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This work, the Nature and Value of Scepticism, shows that the metaphilosopby arising from what David Hume calls "true scepticism," is of use and value, refuting three standard objections to sceptical philosophy: the charges of unlivability, of idleness and of being dangerous and destructive. / The unlivability charge is refuted with an examination of the work of a self-proclaimed extreme sceptic, Sextus Empiricus. The idleness charge is answered by questioning its assumption that if scepticism does not lead to an extreme conclusion, it must be idle and without philosophical interest. The destructive charge, that the acceptance of scepticism would result in the death of rationality, is countered in reviewing the work of Hume and Ludwig Wittgenstein, showing that their outlook is not against philosophy but only a particular type of philosophy, namely dogmatic philosophy. / Chapter 1 argues that two reasonable interpretations of Sextus's writings yield a scepticism that is livable and philosophically important. Chapter 2 shows Hume's philosophy is livable and not destructive. Chapter 3 examines the connection between Hume's philosophy and his sceptical approach, arguing that his true scepticism informs his philosophical outlook. Chapter 4 argues that Wittgenstein shares much with Hume's "true scepticism," and that his work is not anti-philosophical as widely supposed. Chapter 5 provides examples of how a sceptically informed metaphilosophy can help address questions in epistemology and metaethics.

The AICPA recently released new authoritative audit guidance related to group audits of nonpublic organizations which requires group engagement teams to be involved in the work of a component auditor, including certain minimum baseline requirements and the option for more extensive involvement at the group auditor's discretion. Accordingly, group audits create a scenario where auditors are under the direct oversight of a component audit supervisor, yet their work product is monitored and used by the group engagement team when expressing an opinion on the group financial statements. To my knowledge, prior accounting research has not explored the complexity of auditor decision making in a group audit scenario. Drawing on theory from motivated reasoning, this study investigates how the level of group engagement team involvement in component audit work may influence auditor decision making when a component audit supervisor has expressed preferences for more or less professional skepticism during the component audit process. Prior research in non-group audit settings finds the preferences of audit supervisors can influence the skepticism exhibited by their subordinates. However, in a group audit setting I find that the effects of component supervisor preferences interact with the level of group engagement team involvement in component auditors' work to influence component auditors' budgeted audit hours and planned substantive audit procedures. Results showed that during an accounts receivable audit planning task, auditors who faced an optimistic component supervisor recommended the use of more audit hours and suggested confirming a greater percentage of the accounts receivable balance when a group engagement team chose to be more actively involved in the component audit process than when the group engagement team chose only to review component audit work. However, there were no differences in budgeted audit hours or planned audit procedures when auditors faced a skeptical component supervisor, regardless of the level of group engagement team involvement. Thus, increased involvement of the group engagement team mitigated the influence of an optimistic component supervisor on auditor decision making, but did not significantly influence component auditor judgments when auditors faced a more conservative component supervisor. Path analyses indicated this phenomenon was caused by auditors' sense of pressure to reach appropriate audit conclusions induced by the increased involvement of the group engagement team. These results suggest that the effects of supervisor preferences are complex within a group audit environment, such that the nature of instructions received from a group engagement team may mitigate the effects of supervisor preferences on component auditor decision making. This research has implications for audit practice as it relates to the implementation of the new group audit standard as well as for regulators who establish future auditing guidance. / Ph. D.

