This thesis contributes to the under-researched field of political selection, namely one’s re-selection onto the party list after one has been elected in the previous term. The theoretical rationale is to introduce a broader concept of political selection to a field mostly focused on political recruitment, one’s first point of entry into Politics. We show that the framework developed to study political recruitment can be adapted to study any kind of political selection that involves a broad pool of aspirants from which successful candidates must be selected. To this end, we utilise a panel dataset containing data on 387 Czech legislators covering the period between 1996 and 2013. Using fixed- and random-effects panel models, we show that voting along the party line and preferential vote share at time t are strong predictors of getting a better party-list rank at t+1. Legislative experience, however, is negatively associated with how well one fares at the re-selection process. We also provide evidence that it is left-wing parties rather than their right-wing counterparts that discriminate against women at the re-selection stage. The study thus contributes, directly or otherwise, to debates on women’s representation, political careers and re-election.

A literatura empírica de ciclos políticos orçamentários pouco aborda a influência da limitação de mandato na existência do oportunismo fiscal por parte do ocupante do poder executivo nas finanças dos vários entes da federação. Nesse sentido, à luz da Nova Economia Política, o objetivo desta pesquisa foi investigar o impacto dos diferentes incentivos enfrentados no Brasil por prefeitos em primeiro mandato - aqueles que são elegíveis para a reeleição - e em segundo mandato - aqueles que não podem candidatar-se à reeleição - na gestão fiscal dos municípios. Para além da avaliação de todo o mandato eletivo, também foi analisado o impacto da diferenciação dos dois tipos de incumbentes na inscrição de valores em restos a pagar nos anos eleitorais. Os resultados obtidos via painel clássico sugerem uma efetiva diferenciação entre prefeitos em primeiro e segundo mandato em anos não eleitorais, com prefeitos em primeiro mandato inscrevendo maiores valores em restos a pagar processados e total em relação aos prefeitos de segundo mandato. Ademais, seguindo a legislação de responsabilidade fiscal brasileira, prefeitos em segundo mandato reduziram a inscrição de valores nessas rubricas em ano eleitoral, embora prefeitos em primeiro mandato tenham aumentado a inscrição de valores em restos a pagar não processados. / The empirical literature on political budget cycles has not studied all the influences of term limitations in the existence of fiscal opportunism by politicians in the various levels of government. In this sense, regarding the Political Economy, the objective of this research was to investigate the impact of different incentives faced by first-term mayors in Brazil - those who are eligible for re-election - and second-term mayors - those who cannot apply for re-election - in the fiscal management at the local level. Beyond the assessment of the entire mandate, it was also evaluated the impact of differentiation of the two types of incumbents in the management of the unpaid spending obligations in election years. Results obtained via classic panel suggest an effective differentiation between first and second-term mayors in non-election years, as first-term mayors exhibit higher unpaind recognized spending obligations and total unpaid spending obligations values in comparison to second-term mayors. Moreover, following the Brazilian fiscal responsability law, second-term mayors reduced values in these items in election year, although first-term mayors had higher values on average for unpaid and unrecognized spending obligations.

A literatura empírica de ciclos políticos orçamentários pouco aborda a influência da limitação de mandato na existência do oportunismo fiscal por parte do ocupante do poder executivo nas finanças dos vários entes da federação. Nesse sentido, à luz da Nova Economia Política, o objetivo desta pesquisa foi investigar o impacto dos diferentes incentivos enfrentados no Brasil por prefeitos em primeiro mandato - aqueles que são elegíveis para a reeleição - e em segundo mandato - aqueles que não podem candidatar-se à reeleição - na gestão fiscal dos municípios. Para além da avaliação de todo o mandato eletivo, também foi analisado o impacto da diferenciação dos dois tipos de incumbentes na inscrição de valores em restos a pagar nos anos eleitorais. Os resultados obtidos via painel clássico sugerem uma efetiva diferenciação entre prefeitos em primeiro e segundo mandato em anos não eleitorais, com prefeitos em primeiro mandato inscrevendo maiores valores em restos a pagar processados e total em relação aos prefeitos de segundo mandato. Ademais, seguindo a legislação de responsabilidade fiscal brasileira, prefeitos em segundo mandato reduziram a inscrição de valores nessas rubricas em ano eleitoral, embora prefeitos em primeiro mandato tenham aumentado a inscrição de valores em restos a pagar não processados. / The empirical literature on political budget cycles has not studied all the influences of term limitations in the existence of fiscal opportunism by politicians in the various levels of government. In this sense, regarding the Political Economy, the objective of this research was to investigate the impact of different incentives faced by first-term mayors in Brazil - those who are eligible for re-election - and second-term mayors - those who cannot apply for re-election - in the fiscal management at the local level. Beyond the assessment of the entire mandate, it was also evaluated the impact of differentiation of the two types of incumbents in the management of the unpaid spending obligations in election years. Results obtained via classic panel suggest an effective differentiation between first and second-term mayors in non-election years, as first-term mayors exhibit higher unpaind recognized spending obligations and total unpaid spending obligations values in comparison to second-term mayors. Moreover, following the Brazilian fiscal responsability law, second-term mayors reduced values in these items in election year, although first-term mayors had higher values on average for unpaid and unrecognized spending obligations.

