Alors que depuis 2015, en France, la menace terroriste d’inspiration jihadiste s’avère prégnante, protéiforme et durable, sa détection s’impose dorénavant comme un enjeu fondamental pour les services de renseignement soumis à des missionsd’une sensibilité accrue. Le volume important d’ individus détectés et suivis au titre de la radicalisation violente d’inspiration jihadiste, a entraîné un redimensionnement des services de renseignement français depuis ces quatre dernières années. Leur rôle et leur implication s’inscrivent désormais au travers d’une démarche proactive mise en oeuvre par des moyens humains réévalués mais aussi soutenue par des procédés techniques toujours plus élaborés et encadrés par un droit du renseignement récent qui a su s’imbriquer au sein d' un arsenal juridique antiterroriste en plein essor. Si le droit du renseignement est un droit d'exception permettant aux services de renseignement de bénéficier de pouvoirs exorbitants, pour autant, il est strictement encadré et soumis à des contrôles institutionnels et juridictionnels prévus par la loi. La restructuration des services français de renseignement, depuis 2015, afin de s’adapter à ses nouveaux défis, semble avoir atteint le niveau d’efficacité requis pour lutter contre le processus de radicalisation violente d’inspiration jihadiste et ainsiéviter le passage à l’acte. Mise sous la pression constante d’une obligation de résultats, la communauté des services de renseignement français doit, parallèlement, agir sous une contrainte juridique permanente afin d’atteindre ses buts sans pour autant négliger le format des moyens mis en oeuvre. / Since 2015, France is facing a more acute and multifaceted jihadist-inspired terrorist threat. This crisis is intended to be a long -lasting one and early detection is becoming a priority issue for intelligence services who are subject to more and more sensitive missions.The increasing amount of detected individuals for jihadist-inspired radicalization has led to a resizing of French Intelligence apparatus over the four past years. Their role and involvement are nowadays more proactive, supported by a rescaling of the human resources and abilities to use more sophisticated intelligence techniques. The latter needed to be framed by a renewed intelligence itself properly nested into the booming counter-terrorist legal framework.The restructuring of the French Intelligence services since 2015, decided in order to face its new challenges, seems to have completed the required level of efficiency when dealing with violent jihad-inspired violence and thus the subsequent action. Intelligence law is a law of exception allowing an outrageous power to intelligence services. Though, it remains strictly monitored andsubmitted to judicial and constitutional review provided by the law. French Intelligence community has to work under a dual obligation of law abiding procedures and results obligation to reach its goals without ever neglecting the proper form about the implemented means.

This thesis deals with the topic of the current Wahhabi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of this thesis is to assess the size of the movement, its ties with militant Islamist groups, financing, relations with the majority of the Bosnian society and the extent of potential security threat posed by the Bosnian Wahhabis. Due to the prevailing view of most sources dealing with the topic through the prism of security studies, the analysis focuses apart from security segment on political and economic areas. The study set independent, intermediate and dependent variables in order to verify an assumption that the influence and the scope of Wahhabi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is on a wane, and despite the presence of several thousand of Wahhabis, it neither poses a significant threat to social order nor development of the country. The findings indicate that financial involvement of foreign Islamic actors in the Bosnian Wahhabi movement is limited. Political instability together with socio-economic difficulties of certain groups of the Bosnian society do no lead to the growth of the Wahhabi community, however, they belong among factors which can potentially contribute to an increase of Islamic radicalisation in the country.

This dissertation presents research that is broadly concerned with comparative understanding of the concept of citizenship and its relationship to nationhood, most particularly as it relates to contemporary government policies - what Michel Foucault refers to as 'studies of governmentality' - in Britain and Hong Kong. A major consideration is the assessment of how modern states seek to imbue citizenship with new meanings by mobilising connections to reimagined 'national cultures' and 'national values' as a way of expanding power and limiting access to citizenship. Two cases are selected and examined in this research to elucidate the above concern and consideration. The first is Hong Kong, where a compulsory subject Moral and National Education was proposed in 2012 to cultivate students' positive values and enhance their 'national qualities'. The second is Britain, where all schools and universities since 2015 must by law carry out the Prevent Duty to assess the risk of students becoming terrorists and beginning in 2014 where all schools must actively promote 'fundamental British values'. In both contexts, the education policies and their associated discourses claimed to protect 'our culture', defend 'our values', and promote understanding of 'our nation' Curriculum documents, policy documents, and parliamentary reports related to these education policies are collected and critically analysed in a genealogical approach to reveal (a) the expressions of 'national values' and citizenship in these policy and associated political texts, (b) how these texts and associated discourses influenced the re-imagination of nations, and (c) how the national perspectives expressed ideologically - especially in relation to the narrowing of borders through policies - recast, mediate or alter conceptions of citizenship. The comparative policy landscape in Britain and Hong Kong is assessed by deploying an interdisciplinary framework that addresses nation, citizenship, borders, and governmentality in a unique way. The study of the cases, in return, demonstrates how this framework can be applied to analysing education policies and assessing the rationalities and effects of these policies.

