Rule following is a central concept in the philosophy of Wittgenstein who was one of the pioneers of modern philosophy. Wittgenstein criticizes the traditional concepts of rule, because they were vague, ambiguous, and idealized. He thinks that it is not possible to isolate rules from practice and that a rule takes its meaning in a certain context or in practice. Wittgenstein&rsquo / s concept of rule following is closely related to a set of concepts: internal relation, understanding, criterion. These concepts explains the intimate relation between rule following and practice. Wittgenstein believes that his theory of rule following does not generate some problems such as paradox of interpretation and regression. Furthermore, the concept of practice plays a central role in Wittgenstein&rsquo / s view of rule following. He removes metaphysical speculations that are put forward concerning the &ldquo / essence&rdquo / of rule following and locates rule following in a form of life, that is in a natural context. With this, he provides an explanation that clarifies misuses of language and establishes a correct relation between theory and practice.

Rule-following has been a controversial issue in professional philosophical literature since Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Many authors have developed accounts of rule-following along different lines, including those that naturalistically reduce rule-following to non-normative phenomena and those that take rule-following to be an irreducible aspect of cognition and agency. Hannah Ginsborg, a prominent contributor to rule-following literature, has developed a partially reductive account of rule-following, combining features of both reductionist and nonreductionist accounts. But naturalizing or internalistic theories of rule-following, or even Ginsborg's partial reduction of rule-following, ignore important facets of what it is to follow a rule, particularly its social aspect. In this thesis I reject Ginsborg's partial reductionism, holding that her hybrid theory does not escape the particular problems of naturalistic reductionism or nonreductionism about rule-following. I argue instead that certain social concepts are necessary for a satisfactory theory of rule-following. The first concept is how an individual is "enculturated" into her various social and cultural networks. The second is one's "normative identity," the accumulated concepts and behaviors one has as part of a social and cultural network. I develop these notions with inspiration from Wittgenstein and other social contributors to rule-following literature.

