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SOARES, Daniel Benevides. O mal radical como violência em Eric Weil. 2015. 114f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2015. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-02-20T11:31:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_dbsoares.pdf: 833804 bytes, checksum: de5bdc10ea1b8e04dda22915b9513215 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-02-20T13:06:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_dbsoares.pdf: 833804 bytes, checksum: de5bdc10ea1b8e04dda22915b9513215 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-20T13:06:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_dbsoares.pdf: 833804 bytes, checksum: de5bdc10ea1b8e04dda22915b9513215 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / O conceito de violência para Eric Weil não se resume a um dado ligado a agressão. Violência aqui é o outro da razão, a negação do sentido e, enquanto tal, ela, ao passo que nega o universal e a conduta sensata impõe os limites da razão. Falar da razão e da sua luta com a violência implica em uma opção pela razão, pois a compreensão se dá no âmbito da razão. Compreender o evento do mal como uma forma de violência, portanto, implica em fazê-lo do ponto de vista da razão, como um fenômeno moral. Abordada por ciências distintas e tomada em diferentes sentidos semânticos, a violência em Weil não é, também, conceito desprovido de uma pluralidade de formas: violência pura, violência natural, violência interior, etc. Todas essas manifestações são objeto de consideração e ocupam o pensamento do autor. Tema de debate filosófico e teológico há bastante tempo, o mal também é reconhecido por Weil no seu espectro plural: mal do indivíduo, mal do Estado. Nosso objetivo é situar o mal radical, trabalhado por Weil a partir de Kant, como uma forma de violência específica no pensamento do autor, a violência passional. / Le concept de la violence à Eric Weil n'est pas seulement une donnée liée à l'agression. La violence est l'autre de la raison, le refus de sens et comme telle elle, tout en niant l'universel et la conduite raisonnable impose les limites de la raison. En parlant de la raison et de sa lutte contre la violence implique une option pour la raison parce que la compréhension se fait dans des limites raisonnables. Comprendre l'événement du mal comme une forme de violence, par conséquent, implique de le faire du point de vue de la raison, comme un phénomène moral. Adressée par différentes sciences et prises à différentes valeurs sémantiques, la violence dans Weil n'est pas non plus dénuée de plusieurs formes notion: la violence pure, la violence naturel, la violence de l'intérieur, etc. Toutes ces manifestations sont l'objet de considération et occupent les pensées de l'auteur. Mot de débat philosophique et théologique pendant une longue période, le mal est également reconnu par Weil dans le spectre pluriel: le mal de líndividu, le mal de l’État. Notre objectif est de situer le mal radical, pour Weil a travaillé à partir de Kant, comme une forme spécifique de violence dans la pensée de l'auteur, la violence passionnée.

The aim of this dissertation is to reconstruct the concept of radical evil (das radikale Böse) treated by Kant in his writing On the radical evil in human nature (Über das radicale Böse in der menschlichen Natur), which was published in 1792. Starting from the data provided by this text, the terms in which Kant discusses both the problem of moral evil in the proper sense (conceived as radical), and the possibility of a human progress with regard to morality, are explicated. In that thematic, Kant introduces some concepts which pertain exclusively to the question of evil, among them, the concept on intention (Gesinnung), the concepts of inclination towards the evil (Hang zum Bösen) and of disposition to the good (Anlage zum Guten), also the ideas of revolution and gradual reform (as means to realize moral progress), and finally a new definition of nature. Even if it uses its proper terms, the writing on the evil keeps many basic concepts which Kant had introduced in earlier writings. For this reason, the dissertation does not limitate itself to the writing On the radical evil, but also treats of other kantian works, which serves two purposes: first, an explicative one, clarifying questions already well established in kantian philosophy; and secondly, a comparative one, both in relation with terms which receive a different meaning, and with regard to changes of the claims made, which reflect the new context and follow a different configuration. This is the