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Kant, Fichte, Schelling : essai sur la nature du malDispersyn, Eléonore A.M.H. 13 November 2006 (has links)
Progression d'un concept, le mal radical, dans trois textes : La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison (Kant), Le système de l'Ethique (Fichte), et Le Traité de 1809 (Schelling). Origine ultime du mal : libre arbitre ou détermination ? Responsabilité et liberté du mal. Mal moral et métaphysique du mal/ Advance of a concept: radical evil, in three readings: Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (Kant), System of Ethics (Fichte), and Treatise of 1809 (Schelling).Ultimate origin of evil: free will or determination? Responsibility and freedom to evil. Moral evil and metaphysics of evil.
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Evil: From the Banal to the RadicalMr Paul Formosa Unknown Date (has links)
No description available.
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Banalidade do Mal: colapsos morais no 3º Reich / Banality of Evil: moral collapse in the 3rd ReichVAZ, éden Farias 18 August 2011 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2011-08-18 / This work explores the meaning of the expression Banality of Evil, coined by Hannah Arendt in her investigation about Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. It intends to question its meaning to the logistics of extermination in the Holocaust. Investigates on the one hand, aspects of a moral collapse about our common understandings about the problem of evil, and by the other, the context of bureaucracy that propitiated the novelty of this new form of evil by its singular lack of roots as well as political and moral implications in relation to individual responsibility. Through the conceptual analysis of the problem of evil, along with a series of mismatches in the reasons for doing evil, we propose an interpretation of the meaning of the Banality of Evil. / Este trabalho investiga o significado da expressão Banalidade do Mal cunhada por Hannah Arendt em suas investigações sobre Adolf Eichmann em Jerusalém. Preza-se pelo questionamento do seu significado frente à logística de extermínio do Holocausto. Investiga-se, por um lado, aspectos de um colapso moral a respeito de nossas usuais compreensões acerca do problema do mal e, por outro, o contexto de burocratização do extermínio que propiciou o ineditismo dessa nova forma de mal por sua singular ausência de raízes, bem como as implicações políticas e morais em relação à responsabilidade individual. Através da análise conceitual do problema do mal, juntamente a uma série de descompassos presentes nas razões para se fazer o mal, propomos uma interpretação do significado da Banalidade do Mal.
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Le concept d'œuvre de Jacques Derrida, un vaccin contre la loi du pire / Jacques Derrida's concept of "work", a vaccine against radical evilDelain, Pierre 07 January 2017 (has links)
Jacques Derrida est signataire de ce qu’on appelle une "œuvre" : un vaste corpus de textes où d’autres "œuvres", en grand nombre, sont citées, étudiées, analysées ou déconstruites. Souvent, il utilise le mot "œuvre", et plus rarement mais de manière significative, il interroge ce mot ou ce qu'il appelle l'"énigme" du concept d'œuvre. Dans ce qu’il « dit » alors, un double « faire » est impliqué. D’une part, il se demande « Que fait cette œuvre ? », et nous pouvons analyser et commenter ce qu’il dit. Mais d’autre part, nous pouvons aussi nous demander : « Mais que fait Derrida quand il analyse ce que fait cette œuvre ? ». C’est cette deuxième question qui tend à prévaloir dans cette étude. Dans les champs de l'histoire de l'art, de l'esthétique ou de la critique littéraire, il existe une immense littérature autour de la question de l'œuvre. La convoquer, dans le format limité de ce travail, aurait conduit à des simplifications, des approximations ou des omissions. On a donc fait un autre choix : chercher dans le texte derridien lui-même, dans son faire, son auto-hétéro-affection, les éléments qui pourraient conduire à l’élaboration d’un concept d'œuvre spécifique et singulier. Afin de tenir compte de la critique externe et aussi de la longue histoire de la philosophie autour de cette thématique, on a mis à profit la structure d'"invagination" du texte derridien. Dans ce texte même, en prenant appui sur la littérature secondaire, on peut repérer d'autres pensées de l'œuvre, par exemple celles de Lévinas ou d’Heidegger. Cette méthode a conduit aux hypothèses suivantes : 1. Il y a dans l'œuvre derridienne, y compris à travers l’analyse des autres œuvres, la mise en jeu d’un "Il faut", d’une ou de plusieurs inconditionnalité(s), et ce dès les premiers textes. 