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This dissertation addresses the question: How did later Wittgenstein aim to achieve his goal of putting forward a way of dissolving philosophical problems which centered on asking ourselves what we mean by our words – yet which did not entail any claims about the essence of language and meaning? This question is discussed with reference to “resolute” readings of Wittgenstein. I discuss the readings of James Conant, Oskari Kuusela, and Martin Gustafsson. I follow Oskari Kuusela’s claim that in order to fully appreciate how later Wittgenstein meant to achieve his goal, we need to clearly see how he aimed to do away with hierarchies in philosophy: Not only is the dissolution of philosophical problems via the method of clarifying the grammar of expressions to be taken as independent from any theses about what meaning must be – but furthermore, it is to be taken as independent from the dissolution of any particular problem via this method. As Kuusela stresses, this also holds for the problems involving rule-following and meaning: the clarification of the grammar of “rule” and “meaning” has no foundational status – it is nothing on which the method of clarifying the grammar of expressions as such were meant to in any way rely on. The lead question of this dissertation then is: What does it mean to come to see that the method of dissolving philosophical problems by asking “How is this word actually used?” does not in any way rely on the results of our having investigated the grammar of the particular concepts “rule” and “meaning”? What is the relation of such results – results such as “To follow a rule, [...], to obey an order, [...] are customs (uses, institutions)” or “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” – to this method? From this vantage point, I concern myself with two aspects of the readings of Gustafsson and Kuusela. In Gustafsson, I concern myself with his idea that the dissolution of philosophical problems in general “relies on” the very agreement which – during the dissolution of the rule-following problem – comes out as a presupposition for our talk of “meaning” in terms of rules. In Kuusela, I concern myself with his idea that Wittgenstein, in adopting a way of philosophical clarification which investigates the actual use of expressions, is following the model of “meaning as use” – which model he had previously introduced in order to perspicuously present an aspect of the actual use of the word “meaning”. This dissertation aims to show how these two aspects of Gustafsson’s and Kuusela’s readings still fail to live up to the vision of Wittgenstein as a philosopher who aimed to do away with any hierarchies in philosophy. I base this conclusion on a detailed analysis of which of the occasions where Wittgenstein invokes the notions of “use” and “application” (as also “agreement”) have to do with the dissolution of a specific problem only, and which have to do with the dissolution of philosophical problems in general. I discuss Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, showing how in the dissolution of the rule-following paradox, notions such as “use”, “application”, and “practice” figure on two distinct logical levels. I then discuss an example of what happens when this distinction is not duly heeded: Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker’s idea that the rule-following remarks have a special significance for his project of dissolving philosophical problems as such. I furnish an argument to the effect that their idea that the clarification of the rules of grammar of the particular expression “following a rule” could answer a question about rules of grammar in general rests on a conflation of the two logical levels on which “use” occurs in the rule-following remarks, and that it leads into a regress. I then show that Gustafsson’s view – despite its decisive advance over Baker and Hacker – contains a version of that same idea, and that it likewise leads into a regress. Finally, I show that Kuusela’s idea of a special significance of the model “meaning as use” for the whole of the method of stating rules for the use of words is open to a regress argument of a similar kind as that he himself advances against Baker and Hacker. I conclude that in order to avoid such a regress, we need to reject the idea that the grammatical remark “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” – because of the occurrence of “use” in it – stood in any special relation to the method of dissolving philosophical problems by describing the use of words. Rather, we need to take this method as independent from this outcome of the investigation of the use of the particular word “meaning”. / Die Ausgangsfrage dieser Dissertation ist: Wie gedachte der späte Wittgenstein sein Ziel zu erreichen, eine Art und Weise der Auflösung philosophischer Probleme zu vorzulegen, die daran ansetzt, was wir mit unseren Worten meinen, jedoch keine Thesen über Sprache und Bedeutung mit sich zieht? Ich behandele diese Frage mit Bezug auf sogenannte „strenge“ Lesarten Wittgensteins. Ich befasse mich mit den Interpretationen von James Conant, Oskari Kuusela und Martin Gustafsson. Ich nehme Kuuselas Gedanken auf, daß zu einem vollen Verständnis davon, wie Wittgenstein sein philosophisches Ziel zu erreichen gedachte, gehört, die Abwesenheit von Hierarchien in seiner Spätphilosophie zu sehen: nicht nur sollte die Auflösung philosophischer Probleme mithilfe der Methode der Klärung der Grammatik von Ausdrücken von jeden Thesen darüber, wie sprachliche Bedeutung zustande kommt, unabhängig sein – sondern darüberhinaus auch unabhängig von der Auflösung bestimmter Einzelprobleme mittels dieser Methode. Dies, so Kuusela, gelte auch für die Probleme um Regelfolgen und um Bedeutung: „Regel“, „meinen“, und „Bedeutung“ seien keine Grundbegriffe, auf deren Klärung die Methode der Klärung der Grammatik von Ausdrücken in irgendeiner Weise aufbaue. Die Leitfrage dieser Dissertation ist: Was genau heißt es zu verstehen, daß die Auflösung philosophischer Probleme mittels der Frage „Wie wird dieses Wort tatsächlich gebraucht?“ nicht auf Ergebnissen der Untersuchung der Grammatik der Begriffe „Regel“ und „Bedeutung“ aufbaut? In welcher Beziehung stehen diese Ergebnisse – Ergebnisse wie „Einer Regel folgen, [...], einen Befehl geben, [...] sind Gepflogenheiten (Gebräuche, Institutionen)“ und „Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache“ – dann zu dieser Methode? Unter diesem Blickwinkel befasse ich mich mit zwei Aspekten der Lesarten von Gustafsson und Kuusela. Bei Gustafsson befasse ich mit der Auffassung, die Auflösung philosophischer Probleme an sich „beruhe auf“ genau der Art von Übereinstimmung, die sich – im Zuge der Auflösung des Regelfolgen-Problems – als eine Voraussetzung für unsere Rede von „meinen“ und „bedeuten“ herausstellt. Bei Kuusela befasse ich mich mit der Idee, daß Wittgenstein, indem er zur Auflösung philosophischer Probleme die Frage nach dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch von Wörtern einführt, dem Modell „Bedeutung als Gebrauch“ folgt – welches er vorher eingeführt hatte, um einen Aspekt des tatsächlichen Gebrauchs des Wortes „Bedeutung“ übersichtlich darzustellen. Ich versuche zu zeigen, warum diese beiden Aspekte der Lesarten von Gustafsson und Kuusela noch zurückfallen hinter die Vision von Wittgenstein als einem Philosophen, dem es darum geht, Hierarchien zu vermeiden. Zur Begründung lege ich eine detaillierte Analyse der Art und Weise des Auftretens der Begriffe „Gebrauch“, „Verwendung“ und „Anwendung“ (sowie „Übereinstimmung“) in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie vor. Wie ich zeige, läßt sich das Auftreten dieser Begriffe unterteilen in Fälle, wo es im Zusammenhang steht mit der Auflösung bestimmter Einzelprobleme, und Fälle, in denen es im Zusammenhang steht mit Auflösung philosophischer Probleme im Allgemeinen. Als Beispiel behandele ich Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über Regelfolgen. Ich zeige, wie in der Auflösung des Regelparadoxes Begriffe wie „Gebrauch“, „Verwendung“, „Anwendung“ auf zwei unterschiedlichen logischen Ebenen auftreten. Dann behandele ich Gordon Bakers und Peter Hackers Auffassung, Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zum Regelfolgen hätten eine besondere Bedeutung für sein Projekt der Auflösung philosophischer Probleme an sich. Ich lege ein Argument dafür vor, daß ihre Idee, die Klärung der Regeln der Grammatik des bestimmten einzelnen Ausdrucks „einer Regel folgen“ könne eine Frage über Regeln der Grammatik im Allgemeinen beantworten, auf einer Vermengung der beiden Ebenen basiert, auf denen der Begriff „Gebrauch“ in den Regelfolgen-Bemerkungen vorkommt, und daher in einen Regreß führt. Anschließend zeige ich, daß dies auch für Gustafssons Idee gilt. Schließlich zeige ich, daß Kuuselas Auffassung, das Modell „Bedeutung als Gebrauch“ – gewonnen im Rahmen der Untersuchung der tatsächlichen Verwendung des Wortes „Bedeutung“ – habe eine besondere Relevanz für die Methode der Untersuchung der tatsächlichen Verwendung von Wörtern an sich, ebenfalls in einen Regreß führt. Meine Schlußfolgerung ist, daß die grammatische Bemerkung „Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache“ in keinem besonderen Bezug zu Wittgensteins Methode der Untersuchung des tatsächlichen Gebrauchs von Ausdrücken stehen kann. Stattdessen muß diese Methode als unabhängig von diesem Ergebnis der Untersuchung des Gebrauchs des bestimmten Wortes „Bedeutung“ betrachtet werden.