horizon which the present dissertation is itended to reconstruct and within which it locates itself. Regarding the question of the evil (and its qualification as radical), various other questions are discussed in a specific manner, for instance, the origin of evil, the responsibility of man for its existence, the notions of virtue (both in the moral and in the legal sphere), the concept of evil action, the idea of moral education, and finally, the function of religion as supporting and stabilizing good moral conduct. These questions were harmonized as far as possible, and reconstructed from the point of view which caracterizes kantian philosophy: the critical-systematic point of view. / A presente Dissertação é uma reconstrução do conceito de mal radical (Radicale Böse) tratado por Kant em seu artigo Sobre o mal radical na natureza humana (Über das radicale Böse in der menschlichen Natur), publicado em 1792. A partir dos dados desse texto o que se fez foi explicitar em que termos Kant aborda tanto a questão do mal moral propriamente dito (concebido posteriormente como radical), como também a da possibilidade de um progresso humano no que tange à moralidade. Nessa tratativa, Kant introduz algumas noções que são exclusivas à problemática do mal, entre elas, o conceito de intenção (Gesinnung), as noções de propensão para o mal (Hang zum Bösen) e de disposição para o bem (Anlage zum Guten), também as idéias de revolução e de reforma gradual (como meios de se alcançar o progresso moral), e, enfim, uma nova definição de natureza. Embora se sirva de termos exclusivos, o artigo sobre o mal mantém muitas das noções básicas desenvolvidas por Kant em obras anteriores. Daí porque a Dissertação não se restringe ao artigo Sobre o mal radical, mas se estende por outras obras em busca de recorrências feitas com dois objetivos bem precisos: um, elucidativo, em que se apresenta questões já plenamente consolidadas na filosofia kantiana; outro, comparativo, seja em relação a termos que adquiriram um sentido distinto, seja em vista de alterações propositivas, repensadas diante de um novo contexto e submetidas a uma nova configuração. Esse é o horizonte que esta Dissertação busca reconstruir e dentro do qual se insere. Relativo à questão do mal (e de seu qualificativo de radical), várias outras questões são tratadas de modo específico, por exemplo, a origem do mal, a imputabilidade do homem pela sua existência, as noções de virtude (concebidas tanto no domínio moral quanto no campo legal), o conceito de ação viciosa, a idéia de uma educação moral e, além dela, a função da religião como fomentadora e mantenedora de uma boa conduta moral. Essas questões, na medida do possível, foram harmonizadas entre si e reconstruídas pelo ponto de vista próprio da filosofia de Kant: o crítico-sistemático.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T15:06:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Eden_Farias.pdf: 507724 bytes, checksum: 9b523cf2a27a82cf9797fbb4fa4709fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-18 / This work explores the meaning of the expression Banality of Evil, coined by Hannah Arendt in her investigation about Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. It intends to question its meaning to the logistics of extermination in the Holocaust. Investigates on the one hand, aspects of a moral collapse about our common understandings about the problem of evil, and by the other, the context of bureaucracy that propitiated the novelty of this new form of evil by its singular lack of roots as well as political and moral implications in relation to individual responsibility. Through the conceptual analysis of the problem of evil, along with a series of mismatches in the reasons for doing evil, we propose an interpretation of the meaning of the Banality of Evil. / Este trabalho investiga o significado da expressão Banalidade do Mal cunhada por Hannah Arendt em suas investigações sobre Adolf Eichmann em Jerusalém. Preza-se pelo questionamento do seu significado frente à logística de extermínio do Holocausto. Investiga-se, por um lado, aspectos de um colapso moral a respeito de nossas usuais compreensões acerca do problema do mal e, por outro, o contexto de burocratização do extermínio que propiciou o ineditismo dessa nova forma de mal por sua singular ausência de raízes, bem como as implicações políticas e morais em relação à responsabilidade individual. Através da análise conceitual do problema do mal, juntamente a uma série de descompassos presentes nas razões para se fazer o mal, propomos uma interpretação do significado da Banalidade do Mal.