Submitted by Cristiane Oliveira (cristiane.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2011-06-13T16:44:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 63090100010.pdf: 1372201 bytes, checksum: 995a04ac3460fc65ad46377b6a2ba70d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-13T16:55:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 63090100010.pdf: 1372201 bytes, checksum: 995a04ac3460fc65ad46377b6a2ba70d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-13T16:57:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 63090100010.pdf: 1372201 bytes, checksum: 995a04ac3460fc65ad46377b6a2ba70d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-06-13T17:50:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 63090100010.pdf: 1372201 bytes, checksum: 995a04ac3460fc65ad46377b6a2ba70d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-05 / This study analyses the demand for quality education in Brazil in two contexts: firstly, when the information about quality is imperfect and secondly, when there is perfect information. For this, we analyze the impact of the Basic Education Development Index (IDEB) on the probability of re-election of mayors in municipalities in two contexts: in 2004, when there was no IDEB and there was not a specific measure of quality of education and in 2008, when it was possible to use IDEB as a tool for voting decision. The results show that, on average, an increase of one point in IDEB rises by around 4.5 pp. the probability of reelection. This effect is even greater in cities with lower income and those where the population of children is higher. The study also shows that for other measures of quality of education the impact is not statistically different from zero. We thus find that the Brazilian school accountability system, while not directly impact principals and teachers by awards or punishment, can impact the quality of schools through the political mobilization of the population, who punishes or rewards the managers of education according to their performance / Este trabalho avalia a demanda por qualidade da educação no Brasil em dois contextos: um onde a informação sobre qualidade é imperfeita e outro onde há perfeita informação. Para isto, analisa-se o impacto do Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica (IDEB) sobre a probabilidade de reeleição de prefeitos em municípios brasileiros em dois contextos: em 2004, quando ainda não havia IDEB e, portanto, à população não existia uma medida clara da qualidade da educação e em 2008, quando já era possível usar o IDEB como instrumento para decisão do voto. Os resultados mostram que, na média, um ponto a mais no IDEB aumenta em torno de 4.5 pp. a probabilidade de reeleição. Esse efeito é ainda maior em municípios com menor renda e naqueles onde a população de crianças é maior. O trabalho também mostra que para outras medidas de qualidade da educação o impacto não é estatisticamente diferente de zero. Evidencia-se assim, que o sistema de accountability escolar brasileiro, embora não impacte diretamente diretores e professores por meio de premiações e/ou punições, pode impactar a qualidade escolar por meio da mobilização política da população, que pune ou premia os gestores da educação conforme o desempenho destes.

Cette thèse étudie le rôle du conformisme social dans un contexte de vote. Dans le premierchapitre, nous présentons la définition, en psychologie sociale, du conformisme. Nous passons enrevue les éléments cl´es de la littérature afin de montrer l’influence du conformisme. Dans le deuxièmechapitre, nous procédons `a une revue de la littérature sur le rôle économique du conformisme, quirassemble des travaux en économie expérimentale et en psychologie sociale. Dans le troisième chapitre,nous présentons des modèles théoriques en économie comportementale étudiant le rôle du conformisme.Sur cette base, le quatrième chapitre est consacré `a une approche économique de la modélisation despréférences conformistes lorsque les électeurs souhaitent voter pour le candidat vainqueur, lors d’uneélection sujette `a la règle de la majorité. Concrètement, nous proposons d’expliquer comment le désirdes électeurs de voter pour le gagnant peut dissuader le candidat sortant de prendre des décisionsinefficaces pendant son mandat `a des fins de réélection. Dans le cinquième chapitre, nous présentonsun modèle intégrant des préférences conformistes, comme le désir de faire le même choix que lamajorité, lors d’un vote `a l’unanimité. La résolution du modèle permet de mettre en évidence qu’unepréférence pour se conformer au comportement d’autrui peut améliorer le bien-être social des votantset atténuer le problème du passager clandestin. Bien que le conformisme ait toujours eu une mauvaiseréputation, tous nos résultats mettent en lumière son utilité dans divers contextes de vote. / This thesis studies the role of social conformity in voting. In the first chapter, we presentthe definition of social conformity in social psychology. We review key elements of literature in order toshow the influence of conformity. In the second chapter, we conduct a literature review on the economicrole of conformity, which brings together work in experimental economics and social psychology. In thethird chapter, we present theoretical models in behavioral economics studying the role of conformity.On this basis, the fourth chapter is devoted to an economic approach to modeling the preferencesof conformity as voters’ desire to win in a re-election under Majority rule. Concretely, we offer anexplanation about how voters’ desire to win can deter incumbents from inefficient decisions while inoffice. In the fifth chapter, the thesis comes to model conformity preferences as desire to make the samevote as the majority in voting for collective decision-making under the unanimity rule. The findingsof the model highlight that conformity preferences can improve the sum of voters’ social welfare andalleviate the free-rider problem. Though conformity has always had a bad reputation, all our resultsshed light on its usefulness in various contexts to vote.