[pt] Esta tese tem por objetivo apresentar, analisar e defender uma solução inferencialista para o assim chamado problema de seguir uma regra. O primeiro capítulo serve como uma introdução. No segundo capítulo, traço as linhas gerais que balizam a discussão ao longo do resto do trabalho: introduzo a ideia de uma teoria do significado e os seus elementos e mostro que ela pode ser uma base sistemática para discussões metafísicas e epistemológicas – com destaque para os temas do realismo e do representacionismo. No terceiro capítulo, abordo em detalhes o problema de seguir uma regra – apresentando uma reconstrução do argumento do Wittgenstein de Kripke (baseando-me em Hattigandi) que conduz à conclusão cética- bem como analiso a viabilidade das possíveis linhas de resposta. No quarto capítulo, apresento o maquinário teórico-conceitual do inferencialismo (baseando-me sobretudo na obra de Brandom); esboço a estrutura geral de uma teoria semântica inferencialista combinando o inferencialismo com duas outras ideias: o normativismo pragmático e o expressivismo lógico. Por fim, no quinto capítulo, enfrento o problema cético de seguir uma regra a partir da perspectiva apresentada no capítulo anterior, e utilizando os elementos introduzido nos outros três capítulos. / [en] In this dissertation I aim to present, analyze, and defend an inferentialist solution to the so-called rule-following problem. The first chapter works as an introduction. The second chapter sets the stage for the discussion throughout the dissertation. After introducing the very idea of a theory of meaning, I show that it can serve as a systematic basis for metaphysical and epistemological discussions – wherein the themes of realism and representationalism take center stage. In the third chapter, I tackle the rule-following problem. More precisely, drawing on Hattiangadi s seminal interpretation, I offer a reconstruction of Kripkenstein s argument leading to the skeptical solution. I also assess the plausibility of the main lines of response to the problem. In the fourth chapter, I introduce the inferentialist theoretical-conceptual machinery inspired by Brandom, drawing the general framework for an inferentialist semantic theory that combines semantic inferentialism with pragmatic normativism and logical expressivism. The final chapter tackles the rule-following problem from the perspective set out in the previous chapter, using at the same time elements brought into play in the other three chapters.

<p>Enligt ett argument mot nonkognitivismen som många kritiker hänvisat till, så är denna teori oförenlig med förekomsten av så kallade ‘tjocka moraliska begrepp’. Argumentet har dock aldrig artikulerats och preciserats ordentligt, vilket lett till att det ofta misstolkats av både anhängare och kritiker av nonkognitivismen. I uppsatsen rekonstrueras och utvärderas argumentet såsom det formulerats av John McDowell. Enligt argumentet är nonkognitivismen bristfällig eftersom den inte både kan ge en tillfredsställande analys av tjocka moraliska begrepp och framställa moralisk argumentation och debatt som rationell. Uppsatsen visar dock att nonkognitivister kan undvika denna slutsats på flera sätt. Uppsatsen innehåller även en översikt över olika nonkognitivistiska perspektiv på tjocka moraliska begrepp.</p> / <p>Many critics of non-cognitivism have argued that the existence of ‘thick moral concepts’ constitutes a serious challenge to non-cognitivist views of moral language. While this argument is frequently invoked, it has never been clearly articulated. Hence, the argument is often misinterpreted by both friends and foes of non-cognitivism. In this thesis, John McDowell’s forceful rendering of the argument is reconstructed and evaluated. According to the argument, non-cognitivism is not an adequate metaethical view because it cannot both provide an adequate analysis of thick moral concepts and construe moral discourse as rational. It is argued in this thesis that there are several ways in which non-cognitivists can avoid this conclusion. The thesis also contains a survey of various non-cognitivist views on thick moral concepts.</p>

