Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Latin America has been experiencing in the last years critical cases of forced displacement. This phenomenon is followed by the adoption of a series of initiatives that seem to follow successful efforts around the world. The approach of this thesis on International Refugee law in Latin America is justified on the Latin American tradition in terms of asylum, refugee and human rights, and intends to contribute by analysing the solidarity proposals of Mexico s Plan of Action based on the thought of Hannah Arendt. The general objective of this thesis is to investigate how the question of the International Refugee law in Latin America was configured, from the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 1984 until the Mexico Plan of Action of 2004, in order to contribute for the building of a a sui generis Latin American treatment regimen. The line of thought follows the reflection by Arendt on the basic requirements for the exercise of the human condition. Contemporary social, economic and political situations contribute to make men more superfluous and without a place in the world. The text is divided in two chapters. The first intends to provide an understanding of the asylum constitution and its consolidation under a juridical, social and individualist approach. The second chapter aims at understanding the International Refugee Law in Latin America, more specifically the Mexico Plan of Action, on the light of the intellectual legacy of Arendt. It pays particular attention to the meaning of citizenship as the right to have rights , fundamental to the human condition and collectively constructed in the public space. The final considerations point out to the advances of the proposals of the Mexico Plan s three programs in the search for more durable solutions and for the possibility for refugee and asylum seekers to have a life that goes beyond the biological life. What is more, a life that can reach political action and a full human condition, as prophesized Hannah Arendt. / A América Latina tem experimentado nos últimos anos casos graves de deslocamento forçado de indivíduos, fenômeno acompanhado pela adoção de uma série de iniciativas que parecem apontar para esforços reparadores situados entre os mais bem sucedidos no mundo. O enfoque desse trabalho no Direito Internacional dos Refugiados na América Latina justifica-se diante da tradição latinoamericana em matéria de asilo, refúgio e direitos humanos e pretende contribuir ao procurar examinar as propostas solidárias do Plano de Ação do México à luz do pensamento de Hannah Arendt. O objetivo geral desta dissertação é investigar como se configurou a questão do Direito Internacional dos Refugiados na América Latina, desde a Declaração de Cartagena para Refugiados de 1984 até o Plano de Ação do México de 2004, no sentido de contribuir para a construção de um regime de tratamento latino-americano sui generis. O fio condutor da reflexão é o pensamento de Arendt sobre os requisitos básicos para o exercício da condição humana, pois no mundo contemporâneo persistem situações sociais, políticas e econômicas que contribuem para tornar os homens supérfluos e sem lugar em um mundo comum. O texto está dividido em dois capítulos. O primeiro objetiva proporcionar uma compreensão da constituição do instituto do refúgio e sua consolidação sob uma perspectiva coletiva (jurídico-social) e individualista. O segundo visa compreender o Direito Internacional dos Refugiados na América Latina, mais especificamente o Plano de Ação do México, à luz do legado intelectual de Arendt, em especial da acepção de cidadania como direito a ter direitos , fundamental à condição humana e construída coletivamente no espaço público. As considerações finais sinalizam pontualmente os avanços das propostas dos três programas do Plano de Ação do México em busca de soluções mais duráveis e à possibilidade, aos refugiados e solicitantes de refúgio, de uma vida que vá além da vida biológica e possa chegar à ação política e a uma condição humana plena, como vaticinou Hannah Arendt.

States are routinely confronted with conflicting duties of maintaining full respect for human rights, on the one hand, and protecting national security and public safety, on the other. This is not least noticeable when States’ sovereignty and the right to control who enters and leaves their territories clash with the obligation to afford protection to refugees fleeing persecution. Some refugees are bound to be dangerous criminals, presenting a serious threat to national security and public safety in the host State. Refugee law prescribe that allegedly serious criminals must be excluded from refugee protection. However, the principle of non-refoulement, as developed and interpreted under international and regional human rights law, prohibits removal of persons if there is risk for torture or ill-treatment in the country of origin. This thesis explores the fact that a person can be considered fundamentally undeserving of protection under refugee law, while protected against removal under human rights law. Persons like this have fittingly been coined undesirable but unreturnable.      The relationship between the relevant provisions on refoulement and exclusion from refugee protection is examined and analyzed, followed by a recount of the effects that this clash of legal regimes and legitimate interests has on the individuals concerned, on the States, and on the integrity of refugee law. Possible solutions to adverse effects are identified and discussed, including the question of whether the principle of non-refoulement, as understood today, is viable in light of the challenges presented to national security and public safety.