No description available.

La présente thèse a pour but d'effectuer une étude des effets de la réélection immédiate sur les exécutifs des unités sous-nationales de l'Argentine, le Brésil et l'Uruguay entre 1983-2006. À partir de ce travail on prétend constater quels sont les effets véritablement appréciables de ce mécanisme sur les systèmes politiques sousnationaux. On part de l'hypothèse que cette modalité de réélection provoque des effets les niveaux de concurrence du système de partis, sur la permanence du parti de gouvernement, et dans l'interne de ce. Cette recherche essaye d'approfondir dans la discussion (présent dans une vaste littérature) des effets et les règles électorales sur les systèmes politiques et en particulier de la réélection immédiate aujourd'hui adoptée par quelques pays latino-americains et en débat dans plusieurs de d'eux au niveau présidentiel. L'objectif final de ce travail n'est pas de prononcer à faveur - ou dans contre - de la réélection immédiate, ni s'agit d'un débat élémentairement normatif, mais essaye de présenter quelques questions ponctuelles qu'ils peuvent servir à améliorer le niveau de discussion sur cette dernière. / The present thesis must as objective make a study of the effects of the immediate re-election on the executives of the subnational units of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay between 1983-2006. From this work it is tried to state as they are the truely appreciable effects of this mechanism on the subnational political systems. Part of the hypothesis that this modality of re-election causes effects in the levels of competition of the system of parties, in the permanence of the government party, and in the internal one of this. This investigation tries to deepen in the discussion (present in a vast Literature) of the effects and the electoral rules on the political systems and in individual of the reelection immediate today adopted by some Latin American countries and in debate in several of them to presidential level. The final mission of this work is not to pronounce itself to favor - or in against of the immediate re-election, nor is an elementarily normative debate, but that tries to present/display some precise questions that can serve to improve the discussion level about the same one. / La presente tesis tiene como objetivo realizar un estudio de los efectos de la reelección inmediata sobre los ejecutivos de las unidades subnacionales de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay entre 1982-2007. A partir de este trabajo se pretende constatar cuales son los efectos verdaderamente apreciables de este mecanismo sobre los sistemas políticos subnacionales. Se parte de la hipótesis de que esta modalidad de reelección provoca efectos en los niveles de competencia del sistema de partidos, en la permanencia del partido de gobierno, y en la interna de este. Esta investigación intenta profundizar en la discusión (presente en una vasta literatura) sobre los efectos de las reglas electorales sobre los sistemas políticos y en particular de la reelección inmediata hoy adoptada por algunos países latinoamericanos y en debate en varios de ellos a nivel presidencial. El objetivo final de este trabajo no es pronunciarse a favor -o en contra- de la reelección inmediata, ni se trata de un debate elementalmente normativo, sino que intenta presentar algunas cuestiones puntuales que pueden servir para mejorar el nivel de discusión acerca de la misma.