Jacques Derrida est signataire de ce qu’on appelle une "œuvre" : un vaste corpus de textes où d’autres "œuvres", en grand nombre, sont citées, étudiées, analysées ou déconstruites. Souvent, il utilise le mot "œuvre", et plus rarement mais de manière significative, il interroge ce mot ou ce qu'il appelle l'"énigme" du concept d'œuvre. Dans ce qu’il « dit » alors, un double « faire » est impliqué. D’une part, il se demande « Que fait cette œuvre ? », et nous pouvons analyser et commenter ce qu’il dit. Mais d’autre part, nous pouvons aussi nous demander : « Mais que fait Derrida quand il analyse ce que fait cette œuvre ? ». C’est cette deuxième question qui tend à prévaloir dans cette étude. Dans les champs de l'histoire de l'art, de l'esthétique ou de la critique littéraire, il existe une immense littérature autour de la question de l'œuvre. La convoquer, dans le format limité de ce travail, aurait conduit à des simplifications, des approximations ou des omissions. On a donc fait un autre choix : chercher dans le texte derridien lui-même, dans son faire, son auto-hétéro-affection, les éléments qui pourraient conduire à l’élaboration d’un concept d'œuvre spécifique et singulier. Afin de tenir compte de la critique externe et aussi de la longue histoire de la philosophie autour de cette thématique, on a mis à profit la structure d'"invagination" du texte derridien. Dans ce texte même, en prenant appui sur la littérature secondaire, on peut repérer d'autres pensées de l'œuvre, par exemple celles de Lévinas ou d’Heidegger. Cette méthode a conduit aux hypothèses suivantes : 1. Il y a dans l'œuvre derridienne, y compris à travers l’analyse des autres œuvres, la mise en jeu d’un "Il faut", d’une ou de plusieurs inconditionnalité(s), et ce dès les premiers textes. 2. La structure d'auto-immunité, décrite dans l'œuvre, opère dans l'œuvre. "Il faut" se protéger contre quelque chose. Quoi? Notre hypothèse, c'est qu'il s'agit du mal radical. 3. Malgré les apories multiples dont la description occupe une large partie de l'œuvre, le désir de protection, en principe impossible à réaliser, réussit quand même. On peut tenter de démontrer cette réussite, mais on peut aussi, surtout, en témoigner par la lecture : Je dois reconnaître, je dois avouer qu'elle me vaccine. 4. Cette opération, que nous nommons aussi "œuvrance", est performative. Elle passe par cinq principes inconditionnels : laisser l’avenir ouvert, s’adresser à l’autre comme tel, s’aventurer pour plus que la vie, garder le secret, répondre des principes - en ce moment même. 5. Cela conduit à la définition d'un "principe de l'œuvre" spécifique de l’œuvre derridienne dont l'énoncé est le suivant : Ce qui a lieu dans une œuvre s’affirme inconditionnellement, en-dehors de tout calcul, de toute finalité et de toute transaction. / Jacques Derrida signs what is called “une oeuvre” ("a work") : a vast corpus of texts, in which other "works", great in number, are cited, studied, analyzed or deconstructed. He often uses the word "work", and more rarely, but in a significant way, he interrogates this word, or what he calls "the enigma" of the concept of work. In what he "says", then, a double "doing" is implied. On the one hand, he asks himself "What makes this work?", and we can analyze and comment upon what he says. But, on the other hand, we can also ask ourselves : "But what does Derrida do when he analyzes what it is that makes this work?" This second question is the one that tends to prevail in this study. In the fields of art history, esthetics or literary criticism, there exists an enormous litterature around the question of the work. To raise it, in the limited form of this essay, would lead to simplifications, approximations, or omissions. We have therefore made another choice : to seek out, in the derridian text itself, in its "doing", its auto-hetero-affection, the elements that could lead to the elaboration of a specific and singular concept of work. In order to account for external criticism, and also of the long history of philosophy around this thematics, we have privileged the Derridian text's structure of "invagination". In his text itself, drawing on the secondary literature, we can link up other thoughts involving the work, for example those of Levinas or Heidegger. This method has lead to the following hypotheses: 1. In the derridian work, including across the analysis of other works, the setting into play of an "it must", of one or several unconditional(s), and beginning with the first texts. 2. The structure of auto-immunity, described in the work, is operating within the work. "It must" protects itself against something. Against what? It is our hypothesis that this has to do with radical evil. 3. Despite the multiple aporias whose description occupies a large part of his work, the desire for protection, in principle impossible to realize, nonetheless succeeds. We can try to demonstrate this success, but we can also, above all, take note of it by reading : I ought to recognize, I ought to acknowledge that it vaccinates me. 4. This operation, that we also call “œuvrance” (“working”), is performative. It passes through five unconditional principles : leave the future open, address oneself to the other as such, aim for more than life, keep the secret, answer to principles -- in this very moment. 5. This leads to the definition of a "principle of the work": specific to the derridian work whose statement is the following : what takes place in the work, is unconditionally affirmed, beyond all calculation, all finality and all transaction.

