We consider a decentralized, two-echelon supply chain where the upper echelon --the supplier-- bears the inventory risk. To service the retailers, the supplier either keeps inventory reserved for each of her customers or else pools inventory to share among her customers. The common insight regarding inventory pooling is that it reduces costs and so increases profits for the supply chain party carrying inventory. However, it has recently been shown that inventory pooling may indeed reduce the total supply chain profits. We further show that inventory pooling may reduce supply chain profits even under traditional service contracts based on the frequently invoked measure of service, probability of stock-out. We model the inventory transactions among the retailers and the supplier as a cooperative game. The players have the option of reserving inventory or forming inventory-pooling coalitions. The total profit of the coalitions is allotted to the players using a profit-sharing mechanism based on Shapley value. We analyze the properties of the proposed profit-sharing scheme in two steps. We first consider a stylized model with two retailers who are not necessarily identical. Then we extend the analysis to an arbitrary number of identical retailers. In both cases, we assume the demand across retailers is independent. We find that the Shapley value allocations coordinate the supply chain and are individually rational. However for more than two retailers, they may not be in the core. Even when they satisfy all the stability properties, including membership in the core, they may be perceived unfair since a player's allocation can exceed his contribution to the total supply chain profit. In addition to analyzing the stability properties of the proposed allocation mechanism, we are also interested in the types of behavior the mechanism induces in the players. We find that the retailers prefer pooling partners with either very high or low service level requirements and the supplier prefers retailers with low service requirements since this gives her the ability to maximize her profit allocation. Finally, we analyze the effects of demand variance on the allocations and the profitability of strategic retailer coalitions.

The aim of the paper is to discuss the way that the online job banks send resumes to businesses for job seekers, and most businesses and job seekers have chosen online job banks as channel management for job wanted due to the rapid development of information technology for recent years. What businesses find employees and job seekers find jobs through the online job banks can be classified into two kinds, one is active candidates for the job, and another is matching pair by the online job banks. The online job banks help job seekers to send resumes to businesses by means of both ways, and how the online job banks send resumes to businesses for job seekers will affect the outcome. Therefore, this paper focuses on original way of sending resumes used by the online job banks, and also uses Gale-Shapley algorithm to devise different way of sending resumes which the online job banks possibly use in the future and consequently by comparing two ways of sending resumes, it can analyze what ways of sending resumes can be adopted by the online job banks under different situations.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T15:49:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Este trabalho apresenta uma metodologia para a aplicação de conceitos de Teoria dos Jogos Cooperativos para a alocação de banda entre fluxos de tráfego de aplicações da Internet, com perfis diferenciados. O cenário de redes multisserviço é explorado como aplicação do mecanismo de compartilhamento de banda com justiça. Este cenário utiliza mecanismos baseados em classes de serviço para fornecer suporte explícito para as necessidades de qualidade de serviço de aplicações de rede. Os fluxos de tráfego são agregados em classes de acordo com modelos de restrição de banda. Estes modelos são configurados para cada enlace, especificando como uma parcela de banda pode ser compartilhada. A solução adotada utiliza o princípio de coalizão de jogos cooperativos através do cálculo do Valor de Shapley para determinação do limite desta parcela. Esta solução é eficiente porque distribui todos os recursos disponíveis entre os jogadores e é justa porque considera a combinação de todas as possíveis ocorrências de alocação, dividindo excedentes ou perdas de maneira igualitária. Isso permite que sejam considerados os casos em que a demanda menor de uma classe possibilite que essa classe ceda recursos para outra classe mais sobrecarregada. A adoção de classes de serviços garante a minimização da troca de informação, viabilizando o uso de um mecanismo de arbitragem capaz de tomar decisões segundo um critério de justiça pré-estabelecido. Nos cenários apresentados, a alocação foi realizada de acordo com a carga oferecida de cada classe. Dois novos modelos de restrição de banda foram propostos: MAR with Shapley value e SHApley value with Reservation Model. Formalismos de Redes de Petri Estocásticas foram aplicados para a especificação de modelos de restrição de Banda. Isto permitiu a análise de desempenho de modelos de restrição de banda em redes com perdas em modelos já estabelecidos na literatura, assim como viabilizou a análise dos novos modelos de restrição de banda propostos com relação à eficiência e justiça da alocação. Os resultados apresentados validaram a aplicação da solução proposta através da avaliação do impacto da substituição da regra de alocação proporcional pelo Valor de Shapley