Le Canada est le cinquième plus grand émetteur de gaz à effet de serre (GES) par habitant au monde et le quatrième plus grand producteur de pétrole brut. Il joue donc un rôle important dans la lutte aux changements climatiques. Considérant que les changements climatiques sont de plus en plus polarisant et politisés et que l’opinion publique peut représenter un frein important à l’action climatique, cette étude a pour objectif de dresser un portrait du scepticisme climatique au Canada. À l’aide d’une analyse en composantes principales, nous avons pu identifier quatre types de climato-sceptiques au Canada, soient les sceptiques anthropogénique (remettent en doute l’existence des changements climatiques anthropogéniques), d’impact (doutent que les changements climatiques aient des conséquences négatives pour eux ou pour autrui), de réponse (remettent en doute les capacités humaines et sociales à atténuer les effets de changements climatiques) et de responsabilité (doutent que le Canada ait une part de responsabilité dans les changements climatiques et minimisent le rôle qu’il devrait jouer dans la lutte). En nous appuyant sur des modèles de régressions linéaires et la technique des graphes orientés acycliques (GOA), nous avons dressé le profil sociodémographique des différents types de climato-sceptiques au Canada. Ainsi, nous avons découvert que les trois premières formes de scepticisme (anthropogénique, d’impact et de réponse) sont fortement corrélées et partagent plusieurs caractéristiques sociodémographiques. Ils ont plus de chance d’être de sexe masculin, d’être plus âgés, d’être moins éduqués, de vivre en zone rurale et d’être associés aux valeurs et aux partis politiques de droite. De plus, ce mémoire est le premier à révéler la présence de scepticisme de responsabilité au Canada. Nous constatons que le scepticisme de responsabilité s’appuie sur les mêmes arguments que les groupes de pression conservateurs qui ont pour objectif d’entraver et de ralentir la mise en place de politique climatique. Le scepticisme de responsabilité se démarque, car il s’agit de la forme de scepticisme climatique la plus répandue et qu'il est partagé par la majorité des résidents du Canada. Les sceptiques de responsabilité diffèrent des autres climato-sceptiques, car ils ont plus de chance d’avoir des revenus plus élevés que la moyenne et de s’associer au Parti Libéral du Canada. / As the fifth-largest per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter and the fourth-largest crude oil producer in the world, Canada will play a major role in the fight against climate change. Considering the politicization of climate change, polarization on this issue, and the fact that public opinion is a major constraint on climate action, this study aims to draw a portrait of climate skepticism in Canada. Using principal component analysis, we identify four types of climate skeptics in Canada: anthropogenic skeptics (doubt the existence of anthropogenic climate change), impact skeptics (doubt that climate change will have negative consequences for themselves or others), response skeptics (doubt the human and social capacity to mitigate the effects of climate change) and responsibility skeptics (doubt that Canada has a share of responsibility in climate change and minimize the role it should play in the fight against it). Using linear regression models and the directed acyclical graphs technique, we developed a sociopolitical profile of different types of climate skeptics in Canada. We also found that the first three forms of skepticism (anthropogenic, impact, and response) are highly correlated and share several sociopolitical characteristics. They are more likely to be male, older, less educated, live in rural areas, and be associated with rightwing values and political parties. In addition, this thesis is the first to reveal the presence of responsibility skepticism in Canada. We find that responsibility skepticism relies on the same arguments as conservative think tanks that aim to obstruct and slow down the implementation of climate policy. Responsibility skepticism stands out because it is the most widespread form of climate skepticism, and is one held by the majority of residents in Canada. Responsibility skeptics differ from other climate skeptics in that they are more likely to have higher than average incomes and to associate themselves with the Liberal Party of Canada.

In 2016, it is no longer possible to deny the existence of global warming and its harmful effects on our planet and the environment. Not only experts, but also consumers, have become increasingly concerned about the environment. This increased awareness and concern has increased consumers’ interest in purchasing environmentally friendly food products, and has caused companies to focus on programs intent on reducing their environmental impact and helping the environment. Companies have introduced more environmentally friendly food products, accessible on a large scale, and have changed their communication to focus more on green products and green product attributes. Scandinavian countries have some of the largest numbers of organic food consumers in Europe and the world, with the Swedish organic food industry measuring the highest growth rate in organic food sales in 2015. Therefore, this study focuses on the Swedish green food industry. A major way for companies to make consumers aware of their available environmentally friendly food products is through green advertising. An increasingly frequent problem, however, is that consumers tend to distrust these green ads. They have knowledge of green washing practices and misleading information in green advertising. In this thesis, the relationships between green consumerism, green washing and green advertising skepticism were investigated. The potential relationship between demographic factors such as gender, age, income and level and area of study, and green advertising skepticism were tested as well. A research model with three main hypotheses was used in this thesis. The results showed a significant relationship between green consumerism and green advertising skepticism when green washing was a moderator. There was also a significant negative relationship between attitude towards green products and green advertising skepticism and a positive relationship between environmental concern and green advertising skepticism. There existed no significant relationship between the tested demographic factors and green advertising skepticism in the Swedish green food industry.

This dissertation is an attempt and, if you will, a temptation to engage with the ‘disturbing’ prospect of the truth of skepticism. All of Stanley Cavell’s works refer to the truth of skepticism, and yet the discourse surrounding this concept is sparse and often engaged minimally. The truth of skepticism is that “the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing” (The Claim of Reason, p.241). In order to make sense of what he means by what “we think of as knowing” Cavell provides a philosophical framework in which to understand skepticism and what it threatens: through his notion of “criteria” taken from Ludwig Wittgenstein; the concept of the “ordinary” derived from the works of J.L. Austin; and the “search for community” as a problem of “acknowledgement” or “avoidance” as opposed to a problem of knowledge. I argue that the “standard” (Stephen Mulhall’s) reading of Cavell fails to fully account for the truth of skepticism and I propose reading Cavell as a Nietzschean Versucher – one who attempts and searches endlessly, never fully embracing any particular view. By reading Cavell in this way, I explore how to do genuine philosophy and consider how to address the role of traditional epistemological problems in the face of Cavell’s framework. Beyond the traditional philosophical questions of skepticism, I address how the theoretical musings of the first half of the dissertation can be used in practice – or one could say how they reflect on the ordinary. Following Cavell, I connect philosophy and art as sister disciplines concerned with similar problems such as epistemological skepticism itself. To show these connections I analyze two plays and three films: Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale and Othello, alongside The Philadelphia Story (1940), Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), and Her (2013). By engaging these pieces with Cavell’s philosophical framework in mind, I show how sexual jealousy is a form of living one’s skepticism in a real context that cannot be so easily dismissed by philosophers who claim that skepticism is somehow empty, confused, or nonsense. By showing how the threat of skepticism is a part of our ordinary lives, I conclude by considering how we might recover from our skepticism. Skepticism is not the end, it is the beginning.

