No description available.

This qualitative study explores the motivations and experiences of individuals elected to serve on the Governing Council of the University of Toronto. Elected governors include alumni, students, staff and faculty. Six semi-structured interviews were conducted with 2 alumni governors, 2 student governors, and 2 staff/faculty governors. Interview questions helped to examine personal motivations behind serving in university governance, activities and duties of governors, self-perceptions of effectiveness and improvements to the experience of elected members. The responses were used to create interview summaries and discover common themes in the experiences of elected governors. Four theme areas emerged. They are (1) initial motivations, (2) learning and informal communication, (3) personal benefits, pride and positive experience, and (4) approach to governance. This study includes a discussion of the unique position of alumni governors and suggests improvements to the governor experience as recommended by the research participants.

This qualitative study explores the motivations and experiences of individuals elected to serve on the Governing Council of the University of Toronto. Elected governors include alumni, students, staff and faculty. Six semi-structured interviews were conducted with 2 alumni governors, 2 student governors, and 2 staff/faculty governors. Interview questions helped to examine personal motivations behind serving in university governance, activities and duties of governors, self-perceptions of effectiveness and improvements to the experience of elected members. The responses were used to create interview summaries and discover common themes in the experiences of elected governors. Four theme areas emerged. They are (1) initial motivations, (2) learning and informal communication, (3) personal benefits, pride and positive experience, and (4) approach to governance. This study includes a discussion of the unique position of alumni governors and suggests improvements to the governor experience as recommended by the research participants.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

No description available.

My Master?s thesis will be dealing with a field trip into the Parliament of the Czech Republic as a part of civics lessons in the 6th to the 9th grade of a primary school. It emphasises the meaning of field trips, their organization and it describes possible difficulties which the organizer can get into. The first part focuses on a political system in the Czech Republic with emphasis on general power division in the land. Its aim is to monitor the evolution of legislative power in Czech lands in the 20th century. The second part deals with a teaching method of a field trip as a progressive teaching method which has been out of interest of pedagogy and didactics. In the third part the emphasis is put on the preparation, accomplishment and consequent evaluation of the field trips into the Parliament of the Czech Republic in a form of a case study. It gives instructions for their organisation and mentions basic data about the running of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. It also analyses how much the field trip can supplement theoretical knowledge of the pupils gained in the civics lessons. The aim is to deal with the experience from a direct contact with the observed reality from the point of view of the 6th to the 9th grade primary school pupils. Diploma thesis can be used as a methodical tool for pedagogues of civics lessons to organise field trips into the Parliament of the Czech Republic.

Este trabalho discute o federalismo do ponto de vista de suas relações com o regime político democrático. Se o argumento de Alfred Stepan (1999) é de que o federalismo constrange as decisões do centro nacional e por isso seria anti-democrático, contrapõem-se uma visão consociativa, no qual o federalismo é visto como importante para integrar minorias dentro de sociedades eminentemente heterogêneas. A referência aqui é o trabalho de Arend Lijphart (2003). A democracia federativa brasileira é o campo de análise empírico, por meio de uma de suas instituições federativas, o Senado Federal. Examinamos os efeitos da desproporcionalidade desta casa com os da Câmara dos Deputados, a partir das possibilidades eventuais de vetos às propostas de emendas à Constituição. E a partir daí analisamos o governo de Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), por causa de seu caráter reformista, através de emendas constitucionais, a maior parte delas com impacto federativo. E se dentre estas emendas, as de caráter fiscal são as mais recorrentes, pesquisamos o papel do Senado no processo de ajuste fiscal deste governo, primeiro com relação à renegociação das dívidas estaduais e em segundo nas votações nominais do Fundo Social de Emergência (FSE) e suas renovações. Com isso procuramos verificar se, como e em que situações o Senado atuaria em defesa dos interesses dos estados (e regiões) que representa ou cooperaria com os intereses do governo, por meio dos partidos políticos. / This work discusses federalism from the standpoint of its relationship with the democratic political regime. If the viewpoint of Alfred Stepan (1999) is that federalism constrains decisionmaking at the national center, thus becoming anti-democratic, a consociative view is opposed: federalism would be important for the integration of minorities within eminently heterogeneous societies. In this work, the reference will be the work of Arend Lijphart (2003). The Brazilian federative democracy is the empirical field of analysis, through its federative institutions, the Federal Senate. We examine the effects of the disproportionallity of that body in relation to the Chamber of Deputies, manifest in the eventual possibilities of vetoes to proposed amendments to the Constitution, and we analyze the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), because of its reformist character, through constitutional amendments, most of them with federative impact. Since among those amendments, the fiscal-related ones are the most recurrent, we have researched the role of the Senate in the process of fiscal adjustment made by that administration, firstly in relation to the renegotiation of state-debts, and secondly in relation to nominal voting concerning Fundo Social de Emergência (FSE, or Emergency Social Fund) and its extensions. With that we have tried to verify whether, how and in which situations the Senate would be acting on behalf of the interest of the States (and regions) that the Senate represents, or whether it would cooperate with the interests of the administration, through party politics.