In his account of the intellectual cognition of singulars, Aquinas claims that the intellect cognizes singulars by way of mental images. Some recent commentators have claimed that Aquinas' appeal to mental images is inadequate to account for the intellectual cognition of singulars because mental images considered in terms of their qualitative character alone have content that is general and are, therefore, insufficient to determine reference to a singular. That is, if Aquinas takes mental images to refer to singulars because those singulars perfectly resemble the mental images, then his account is deficient. In my paper, I argue that the critical interpretation above is predicated on a misunderstanding of Aquinas regarding the intentionality of images. I investigate Aquinas' account of the intentionality of images in order to show that Aquinas understands the reference of mental images to be determined not by their qualitative character alone but also by the causal relation that obtains between the cognizer and a singular. / Master of Arts

It is often supposed that we can make progress understanding singular thought about objects by claiming that thinkers use ‘mental files’. However, the proposal is rarely subject to sustained critical evaluation. This thesis aims to clarify and critique the claim that thinkers use mental files. In my introductory first chapter, I motivate my subsequent discussion by introducing the claim that thinkers deploy modes of presentation in their thought about objects, and lay out some of my assumptions and terminology. In the second chapter, I introduce mental files, responding to the somewhat fragmented files literature by setting out a core account of files, and outlining different ways of implementing the claim that thinkers use mental files. I highlight pressing questions about the synchronic and diachronic individuation conditions for files. In chapters three and four, I explore whether ‘de jure coreference’ can be used to give synchronic individuation conditions on mental files. I explore existing characterisations of de jure coreference before presenting my own, but conclude that de jure coreference does not give a useful account of the synchronic individuation conditions on files. In chapter five, I consider the proposal that thinkers must sometimes trade on the coreference of their mental representations, and argue that we can give synchronic individuation conditions on files in terms of trading on coreference. In chapter six, I bring together the account of files developed so far, compare it to the most developed theory of mental files published to date, and defend my account from the objection that it is circular. In chapter seven, I explore routes for giving diachronic individuation conditions on mental files. In my concluding chapter, I distinguish the core account of files from the idea that the file metaphor should be taken seriously. I suggest that my investigation of the consequences of the core account has shown that the file metaphor is unhelpful, and I outline reasons to exercise caution when using ‘files’ terminology.

This thesis is a study of aboutness. It defends the claim that we have singular thoughts about ordinary objects and argues that an essential part of how we do so is by maintaining singular representations. This proposal allows us to avoid traditional, unsatisfying conceptions of the scope of singular thought while restoring the sense in which such thought is a distinctively epistemic achievement. Reconnecting the study of aboutness with epistemology promises to alleviate the sense of directionlessness in the contemporary literature, offering a firmer grip on the phenomenon along with new, systematic resources for its investigation. Chapters 1-2 explore the effects of contextualist machinery on orthodox views about singular thought. It is widely thought that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject's possession of a singular thought, then there can be no acquaintance requirement(s) on singular thought. Chapter 1 shows that this view rests on a faulty picture of how we talk about attitudes. Indeed, the truth of a de re attitude report cannot be taken to track the singular/non-singular distinction without collapsing it. A new, contextualist picture is needed. That there must be a distinction between singular and non-singular intentionality is emphasized in Chapter 2, where a key explanatory role for singular thought - brought out by a thought experiment due to Strawson - is examined. I show that the role does not call for any distinctive kind of mental content. Once we abandon the two widespread views questioned in Chapters 1-2, our grip on the phenomenon of singular aboutness is loosened: it is not constitutively tied to the kinds of attitude-reporting data or mental content by which it is often assumed to be revealed. Where are we to look for insight? What makes something the object of a singular thought? According to Russell, it is a datum of intuition that singular thought involves a kind of knowledge; a theory of aboutness will precisify the intuitive notion of 'knowing which thing one is thinking about' in order to capture this demand in a philosophically revealing way. If Russell is right, teasing out this connection to knowledge will allow us to see what it takes for a particular thing to be the immediate subject matter of thought. Chapter 3 discusses Evans's theory of this kind. Chapter 4 examines recent work by Dickie. While serious concerns emerge in each case, insights recovered are used to precisify Russell's requirement, leading to a novel picture of singular representation and the epistemic character of this achievement. While the chapters follow a narrative, providing an extended rationale for the proposal in Chapter 4, each may be read in isolation by those familiar with the philosophical issues. For those who are not, the Introduction provides sufficient background.

<div>Philosophers who affirm the existence of propositions contend that the contents of declarative sentences, beliefs, doubts, and so on are entities (the things picked out by the term “propositions”), and that these entities have truth-values. Unsurprisingly, there’s rampant disagreement among those philosophers about sorts of things are called “propositions”. Propositions have been identified with sui generis abstract objects, interpreted facts, properties, and types of cognitive acts (this is not an exhaustive list). Despite this debate, most agree that propositions are representations (this is how they come to have truth-values), and that propositions are not to be identified with token mental representations. I agree that propositions are representations, but argue that propositions are mental representation tokens. The view I defend has sparse contemporary support, but has an impressive pedigree—ancestral views were widely popular in the late medieval, and early modern periods. In this dissertation I argue at length against contemporary criticisms that this view is still credible.</div><div>In chapter one, I defend a mentalist semantics; that is, I argue that linguistic representation is parasitic on mental representation: for a sentence to mean that p is for it to express (or be conventionally used to express) the thought that p. Once this is established, I argue in chapter two that mental representations (as opposed to non-mental ones) are ideal candidates to serve as the contents of sentences and propositional attitudes. I compare my preferred view, that propositions are token mental representations, against rival views (sorted into two groups) and show that a cost benefit analysis of each favors my position. In chapter three, I start exploring what these mental representations might be like. I argue that they’re structured entities whose constituents are modes of presentation of the things represented. I decline to analyze the relation which unites these modes of presentation, but argue (contra some contemporary philosophers) that this relation is not predication. Finally, in chapter four, I argue against the widely popular view that propositions have the things they’re about as constituents. I show that such a view cannot accommodate thoughts about nonexistent entities. I propose that the modes of presentation which are constituents of propositions are non-descriptive, but criticize the mental file conception of non-descriptive modes of presentation.</div>