Progression d'un concept, le mal radical, dans trois textes : La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison (Kant), Le système de l'Ethique (Fichte), et Le Traité de 1809 (Schelling). Origine ultime du mal : libre arbitre ou détermination ? Responsabilité et liberté du mal. Mal moral et métaphysique du mal/ Advance of a concept: radical evil, in three readings: Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (Kant), System of Ethics (Fichte), and Treatise of 1809 (Schelling).Ultimate origin of evil: free will or determination? Responsibility and freedom to evil. Moral evil and metaphysics of evil.

Penser l’être humain comme un être libre : tel est le souci constant de la réflexion de Paul Ricœur. Au niveau anthropologique, le philosophe cherche à remettre la liberté en lien avec la condition concrète de l’homme, où la nature, le corps, autrui et la société sont en jeu. Ce n’est qu’en reconnaissant une telle condition que la liberté devient réelle, affirmative et puissante. Au niveau ontologique, c’est la liberté humaine qui offre un accès privilégié à la compréhension de l’être en général. Après avoir écarté la notion de l’être comme objectivité, la liberté le dévoile comme un acte affirmatif. Au niveau méthodologique, le développement d’une herméneutique phénoménologique constitue un élément essentiel de l’ontologie de la liberté, dans la mesure où la pensée est elle-même toujours impliquée dans cette interrogation ontologique. C’est par un tel « engagement » que la pensée atteste l’être de la liberté, surtout face à l’énigme du mal. / One of the persistent concerns of Paul Ricœur’s philosophy is to reflect upon the human being as being free. At the anthropological level, Ricœur always considers freedom within concrete human condition, in which nature, body, others and society are all involved. One’s freedom becomes real, affirming and powerful only when such condition is recognized. At the ontological level, it is only as a free being that one has the privileged access to the understanding of being in general. Human as free being reveals that being should not be understood as objectivity, but as an affirming act. Finally, at the methodological level, Ricœur’s elaboration of phenomenological hermeneutics constitutes an essential element of his ontology of freedom. From his methodological development, it can be seen that the thinking philosopher himself, as a free being, is also engaged in his inquiry. In this regard, Ricœur’s philosophy as such becomes an attestation of free being, especially in his confrontation with the enigma of evil.

Progression d'un concept, le mal radical, dans trois textes :La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison (Kant), Le système de l'Ethique (Fichte), et Le Traité de 1809 (Schelling). Origine ultime du mal :libre arbitre ou détermination ?Responsabilité et liberté du mal. Mal moral et métaphysique du mal/ Advance of a concept: radical evil, in three readings: Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (Kant), System of Ethics (Fichte), and Treatise of 1809 (Schelling).Ultimate origin of evil: free will or determination? Responsibility and freedom to evil. Moral evil and metaphysics of evil. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished