When the case for organizational change is presented as a “vision,” is action to support the change more likely? This notion was tested in two studies in the context of diversity issues at work. Diversity was selected as the context because Canadian workplaces are becoming increasingly diverse, and organizations are confronted with the challenge of addressing diversity issues appropriately and effectively. Moreover, theoretically critical features of visions, such as a connection with personal values, may be present in a vision of diversity. It was hypothesized that a vision—a picture of a desirable future state—may be more effective when it is aligned with individuals’ self interests and personal values. In Study 1, small groups of undergraduate male and female students (N=221) were presented with a vision of a proposed Employment Equity (EE) program that focused on raising women's employment rates. Self-interest was captured in the design as the interaction of participant gender with extent of employment change for women (small vs. large) resulting from the implementation of the EE program. Value orientation was captured by participants’ importance ranking of social justice on a pre-study measure. Verifying the self interest manipulation, men were seen to perceive that this program would influence their career advancement negatively and this effect was significantly stronger in the condition with the large increase in women’s employment. The most striking finding emerged with the three-way interaction between gender, social justice orientation, and the extent of employment change condition as these variables affected participants’ willingness to support the proposed EE program. Men who placed lower value on social justice showed a straightforward self-interest effect, with lowest support for the policy occurring when the increase in the women’s employment rate was greater. In contrast, men with higher social justice value were more favourable toward the policy that produced a greater change in women’s employment rates. For these men, personal values seemed to trump self-interests. Results involving positive affect mirrored the pattern of these results. Compared to a small employment increase for women, a large mandated increase in women’s employment led men who placed lower value on social justice to report feeling less positive. However, men who placed higher value on social justice reported feeling more positive when the mandated increase in women’s employment was large. Study 2 further examined the role of values in responding to a vision involving diversity. It was hypothesized that when values guide behaviour, the underlying motivation is relatively autonomous. That is, instead of yielding to guilt or social pressure, the values-guided person acts to attain identity fulfillment. To investigate this matter, undergraduate students (N=475) were randomly assigned to watch either a visionary presentation about promoting workforce diversity or a business case presentation. The visionary presentation described a prejudice-free, inclusive workplace; the business case covered the legalities of diversity. It was found that participants whose values were diversity-oriented felt more “inspired” than other participants overall, and this effect was significantly stronger in the vision condition. The primary difference in findings between experimental conditions involved the association between a measure of autonomous motivation and participants’ reports of intended action. A positive, significant association was obtained in the vision condition; no significant association was obtained with the business case. These results are understandable from the conditional nature of autonomous motivation as assessed here. That is, in both conditions, some people (i.e., autonomously motivated people) said that if they acted to promote diversity, it would be in order to promote their personal values. However, it was only in the vision condition in which the connection of diversity-promotion action to personal values was made salient. Thus it appears that a vision can influence behaviour by inducing autonomously motivated people to recognize this connection. The vision was not more influential overall in motivating participants to support the proposed cause. Nonetheless results indicated that a vision can be a complementary tool in a diversity change implementation by sparking an interest to act within the right people. Taken together, the findings from these two studies indicate that a key way a vision motivates behaviour is by forging the link between values and a course of action.