Les attentats du 7 juillet 2005 à Londres ont causé un choc et un effroi dans la société britannique non seulement à cause du nombre important des victimes mais aussi en raison de la citoyenneté britannique des kamikazes. A l’exception de Germaine Lindsay qui était d’origine jamaïcaine, les autres membres de la cellule – Mohammed Siddiq Khan, Shehzad Tanweer et Hussib Hussain - étaient tous d’origine pakistanaise. Les kamikazes du 7 juillet 2005 n’étaient pas les seuls Britanniques d’origine pakistanaise impliqués dans des actes de terrorisme. Avant 2005, ils étaient nombreux à aller combattre auprès d’organisations djihadistes pakistanaises au Cachemire ou à commettre des tentatives d’attentat sur le sol britannique, comme ce fut le cas de la cellule de Luton en 2004. Après 2005, d’autres cellules, comme celle de Birmingham en 2011, ont essayé de commettre des attentats à une plus grande échelle. L’origine pakistanaise des auteurs, leur intérêt pour le conflit au Cachemire et leur entrainement paramilitaire dans les camps d’organisations djihadistes pakistanaises sont autant d'éléments communs qui nous ont conduit à nous interroger sur la nature de la radicalisation violente en Grande-Bretagne. Cette thèse examine la dimension pakistanaise de la radicalisation islamiste violente en Grande-Bretagne en se basant sur la théorie des mouvements sociaux, notamment le modèle de Quintan Wiktorowicz, selon lequel la radicalisation est le fruit de griefs politiques, socio-économiques et d’idéologie. Elle s’appuie sur dix études de cas : trois organisations djihadistes pakistanaises (Lashkar e-Toiba, Harakat ul-Mujahideen et Jaish e-Mohammed), trois organisations extrémistes transnationales (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun et Supporters of Sharia) et quatre mouvements de l’islam sud-asiatiques (Ahl e-Hadith, déobandi, Tablighi Jamaat et Jamaat e-Islami). La thèse démontre qu’il y a une dimension spécifiquement pakistanaise de la radicalisation islamiste violente en Grande-Bretagne en raison de l’histoire coloniale, le conflit au Cachemire, la « guerre contre la terreur » et l’intervention militaire en Afghanistan. / The 7 July 2005 London bombings caused shock and awe in the British society not only because of the important number of casualties, but also due to the British citizenship of the bombers. With the exception of Germaine Lindsay, who was of Jamaican descent, all the other members of the cell - Mohammed Siddiq Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hussib Hussain - had Pakistani background. The London bombers were not the only British Pakistanis who were involved in acts of terrorism. Before 2005, many went to fight alongside the Pakistani jihadi organisations in Kashmir or plotted against Britain such as the Luton cell in 2004. After 2005, other cells, like the one in Birmingham in 2011, planned attacks on a bigger scale on British soil. The Pakistani origin of the perpetrators, their interest in Kashmir and their paramilitary training in camps belonging to Pakistani jihadi organisations were common features that have raised questions about the nature of violent radicalisation in Britain. This thesis examines the Pakistani dimension of violent radicalisation in Britain by building on social movement theory, especially on Quintan Wiktorowicz’ model, according to which radicalisation is the result of political, socio-economic grievances and ideology. This research is based on ten case studies: three Pakistani jihadi organisations (Lashkar e-Toiba, Harakat ul-Mujahideen and Jaish e-Mohammed), three extremist transnational organisations (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun and Supporters of Sharia) and four South-Asian Islamic mouvements (Ahl e-Hadith, Deobandi, Tablighi Jamaat and Jamaat e-Islami). The thesis shows that there is specifically a Pakistani dimension to the violent islamist radicalisation in Britain due to the colonial history, the conflict in Kashmir, the ‘’war on terror’’ and the military intervention in Afghanistan.

