M.A. (Philosophy) / Usually when we think of law, we think of rationality and outcomes that are not swayed by emotion. Modern Western society tends to think of emotion and rationality as incompatible. It is a widely-held belief that it is more morally desirable for people to make ‘rational’ decisions rather than ‘emotional’ decisions in life in general. Perhaps in no other area is this distinction between the two more pronounced as in criminal law, where judges who society considers to be making ‘rational’ judicial decisions are revered, and those who society at large considers to be making ‘emotional’ judicial decisions are distrusted. As Terry Maroney (2006: 120) says, “[a] core presumption underlying modern legality is that reason and emotion are different beasts entirely…the sphere of law admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion from creeping in where it does not belong”. In this dissertation, I propose to look at the virtue of mercy, where mercy is understood to have a significant emotional component, and to answer the question: Should a judge in a criminal trial employ mercy? If so, under what conditions? The importance of the question of whether a judge should employ mercy in a criminal case is that it addresses one part of the larger enquiry into how the state should respond to offenders. As moral beings, our emotional responses to criminals and their crimes are varied. Sometimes we feel anger, at other times disgust, and at other times mercy, grief and sadness.

This thesis examines in detail the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 which allow for the incapacitation of the 'dangerous' offender. Incapacitation has been used as an example of a growing trend in criminal justice towards viewing crime in terms of risk. This risk discourse points to the use of actuarial practices and insurance techniques in this field, with a resultant 'abstraction' of the traditional view of crime as a moral wrong. The technologies of risk assessment are central to the very power of the discourse, it has been argued that these techniques further increase the effectiveness of control and that they are a response to a growing preoccupation in society with security. It is argued that risk is, in a sense, pre-political in that as risk takes hold, overtly political responses to crime become more difficult. Given that incapacitation has been used as an example of crime as risk, this thesis takes the form of a micro-study of the above incapacitatory legislation. It assesses the degree to which this legislation can be seen to be a part of the risk discourse. It is argued that on a general level the legislation does fit within the risk model, seeking to incapacitate 'bad risks'. However, it is argued that as the legislation has been conceived, formulated and employed, it does not make use of the actuarial techniques of risk assessment - seen as so central to 'internal dynamic' of the risk discourse - to a significant extent. Rather, it is argued that the legislation embodies a politically motivated appeal to the idea of risk rather than to risk assessment itself. It is concluded that this use of risk - once shed of its attendant technologies - far from making political responses more difficult, sits well with punitive responses demanded by a government of the right. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

In this study I tackle the problem of justifying criminal punishment. Although I take heed of a traditional line of theorizing which says that punishment is an expressive and communicative endeavour, my theory breaks away from traditional approaches. This break is motivated by a recognition that theorists working in the traditional framework have failed to resolve the tension between retributivist and consequentialist reasons for punishment. I argue that punishment is justified as a type of communication from those affected by the crime to distinct and varied audiences. My naturalistic theory is structured around two fundamental themes, naturalism and pluralism about aims. The naturalism consists in the fact that the theory takes an empirically informed descriptive approach to the problem of justifying punishment. This foundation provides the resources for developing a balanced view of the moral agent which takes into account not only cognitive but also emotional capacities. This broader, deeper view of agency permits, indeed calls for, an analysis of the moral psychologies of those involved in the social practice. That analysis leads to the explanation that punishment is a type of communication of, among other things, strong but justified moral sentiments. Further development of this view suggests that punishment's various messages are intended for a variety of audiences - not just the wrongdoer but also the victim and community. That explication supports my other fundamental theme, pluralism about aims. The social institution of punishment is a complex one involving stakeholders who have differing motives and needs. Consequently, we should reject strategies which claim that punishment's justification can be reduced to one reason such as, for example, that the criminal deserves it. I argue that punishment's justification is multifaceted and complex. The arguments I put forward to justify punishment also bring to light aspects of the existing social institution that need reform. In general, they point to the need to design penal measures that promote communication among wrongdoer, victim and community. But I also call for a specific reform. I argue that the victim, whose concerns have traditionally been disregarded, should also be given a voice within the social institution. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

