Esta tese investiga a história de um dos mais longevos partidos políticos do nosso sistema partidário, o Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB). A partir de uma perspectiva nacional e diacrônica, analisamos sua história interna cobrindo mais de duas décadas de sua trajetória, de 1979 a 2002, com o intuito de compreender como o partido passou do protagonismo ao pano de fundo da política nacional, mas mantendo-se, ainda assim, um ator determinante em nosso arranjo político institucional. Levando em conta o peso que os órgãos de direção têm na definição dos rumos dos partidos políticos brasileiros, assim como a forte presença de parlamentares nesses órgãos no que se refere especificamente ao PMDB (Ribeiro, 2014), fazemos uso do conceito de coalizão dominante de Panebianco (2005) para analisar a face diretiva do partido (Katz e Mair, 1993) e argumentamos que a compreensão da dinâmica interna dos seus principais órgãos de direção contribui para entender as mudanças ocorridas nas estratégias políticas e eleitorais adotadas pelo PMDB, sobretudo no que tange às disputas pelo cargo de Presidente da República. Para realizar esse objetivo, a tese apoia-se tanto em um amplo levantamento documental quanto em entrevistas em profundidade, realizadas com políticos importantes para a história do partido em seus respectivos estados, um esforço pioneiro nos estudos em relação a este objeto. Ainda nesse sentido, este estudo divide-se em duas partes. A primeira delas investiga o recorte histórico de 1979 a 1988, período no qual as transformações internas do partido estiveram mais ligadas às constantes entradas e saídas de quadros. Incluem-se nesse período, entre outros eventos, a refundação da sigla em 1979, a incorporação do Partido Popular em 1982, a entrada de José Sarney no partido em 1985, a legalização dos partidos comunistas em 1985 e a formação do PSDB em 1988. Por sua vez, na segunda parte deste estudo investigamos o recorte histórico de 1989 a 2002. Neste segundo período, as transformações internas na coalizão dominante e consequentemente as estratégias eleitorais adotadas estiveram mais ligadas a disputas internas entre suas diferentes alas. Incluem-se nesse período as breves hegemonias ulyssista e quercista, que levaram Ulysses Guimarães e Orestes Quércia a serem os candidatos presidenciais respectivamente em 1989 e 1994, a indefinição quanto a lançar candidatura própria ou coligar-se com outro partido nas eleições presidenciais de 1998 e, por fim, a chegada de Michel Temer à presidência do partido em 2001, consolidando o bloco chamado de governista enquanto coalizão dominante do partido a partir de então. Sugerimos que o estudo deste partido em específico de maneira aprofundada, dados o tamanho e a complexidade do PMDB, permitem-nos uma compreensão de processos e dinâmicas que vão além dele. Seu estudo proporciona uma visão, a partir de um ponto de vista específico, da história política do Brasil durante e após a transição democrática, e nos permite, também, lançar luz sobre outros aspectos do nosso sistema político-partidário, como, por exemplo, a dinâmica de bipolarização das disputas presidenciais no país entre candidaturas de PT e PSDB, que se consolida durante o recorte histórico aqui estudado. / This thesis investigates the history of one of the longest-lived political parties in our party system, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). From a national and diachronic perspective, we analyze its internal history covering more than two decades, from 1979 to 2002, in order to understand how the party moved from the protagonism to the background of national politics, but remaining yet as a determining actor in our political system. Taking into account the weight that the governing bodies have in defining the directions of the Brazilian political parties, as well as the strong presence of parliamentarians in these bodies with regard to the PMDB (Ribeiro, 2014), we use the concept of ruling coalition of Panebianco (2005) to analyze the party in central office (Katz and Mair, 1993) and argue that the understanding of the internal dynamics of its main governing bodies contributes to understanding the changes in the political and electoral strategies adopted by the PMDB, especially regarding the presidential elections. In order to achieve this goal, the thesis is based on a wide documentary investigation and on in-depth interviews with important politicians to the history of the party in their states, a pioneering effort in the studies related to this object. In this sense, this study is divided into two parts. The first one investigates the time period from 1979 to 1988, a moment in which the internal transformations of the party were more linked to the constant flow of politicians in and out of it. This period includes, among other events, the refoundation of the party in 1979, the incorporation of the Popular Party in 1982, the entry of José Sarney in 1985, the legalization of the communist parties in 1985 and the formation of the PSDB in 1988. On the other hand, in the second part of this study we investigate the time period from 1989 to 2002. In this second period, the internal transformations in the ruling coalition and consequently the electoral strategies adopted were more related to internal disputes between its different wings. Included in this period were the brief Ulyssist and Quercist hegemonies, which led Ulysses Guimarães and Orestes Quércia to be the presidential candidates respectively in 1989 and 1994, the indefiniteness in launching their own candidacy or joining with another party in the 1998 presidential elections and, finally the arrival of Michel Temer to the presidency of the party in 2001, consolidating the wing called \"governists\" as the party\'s ruling coalition thereafter. We suggest that the in depth study of this particular party, given the size and complexity of the PMDB, allow us an understanding of processes and dynamics that go beyond it. His study provides a view, from a specific point of view, of Brazil\'s political history during and after the democratic transition, and also allows us to shed light on other aspects of our political-party system, such as the dynamics of bipolarisation of the presidential elections in the country between PT and PSDB candidacies, which has consolidated during the time period studied here.