Internally Displaced Persons ('IDPs') outnumber refugees by two to one and often have the same fears, needs and wants as refugees recognised as such under international law. However, refugee status entails international protection, while IDPs are left to the protection of their own state, which may, but by no means necessarily, be the very entity that has forced them to flee in the first place. In recent years, there have been significant developments in the realm of IDP protection. This includes the conclusion of two regional treaties on the protection of IDPs, the development of relevant soft law instruments, and the reformed 'Cluster Approach' of humanitarian response. Although the increased focus on IDP protection is a welcome development, the UNHCR has expressed the fear that 'activities for the internally displaced may be (mis)interpreted as obviating the need for international protection and asylum.' This thesis represents the first legal analysis of the relationship between the protection of IDPs and International Refugee Law. It will discuss five key challenges in this respect. First, the challenge of drawing the attention of the international community to the plight of IDPs; second, the challenge of developing an appropriate framework for the protection of IDPs; third, the challenge of ensuring that internal protection is not interpreted as a substitute for asylum; fourth; the challenge of determining the relationship between complementary protection and internal displacement; and fifth, the challenge of ensuring that IDP protection in an inter-agency context does not trigger the application of Article 1D of the Refugee Convention, rendering the Convention inapplicable to the recipients of that protection. This thesis will conclude by setting out the future challenges in the relationship between IDP protection and International Refugee Law, by identifying questions left open for further research, and by illustrating the overall impact and importance of this thesis' findings.

Armed conflicts of our time tend to be prolonged, characterised by indiscriminate violence and the direct targeting of civilians. These conflicts cause situations where civilians are not only at risk of being exposed to threats of direct violence, but also unbearable humanitarian situations, a form of indirect harm resulting from armed violence. Current protection regimes only address direct harm to civilians, which leaves a significant protection gap. Previous research has identified a possibility for recognising severe humanitarian conditions as a basis for international protection in recent human rights law developments. This thesis explores if the right to a dignified life can further address this form of indirect harm to civilians and create assessment criteria for providing international protection to persons fleeing severe humanitarian conditions caused by armed conflict. The right to a dignified life is constructed from theories on human dignity as a basis for human rights, as well as case law from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. The results show that the right to a dignified life is able to provide criteria for assessing the severity of a humanitarian situation and establish a threshold for triggering international protection, but several legal difficulties remain for its practical application. / Dagens väpnade konflikter tenderar att vara utdragna och komplexa. De karaktäriseras ofta av urskillningslöst våld och våld riktat mot civila. Väpnade konflikter i vår tid har orsakat svåra humanitära situationer, som innebär att civila inte endast riskerar att utsättas för skada till följd direkt våld, utan även en form av indirekt skada till följd av våld. Nuvarande skydd för den som flyr väpnad konflikt omfattar endast den som riskerar skada som en direkt följd av väpnat våld. Detta innebär att det finns en lucka i existerande skydd som behöver adresseras. Tidigare forskning har identifierat en möjlighet att inkludera även personer som riskerar att utsättas för skyddsgrundande behandling på grund av humanitära situationer i den senaste utvecklingen i regionala människorättsdomstolar. Denna uppsats undersöker huruvida rätten till ett värdigt liv kan adressera allvarlig skada som en indirekt följd av väpnad konflikt och skapa kriterier för när en humanitär situation ska omfattas av internationellt skydd. Rätten till ett värdigt liv konstrueras med hjälp av teorier om mänsklig värdighet samt praxis från Inter-Amerikanska domstolen för mänskliga rättigheter och Europadomstolen för mänskliga rättigheter. Resultatet visar att rätten till ett värdigt liv kan erbjuda kriterier för att bedöma allvaret hos en humanitär situation och aktivera internationella skyddsmekanismer, men finner att det kvarstår juridiska svårigheter för att applicera i verkliga fall.

