<p>Swedish public administration has for the last few decades undergone reforms aimed at making it more efficient. A substantial part of these reforms have concerned creating clearer roles for politicians versus officials in the public sector, i.e. giving politicians a responsibility for setting goals and steering activities and public officials the role of implementing them.</p><p>This study aims to examine one reform following this path that is under implementation in a Swedish public authority; Försäkringskassan, the Social Insurance Agency. The purpose of the reform is to increase the organization’s effectiveness and the rule of law. The reform means that decision-making committees, Social Insurance Committees, consisting of political appointees are being replaced by public officials as decision-makers in complex social insurance cases. The purpose of this study is to see if, and how this reform could affect the democratic foundation of these decisions.</p><p>The study concludes that the reform will have a negative impact on the democratic support and the legitimacy of the decisions made, as it indirectly removes the citizens’ possibilities of expressing discontent through elections. This reform could also have a negative impact on the quality of rule of law if the new roles for public officials as decision-makers are not properly exercised.</p>

Swedish public administration has for the last few decades undergone reforms aimed at making it more efficient. A substantial part of these reforms have concerned creating clearer roles for politicians versus officials in the public sector, i.e. giving politicians a responsibility for setting goals and steering activities and public officials the role of implementing them. This study aims to examine one reform following this path that is under implementation in a Swedish public authority; Försäkringskassan, the Social Insurance Agency. The purpose of the reform is to increase the organization’s effectiveness and the rule of law. The reform means that decision-making committees, Social Insurance Committees, consisting of political appointees are being replaced by public officials as decision-makers in complex social insurance cases. The purpose of this study is to see if, and how this reform could affect the democratic foundation of these decisions. The study concludes that the reform will have a negative impact on the democratic support and the legitimacy of the decisions made, as it indirectly removes the citizens’ possibilities of expressing discontent through elections. This reform could also have a negative impact on the quality of rule of law if the new roles for public officials as decision-makers are not properly exercised.