My thesis aims to show that Wittgensteins view of rule-following involves a misleading picture of the rule. Since he saw the rule as something fundamentally independent of the rule-follower and something with which the rule-follower must comply, he inevitably became entangled in the paradox of compliance: that is, the idea that there must be something other than the rule-follower for rule-following to exist, even though he knew that there was really nothing there to guide the rule-follower or to measure his action. This paradox, dimly expressed within key Wittgensteinian problems relating to how one is able to follow a rule and whether one can follow a rule privately, eventually gave rise to the question over the social nature of rules. In that debate, Wittgensteins commentators vigorously argued, and continue to argue, whether the concept of rule-following presupposes a community of practitioners or not. I argue that this debate itself is misguided, since both sides in this debate take as their starting point a picture of compliance which sees rule and rule-follower as essentially different. In contrast to a compliant picture, I offer a different picture of the rule, which I will call the pliant picture of the rule. I will show that rule and rule-follower are fundamentally the same, and are related to one another, not socially or grammatically, but genealogically. This relationship of identity is in fact exhibited in the relationship between teacher and pupil, when the pupil becomes what his teacher already is through following his teacher. Although compliance can be said to define this relationship initially, it ends with the pupil learning, or becoming, the rule. To conceive of the rule in this way is to avoid the paradox of compliance; that is, it is to go beyond Wittgensteins picture of a paradox.

My thesis aims to show that Wittgensteins view of rule-following involves a misleading picture of the rule. Since he saw the rule as something fundamentally independent of the rule-follower and something with which the rule-follower must comply, he inevitably became entangled in the paradox of compliance: that is, the idea that there must be something other than the rule-follower for rule-following to exist, even though he knew that there was really nothing there to guide the rule-follower or to measure his action. This paradox, dimly expressed within key Wittgensteinian problems relating to how one is able to follow a rule and whether one can follow a rule privately, eventually gave rise to the question over the social nature of rules. In that debate, Wittgensteins commentators vigorously argued, and continue to argue, whether the concept of rule-following presupposes a community of practitioners or not. I argue that this debate itself is misguided, since both sides in this debate take as their starting point a picture of compliance which sees rule and rule-follower as essentially different. In contrast to a compliant picture, I offer a different picture of the rule, which I will call the pliant picture of the rule. I will show that rule and rule-follower are fundamentally the same, and are related to one another, not socially or grammatically, but genealogically. This relationship of identity is in fact exhibited in the relationship between teacher and pupil, when the pupil becomes what his teacher already is through following his teacher. Although compliance can be said to define this relationship initially, it ends with the pupil learning, or becoming, the rule. To conceive of the rule in this way is to avoid the paradox of compliance; that is, it is to go beyond Wittgensteins picture of a paradox.

Enligt ett argument mot nonkognitivismen som många kritiker hänvisat till, så är denna teori oförenlig med förekomsten av så kallade ‘tjocka moraliska begrepp’. Argumentet har dock aldrig artikulerats och preciserats ordentligt, vilket lett till att det ofta misstolkats av både anhängare och kritiker av nonkognitivismen. I uppsatsen rekonstrueras och utvärderas argumentet såsom det formulerats av John McDowell. Enligt argumentet är nonkognitivismen bristfällig eftersom den inte både kan ge en tillfredsställande analys av tjocka moraliska begrepp och framställa moralisk argumentation och debatt som rationell. Uppsatsen visar dock att nonkognitivister kan undvika denna slutsats på flera sätt. Uppsatsen innehåller även en översikt över olika nonkognitivistiska perspektiv på tjocka moraliska begrepp. / Many critics of non-cognitivism have argued that the existence of ‘thick moral concepts’ constitutes a serious challenge to non-cognitivist views of moral language. While this argument is frequently invoked, it has never been clearly articulated. Hence, the argument is often misinterpreted by both friends and foes of non-cognitivism. In this thesis, John McDowell’s forceful rendering of the argument is reconstructed and evaluated. According to the argument, non-cognitivism is not an adequate metaethical view because it cannot both provide an adequate analysis of thick moral concepts and construe moral discourse as rational. It is argued in this thesis that there are several ways in which non-cognitivists can avoid this conclusion. The thesis also contains a survey of various non-cognitivist views on thick moral concepts.