Submitted by Rosina Valeria Lanzellotti Mattiussi Teixeira (rosina.teixeira@unisantos.br) on 2017-02-21T16:16:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Camila Marques Gilberto.pdf: 1029531 bytes, checksum: 2d61de2b9dad88156cc0a9e0a886328b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-21T16:16:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Camila Marques Gilberto.pdf: 1029531 bytes, checksum: 2d61de2b9dad88156cc0a9e0a886328b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-12 / This study deals with the evolution of the refugee concept and its growing dialogue with the International Human Rights Law. International Refugee Law stems from the Second World War and seeks to protect more and more individuals whose human rights are systematically violated (civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights), and due to those violations are forced to leave their countries in search of international protection. More than identifying an individual in a situation of vulnerability, it is necessary to recognize him as a refugee and to allow him access to a system of rights. In this perspective, the concept of refugee remains vital for the system of protection resulting in constant conceptual expansion through interpretations in light of International Human Rights Law. Therefore, this work has the specific objective of analyzing the concept established by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the regional advances that have broadened the scope of the universal definition, especially in the regional context of the Inter-American Human Rights System. The protection approach used in the context of the Americas is analyzed in the light of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, the American Convention of Human Rights, and other universal protection instruments. The progress observed regionally is translated into a recent precedent of the Inter-American System, Pacheco Tineo vs. Plurinational State of Bolivia. The rights ensured in this case demonstrate that the region is moving towards the consolidation of a refugee protection system that is based on the analysis of demands in light of International Human Rights Law. Although the case has not brought conceptual advances, it has brought a series of procedural advances that result in the recognition and protection sought by individuals in situations of extreme vulnerability. The methodology used in this study is based on descriptive and normative approaches, based on bibliographical, documentary and jurisprudential research. The analysis uses reference works on International Human Rights Law, International Refugee Law and on the Inter-American Human Rights System. The method used is a deductive approach, starting with the construction of the concept of refugee throughout the twentieth century and analyzing the complementarity of the human protection aspects represented in the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. / O presente trabalho trata da evolução do conceito de refugiado e sua crescente interlocução com o Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos. O Direito Internacional dos Refugiados tem origem após a Segunda Guerra Mundial e busca proteger cada vez mais indivíduos que, por terem seus direitos humanos (direitos civis e políticos e direitos econômicos, sociais e culturais) sistematicamente violados, são obrigados a deixar seus países em busca de proteção internacional em outro local. Mais do que identificar um indivíduo em situação de vulnerabilidade, é necessário reconhecê-lo enquanto refugiado e permitir a ele acesso a um sistema de direitos. Assim, o conceito de refugiado segue vital para o sistema de proteção resultando em constante expansão conceitual por via de interpretações à luz do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos. Nesta perspectiva, este trabalho tem como objetivo específico analisar o conceito estabelecido pela Convenção de 1951 Relativa ao Status dos Refugiados e os avanços regionais que ampliaram o alcance da definição universal, especialmente no contexto regional do Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos. A abordagem de proteção utilizada no contexto das Américas é analisada à luz da Declaração de Cartagena de 1984, da Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos e demais instrumentos universais de proteção. Os avanços observados regionalmente são traduzidos em precedente recente do Sistema Interamericano, o Caso Família Pacheco Tineo vs. Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia. Os direitos assegurados, neste caso, demonstram que a região caminha para a consolidação de um sistema de proteção ao refugiado que prima pela análise de demandas à luz do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos. Muito embora o caso não tenha trazido avanços conceituais, trouxe uma série de avanços procedimentais que resultam no reconhecimento e proteção almejados por indivíduos em situação de extrema vulnerabilidade. A metodologia empregada no presente trabalho é de abordagens descritivas e normativas, com base em pesquisa bibliográfica, documental e jurisprudencial. O trabalho utiliza obras de referência sobre o Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, Direito Internacional dos Refugiados e sobre o Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos. O método utilizado é de abordagem dedutivo, pelo qual parte-se da construção do conceito de refugiado ao longo do século XX e da análise da complementaridade das vertentes de proteção da pessoa humana representadas no julgamento proferido pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos.