La thèse propose quatre contributions sur la méthode axiomatique. Les trois premiers chapitres utilisent le formalisme des jeux coopératifs à utilité transférable. Dans les deux premiers chapitres, une étude systématique de l'opération de nullification est menée. Les axiomes de retraits sont transformés en axiomes de nullification. Des caractérisations existantes de règles d’allocation sont revisitées, et des résultats totalement neufs sont présentés. Le troisième chapitre introduit et caractérise une valeur de Shapley proportionnelle, où les dividendes d’Harsanyi sont partagés en proportion des capacités des singletons concernés. Le quatrième chapitre propose une variante multi-dimensionnelle de l’indice de Hirsch. Une caractérisation axiomatique et une application aux classements sportifs sont fournies. / The dissertation provides four contributions on the axiomatic method. The first three chapters deal with cooperative games with transferable utility. In the first two chapters, a systematic study of the nullification operation is done. The removal axioms are translated into their nullified counterparts. Some existing characterizations are revisited, and completely new results are presented. The third chapter introduces and characterizes a proportional Shapley value in which the Harsanyi dividends are shared in proportion to the stand-alone worths of the concerned players. The fourth chapter proposes a multi-dimensional variant of the Hirsch index. An axiomatic characterization and an application to sports rankings are provided.

Diese Dissertation präsentiert Modelle zur Lösung von Verhandlungsproblemen mit diskreten Strukturen. Hauptgrundlage der Betrachtung ist dabei die Erweiterung und Anwendung von Theorien der kooperativen Spieltheorie. Insbesondere der Shapley-Wert spielt eine wichtige Rolle. Als erste Problemklasse werden kooperative Spiele präsentiert, bei denen einige Spiele feste Auszahlungen erhalten. Als zweite Problemklasse werden kooperative Spiele untersucht, deren Lösungen ausschließlich ganzzahlig sein dürfen.

在各國職業運動的發展中，自由球員制度的出現醞釀出了大革命。本文以一賽局模型，利用Nash 議價及 Shapley 值等數學模型的輔助，嘗試探討自由球員制度出現後球員及球團效用的增減。最後，我們得到談判力量大小左右了勞資雙方談薪優勢或劣勢這樣的結果。當球團擁有高於球員的談判力量時，即使在自由球員制度下球團仍然獲益。

L’étude de la planification entre partenaires coopérant au sein d’une chaine logistique au niveau tactique fait l’objet de cette thèse. Le présent travail se focalise plus particulièrement sur la coordination des processus de planification des activités de transport et de production, autour d’une nouvelle approche fondée sur la théorie des jeux. Deux situations de coopération sont considérées, selon le caractère homogène ou hétérogène des partenaires ; ainsi une première étude est menée sur un ensemble d’opérateurs de transport pour ensuite être étendue à la relation entre l’entreprise manufacturière et les transporteurs qui travaillent avec elle. L’expérimentation s’appuie sur des modèles mathématiques en programmation linéaire pour simuler les processus de planification des différents groupes de partenaires (également appelés coalitions), un protocole de coopération utilisant certaines propriétés liées à la théorie des jeux et sur une répartition équitable des gains / coûts telle que préconisée par la valeur de Shapley. Les modèles et l’ensemble du protocole sont appliqués à deux cas d’étude basés sur des jeux de données réalistes. / This thesis focuses on the collaboration between partners inside supply chain at the tactical level of planning. This work aims to develop a new approach based on game theory to solve the problem of coordinating processes concerned by production and transportation planning decision making. Two types of coalitions cooperative games are implemented according to the nature of partners: the cooperation between homogeneous partners concerns multiple transport operators while the other case is more on the relationships between heterogeneous partners including one manufacturer and multiple transport operators. The coordination is supported by mathematical models implemented in linear programming which simulate the planning process within the various possible pools of partners, also called “coalitions”. These models are used in a gains/costs sharing protocol between the partners which is based on the Shapley value. Some basic properties are checked in order to verify if the cooperation is valid. The models and the protocol are assessed on theoretical test cases based on realistic data sets.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento CientÃfico e TecnolÃgico / This work aimed at to analyze the allocation of the financial costs in projects of multiple uses in the section of water resources, among different purposes of use of the water. Such projects are cheaper because, they present scale savings due to the shared use of the resources, thus, the central problem that appears is as allocating the costs among the participants of the project. It was taken as example the fishing reservoir in the municipal district of Capistrano, and the one of Figueiredo in the municipal district of High Saint, both in CearÃ. The methodology used to allocate the costs among the purposes of the projects was given by the rule of defined allocation as value of Shapley, belonging to the theory of the cooperative games. For the project of the Fishing reservoir, the allocated values of the total cost among the integral purposes, they satisfy the beginnings of justness, resulting in a fair and efficient solution, what indicates for that case studied that the solution is in the nucleus of the game. A different conclusion is removed of the results generated for the other used example. The obtained allocations are not in agreement with one of the beginnings of justness, indicating a solution no belonging to the nucleus of the game, which defines impartiality in the allocations obtained for the project of Figueiredo's reservoir. / Este trabalho objetivou analisar a alocaÃÃo dos custos financeiros em projetos de usos mÃltiplos no setor de recursos hÃdricos, entre diferentes finalidades de uso da Ãgua. Tais projetos sÃo mais baratos porque, apresentam economias de escala devido ao uso compartilhado dos recursos, assim, o problema central que surge à como alocar os custos entre os participantes do projeto. Tomou-se como exemplo o reservatÃrio Pesqueiro no municÃpio de Capistrano, e o de Figueiredo no municÃpio de Alto Santo, ambos no CearÃ. A metodologia utilizada para alocar os custos entre as finalidades dos projetos foi dada pela regra de alocaÃÃo definida como valor de Shapley, pertencente à teoria dos jogos cooperativos. Para o projeto do reservatÃrio Pesqueiro, os valores alocados do custo total entre as finalidades integrantes, satisfazem os princÃpios de equidade, resultando em uma soluÃÃo justa e eficiente, o que indica para esse caso estudado que a soluÃÃo està no nÃcleo do jogo. Uma distinta conclusÃo à retirada dos resultados gerados para o outro exemplo utilizado. As alocaÃÃes obtidas nÃo estÃo de acordo com um dos princÃpios de equidade, indicando uma soluÃÃo nÃo pertencente ao nÃcleo do jogo, que define imparcialidade nas alocaÃÃes obtidas para o projeto do reservatÃrio de Figueiredo.

