Thesis (Ph. D.)--Duke University, 2008.

No description available.

It is widely agreed that ontological reduction is possible, that the ontology of one theory can be shown to be nothing over and above the ontology of a distinct theory. However, it is also widely agreed that one assesses a theory’s ontology by determining what it says there is. I show that there is a tension between these orthodox positions. To resolve this tension, I propose and defend the view that the ontological commitments of a statement are sensitive to the theory in which it is embedded. / text

Undergraduate honors paper--Mount Holyoke College, 2005. Dept. of Philosophy. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 167-169).

<p>This thesis examines the methodological context, nature, strengths and weaknesses of an unconventional approach to the explanation of human action: 'the argument from rationality.' The study focuses on Martin Hollis' innovative presentation of this alternative method of social science. The argument from rationality proposes that in the explanation of human actions consideration must be given to an asymmetry in modes of explanation: nonrational actions are subject to causal analyses, but rational actions are their own explanations. A rational action, that is, is a free action; and the social scientist is under a methodological obligation to discover whether an action is free prior to formulating a causal explanation. The argument from rationality suits the needs of students of the social scientific study of religion. With its development and legitimation two points of antagonism between the scientific and the religious worldviews are ameliorated. The argument from rationality directly curbs the reductive thrust of scientific accounts of religion by giving methodological voice to the freedom of will asserted by the great religious traditions. Indirectly, the epistemological framework of the argument indicates that reference to the transcendent is a conceptual a priori of 'talk of religion,' just as rational human agency is for 'talk of human action.' The thesis has three parts. First, the parameters of the problem of human freedom are established through discussion of the two sociologies conflict. the positivism-humanism debate, and the struggle of determinists and libertarians. Second, the epistemological and methodological legitimacy of the argument from rationality is argued through a critique of positivist and conventionalist alternatives and the specification of the analytical constituents of Hollis' qualified idealist perspective. Third, the argument is applied to the debate over reductionism in religious studies and defended against the charges of vacuity and decisionism by proposing that the rationality of an action is a question of 'degrees' and hence open to empirical investigation.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searles theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searles theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.

My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searles theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searles theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.

Thesis (MA) -- University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This review explores the availability of programs aimed at reducing racism in South Africa. A summary of legislation and policy directives is included to provide clarity and inject impetus into the need for such programs. There were difficulties in receiving information and reviewing such programs and therefore a conceptualisation of racism is provided along with an examination of current manifestations thereof. To assist in the future design of racism reduction programs a detailed exposition of principles shown to be crucial to racism reduction is also provided. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie literatuur oorsig ondersoek die beskikbaarheid van programme wat daarop gemik is om rassisme in Suid-Afrika te verminder. 'n Opsomming van wetgewing en staatsbeleid word as verklaring en motivering vir die behoefte aan sodanige programme ingesluit. Aangesien daar sekere probleme ondervind is tydens die insameling van inligting, asook by die ontleding van sodanige programme, word daar gefokus op die konsep van rassisme, asook op die huidige voorkoms daarvan. In 'n poging om die ontwikkeling van toekomstige programme wat daarop gerig is om rassisme te verminder, te vergemaklik, word daar 'n gedetailleerde uiteensetting van sekere beginsels wat onteenseglik verwant is aan die vermindering van rassissme, ook weergegee.

In this thesis I present a critical examination of the role played by mechanistic ideas in shaping our understanding of living systems. I draw on a combination of historical, philosophical, and scientific resources to uncover a number of problems which I take to result from the adoption of mechanistic thinking in biology. I provide an analysis of the historical development of the conflict between mechanistic and vitalistic conceptions of life since the seventeenth century, and I argue that the basic terms of this conflict remain central to current disputes over the nature of the organism as well as the question of how far the theories, concepts, and methods of physics, chemistry, and engineering can ultimately take us in the explanation of life. I offer a detailed critique of the machine conception of the organism, which constitutes the central unifying idea of mechanistic biology. I argue that this notion, despite its undeniable heuristic value, is fundamentally inadequate as a theory of the organism due to a number of basic differences between organisms and machines. Ultimately, I suggest that the neglected vitalistic tradition in biology actually possesses the best conceptual tools for coming to terms with the nature of living systems. I also undertake a philosophical analysis of the concept of mechanism in biology. I argue that the term ‘mechanism’ is actually an umbrella term for three distinct notions, which are unfortunately conflated in philosophical discussions. I explore the relation between mechanistic biology and the new philosophical interest in the concept of mechanism and I show that these two research programs have little to do with one another because each of them understands the concept of mechanism in a different way. Finally, I draw on the historical and philosophical foundations of cell theory to propose an epistemological perspective which enables the reductionistic explanation of the organism without having to give up the distinctive features of life in the process. In this way, I show this perspective to have significant advantages over the classic physicochemical reductionism of mechanistic biology.

This thesis articulates a critique of scientific naturalism from the perspective of John Dewey. Scientific naturalism can be defined by two explicit, metaphysical commitments, one ontological and one epistemological. Implicit to these commitments is a further commitment concerning the nature of human experience. This understanding of human experience can be described as epistemic reductionism because it reduces the whole of experience and all empiricism to epistemology. Scientific naturalism is the orthodox position for most contemporary, Anglo-American philosophy. Many philosophers within this tradition are dissatisfied with scientific naturalism and attempt to critique scientific naturalism from the perspective of "liberal" naturalism. One major objection from the liberal perspective concerns the ontology and placement of moral qualities: where are moral qualities to be placed in a scientifically naturalistic ontology? However, due to the fact that liberal naturalists share with scientific naturalists a commitment to an epistemically reductionistic understanding of the nature of human experience, liberal naturalism fails to adequately address the placement problem.