholders.

Denna uppsats behandlar politisk förändring i svenska kommuner. Fokus är New Public Management-reformer och specifikt har andelen kommunal barnomsorg på entreprenad studerats. Studien är kvantitativ och består av datamaterial över Sveriges 290 kommuner som samlats av Statistiska Centralbyrån (SCB) under perioden 1998-2005. Teoretiskt utgår uppsatsen från en nyinstitutionell teori. Fyra hypoteser om politisk förändring i svenska kommuner har konstruerats och sedan operationaliserats genom sex variabler; politisk majoritet (blå/röd), kommunstorlek, skatteunderlag och andel barn- och äldreomsorg på entreprenad. Dessa har sedan analyserats genom en regressionsanalys och slutsatsen är att ideologi som variabel inte inverkar på en kommuns reformbenägenhet, utan visar främst att stigberoende, isomorphism och kommuners ekonomiska situation är avgörande för kommuner ska välja att lägga ut barnomsorg på entreprenad.