I begin my discussion of the question 'Why should I be moral?' by drawing distinctions both between possible different senses of 'moral' and also between different conceptions of what morality requires. I then criticize the idea that one should be moral because it serves self-interest. Self-interest is served by one's having benevolent concern for only a fairly small number of others, but being moral involves more than this. Furthermore, having moral dispositions other than benevolence is in one's interest only if these dispositions are required by the moral code predominant in one's society. Moreover, even if we confine our attention to people who live in such a society, each person would probably be better off with moral dispositions that were not so strong that they would always get their way, but the completely moral person would presumably have overriding moral dispositions. Finally, having the correct moral beliefs may not be in one's interest. But whatever the gap between self-interest and morality, might one not have most reason to be moral? Derek Parfit has recently argued that the view that one has most reason to do whatever best achieves one's present aims (and these may sometimes be moral aims) is at least as good as the view that one has most reason to do what best promotes one's own long-term good. I attack some of his arguments. But I then go on to argue that moral requirements as such—i.e., independently of whether they are reflected in present desires—do generate reasons for action. But are these moral reasons always stronger than reasons of other kinds? On the basis of an example I describe in the closing pages, I reluctantly conclude that they are not.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Michael Ruse, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Philosophy. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Jan. 13, 2005). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Thesis advisor: Christopher J. Kelly / This dissertation is a study of the moral and political significance of the imagination in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's <italic>Emile</italic>. Rousseau attributes to the imagination a pervasive influence over human life, claiming that it "gives birth not only to the virtues and vices, but to the goods and ills of human life" and that its "empire" makes men "good or bad, happy or unhappy on this earth." The dissertation examines the ambivalence of Rousseau's account, and shows how the model "natural education" of Emile depends on the proper handling of the imagination to cultivate virtue and to secure individual happiness. After first establishing what Rousseau means by "natural education" and what its particular goals are, I turn to the threat the imagination poses to the success of that education. Rousseau's attack on the imagination centers on its power to open the human heart to infinite desire. By generating ever-new and ever-expanding desires, the imagination renders men necessary to one another, causing dependence, weakness, and, ultimately, wickedness, and unhappiness. As a principal agent of man's departure from natural self-sufficiency, the imagination is at the center of the process that transforms natural self-love (<italic>amour de soi</italic>) into <italic>amour-propre</italic>, and makes genuine human satisfaction fundamentally elusive. Following these introductory chapters, the remainder of the dissertation argues that, despite this critique, Rousseau in fact relies on the imagination in the successive stages of Emile's moral education to protect his independence and to strengthen those aspects of natural self-love (<italic>amour de soi</italic>) that lend themselves to the cultivation of the social virtues. Tracing the role of the imagination through Emile's education in compassion, justice, natural religion, love, and virtue, I argue that the proper habituation of the imagination proves to be indispensable for securing both happiness and morality, for defending individual autonomy in the context of social life, and for reconciling, to the extent possible, the private and the public good. Moreover, although Rousseau's recourse to the imagination might initially seem to introduce an element of irrationality into Emile's education, Emile's imagination in fact aids his ability to live not only a moral life but also a rational life. In a variety of ways, detailed in the dissertation, Rousseau employs the imagination and its illusions to forestall other more crippling illusions, to reveal the social world and the passions of men for what they truly are, and to make Emile both moderate and wise. Finally, however, while Emile's moral education engages his imagination in the most salutary manner possible, both for himself and for others, it cannot wholly prevent the imagination from giving birth to desires that betray a disruption of natural wholeness. While these desires present a complicated set of issues, in general, they represent the compromise with natural self-sufficiency that is involved in even the most promising moral education. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

The workings of admiration and adoration within individuals and the family as attitudes against self-interest were investigated. Interviews with American families in two New England states from ten Christian denominations (n = 20) were analyzed qualitatively. As a result, admiration was observed among almost all the families. Three means-end structures emerged in regard to spouses' configuration of the components of adoration, and these three groups of families indicated different features of family. The spouses of the Holistic Devotion (HD) group devoted all resources to God, rejecting the quest for self-interest, defining marriage/family as a coherent unit to serve God. The children participated in this attitude, expressing a similar devotion to God and rejection of self-interest. The spouses of the Personal God (PG) group perceived God as a meaning-maker and a benefactor who was involved in marriage, having multiple goals including spiritual growth and marital care and togetherness. The children expressed similar goals, including family togetherness and affirmation of satisfaction of self-interest. The spouses of the God-as-Benefactor (GB) group mentioned only admiration, and perceived that God was less involved in marriage; they valued marital care that functioned as mutual satisfaction of self-interest. The children similarly sought family togetherness, were centered in self-interest, and religion was instrumental to their self-interest. Six functions working in the family relationships of the HD group were elaborated, and the unique ontology behind these functions was analyzed.

The present study examined the effects of perceptions of fairness, prejudice and collective self-interest on the affirmative action attitudes of 85 White undergraduate students. Participants were classified as non-racists, modern racists or old-fashioned racists based on their scores on the Implicit Association Test and Attitudes Toward Blacks scale. In the first phase of the study, participants read affirmative action information preceded by either high or low attention instructions. In the second phase, fairness, status of position and race of the target of an affirmative action plan were manipulated using vignettes. No significant differences were found in the first phase of the study. In the second phase, it was found that when the plan was unfair and the target Black, participants preferred plans for low status positions to plans for high status positions. This finding was consistent with the idea that fairness, race and collective self-interest are related to affirmative action attitudes. However, contrary to the initial hypotheses, these effects did not interact with level of prejudice. Possible reasons for the null results regarding prejudice were discussed.