Moral skeptics sometimes argue that science is at odds with morality. These arguments sometimes privilege scientific explanations of moral belief at the expense of objective moral knowledge. More specifically, since morality is (arguably) a biological adaptation involving belief, Richard Joyce and Sharon Street doubt the justification and objective truth of moral belief, respectively. This thesis defends objective normative facts from this empirical problem. Reasons for moral skepticism are not compatible with arguments against objective normativity. Put simply, without objective normativity, skeptics have no ultimate reason to doubt anything in particular, moral or otherwise. So, on pain of incoherence, moral skeptics should doubt the truth, rather than the objective normativity, of moral belief. / Graduate / 0422

[pt] Apresentamos aqui o ceticismo desenvolvido por Francisco Sanches (1551 – 1623), filósofo e médico português, em sua obra Que Nada se Sabe, na qual, defendemos, é cunhada uma dúvida metódica e hiperbólica, comumente atribuída ao engenho cartesiano. Também sustentamos que Sanches desenvolve um ceticismo construtivo ou mitigado, conforme a expressão de Richard Popkin, ao propor um conhecimento imperfeito em resposta à dúvida e por ela própria limitado. Tal conhecimento não acessa a natureza das coisas, se mantém na esfera secundária e falha da interação entre as imagens sensíveis que recebemos da realidade e a análise destas por parte do juízo. Acreditamos poder, com tais informações, avaliar Sanches como importante figura na formação do ceticismo da Modernidade. / [en] Here we present the scepticism developed by Francisco Sanches (1551 – 1623), portuguese philosopher and physician, in his work That Nothing is Known, in which, we say, the methodological and hyperbolical doubt, often attributed to the Cartesian enterprise, is forged. We also say that Sanches sustains a mitigated or constructive scepticism, after the expression of Richard Popkin, when he proposes imperfect knowledge as an answer to doubt, and by it limited. Such Knowledge doesn t access the nature of things, keeps itself in the secondary plan of the flawed interaction between the sensible images that we receive from reality and its analysis by judgment. With such information, we believe, we ll be able to evaluate Sanches as an important figure in the forging of the scepticism of Modern Age.

Abstract In this research report, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” model of modal epistemology. The defence of van Inwagen’s argument also involves a rebuttal to objections offered to van Inwagen by Geirrson and Sosa.

Trata-se de mostrar alguns argumentos, desenvolvidos por Ludwig Wittgenstein nos seus últimos escritos, contra uma espécie de investida cética que pretende colocar em suspensão a certeza que temos a respeito da existência do mundo. Para tanto, procuramos, primeiramente, a partir da exegese do parágrafo 308 de Da Certeza, explorar a relação estabelecida entre os conceitos de dúvida, saber e certeza a fim de esclarecer a concepção de que a dúvida apenas pode ser aplicada sobre proposições empíricas e jamais sobre proposições gramaticais. Em segundo lugar, mostramos que, ao entender que a dúvida ( o ato de duvidar) sobre qualquer coisa faz sentido apenas quando aceitamos um sistema de proposições, Wittgenstein a (o) coloca como dependente da estabilidade da gramática de nossa linguagem. Nesse sentido, buscamos elucidar a maneira como o filósofo caracteriza a lógica demonstrando-a, de um lado, como algo constante um quadro de referência que possibilita o curso das proposições relacionadas à experiência e, de outro, como algo inconstante que comporta fissuras, quebras e até desmoronamento. Por fim, desenvolvemos a ideia de que essa precária condição de nossa gramática não impede que confiemos nela e que, unicamente por conta disso, possamos dizer que algumas proposições fundamentam nossos jogos de linguagem. É nesse sentido que o cético, ao tentar colocar uma proposição fundante em nossos jogos tal qual o mundo existe em dúvida, suspende sem perceber a fluência do jogo assertivo que pretende estabelecer e, por que não dizer, sua lógica. / This work aims to show some arguments, developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings, against a kind of skeptical assault that wants to put in suspension our assurance about the existence of the world. First, we should clarify the conception that a doubt can only be applied on empirical propositions and never on grammatical ones, from the relationship established between the concepts of doubt, know and certainty. Secondly, we aim to show that by identifying that raising a question makes sense only when we accept a system of propositions, Wittgenstein puts it as dependent on the stability of our grammar. Accordingly, we seek to elucidate how the philosopher characterizes grammar as something stable, on one hand as a reference framework which enables the course of the propositions that refer to the experience and, on the other, as something unstable that can crack, break and even collapse. Finally, we developed the idea that this precarious condition of our grammar does not prevent us to trust her and solely because of that we can say that some propositions underlie our language games. In this sense, the skeptic, when trying to put a founding proposition for our language games like \"the world exists\" in doubt, suspend without notice the fluency of the assertive game he intended to stablish, its consistency and, for that matter, its logic.