South Africa is seen as a major destination for refugees and asylum-seekers and is, according to the 2010 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the world’s highest destination country for asylum-seekers, mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa. Following the 1994 democratic elections, there was a transformation in foreign policy, embracing the African Agenda, and South Africa became a major country of destination because of its relative prosperity in Africa. As a State Party to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees, South Africa is under a legal obligation to protect refugees and grant them legal rights. At the same time, South African citizens, who had legitimate aspirations that the 1994 democratic government would address their development challenges, opposed the significant flow of refugees into the country by violent acts of xenophobia. The government, seen as a moral authority internationally with human rights being a key principle underpinning its foreign policy, found itself between the promotion of the African Agenda and its commitments to its own citizens. The refugee issue was addressed in the United Nations where the government made multilateral diplomacy a central platform of its foreign policy, a policy embedded in Africa and the South. South Africa is used as a case study to determine how it used multilateral diplomacy in the United Nations refugee regime through its coalition, the African Group, to address the migration issue. The study draws out the weaknesses of the international refugee regime by discussing the roles of two important diplomatic actors: the sovereign states in the United Nations General Assembly, and the international organization mandated to supervise the international refugee regime, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. South Africa’s foreign policy objective of promoting the African Agenda at times conflicts with the promotion of its national interest. Its progressive Constitution (1996) provides economic, social, and cultural rights to refugees, to the resentment of its own citizens, who view the refugees as beneficiaries of the United Nations. The study provides a critical analysis of South Africa’s multilateral diplomacy, and also provides the following recommendations where South Africa could use this mode more effectively to address the migration issue: Reform the international refugee regime; Allocate funds from the United Nations regularly assessed budget to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and, Develop an international normative regulatory framework for irregular migrants. / Dissertation (MDiplomatic Studies)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / Unrestricted

La presente tesis aspira a demonstrar que, ante la afluencia masiva de personas venezolanas a territorio peruano, sobre todo en los años 2017, 2018 y 2019, el Estado peruano debería haber aplicado la Declaración de Cartagena de 1984, conforme está transcrita a su normativa interna, en la Ley N°27891 y su Reglamento. Para ello, se presenta primero el marco legal internacional y nacional del Derecho de Refugiados; para luego apreciar estadísticamente los movimientos migratorios sucesivos de más de un millón de venezolanos hacía el Perú. Investigamos, al detalle, el actuar del Estado peruano ante esta situación. Analizamos rigorosamente cada uno de los elementos constitutivos, que habrían justificado el otorgamiento del asilo, a los migrantes venezolanos, en base a la definición ampliada de refugiado, tal como está estipulada en la Declaración de Cartagena de 1984 y recogida en el literal b) del Artículo 3.- de la Ley peruana del Refugiado, Ley N°27891, y en aplicación del mecanismo de acogida grupal o prima facie. Se consideran las objeciones del Perú frente a esta constelación, para refutar sus argumentos y demostrar los beneficios que le resultarían de la aplicación de la Declaración de Cartagena de 1984 y de su propia normativa sobre refugio. Comprobamos la validez de esta afirmación, al observar la complejidad de una regularización ex post de la presencia venezolana en el Perú, a la cual finalmente, se ha visto obligado el Estado peruano. / This thesis aims to demonstrate that, given the massive influx of Venezuelan people into Peruvian territory, especially in 2017, 2018 and 2019, the Peruvian State should have applied the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, as transcribed into its internal Law No. 27891 and Regulation. For this, we first present the international and national legal framework of Refugee Law, and then statistically appreciate the successive migratory movements of more than one million Venezuelans to Peru. We investigate, in detail, the Peruvian State´s response to this situation. We rigorously analyze each of the constituent elements that would have justified the granting of asylum to Venezuelan migrants, based on the expanded definition of refugee, as stipulated in the Cartagena Declaration of 1984 and included in Article 3 (b) of the Peruvian Refugee Law, Law No. 27891, and in application of the group or prima facie reception mechanism. Peru's objections to this constellation are considered in order to refute its arguments and demonstrate the benefits that would result from the application of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and its own internal refugee regulations. We verify the validity of this statement by observing the complexity of an ex post regularization of the Venezuelan presence in Peru, which the Peruvian State has finally been forced to undertake. / Tesis