Why be moral? One possible, and compelling answer is that to act morally is in an agent's self-interest. Such an answer can be either elevationist (broadly speaking the Aristotelian/Platonic approach) where self-interest is elevated to coincide with living the good life, or reductionist where morality is defined as acting in an agent's self-interest. Elevationist moral theories appear flawed. If you are in possession of information that, if divulged, will bring about the deaths of others then it may be virtuous to stay silent. However, if staying silent results in you being slowly tortured to death in an effort to extract the information then it seems bizarre to suggest that in doing so you are flourishing, happy, or acting out of self-interest. Reductionist moral theories, acting for the 'good of self' rather than the 'good of others', are widely considered to be the antithesis of morality. Moral philosophers tend to attack such positions claiming that the doctrine of egoism is unworkable. It is commonly claimed that any theory which recommends 'an agent do x if x is in the agent's best interest' is inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory and fails to meet the basic requirements of a moral theory (notably the requirement of universalisability). I begin this thesis with an examination of ethical egoism in its most widely known consequentialist form; i.e. an agent ought to act so as to bring about the best consequences for that agent. I examine the major criticisms of this theory and demonstrate that the axioms of egoism can be developed so as to overcome these criticisms. I argue that consequentialist based ethical egoism is coherent, consistent and noncontradictory. However, I go on to argue that while egoism can be formulated in a manner that overcomes all the aforementioned analytic criticisms it is a flawed moral theory in that within certain contexts the action deemed morally correct by egoism is, as a matter of fact, morally pernicious. That a theory contains a flaw is not reason enough to discard the entire theory and I go on to contend that the problem with egoism is the consequentialist approach, not the fact that it is based on self-interest. In Part 2 of the thesis I abandon the consequentialist approach and examine the possibility of a flourishing-based form of ethical egoism. I further develop the axioms of egoism established in Part 1 through an examination of the concept of flourishing (as commonly associated with virtue ethics). Ultimately I tread a path between the consequentialist and elevationist positions. While I do not elevate self-interest to acting virtuously I do contend that an egoist must adopt certain virtues if that egoist is to have the best possibility to flourish. However, I further contend that an egoist ought to act so as to promote that which the egoist values and that this agent-relative hierarchy of values, which necessarily contains certain virtues, determines the manner in which an egoist ought to act.

Lord and Brown (Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999; Lord & Brown, 2004) suggest that leaders may impact followers by priming certain goals or ideals in their followers’ minds, which in turn influence judgment and behaviour. The current research examined whether transformational and transactional leaders unconsciously affect the values followers adopt and the goals they pursue, specifically the impact leaders have on follower self-interest. Although the relationship between leadership and self-interest has attracted a good deal of theoretical attention, little empirical work has been conducted to explore the impact of leadership on self-interest. Using established priming techniques, I demonstrated in three studies that transformational and transactional leaders affect self-interest in characteristic ways. In Study 1, participants read about a transformational and transactional leader and were subsequently primed with the image of one of the leaders. The results showed that participants primed with the transformational leader exhibited lower self-interest than those primed with the transactional leader. Study 2 replicated this effect, and demonstrated that the image of the leaders had a nonconscious effect on participants’ self-interest that was measurable after a delay of three days. Furthermore, this study found that participants’ pre-existing levels of prosocial values moderated the effectiveness of the prime. Study 3 extended the results of the first two studies by demonstrating that priming participants with a transformational leader significantly lowered self-interest in a context where individual gain was salient, and the transactional leader increased self-interest in a context focused on collective outcomes.

The crucial purposes of this thesis have two folds. Firstly, I will reconstruct Adam Smith¡¦s (5 June 1723-17 July 1790) thought through re-conceptualising the doctrine of the human nature in his theory. In doing this, I will give you reasons that the so-called ¡¥Das Adam Smith Problem¡¦ is founding on the wrong problematic concern in interpreting Smith¡¦s doctrine. The bulk of ¡¥the problem¡¦, having raised from the incessant controversy about whether Smith¡¦s theory is a coherent system built upon either sympathetic-based or interested-based foundation, but, as my kernel problematic concern in this thesis, I will argue that, neither side alone captures comprehensively about Smith¡¦s own understanding of human nature. Through presenting Smith¡¦s conception of the development of our moral judgement and his construction of operational principal of our market bahaviour, his doctrine of man should be orientated towards our intellectual capacity, especially on how do human cultivate their own moral judgement and the proper way of mutual understanding in everyday life. To accentuate the development of our capacity of judgement or reflection is the way I argue to understand Smith¡¦s conception of man correctly. Secondly, another controversy about Smith¡¦s doctrine lies on the contradiction among the concepts of ¡¥propriety¡¦ and ¡¥virtue¡¦ in his moral philosophy, while the former is the general standard attainable by the majority, and the latter with the stricter normative standard only a few men can achieve. My argument is, if man¡¦s intellectual capacity, such as judgement and reflection, having been regarded as essential concepts that Smith used to supersede the deficiency of one-sided understanding of human, then, his conception of impartial spectator and spectatorship¡¦s approach also gives the priority to cultivate our moral judgement and our capacity of reflection. Smith¡¦s primary concern, if I conceive it rightly, is to inspire our moral potential through disclosing the general principle lies behind our moral learning which terminated in the judgement made by impartial spectator, further, the concept of impartial spectator is also a linkage of different normative standards prescribed by propriety or virtue. Finally, In the conclusion part, I will connect my argument about moral potential with Smith¡¦s conception of human nature which tries to prove that, as the practical moralist, who considered man as intellectual animals that who deserves this privileged claim when who urges himself in enlarging and improving his own mentality.