[pt] A Geração Distribuída (GD) tem modificado profundamente a estrutura clássica dos sistemas elétricos. No Brasil, o modelo tarifário adotado pela regulação atual, denominado Sistema de Compensação de Energia, estabelece que a energia injetada pela GD na rede da distribuidora desconta integralmente a energia consumida, com todas suas componentes tarifárias. Em voga, a discussão para novas regras a respeito das formas de remuneração e valoração da GD envolve por um lado as distribuidoras, que alegam que o atual mecanismo de compensação não remunera adequadamente o uso do sistema de distribuição e, por outro lado, consumidores que optam pela GD, pontuam seus benefícios à sociedade e defendem o atual modelo. Neste sentido, é proposta nesta tese de doutorado uma nova metodologia de quantificação e alocação de benefícios e custos da GD em sistemas de distribuição, que gere um sinal tarifário capaz de traduzir os efeitos da sua localização e presença na rede. A concepção básica abrange a identificação, contabilidade e partilha do que são denominadas na metodologia proposta como funções, que representam características tarifáveis e consideradas adequadas na averiguação da remuneração da GD. Neste trabalho, as funções que serão avaliadas representam o impacto da GD no uso, nas perdas, no pico de carga e na confiabilidade da rede de distribuição. A alocação entre os geradores é realizada utilizando-se o Valor Shapley da Teoria de Jogos Cooperativos. Para aplicação da metodologia proposta, dois sistemas testes e um sistema real de distribuição são utilizados e os resultados obtidos são amplamente discutidos. / [en] Distributed Generation (DG) has deeply changed the classical structure of electrical power systems. In Brazil, the tariff model adopted by the current regulation, called the Energy Compensation System, establishes that the energy injected by DG into the distribution grid fully discounts the energy consumed, with all its tariff components. In vogue, the discussion for new rules regarding the forms of remuneration and valuation of DG involves, on the one hand, distributors, who claim that the current compensation mechanism does not adequately remunerate the use of the distribution system, and, on the other hand, consumers who choose for DG, point out its benefits to society and defend the current model. In this sense, this doctoral thesis proposes a new method for quantifying and allocating DG benefits and costs in distribution systems, which generates a tariff signal capable of translating the effects of its location and presence in the network. The basic concept covers the identification, accounting and sharing of what are called in the proposed method as functions, which represent chargeable characteristics and considered adequate in the study of DG remuneration. In this work, the functions that will be evaluated represent the DG impact on the usage, losses, peak load and reliability of the distribution network. The allocation between generators is performed using the Shapley Value of Cooperative Game Theory. In order to apply the proposed method, two test systems and a real distribution system are used and the obtained results are widely discussed.

Apresentamos a teoria sobre mercados de dois lados, centralizados e descentralizados, para analisar o mercado de admissão de estudantes aos Centros de Pós-graduação em Economia no Brasil ao longo dos últimos 15 anos. Iniciamos descrevendo a história da organização deste mercado até a época atual. As falhas do sistema descentralizado e as hipóteses sobre o insucesso do procedimento centralizado de 1997 são discutidas. Observações empíricas são utilizadas para propor um modelo teórico que represente aproximadamente o atual mecanismo descentralizado e explique a aparente duradoura aplicação desse mecanismo. Por fim, tecemos considerações a respeito das possibilidades de aprimoramento deste mercado com modificações do mecanismo existente. / We present the theory of two-sided matching markets, with centralized and decentralized mechanisms, in order to analyze a Brazilian market in which graduated students seek positions in postgraduate programs in economics. We first describe the institutional history of this market. The failures of the decentralized procedure and the hypothesis about the failure of the 1997 centralized mechanism are discussed. Empirical observations are used to propose a theoretical model that represents the actual decentralized matching procedure of the market. Based in this model we explain the apparent long-lasting use of this decentralized mechanism. Finally, we make considerations about the possibilities of developments in this market by modifying the mechanism used today.