En 1951, le droit international des réfugiés voyait le jour avec la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés. Cette convention ainsi que son Protocole stipulent la définition contemporaine de cette notion et les obligations de l'État d'accueil à l’égard des réfugiés mais y prévoit aussi une exception. En effet, les rédacteurs de la Convention de 1951, percevant que certains bourreaux tenteraient d'user de ce mécanisme pour échapper à des poursuites en trouvant refuge à l'étranger, y ont intégré une dérogation à la définition de réfugié qui a pris la forme d’une clause d'exclusion. Celle-ci permet à tout État ayant adhéré à cet instrument de refuser d'accueillir sur son territoire les individus à l'origine des plus grands crimes internationaux et nationaux. Le Canada, en ratifiant la Convention de 1951 et son Protocole en 1969, a incorporé dans sa législation nationale cette clause d'exclusion dans l'article 98 de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés. Le présent mémoire porte sur l'application de cette clause d'exclusion en droit canadien. Nous proposons une analyse de l'application de cette disposition en droit interne. L’objectif général est de montrer que les cours de justice favorisent une interprétation trop large de la clause d’exclusion, dénaturant ainsi son statut de règle d’exception. En effet, cette interprétation jurisprudentielle a pour conséquence d’attribuer un poids prépondérant à la sécurité nationale aux dépens du caractère humanitaire qui imprègne le droit d’asile depuis ses origines. / International refugee law emerged in 1951 with the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This instrument, along with its Protocol, defined the contemporary notion of “refugee” and established the rights of these individuals as well as State obligations towards them. However, this international protection was not absolute. Suspecting that many oppressors would attempt to use this mechanism to escape prosecution by finding refuge abroad, the authors of the 1951 Convention introduced a derogation to the definition of refugee by way of the exclusion clause. As such, this article allows States to refuse to extend refugee protection to individuals responsible for the most serious international and national crimes. Canada, which ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1969 Protocol, incorporated the exclusion clause in its national legislation through article 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The present thesis wishes to examine the application of this exclusion clause in Canadian law. In doing so, we will analyze the understanding of this provision in domestic law. Our objective is to demonstrate that our judicial courts favor a large interpretation of this clause, thus straying from its exceptional nature. This approach results in overweighing the importance of national security against the humanitarian nature of the refugee protection system.

En 1951, le droit international des réfugiés voyait le jour avec la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés. Cette convention ainsi que son Protocole stipulent la définition contemporaine de cette notion et les obligations de l'État d'accueil à l’égard des réfugiés mais y prévoit aussi une exception. En effet, les rédacteurs de la Convention de 1951, percevant que certains bourreaux tenteraient d'user de ce mécanisme pour échapper à des poursuites en trouvant refuge à l'étranger, y ont intégré une dérogation à la définition de réfugié qui a pris la forme d’une clause d'exclusion. Celle-ci permet à tout État ayant adhéré à cet instrument de refuser d'accueillir sur son territoire les individus à l'origine des plus grands crimes internationaux et nationaux. Le Canada, en ratifiant la Convention de 1951 et son Protocole en 1969, a incorporé dans sa législation nationale cette clause d'exclusion dans l'article 98 de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés. Le présent mémoire porte sur l'application de cette clause d'exclusion en droit canadien. Nous proposons une analyse de l'application de cette disposition en droit interne. L’objectif général est de montrer que les cours de justice favorisent une interprétation trop large de la clause d’exclusion, dénaturant ainsi son statut de règle d’exception. En effet, cette interprétation jurisprudentielle a pour conséquence d’attribuer un poids prépondérant à la sécurité nationale aux dépens du caractère humanitaire qui imprègne le droit d’asile depuis ses origines. / International refugee law emerged in 1951 with the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This instrument, along with its Protocol, defined the contemporary notion of “refugee” and established the rights of these individuals as well as State obligations towards them. However, this international protection was not absolute. Suspecting that many oppressors would attempt to use this mechanism to escape prosecution by finding refuge abroad, the authors of the 1951 Convention introduced a derogation to the definition of refugee by way of the exclusion clause. As such, this article allows States to refuse to extend refugee protection to individuals responsible for the most serious international and national crimes. Canada, which ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1969 Protocol, incorporated the exclusion clause in its national legislation through article 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The present thesis wishes to examine the application of this exclusion clause in Canadian law. In doing so, we will analyze the understanding of this provision in domestic law. Our objective is to demonstrate that our judicial courts favor a large interpretation of this clause, thus straying from its exceptional nature. This approach results in overweighing the importance of national security against the humanitarian nature of the refugee protection system.

