Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Thesis (B.Psy.Sc.(Hons.)) - University of Queensland, 2006. / Includes bibliography.

This study deals with the Definiteness Effect (DE) in Chinese you existential sentences from pragmatic perspectives and the scope is confined to the formal written style with discourse environments. The data used for analysis is the United Daily News Corpus and the data selection is restricted to the definite NPs which are considered unacceptable in you existential sentences: proper names, pronouns, demonstratives, universal quantifications, most-NPs, and superlative. The data for analysis in this study consist of 119 natural occurrences and the results reveal that definite NPs can occur in you existential sentences and the contexts where they appear consist of adjunct clauses and complement clauses embedded under the matrix verb. It is also observed that you existential sentences can assert the existence of entities or events and definite NPs can represent given information. I suggest that the Definiteness Effect is a misnomer and the restriction imposed on you existential sentences is derived from the non-application of ¡§identification¡¨ in existential sentences. Definite NPs are only allowed in you existential sentences when they are used to identify the entities. If the postverbal NPs are to introduce or present the entities into the discourse, definite NPs are ruled out. In addition, it is argued that if the definite NPs are anaphoric and thus given information, they are used to draw the addressee¡¦s attention to the presence of entities or events; namely, they serve as focusing topics. It seems odd to view them only as topic-introducing constructions.

Diss.--Hamburg Universität--Hamburg, 1998. / Bibliogr. p.181-195.

Thesis (M.A.) - Simon Fraser University, 2005. / Theses (School of Criminology) / Simon Fraser University. Also issued in digital format and available on the World Wide Web.

In late 20th-century Texas, during decades of rapid economic growth and abrupt social transformation, traditional state institutions and other features of a less affluent Southern past persisted side by side with the modern and newly developed. Criminal justice, in Texas as in other states, became a realm that was fiercely contested politically and in the courts. Sentencing and corrections, in particular, bore the brunt of changes promoted by the frequently conflicting forces of federal grant aid to states and federal judicial intervention. In the case of Texas, comprehensive reforms ordered by federal courts became a crucial, if limited, impetus for change that challenged the resistance of the political establishment. The courts typically sought to compel state institutions to meet standards of service provision set by professional experts and certifying organizations. The lead role played by federal courts--rather than Texas professionals themselves and their statewide organizations--in advocating for reforms indicates that in a state political environment marked by a tendency toward concentrated power, and with few independent, politically insulated institutions of their own, Texas doctors, lawyers, academics, and other professionals had few active roles to play. As examples of courtordered reform, the cases of prison medical care and juvenile confinement both display the chronic abasement of professional standards by state institutions, the limits of effective judicial intervention over time, and the long-term cyclical patterns of state politics. Other episodes of attempted reform--the use of federal grant funds originally intended to upgrade criminal justice agencies, and a succession of initiatives to change the criminal sentencing code--demonstrate the prevalence of political pressures over state-supported professional expertise. The particular importance of physicians--and the absence of state medical organizations--in promoting the revival of a modernized death penalty is emphasized by a comparison with England, where doctors asserted a professional interest in criminal justice policies and preempted the medicalization of capital punishment. Ultimately the fate of each of these initiatives in the realm of sentencing and correction reflects the pressures tending against the creation and maintenance of independent professional authority in Texas.

This thesis examines in detail the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 which allow for the incapacitation of the 'dangerous' offender. Incapacitation has been used as an example of a growing trend in criminal justice towards viewing crime in terms of risk. This risk discourse points to the use of actuarial practices and insurance techniques in this field, with a resultant 'abstraction' of the traditional view of crime as a moral wrong. The technologies of risk assessment are central to the very power of the discourse, it has been argued that these techniques further increase the effectiveness of control and that they are a response to a growing preoccupation in society with security. It is argued that risk is, in a sense, pre-political in that as risk takes hold, overtly political responses to crime become more difficult. Given that incapacitation has been used as an example of crime as risk, this thesis takes the form of a micro-study of the above incapacitatory legislation. It assesses the degree to which this legislation can be seen to be a part of the risk discourse. It is argued that on a general level the legislation does fit within the risk model, seeking to incapacitate 'bad risks'. However, it is argued that as the legislation has been conceived, formulated and employed, it does not make use of the actuarial techniques of risk assessment - seen as so central to 'internal dynamic' of the risk discourse - to a significant extent. Rather, it is argued that the legislation embodies a politically motivated appeal to the idea of risk rather than to risk assessment itself. It is concluded that this use of risk - once shed of its attendant technologies - far from making political responses more difficult, sits well with punitive responses demanded by a government of the right.

In this study I tackle the problem of justifying criminal punishment. Although I take heed of a traditional line of theorizing which says that punishment is an expressive and communicative endeavour, my theory breaks away from traditional approaches. This break is motivated by a recognition that theorists working in the traditional framework have failed to resolve the tension between retributivist and consequentialist reasons for punishment. I argue that punishment is justified as a type of communication from those affected by the crime to distinct and varied audiences. My naturalistic theory is structured around two fundamental themes, naturalism and pluralism about aims. The naturalism consists in the fact that the theory takes an empirically informed descriptive approach to the problem of justifying punishment. This foundation provides the resources for developing a balanced view of the moral agent which takes into account not only cognitive but also emotional capacities. This broader, deeper view of agency permits, indeed calls for, an analysis of the moral psychologies of those involved in the social practice. That analysis leads to the explanation that punishment is a type of communication of, among other things, strong but justified moral sentiments. Further development of this view suggests that punishment's various messages are intended for a variety of audiences - not just the wrongdoer but also the victim and community. That explication supports my other fundamental theme, pluralism about aims. The social institution of punishment is a complex one involving stakeholders who have differing motives and needs. Consequently, we should reject strategies which claim that punishment's justification can be reduced to one reason such as, for example, that the criminal deserves it. I argue that punishment's justification is multifaceted and complex. The arguments I put forward to justify punishment also bring to light aspects of the existing social institution that need reform. In general, they point to the need to design penal measures that promote communication among wrongdoer, victim and community. But I also call for a specific reform. I argue that the victim, whose concerns have traditionally been disregarded, should also be given a voice within the social institution.

No abstract available. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Durban,1987.

In this thesis we shall investigate the kinds of information which the Human Sentence Processing Mechanism employs during the resolution of local syntactic ambiguity in written texts. The thesis is in three parts. In Part I we consider some current models of syntactic ambiguity resolution. On the one hand, we consider the structural approaches, in which the processor considers only syntactic information when choosing between alternatives. On the other, we consider the interactive approaches, in which different kinds of information are brought to bear during the resolution process. In Part II, we describe a number of experiments which contrast the predictions of these two approaches. In particular, we investigate the processing of sentences which are locally ambiguous between a simple noun phrase analysis and a complex noun phrase analysis. Frazier (1979) predicts that the simple noun phrase analysis is chosen because it utilizes fewest phrasal nodes in its associated phrase marker. Crain and Steedman (1985), however, predict that the interpretation of the noun phrase is determined by referential factors, such as whether or not a unique referent can be identified for the noun phrase. The results support Crain and Steedman's interactive hypothesis. In Part III, we consider some theoretical issues concerning the timing of the processor's decisions. Crain and Steedman's original model is modified in the light of such considerations. We explore the implications of the modification for the status of syntax and semantics within our model of sentence comprehension. In the final chapter, we attempt to explain the existence of parsing preferences in sentences which are presented in isolation, and for which no explicit contextual information has been provided. We conclude that contextual considerations, such as the distinction between what is and what is not already known to the hearer, are of fundamental importance during the resolution of local syntactic ambiguity by the Human Sentence Processing Mechanism.