This report on the subject of Systems Science for Defence and Security, aims to study the possibility for electronic warfare (EW) against the radar in active protection system (APS) on ground combat vehicles. The goal of the EW is to ensure effect of current anti-tank systems against an enemy equipped with APS. Given that the radar is susceptible to jamming, (1) Which opportunities would an EW-system used in conjunction with an anti-tank system, bestow on a successful engagement? (2) Which effect could jamming of an APS result in, and what type of jamming would yield this desired effect?  The result concludes that an APS would increase the statistical number of needed anti-tank projectiles in a given engagement with a combat vehicle by 700 %, from a stated number of five to six to 35–43. This increase shows how the efficiency of an APS is linked to needed anti-tank systems for the same effect, but also the potential gain from employing an EW-system. Studying the use of stand-off jamming, where the jamming is produced in a separate system, there’s no need for new development of weapons systems or munitions. The jamming should employ a technique of combined range and velocity deception (CRV) or noise to successfully lower the efficiency of the APS. Angle deception have arisen as a desirable technique, with promise of an increase of survivability of EW- and anti-tank units, and further studies are therefore interest. / Detta självständiga arbete på grundnivå inom ämnet försvarssystem behandlar möjligheter till aktiv radarstörning av varnar- och motverkanssystem (VMS), i syfte att erhålla verkan med befintliga burna pansarvärnssystem mot stridsfordon. Givet att aktiv radarstörning kan användas mot ett varnar- och motverkanssystem med förstörande motmedel; (1)Vilka möjligheter till verkan ger ett telekrigsystem med aktiv radarstörning i kombination med ett pansarvärnssystem?(2)Vilken typ av aktiv radarstörning är lämplig och vilken effekt på det störda systemet kan förväntas?  Arbetet visar på effekten VMS statistiskt har på duellen mellan stridsfordon och pansarvärnssystem. Beräkningarna utgår ifrån påståendet att det krävs fem till sex pansarvärnprojektiler för nedkämpning av ett stridsfordon, vilket ökar till 35-43st då fordonet utrustas med VMS. Ökningen på cirka 700% visar dels på hur effektiviteten hos VMS höjer antalet erfordrade pansarvärnsvapen för att nå samma effekt, men även den potentiella vinningen att sänka effektiviteten genom telekrig. Arbetet studerade nyttjandet av bakgrundsstörning, då genereringen av störsignalen sker i ett separat telekrigsystem, vilket inte kräver utveckling av nya vapensystem eller ammunition. För utformning av störningen faller en kombinerad hastighet och avstånds vilseledning (CRV) eller brus lämplig och anses sänka effektiviteten hos VMS. Vinkelavhakning har i arbetet visat sig medföra stora förtjänster för ökad överlevnad hos telekrig/pansarvärnsenheter och vidare forskning är därför intressant.

In this work, the interference sensitivity of an FMCW radar has been evaluated by studying the impact on a simulated detection chain. A commercially available FMCW radar was first characterized and its properties then laid the foundation for a simulation model implemented in Matlab. Different interference methods have been studied and a selection was made based on the results of previous research. One method aims to inject a sufficiently large amount of energy in the form of pulsed noise into the receiver. The second method aims to deceive the radar into seeing targets that do not actually exist by repeating the transmitted signal and thus giving the radar a false picture of its surroundings. The results show that if it is possible to synchronize with the transmitted signal then repeater jamming can be effective in misleading the radar. In one scenario the false target even succeeded in hiding the real target by exploiting the Cell-Averaging CFAR detection algorithm. The results suggests that without some smart countermeasures the radar has no way of distinguishing a coherent repeater signal, but just how successful the repeater is in creating a deceptive environment is highly dependent on the detection algorithm used. Pulsed noise also managed to disrupt the radar and with a sufficiently high pulse repetition frequency the detector could not find any targets despite a simulated object in front of the radar. On the other hand, a rather significant effective radiated power level was required for the pulse train to achieve any meaningful effect on the radar, which may be due to an undersampled signal in the simulation. It is therefore difficult based on this work to draw any conclusions about how suitable pulsed noise is in a non-simulated interference context and what parameter values to use.