[pt] O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a noção fregeana de pensamento e discutir o problema da dinâmica cognitiva. Para tal, serão seguidos os seguintes passos. Inicialmente, faremos uma análise da noção de pensamento tal como elaborada por Gottlob Frege. A teoria fregeana será contrastada com sua principal teoria alternativa, a saber, a explicação de Bertrand Russell dos pensamentos ou proposições. Em seguida, será discutido o problema da dinâmica cognitiva, a questão que diz respeito à preservação de crenças e conhecimento por um indivíduo diante das mudanças de contexto. Entende-se ser este um problema com o qual qualquer teoria do pensamento deve lidar. Nosso objetivo é avaliar as soluções para o problema desenvolvidas tanto pelos fregeanos quanto pelos neo-fregeanos, mostrando que elas têm méritos, mas também fraquezas. Questionar-se-á também a viabilidade das propostas de solução avaliadas e será apontada qual delas parece ser a mais plausível. Por fim, discutimos um tipo específico de pensamento que também concerne à questão da dinâmica cognitiva: tratam-se dos pensamentos na primeira pessoa, ou pensamentos de se, ou seja, pensamentos que têm como seu objeto o sujeito referido pelo pronome da primeira pessoa eu . Eles são um caso especial de pensamentos para os quais a questão da dinâmica cognitiva também vale, embora apresentem atributos típicos. Um desses atributos é a imunidade ao erro por má-identificação, já discutida na obra de Gareth Evans. Outras características dos pensamentos na primeira pessoa também serão discutidas, buscando-se apontar para aquela que parece ser a melhor forma de explicar sua natureza e a dinâmica cognitiva que eles envolvem. / [en] The aim of this essay is to analyze the fregean notion of thought and discuss the problem of cognitive dynamics. To this end, I shall take the following steps. To begin with, I analyze the very notion of thought as put forward by Gottlob Frege. Frege s theory is to be contrasted with its main alternative, that is, Russell s account of thoughts or propositions. I proceed, then, to discuss the issue of cognitive dynamics, which is the issue of how it is that the subject is able to maintain his beliefs through context changes. This is, I take it, a difficulty that any theory of thought has to face. My aim is to assess the solutions devised both by the Fregeans and the Neo-Fregeans, showing that they have merits as well as weaknesses. I also question the viability of the would-be solutions and tell which seems the soundest. Finally, I discuss a specific type of thought the issue of cognitive dynamics concerns too: the so-called I-thoughts, or de se thoughts, that is, thoughts that have as their object the very subject referred to by the first person pronoun I . They are a special case of thoughts for which the issue of cognitive dynamics holds too, although they present their own characteristic features. One of these features is the immunity to error through misidentification, already discussed in the work of Gareth Evans. Other characteristics of the I-thoughts will also be discussed, with a view to figure out what seems to be the best way to account for their nature and the cognitive dynamics they involve.

[pt] A presente tese tem como objetivo discutir o fenômeno do pensamento singular. Mais precisamente, meu propósito é o de investigar criticamente os fundamentos da tese que afirma existirem pensamentos singulares sobre números naturais. Para desenvolver tal investigação, aborda-se, por um lado, o papel desempenhado pelos pensamentos singulares em nossa vida mental, e, por outro, os debates acerca das condições a serem satisfeitas no desenvolvimento de tais pensamentos. A argumentação aqui construída favorece uma abordagem cognitiva para os pensamentos singulares, o que significa que as condições a serem satisfeitas em seu desenvolvimento devam ser consideradas como cognitivas, assim como o papel desempenhado por eles, os pensamentos singulares, em nossa vida mental. Deste modo, procuro argumentar que se a questão sobre a possibilidade de um indivíduo desenvolver pensamentos singulares sobre números naturais recebe uma resposta positiva, isso se deve ao fato de que tal possibilidade constitui-se como um fato cognitivo. Em consequência, sendo um fato cognitivo, também se procura argumentar que a investigação ontológica sobre a natureza dos números naturais, embora possivelmente relevante, não é essencial para fundamentar a tese sob análise. / [en] In this dissertation, I tackle the issue of singular thought. More precisely, my main purpose is to critically investigate the grounds for the claim that there are singular thoughts about natural numbers. To do so, I review some of the debates concerning the conditions to be met in order to have (be ascribed) such thoughts and the role played by singular thinking in our mental lives. I clearly favor here a cognitive approach, which means that the conditions to be met must be thought of as cognitive, and the role played by singular thinking in our mental lives as cognitive too. Accordingly, I argue that if the question as to whether one can have singular thoughts about natural numbers is to be given a positive answer, it is because it is a cognitive fact that one can. Being a cognitive fact, I also argue that an ontological investigation into the nature of natural numbers, though possibly relevant, is not essential to support the claim under analysis.