本論文以近年歐盟會員國境內之孤狼恐怖攻擊趨勢出發，分析歐盟因應孤狼恐怖主義威脅所制定之反恐政策，同時評估歐盟反恐政策之內外反恐成效，藉此檢視孤狼恐怖主義與歐盟反恐政策之因果關係。孤狼恐怖主義緣起於美國「無領袖反抗運動」與「暴力激進化」，並透過「全球伊斯蘭反抗運動」與「外國恐怖主義戰士」成為歐盟內部安全之威脅來源；而歐盟反恐政策之決策機構與執行機關，業已透過戰略方針與行動計畫等歐盟反恐法律文件，對內建立合作機制與輔助工具等內部反恐網絡，藉此強化歐盟與歐盟會員國之間的警察合作、司法合作、資訊與情報交換合作、以及邊境安全合作；對外則透過國際協定形式，與重要第三國以及國際組織建構外部反恐網絡，以雙邊與多邊反恐合作形式強化歐盟反恐能量。本論文亦以四起孤狼恐怖攻擊個案分析歐盟會員國層級之反恐措施，分析近年歐盟孤狼恐怖主義之現況與趨勢。 本論文發現，歐盟孤狼恐怖主義來自「聖戰恐怖主義」、「本土恐怖主義」、與「外國恐怖主義戰士」等三種威脅，而歐盟近年因應孤狼恐怖主義威脅之反恐政策與措施，已朝向2005年11月30日歐盟部長理事會《歐盟反恐政策》四大反恐戰略的「預防」層面發展，並以外國恐怖主義戰士為重要反恐目標；此外，歐盟除了著手打擊「激進化」與「暴力極端主義」等導致孤狼恐怖主義之根本原因原因外，亦持續因應敘利亞與伊拉克等衝突地區之「返國外國恐怖主義戰士」所帶來的後伊斯蘭國時代孤狼恐怖主義威脅。 / With the trend of lone-wolf terrorism in member states of the European Union, the thesis analyzes EU’s policy to counter threat from lone-wolf terrorism and also evaluates internal and external effectiveness of EU’s counter-terrorism policy, in an attempt to examine the correlation between lone-wolf terrorism and EU’s counter-terrorism policy. Lone-wolf terrorism originated in the United States from the “Leaderless Resistance” and “Violent Extremism” and further threatened EU’s internal security via “Global Islamic Resistance Movement” and “Foreign Terrorist Fighters.” The decision-making as well as the executing agencies of EU’s counter-terrorism policy has established mechanisms of cooperation and policy toolkits for internal counter-terrorism network by means of EU’s legal documents of counter-terrorism, strategic guidelines and implementing programs included, in order to consolidate cooperation of police, justice, exchange of communication and intelligence, as well as border security between EU and member states. Meanwhile, EU has also been constructing its external counter-terrorism network with bilateral and multilateral agreements with third states and international organizations of importance. The thesis also offers four case studies of lone-wolf terrorist attacks of EU’s member states to analyze conditions and trends of lone-wolf terrorism in EU. The thesis concludes that “Jihadist terrorism,” “Home-grown Terrorism,” and “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” are the three main types of threat of lone-wolf terrorism in EU, and that EU counter-terrorism policy has been developing strategy of “prevention”, one of which stated in “EU’s Counter-terrorism Strategies” of November 30th, 2005, by Council of the European Union, and considering foreign terrorist fighters as its main target. Additionally, EU has been countering not only root causes of lone-wolf terrorism, such as “radicalisation” and “violent extremism,” but also future threats from “Returning Foreign Terrorists Fighters” heading back home from Syria and Iraq in the Era of Post-Islamic State.

The contemporary threat of terrorism has changed the ways in which government and the public view the world. Unlike the existential threat from nation states in previous centuries, today, government and the public spend much of their effort looking for the inward threat. Brought about by high profile events such as 9/11, 7/7, and 3/11, and exacerbated by globalisation, hyper-connected social spheres, and the media, the threats from within are reinforced daily. In the UK, government has taken bold steps to foment public safety and public security but has also been criticised by some who argue that government actions have labelled Muslims as the ‘suspect other'. This thesis explores the counter-terrorism environment in London at the community/government interface, how the Metropolitan Police Service and London Fire Brigade deliver counter-terrorism policy, and how individuals and groups are reacting. It specifically explores the realities of the lived experience of those who make up London's ‘suspect community' and whether or not counter-terrorism policy can be linked to further marginalisation, radicalism, and extremism. By engaging with those that range from London's Metropolitan Police Service's Counterterrorism Command (SO15) to those that make up the radical fringe, an ethnographic portrait is developed. Through that ethnographic portrait the ‘ground truth' and complexities of the lived experience are made clear and add significant contrast to the aseptic policy environment.