2. La structure d'auto-immunité, décrite dans l'œuvre, opère dans l'œuvre. "Il faut" se protéger contre quelque chose. Quoi? Notre hypothèse, c'est qu'il s'agit du mal radical. 3. Malgré les apories multiples dont la description occupe une large partie de l'œuvre, le désir de protection, en principe impossible à réaliser, réussit quand même. On peut tenter de démontrer cette réussite, mais on peut aussi, surtout, en témoigner par la lecture : Je dois reconnaître, je dois avouer qu'elle me vaccine. 4. Cette opération, que nous nommons aussi "œuvrance", est performative. Elle passe par cinq principes inconditionnels : laisser l’avenir ouvert, s’adresser à l’autre comme tel, s’aventurer pour plus que la vie, garder le secret, répondre des principes - en ce moment même. 5. Cela conduit à la définition d'un "principe de l'œuvre" spécifique de l’œuvre derridienne dont l'énoncé est le suivant : Ce qui a lieu dans une œuvre s’affirme inconditionnellement, en-dehors de tout calcul, de toute finalité et de toute transaction. / Jacques Derrida signs what is called “une oeuvre” ("a work") : a vast corpus of texts, in which other "works", great in number, are cited, studied, analyzed or deconstructed. He often uses the word "work", and more rarely, but in a significant way, he interrogates this word, or what he calls "the enigma" of the concept of work. In what he "says", then, a double "doing" is implied. On the one hand, he asks himself "What makes this work?", and we can analyze and comment upon what he says. But, on the other hand, we can also ask ourselves : "But what does Derrida do when he analyzes what it is that makes this work?" This second question is the one that tends to prevail in this study. In the fields of art history, esthetics or literary criticism, there exists an enormous litterature around the question of the work. To raise it, in the limited form of this essay, would lead to simplifications, approximations, or omissions. We have therefore made another choice : to seek out, in the derridian text itself, in its "doing", its auto-hetero-affection, the elements that could lead to the elaboration of a specific and singular concept of work. In order to account for external criticism, and also of the long history of philosophy around this thematics, we have privileged the Derridian text's structure of "invagination". In his text itself, drawing on the secondary literature, we can link up other thoughts involving the work, for example those of Levinas or Heidegger. This method has lead to the following hypotheses: 1. In the derridian work, including across the analysis of other works, the setting into play of an "it must", of one or several unconditional(s), and beginning with the first texts. 2. The structure of auto-immunity, described in the work, is operating within the work. "It must" protects itself against something. Against what? It is our hypothesis that this has to do with radical evil. 3. Despite the multiple aporias whose description occupies a large part of his work, the desire for protection, in principle impossible to realize, nonetheless succeeds. We can try to demonstrate this success, but we can also, above all, take note of it by reading : I ought to recognize, I ought to acknowledge that it vaccinates me. 4. This operation, that we also call “œuvrance” (“working”), is performative. It passes through five unconditional principles : leave the future open, address oneself to the other as such, aim for more than life, keep the secret, answer to principles -- in this very moment. 5. This leads to the definition of a "principle of the work": specific to the derridian work whose statement is the following : what takes place in the work, is unconditionally affirmed, beyond all calculation, all finality and all transaction.