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Alors que la peine de mort a été abolie dans bon nombre de pays occidentaux, sa peine de substitution, l’emprisonnement à perpétuité, est largement acceptée et souvent considérée comme peu problématique. Or, peut-on vraiment considérer que l’emprisonnement à vie est une peine plus humaine, ou moins cruelle, que la peine capitale ? Dans ce mémoire, nous étudierons les peines perpétuelles prévues en droit canadien et français. Les délinquants dangereux feront eux aussi partie de l’analyse : les peines de détention à durée indéterminée qu’ils subissent sont en réalité très peu distinctes des peines imposées aux condamnés à perpétuité. Nous nous inspirerons également de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, dont les enseignements sont particulièrement éclairants en matière de perpétuité. Surtout, ce mémoire présentera des réflexions nécessaires sur la dignité humaine, le droit à l’espoir, le populisme pénal et la notion de dangerosité. Nous examinerons finalement la possibilité que la peine d’emprisonnement à vie soit abolie, et nous présenterons brièvement les peines alternatives permettant de punir les crimes les plus graves. / While the death penalty has been abolished in many Western countries, its alternative penalty, life imprisonment, is widely accepted and often viewed as unproblematic. However, can we really consider life imprisonment to be more humane, or less cruel, than capital punishment ? In the following pages, we will study life sentences in Canadian and French law. Dangerous offenders will also be part of the analysis : the indeterminate sentences they serve are in fact not so different from the sentences imposed on lifers. We will also analyze the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, whose lessons are particularly enlightening regarding life imprisonment. Above all, this work will present necessary reflections on human dignity, the right to hope, penal populism and the notion of dangerousness. We will finally examine if life sentences could in fact be abolished, and we will briefly present the alternative sentences for the most serious crimes.

L'auteure s'est intéressée à l'impact du lieu où se déroule l'imposition de la peine dans la détermination de celle-ci. Au centre de cette étude donc, le principe d'harmonisation des peines que l'on retrouve à l'alinéa 718.2 b) du Code Criminel. Les principes de détermination de la peine guident le juge dans l'exercice difficile de l'imposition de la peine appropriée. Parmi ceux-ci, l'harmonisation des peines implique que le juge doit s'assurer de « l'infliction de peines semblables à celles infligées à des délinquants pour des infractions semblables commises dans des circonstances semblables ». Dans cette étude divisée en deux chapitres, l'auteure nous présente tout d'abord une recension de la littérature portant sur ce principe, comprenant les origines de celui-ci, son interprétation par les tribunaux et une section consacrée à l'étude criminologique des disparités sentencielles. L'auteure discute entre autres de l'arrêt Lacasse, rendu par la Cour suprême en 2015, qui permet au juge de première instance de s'écarter des fourchettes de peines applicables en raison de la présence d'une situation locale particulière ou des besoins de la communauté. Dans le deuxième chapitre, l'auteure nous présente les résultats de son étude empirique, dans laquelle elle a comparé les peines imposées pour des infractions à l'article 733.1 du Code criminel, soit le manquement à une ordonnance de probation entre les districts judiciaires de Montréal et de Rimouski. En ayant compilé plus de 150 dossiers dans lesquels des peines furent imposées en 2018 (année de référence), l'auteure est en mesure de dresser des constats d'intérêt pour la communauté juridique, qui replacent les principes d'harmonisation et de proportionnalité de peine au cœur du débat. / The author is interested in the impact of the place where the imposition of the sentence takes place in the determination of this one. At the center of this study, therefore, is the principle of harmonization of penalties found in section 718.2 b) of the Criminal Code. The principles of sentencing guide the judge in the difficult exercise of imposing the appropriate sentence. Among these, the harmonization of sentences implies that the judge must ensure "the imposition of sentences similar to those inflicted on offenders for similar offenses committed in similar circumstances". In this study divided into two chapters, the author first presents a review of the literature on this principle, including its origins, its interpretation by the courts and a section devoted to the criminological study of sentencing disparities. The author discusses, among other things, the Lacasse decision, rendered by the Supreme Court in 2015, which allows the trial judge to deviate from the applicable sentencing ranges due to the presence of a particular local situation or the needs from the community. In the second chapter, the author presents the results of her empirical study, in which she compared the sentences imposed for offenses under section 733.1 of the Criminal Code, namely breach of a probation order between the judicial districts of Montreal and Rimouski. By having compiled more than 150 cases in which sentences were imposed in 2018 (reference year), the author is able to draw up findings of interest for the legal community, which put the principle of harmonization and proportionality of sentences at the heart of the debate.