La présente thèse a pour but d'effectuer une étude des effets de la réélection immédiate sur les exécutifs des unités sous-nationales de l'Argentine, le Brésil et l'Uruguay entre 1983-2006. À partir de ce travail on prétend constater quels sont les effets véritablement appréciables de ce mécanisme sur les systèmes politiques sousnationaux. On part de l'hypothèse que cette modalité de réélection provoque des effets les niveaux de concurrence du système de partis, sur la permanence du parti de gouvernement, et dans l'interne de ce. Cette recherche essaye d'approfondir dans la discussion (présent dans une vaste littérature) des effets et les règles électorales sur les systèmes politiques et en particulier de la réélection immédiate aujourd'hui adoptée par quelques pays latino-americains et en débat dans plusieurs de d'eux au niveau présidentiel. L'objectif final de ce travail n'est pas de prononcer à faveur - ou dans contre - de la réélection immédiate, ni s'agit d'un débat élémentairement normatif, mais essaye de présenter quelques questions ponctuelles qu'ils peuvent servir à améliorer le niveau de discussion sur cette dernière. / The present thesis must as objective make a study of the effects of the immediate re-election on the executives of the subnational units of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay between 1983-2006. From this work it is tried to state as they are the truely appreciable effects of this mechanism on the subnational political systems. Part of the hypothesis that this modality of re-election causes effects in the levels of competition of the system of parties, in the permanence of the government party, and in the internal one of this. This investigation tries to deepen in the discussion (present in a vast Literature) of the effects and the electoral rules on the political systems and in individual of the reelection immediate today adopted by some Latin American countries and in debate in several of them to presidential level. The final mission of this work is not to pronounce itself to favor - or in against of the immediate re-election, nor is an elementarily normative debate, but that tries to present/display some precise questions that can serve to improve the discussion level about the same one. / La presente tesis tiene como objetivo realizar un estudio de los efectos de la reelección inmediata sobre los ejecutivos de las unidades subnacionales de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay entre 1982-2007. A partir de este trabajo se pretende constatar cuales son los efectos verdaderamente apreciables de este mecanismo sobre los sistemas políticos subnacionales. Se parte de la hipótesis de que esta modalidad de reelección provoca efectos en los niveles de competencia del sistema de partidos, en la permanencia del partido de gobierno, y en la interna de este. Esta investigación intenta profundizar en la discusión (presente en una vasta literatura) sobre los efectos de las reglas electorales sobre los sistemas políticos y en particular de la reelección inmediata hoy adoptada por algunos países latinoamericanos y en debate en varios de ellos a nivel presidencial. El objetivo final de este trabajo no es pronunciarse a favor -o en contra- de la reelección inmediata, ni se trata de un debate elementalmente normativo, sino que intenta presentar algunas cuestiones puntuales que pueden servir para mejorar el nivel de discusión acerca de la misma.

La présente thèse a pour but d'effectuer une étude des effets de la réélection immédiate sur les exécutifs des unités sous-nationales de l'Argentine, le Brésil et l'Uruguay entre 1983-2006. À partir de ce travail on prétend constater quels sont les effets véritablement appréciables de ce mécanisme sur les systèmes politiques sousnationaux. On part de l'hypothèse que cette modalité de réélection provoque des effets les niveaux de concurrence du système de partis, sur la permanence du parti de gouvernement, et dans l'interne de ce. Cette recherche essaye d'approfondir dans la discussion (présent dans une vaste littérature) des effets et les règles électorales sur les systèmes politiques et en particulier de la réélection immédiate aujourd'hui adoptée par quelques pays latino-americains et en débat dans plusieurs de d'eux au niveau présidentiel. L'objectif final de ce travail n'est pas de prononcer à faveur - ou dans contre - de la réélection immédiate, ni s'agit d'un débat élémentairement normatif, mais essaye de présenter quelques questions ponctuelles qu'ils peuvent servir à améliorer le niveau de discussion sur cette dernière. / The present thesis must as objective make a study of the effects of the immediate re-election on the executives of the subnational units of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay between 1983-2006. From this work it is tried to state as they are the truely appreciable effects of this mechanism on the subnational political systems. Part of the hypothesis that this modality of re-election causes effects in the levels of competition of the system of parties, in the permanence of the government party, and in the internal one of this. This investigation tries to deepen in the discussion (present in a vast Literature) of the effects and the electoral rules on the political systems and in individual of the reelection immediate today adopted by some Latin American countries and in debate in several of them to presidential level. The final mission of this work is not to pronounce itself to favor - or in against of the immediate re-election, nor is an elementarily normative debate, but that tries to present/display some precise questions that can serve to improve the discussion level about the same one. / La presente tesis tiene como objetivo realizar un estudio de los efectos de la reelección inmediata sobre los ejecutivos de las unidades subnacionales de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay entre 1982-2007. A partir de este trabajo se pretende constatar cuales son los efectos verdaderamente apreciables de este mecanismo sobre los sistemas políticos subnacionales. Se parte de la hipótesis de que esta modalidad de reelección provoca efectos en los niveles de competencia del sistema de partidos, en la permanencia del partido de gobierno, y en la interna de este. Esta investigación intenta profundizar en la discusión (presente en una vasta literatura) sobre los efectos de las reglas electorales sobre los sistemas políticos y en particular de la reelección inmediata hoy adoptada por algunos países latinoamericanos y en debate en varios de ellos a nivel presidencial. El objetivo final de este trabajo no es pronunciarse a favor -o en contra- de la reelección inmediata, ni se trata de un debate elementalmente normativo, sino que intenta presentar algunas cuestiones puntuales que pueden servir para mejorar el nivel de discusión acerca de la misma.