This research discussed the influence between directors and supervisors and the separation of ownership and control toward enterprise value according to the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment of interest hypothesis. The result indicated that, from 2003 to 2008, directors and supervisors¡¦ shareholding ratio and chair ratio of Taiwanese listed information service corporations had a negative relation with enterprise value. The shareholding ratio of substantial shareholders had a positive relation with enterprise value ¡V the shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors had the convergence and the entrenchment of interest effect on enterprise value. The more cash-flow rights the control shareholders owned, the higher the enterprise value was. When we used specific percentage to discuss the nonlinear relation between equity transparency and enterprise value, we discovered that the nonlinear relation between Proxy Q and the separation of ownership and control did not exist. However, there existed a ¡§W-shaped¡¨ nonlinear relation when the dependent variable was ROA or ROE. It can explain that the implementation of corporate governance on enterprise value has a certain degree of influence. Nonetheless, whether the effect is good or bad depends on what role one plays in the enterprise.

Syfte: Syftet med studien är att ur ett agentteoretiskt perspektiv skapa förståelse för hur separationen av ägande och kontroll ter sig i ett svenskt kundägt bolag samt vilka konsekvenser detta medför och vilka lösningar bolaget arbetar med. Metod: Studien präglas av en abduktiv forskningsansats. Studien är en fallstudie där vi syftar i att undersöka en specifik organisation. Data är insamlad med hjälp av semistrukturerade intervjuer som bearbetats genom tematisk analys. Resultat & slutsats: Vi ser tendenser till en stor separation av ägande och kontroll likaväl som en mindre. Den större separationen beror främst på spritt ägande och resulterar i en hög grad informationsasymmetri. Separationen tenderar dock även att minskas till följd av användning av fullmäktige, lokal placering samt återinvesteringar i länet. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Förslag till vidare forskning är att skapa förståelse för vilken effekt kundägda bolag upplever till följd av att de två parterna kund och ägare innehas av samma person. Uppsatsens bidrag: Studiens teoretiska bidrag är att öka kunskapen om kundägda bolag och dess hantering av separation av ägande och kontroll. Det praktiska bidraget för studien är att bidra med kunskap till intervjuernas respondenter samt övriga intressenter till organisationen vi undersökt. Vår ambition är även att öka intresset för engagerade ägare. Nyckelord: kundägda bolag, agentteori, separation av ägande och kontroll, informationsasymmetri, intressekonflikt / Aim: The aim for this study is from an agent theoretical perspective generate comprehension of how the separation of ownership and control seems in a Swedish mutual organization as well as what consequences this leads to and what solutions the organization is working with. Method: The study is characterized by an abductive approach. The study takes the form of a case study aimed for research of a specific mutual organization. The collected data is a result of semi-structured interviews that has been analyzed with a thematic analysis. Result & conclusions: We anticipate both a large separation of ownership and control as well as a small one. The larger one is due to a scattered ownership that results in a greater extent of information asymmetry. The separation also tends to get smaller due to the establishment of the council, that the organization operates locally and due to the reinvests in the local community. Suggestions for future research: Suggestions for future research is to generate comprehension of which impact mutual organizations experiences from the fact that two parties, customer and owner, are held within the same individual.   Contribution of the thesis: The theoretical contribution is to increase knowledge about mutual organization and their management of separation of ownership and control. The practical contribution is to distribute knowledge to the respondents as well as other stakeholders of the examined organization. Our ambition is also to increase interest for committed owners. Key words: mutual organization, Agent theory, separation of ownership and control, information asymmetry, conflict of interest

Šiuo metu vyraujanti pasaulinė ekonominė krizė, taip pat ankstesni bendrovių bankrotų pavyzdžiai (tokių kaip Enron, Parmalat) signalizuoja apie būtinybę tinkamai sureguliuoti bendrovių valdymo teisinę bazę, o ypač aspektus susijusius su bendrovės akcininkų ir valdymo organo santykiais. Todėl šiame magistro darbe yra analizuojamos teisinės priemonės, kurios padeda sumažinti interesų konfliktus kylančius tarp bendrovių, kurių vertybiniais popieriais yra prekiaujama reguliuojamoje rinkoje, akcininkų ir valdymo organo. Šiam tikslui pasiekti yra išskiriamos penkios teisinio reguliavimo sritys: bendrovių kontrolės rinkos ir bendrovių perėmimo, informacijos atskleidimo, valdymo organo narių finansinio skatinimo, valdymo organo struktūros bei bendrovės akcininkų teisių teisinis reguliavimas. Kiekviena reguliavimo sritis yra aptariama dviem aspektais, pirmiausia, analizuojant Europos Sąjungos lygiu egzistuojantį teisinį reguliavimą, po to vertinant tokio reguliavimo įgyvendinimą Lietuvos Respublikoje bei pateikiant pastabas ir pasiūlymus. Darbe padaroma išvada, kad norint sumažinti neigiamas pasekmes atsirandančias dėl nuosavybės teisės ir valdymo atskyrimo bendrovėse, reikia, kad visos aukščiau išvardintos priemonės papildytų viena kitą ir būtų taikomos sistemiškai. / The ongoing economic crisis around the world and the recent events in corporate bankruptcy sector (including Enron and Parmalat cases) have shown a clear signal to regulate more efficiently the corporate governance laws and especially the relations between shareholders and the governance body of the company. This thesis paper addresses the regulatory framework issues, which mitigate the conflict of interests between the shareholders and the governance body of publicly traded companies. Five legal instruments are analyzed in order to achieve this objective: market for corporate control and takeovers, information disclosure, director remuneration, structure of governance body and shareholder empowerment. Each legal instrument is analyzed from two legal perspectives, first, the European Union legal framework is described and then analysis concentrates on the implementation of European law in the Republic of Lithuania. Comments and proposals are given to existing implementation problems. The conclusion emphasizes that a systematic use of all the above mentioned legal instruments is required in order to mitigate the costs of separation of ownership and control in publicly traded companies.