The diploma thesis deals with a proposal for the development of a remuneration system in a selected company ABC s.r.o. The thesis is divided into theoretical, analytical and design part. The theoretical part describes the basic concepts in the field of management and remuneration of employees. The analytical part focuses on the analysis of the internal and external surroundings of the company, controlled interview and questionnaire survey. The last part of the diploma thesis deals with proposing measures to increase employee satisfaction and loyalty.

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Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)

Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)

This study analyses the relationship between remuneration (real wage) and labour productivity in South Africa at the macroeconomic level, using time series and econometric techniques. The results depict that there is a significant evidence of a structural break in 1990. The break appears to have affected the employment level and subsequently fed through into employees' remuneration (real wage) and productivity. A long run cointegrating relationship was found between remuneration and labour productivity for the period 1990 to 2011. In the long run, 1% increase in labour productivity is linked with an approximately 1.98% rise in remuneration. The coefficient of the error correction term in the labour productivity is large, indicating a rapid adjustment of labour productivity to equilibrium. However, remuneration does not Granger cause labour productivity and vice versa. / Thesis (M.Com.(Statistics) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2014

This thesis analyses several aspects of institutional investor influence in the corporate governance of UK firms. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, and Chapter 2 provides a literature survey. The main original empirical research findings are presented in Chapters 3 to 5.Chapter 3 explores the key firm characteristics related to institutional investors. We show that institutional shareholdings, particularly those institutions with a large shareholding, are positively related to the proportion of outside directors on the board; with stock returns and with volatility. Institutional shareholdings are negatively related to the shareholdings of inside directors and firm size. Interestingly institutional shareholdings are positively related to CEO age but negatively related to the number of CEO’s years in office. This seems contradictory but it is consistent with institutional investors wanting experienced CEOs but not those individuals who have become entrenched. None of the measures proxying for the Cadbury recommendations for board structure, such as number or proportion of non-executive directors, CEO duality, or outside chair, has a significant relationship with institutional shareholdings. Chapter 4 analyses the relationship between institutional shareholdings and CEO cash-based remuneration. Uniquely to this field of research we also consider the different elements of remuneration separately to account for the timing differences relating to their award and performance criteria. First, we find that the presence of a large institutional shareholding, or high concentration of institutional shareholdings, does significantly reduce the magnitudes of salary and bonuses but they do not reduce the magnitude of benefits. However, the presence of an institutional investor, regardless of the size of their shareholding, has no relationship with the magnitude of any of the remuneration variables. Second, we find that institutional shareholdings significantly increases the positive relationship between bonus remuneration and firm performance, but that they do not have such a noticeable effect on the relationship between salary and benefits and firm performance. Third, we find that the presence of a large institutional shareholding, or high concentration of institutional shareholdings, reduces the rates of increase in salary, benefits and bonuses. Fourth, we find that the past practice of modelling salary and bonuses together can produce misleading results. We suggest that salary and bonuses should be modelled separately because they are payments for different reasons and relate to different periods of firm performance. Chapter 5 explores the influence that institutional investors have over CEO turnover. We show that the likelihood of a CEO being forced from office is negative and significantly related to firm performance and positive and significantly related to the presence of a large institutional shareholding or high concentration of institutional shareholdings. The findings in this thesis are robust to variations in research design. The conclusions are that the internal control mechanisms do work, that institutional investors are not the ‘passive’ investors often portrayed by some practitioners and early academic research and that institutional investors go to some lengths to ensure that their investee firms are properly governed.

1 Abstract Remuneration of members of the governing bodies of joint stock companies The goal of this thesis is to analyze the law regarding remuneration of members of the governing bodies of joint stock companies. The topic is a timely one, since high bonuses were one of the causes of the financial crisis. The thesis primarily devotes its attention to the law contained in the Commercial Code. The amendments to the Act on Business on the Capital Market are also mentioned. The recommendations of the European Commission and Directive of the European Parliament and Council are then subjected to analysis. Basic issues are addressed in the introduction to the thesis. The governing body of a joint stock company is the Board of Directors and deciding on its remuneration falls within the competence of the General Meeting. Frequently members of the Board of Directors also hold concurrent office in the company as employees. The difference between claimable and non-claimable bonuses and fixed and variable bonuses is explained. A member of the Board of Directors is in principle entitled to at least the usual bonus for performing his or her office according to the average use of the mandate contract. If the parties so agree or the law so stipulates, performance of the office is not paid. The actual declaration of the...

The purpose of this thesis was to describe the issue of law treatment of labour remuneration, primarily remuneration by wage in private-law sphere and by salary in budgetary sphere. The main source, that explains the treatment of wage and salary is the law number 262/2006, legal code of labour and its further notifications and other implementing rules based on legal code of labour. These implementing rules are government regulations. Wage and salary, or rather the amount of wage or salary is an important factor, by which a potential employee chooses his employment. From the amount of salary unfolds employee's standard of living and his social position, his social status. In my thesis I was first dealing with wage, its characterization, function, the way, how it is determined and also its protection. For this purpose are for Czech Republic binding International Labour Organization (ILO) agreements, primarily ILO agreement number 95 about the protection of wage. The protection function mingles through the whole law of labour, when is necessary to protect an employee as a weaker side of labour-law relations. The subsequent chapters of my thesis I dedicated to salary, by which are remunerated employees in nonbusiness sphere, where the resources for salaries flow from public finance. This is the reason,...

EU electricity markets are facing fundamental challenges as a result of the EU goal to increase the share of the renewable energy sources. This policy negatively influences profitability of the conventional producers known theoretically as "missing money" problem. As the conventional plants are crucial to offset the variability of renewable, this policy puts the stability of the whole grid at risk in long-term under the current electricity market design. The thesis tests and confirms the hypothesis that there is currently a "missing money" effect on the German energy market through a dynamic programming model. Secondly, three types of the capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) are implemented (capacity payments, strategic reserve and capacity auction) in order to deal with "missing money" which mostly eliminates the missing money problem depending on the setting. The most effective CRM seems be the capacity auction model as the price is set dynamically by the market players and not arbitrarily by central regulator. The thesis further supports the creation of the demand flexibility scheme due to the expected low costs. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

The thesis called "Analysis of the Remuneration System used in ČESKÁ POŠTA (Czech Post Office) with emphasis on Workers' Motivation" deals with an analysis of the existing remuneration system at greatest employer of the Czech Republic -- Česká pošta s. p. (Czech Postal Service, a state company). The thesis contains an elementary theoretical treatise on the employees' remuneration and motivation system issue with a focus on work motivation of employees. In the practical part hereof the present remuneration system at the Czech Postal Service has been analysed, and making use of the results of an empirical survey among a selected sample of the employees, the thesis has assessed the functionality and effectiveness of remuneration. In the final part, on the basis of all the ascertained facts the author has suggested some partial changes leading to a better efficaciousness of the remuneration system at Česká pošta s. p.