Plus de soixante ans après sa signature, qui sont les personnes bénéficiaires de la qualité de réfugié au sens de l’article 1A de la Convention de Genève relative au statut de réfugié de 1951? En effet, si cette convention compte parmi les plus ratifiées au monde et n’a jamais été remise en cause, celle-ci fait pourtant l’objet de polémiques croissantes portant sur sa capacité à protéger les personnes contraintes de s’exiler. Elle s’applique par ailleurs dans un contexte politique de suspicion grandissante à l’égard des demandeurs d’asile. On peut donc se demander qui sont aujourdh’ui les personnes qui se voient reconnaître la qualité de réfugié ? A cette fin, l’étude s’appuie sur une analyse comparée des jurisprudences de plusieurs pays occidentaux : Australie – Belgique - Canada - Etats-Unis - France – Grande-Bretagne – Nouvelle-Zélande. Elle s’appuie aussi sur une analyse systémique de l’article 1A et ses interprétations jurisprudentielles à la lumière des évolutions du droit international des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire. Ainsi, l’analyse met en lumière plusieurs points. Plus que les motifs invoqués ou la nature des mauvais traitements craints, c’est sur le caractère individuel ou collectif des persécutions que se dessine une ligne de fracture entre les Etats occidentaux. En effet, ces derniers ont, de manière convergente, fait évoluer leur interprétation de la qualité de réfugié quand les requérants invoquent des persécutions individuelles. C’est ainsi que les individus craignant d’être persecutés en raison de l’expression de leurs opinions politiques ou religieuses dissidentes, ou du libre exercice de leurs droits fondamentaux, quel que soit leur genre ou leur orientation sexuelle, se voient aujourd’hui communément reconnaître la qualité de réfugié. Dans le cadre de ces persécutions individuelles, les Etats ont aussi développé de manière convergente une interprétation assouplie des agents de persécution, acceptant ainsi de protéger les personnes fuyant des mauvais traitements perpétrés par des agents étatiques et des personnes privées. En revanche, il existe encore de nombreuses divergences entre les Etats lorsque les individus revendiquent fuir des persécutions collectives. S’appuyant sur la reconnaissance d’une interprétation plus ou moins individualiste de la qualité de réfugié, les personnes craignant d’être persécutées en raison de leur race, de leur nationalité ou de leur appartenance à un groupe religieux ne doivent pas satisfaire aux mêmes exigences pour se voir reconnaître la qualité de réfugié. Et dans le contexte actuel où de plus en plus de personnes fuient des persécutions collectives perpétrées dans un Etat en situation de conflit armé, ces divergences sont d’autant plus importantes. / Sixty years after its signatory, who can be qualify as a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugee ? If it is one of the most ratified treaty of the world, it’s relevance have nevertheless recently been questioned and some commentators don’t hesitate to speak of an outdated Convention. Moreover, it applies in a political context of clear suspicion against asylum-seekers. So, we can wonder who can nowadays qualify as a refugee among the million of persons fleeing their home ? To answer to this question, the study focuses on judicial review of many industrialized countries, such as Australia – Belgium – Canada – United States – France – Great-Britain and New Zealand. A systemic interpretation of Article 1A and its judicial interpretation in the light of both international human right law and international humanitarian law also helps to conduce the study. First, the analyse reveals that it is not on the motives of persecution neither the nature of the treatment feared that we can observe similarities or differences between the countries. It is on individual or collective persecutions. When asylum seekers look for international protection based on individual persecutions, States have commonly adopted a dynamic interpretation of article 1A . Persons who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted because they have freely express their dissent political or religious opinion, their sexual orientation, or because they refuse to conform to the roles and identities attributing to their gender, can be recognised as refugees in all the countries of the study. In the context of individual persecutions, States have also commonly developed an evolutive interpretation of the persecution agents. They protect all the persons who risk to be persecuted by state agents or non-state agents. On the contrary, there are many continuing and growing divergences between States when persons flee collective persecutions because of their race, their nationality of their belonging to a religious group. They keep on developing a different interpretation of the individualist definition of the refugee. And while more and more person ask for international protection because they flee collective persecutions during an armed conflict, these divergences are even more important.