The primary focus of this thesis was to find out what makes workable topic sentences different from inadequate ones. A group of topic sentences was collected from the author's eight grade students and reviewed.

Depuis longtemps l’importance des commentaires des Sentences de Pierre Lombard pour les études en histoire de sciences n’est plus à démontrer. Œuvres des théologiens, ces textes traitent pourtant un grand nombre de sujets relevant de la philosophie naturelle. La question de l’influence céleste en est une preuve. Les commentateurs des Sentences l’abordent de deux façons. D’une part, ils parlent de l’influence céleste « normale », celle des sphères, des planètes et des étoiles étudiées dans les ouvrages astronomiques médiévaux. Nos auteurs décrivent en détail le rôle de ces corps supérieurs dans le système des causes, énumèrent et classifient les effets qu’ils produisent, indiquent les limites de leur pouvoir. Tout en se démarquant des astrologues, ils affirment également que les astres sont des signes à interpréter. D’autre part, les commentateurs des Sentences veulent saisir une influence céleste « extraordinaire », celle des corps supérieurs dont l’existence est postulée par les théologiens. Ils cherchent à savoir si le ciel des empyrées, l’ultime sphère de l’univers dans laquelle demeureront à la fin des temps les bienheureux, agit sur les corps terrestres. Ils s’efforcent de comprendre si, après le Jugement dernier, les planètes et les étoiles dont le mouvement cessera et dont la lumière augmentera produiront toujours des phénomènes dans le monde d’ici-bas. Notre étude poursuit un objectif double : d’abord, analyser les deux notions, celle de l’influence des cieux astronomiques et celle de l’influence des cieux théologiques, ensuite, comprendre comment elles s’articulent. Le problème de la causalité des corps supérieurs « hors normes » est-il résolu conformément à la conception de la causalité céleste « ordinaire » d’une période donnée ? Ou, inversement, cette théorie est-elle capable d’évoluer pour inclure les cas limites de l’empyrée et des cieux post-apocalyptiques ? À travers ces interrogations, nous aborderons le complexe sujet des rapports entre la théologie et la physique, entre la foi et la science. / The importance of the Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard for the history of science has been well-established for a long time. Although they were written by theologians, those texts deal with many topics coming under natural philosophy. The question of celestial influence is a good proof. The Sentences commentators address it in two ways. On the one hand, they deal with the « normal » influence, that of the spheres, planets and stars which are studied in the medieval astronomical writings. Our authors describe with scrutiny the role of the celestial bodies within the system of causes, they list and classify the effects which they produced, show the limit of their power. While distancing themselves from the astrologers, they also assert those celestial bodies are signs to be interpreted. On the other hand, the Sentences commentators want to grasp an « extraordinary » celestial influence, that of some celestial bodies, whose existence is postulated by the theologians. They seek to know if the Empyrean Heaven, the last sphere of the universe where the Blessed will live, act on terrestrial bodies. They strive to understand if, after the Last Judgement, the stars and the planets, whose motion will cease and whose light will grow, will still produce phenomena on our inferior world. Our study pursues a double goal: first, it aims to analyze the two notions, that of the influence of the astronomical heavens and that of the influence of the theological heavens; then, it aims to understand how these two notions are articulated. Is the problem of the causality of « abnormal » superior bodies solved according to the conception of the « ordinary » celestial causality at a given period? Or conversely is this theory able to evolve so that it may include the borderline cases of the Empyrean Heaven and the Post-Apocalyptic heavens? This questioning will enable us to tackle the complex issue of the relationship between theology and physics, between faith and science.