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Back to the Woods or Into Ourselves? : Kant, Rousseau and the Search for the Essence of Human NatureWennersten, Annika January 2015 (has links)
This thesis contributes to a field of Kant’s practical philosophy that has received renewed attention, namely his moral anthropology. While it is true that Kant, in some of his best-known writings, literally says that the fundamental ground of morality must be pure and thus entirely free from admixture with anthropological principles, he nevertheless admits that these “subjective conditions” in human nature that “either hinder or help people in fulfilling the laws of the metaphysics of morals” make up the foundation of all applied ethics. In other words, in order to know if and to which extent human beings are susceptible to moral commands, we need to know our abilities as well as our limitations. Kant wrote several works about these topics and his long-term teaching of anthropology shows that he had a continuing interest in the theory of man. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that Kant, during the mid-1760s was highly influenced by Rousseau. It is hardly a coincidence that Kant’s first reference to the “unchanging nature of human beings” appeared at the same time as Rousseau proclaimed the need of finding the true nature of man – the unmasked being who has not been damaged by social prejudice. In order to understand man and his moral capacities we need to find his true essence or what really constitutes humanity. Accordingly, a careful examination of the multifaceted characteristics of human nature is needed in order to understand the very concept of a moral being and to account for his moral progress. I will argue that Kant’s early insights about this need runs like a thread through his entire course of philosophy and that Rousseauian ideas actually affect also his critical ethics. They agree that man is sociable, but also suspicious. He has good predispositions but is likewise susceptible to corruption. My analysis will shed light on man’s eternal balance between conflicting forces and on the means needed for the progress towards the vocation of humankind. This reveals the need of knowing oneself and explains why the question: “what is the human being?” ought to be taken seriously.
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Kant, Fichte, Schelling: essai sur la nature du malDispersyn, Eléonore 13 November 2006 (has links)
Progression d'un concept, le mal radical, dans trois textes :La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison (Kant), Le système de l'Ethique (Fichte), et Le Traité de 1809 (Schelling). Origine ultime du mal :libre arbitre ou détermination ?Responsabilité et liberté du mal. Mal moral et métaphysique du mal/ Advance of a concept: radical evil, in three readings: Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (Kant), System of Ethics (Fichte), and Treatise of 1809 (Schelling).Ultimate origin of evil: free will or determination? Responsibility and freedom to evil. Moral evil and metaphysics of evil. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Une ontologie de la liberté dans l'œuvre de Paul Ricoeur / An ontology of freedom in the works of Paul RicœurKuang, Quan 05 December 2016 (has links)
Penser l’être humain comme un être libre : tel est le souci constant de la réflexion de Paul Ricœur. Au niveau anthropologique, le philosophe cherche à remettre la liberté en lien avec la condition concrète de l’homme, où la nature, le corps, autrui et la société sont en jeu. Ce n’est qu’en reconnaissant une telle condition que la liberté devient réelle, affirmative et puissante. Au niveau ontologique, c’est la liberté humaine qui offre un accès privilégié à la compréhension de l’être en général. Après avoir écarté la notion de l’être comme objectivité, la liberté le dévoile comme un acte affirmatif. Au niveau méthodologique, le développement d’une herméneutique phénoménologique constitue un élément essentiel de l’ontologie de la liberté, dans la mesure où la pensée est elle-même toujours impliquée dans cette interrogation ontologique. C’est par un tel « engagement » que la pensée atteste l’être de la liberté, surtout face à l’énigme du mal. / One of the persistent concerns of Paul Ricœur’s philosophy is to reflect upon the human being as being free. At the anthropological level, Ricœur always considers freedom within concrete human condition, in which nature, body, others and society are all involved. One’s freedom becomes real, affirming and powerful only when such condition is recognized. At the ontological level, it is only as a free being that one has the privileged access to the understanding of being in general. Human as free being reveals that being should not be understood as objectivity, but as an affirming act. Finally, at the methodological level, Ricœur’s elaboration of phenomenological hermeneutics constitutes an essential element of his ontology of freedom. From his methodological development, it can be seen that the thinking philosopher himself, as a free being, is also engaged in his inquiry. In this regard, Ricœur’s philosophy as such becomes an attestation of free being, especially in his confrontation with the enigma of evil.
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