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T20:20:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael de Carvalho Morales.pdf: 585614 bytes, checksum: 7844b70ba449bf4b5b6d5cde3f93cc3b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-18 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Being considered the first Brazilian mass party, a heterogeneous and different from most others in Brazil. The Partido dos Tbrabalhadores (PT) became a party electorally competitive and a different discourse from that of its genesis. Internal changes from the perspective of institutionalization and of formation of a ruling coalition will be made from the model of party Panebianco. We will use the Robert Michel s concept iron law of oligarchy to check their application in PT and also to elevate the discussion that I find little in political science on the internal organization of parties. Such "evolution" of the PT has consequences and conclusions, they can be found and discussed what was classified by Kirchheimer as the "crisis of parties / Sendo considerado o primeiro partido de massas brasileiro, de formação heterogênea e diferente da maioria dos outros do Brasil. O Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) se transformou num partido eleitoralmente competitivo e com um discurso diferente daquele de sua gênese. A análise das mudanças internas a partir da óptica da institucionalização e da formação de uma coalizão dominante será feita a partir do modelo de partido de Panebianco. Utilizaremos o conceito lei de ferro da oligarquia de Michels para verificar a sua aplicação no PT e também para elevar à discussão que consideramos pequena na ciência política, a organização interna dos partidos. Tal evolução do PT tem consequências e conclusões, elas podem ser encontradas e debatidas naquilo que foi classificado por Kirchheimer como a crise dos partidos

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T14:53:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael de Carvalho Morales.pdf: 585614 bytes, checksum: 7844b70ba449bf4b5b6d5cde3f93cc3b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-18 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Being considered the first Brazilian mass party, a heterogeneous and different from most others in Brazil. The Partido dos Tbrabalhadores (PT) became a party electorally competitive and a different discourse from that of its genesis. Internal changes from the perspective of institutionalization and of formation of a ruling coalition will be made from the model of party Panebianco. We will use the Robert Michel s concept iron law of oligarchy to check their application in PT and also to elevate the discussion that I find little in political science on the internal organization of parties. Such "evolution" of the PT has consequences and conclusions, they can be found and discussed what was classified by Kirchheimer as the "crisis of parties / Sendo considerado o primeiro partido de massas brasileiro, de formação heterogênea e diferente da maioria dos outros do Brasil. O Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) se transformou num partido eleitoralmente competitivo e com um discurso diferente daquele de sua gênese. A análise das mudanças internas a partir da óptica da institucionalização e da formação de uma coalizão dominante será feita a partir do modelo de partido de Panebianco. Utilizaremos o conceito lei de ferro da oligarquia de Michels para verificar a sua aplicação no PT e também para elevar à discussão que consideramos pequena na ciência política, a organização interna dos partidos. Tal evolução do PT tem consequências e conclusões, elas podem ser encontradas e debatidas naquilo que foi classificado por Kirchheimer como a crise dos partidos

Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l’instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la question suivante : dans quelles conditions l’autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou contestée? Notre réponse s’articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition dirigeante : c’est-à-dire, l’alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux dominants. L’inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion entraîne l’affrontement et l’instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l’État sur le territoire et dans l’économie. La première variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (militaires) ou du régime (partis d’opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L’apport de la recherche est d’approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en mettant l’accent sur l’identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d’appréhender des relations causales autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un pays où l’État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l’instabilité dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin d’illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d’exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L’une sans l’autre offre nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forgent les conditions de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides. / The thesis studies stability and instability in hybrid regimes. The research question is: under which conditions the authority of the elites in power is recognized or contested? Our answer rests on the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the ruling coalition: that is, the strategic alliance between the ruling elites and dominant social groups. Inclusion favors consent and stability whereas exclusion favors contention and instability. The composition of the ruling coalition depends on (i) the degree of extra-legal organized violence and (ii) the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. The first variable identifies which social group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites. The second variable identifies which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center. The thesis contribution is to deepen our understanding of political institutions in hybrid regimes by focusing on the identity of dominant social groups according to a given context. It offers a simple, flexible and original model that allow us to grasp causal relations that would otherwise be counter-intuitive. Hence, political stability is also possible in a country where the state is weak and/or rebellion movements exist; and instability in the opposite context. It all comes down to the composition of the ruling coalition. In order to illustrate the line of reasoning and unfold the richness of our framework, a comparative historical analysis of the ruling coalition in Malaysia (1957-2010), Indonesia (1945-1998), Senegal (1960-2010) and Paraguay (1945-2008) is used. The main conclusion is that the two variables are key. One without the other necessarily amounts to an incomplete explanation of political alliances at stake when dealing with conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes.

Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l’instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la question suivante : dans quelles conditions l’autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou contestée? Notre réponse s’articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition dirigeante : c’est-à-dire, l’alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux dominants. L’inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion entraîne l’affrontement et l’instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l’État sur le territoire et dans l’économie. La première variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (militaires) ou du régime (partis d’opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L’apport de la recherche est d’approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en mettant l’accent sur l’identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d’appréhender des relations causales autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un pays où l’État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l’instabilité dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin d’illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d’exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L’une sans l’autre offre nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forgent les conditions de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides. / The thesis studies stability and instability in hybrid regimes. The research question is: under which conditions the authority of the elites in power is recognized or contested? Our answer rests on the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the ruling coalition: that is, the strategic alliance between the ruling elites and dominant social groups. Inclusion favors consent and stability whereas exclusion favors contention and instability. The composition of the ruling coalition depends on (i) the degree of extra-legal organized violence and (ii) the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. The first variable identifies which social group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites. The second variable identifies which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center. The thesis contribution is to deepen our understanding of political institutions in hybrid regimes by focusing on the identity of dominant social groups according to a given context. It offers a simple, flexible and original model that allow us to grasp causal relations that would otherwise be counter-intuitive. Hence, political stability is also possible in a country where the state is weak and/or rebellion movements exist; and instability in the opposite context. It all comes down to the composition of the ruling coalition. In order to illustrate the line of reasoning and unfold the richness of our framework, a comparative historical analysis of the ruling coalition in Malaysia (1957-2010), Indonesia (1945-1998), Senegal (1960-2010) and Paraguay (1945-2008) is used. The main conclusion is that the two variables are key. One without the other necessarily amounts to an incomplete explanation of political alliances at stake when dealing with conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes.