Peu différenciées à la naissance, les émotions deviendraient intelligibles en étant élevées à la conscience par le développement d’une sensibilité aux sensations internes accompagnant l’émotion, sa représentation et sa symbolisation (Gergely & Watson, 1996). La théorie du miroir affectif-parental du biofeedback social de Gergely & Watson (1996), poussée plus loin par Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist et Target (2002), explique comment une interaction de biofeedback social complexe, innée, et probablement implicite, s’établit entre parent et nouveau-né pour aider ce dernier à différencier les somatosensations accompagnant l’expérience d’une émotion, au travers d’un comportement parental de miroir. Le but de cette thèse est de réviser cette théorie, et plus particulièrement l’hypothèse du miroir « marqué » (markedness), qui serait nécessaire pour dissocier le miroir parental du parent, et permettre l’appropriation de son contenu informationnel par l’enfant. Ce processus de sensibilisation est conçu comme partie intégrante du travail de symbolisation des émotions chez les enfants autant que chez les adultes. Cependant, le miroir marqué se manifestant par une expression exagérée ou « voix de bébé » (motherese) nécessiterait l’utilisation par le thérapeute d’une « voix de patient » (therapese) (Fonagy, 2010) pour être appliqué à la psychothérapie adulte, une proposition difficile à soutenir. La révision examine comment la sensibilisation d’une émotion est accomplie : par un mécanisme d’internalisation nécessitant un miroir « marqué » ou par un mécanisme de détection de la contingence de l’enfant. Elle démontre que le détecteur de contingence du nouveau-né (d’un fonctionnement semblable au système d’entraînement par biofeedback pour adultes) est le médiateur des fonctions de sensibilisation, de représentation, et de symbolisation de la ii sensation d’une émotion par ses processus de détection de la covariance-invariance, de la maximisation, et du contrôle contingent du miroir parental. Ces processus permettent à l’émotion de devenir consciente, que le miroir parental soit ‘marqué’ ou non. Le modèle révisé devient donc applicable à la thérapie des adultes. Une vignette clinique analysée à l’aide de la perspective du Boston Change Process Study Group sur le changement est utilisée pour contraster et illustrer les processus de sensibilisation et de symbolisation des émotions, et leur application à la psychothérapie adulte. Cette thèse considère les implications cliniques du nouveau modèle, et elle spécule sur les conséquences de difficultés parentales vis-à-vis de la disponibilité requise par les besoins de biofeedback social du nouveau-né, et sur les conséquences de traumatismes déconnectant des émotions déjà sensibilisées de leurs représentations. Finalement, elle suggère que le miroir sensible des émotions en thérapie puisse remédier à ces deux sortes de difficultés, et que le modèle puisse être utilisé concurremment à d’autres modèles du changement, en facilitant la génération d’états internes ressentis et symbolisés pouvant être utilisés pour communiquer avec soi-même et les autres pour la réparation de difficultés émotionnelles et relationnelles chez les enfants et les adultes. / Undifferentiated at birth, emotions would become intelligible by being raised to consciousness through the development of sensitivity to the inner sensations accompanying the emotion, their representation and symbolization (Gergely & Watson, 1996). The social biofeedback theory of parental affect-mirroring of Gergely and Watson (1996), furthered by Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target (2002), explains how these somatosensory signals are so important that a complex, probably implicit, and possibly innate social biofeedback interaction exists between caregiver and infant, where the latter learns to differentiate between emotions through the parent’s mirroring of his emotion expression. The aim of this thesis is to revise this theory, and more precisely the ‘markedness’ hypothesis, which would be necessary to dissociate the parental mirroring from the parent and allow appropriation of its informational content as pertaining to the infant. The process of sensitization to these sensations is conceived to be integral to the symbolization of emotions in children and adults. However, ‘motherese’, the singsong prosody of markedness hypothesized to be necessary to foster successful social biofeedback interactions between caregivers and infants, requires that therapists use ‘therapese’ in the clinical setting (Fonagy, 2010), a proposition difficult to reconcile with the therapy of adults. The revision investigates whether the sensitization and symbolization of an emotion is accomplished through an internalization mechanism requiring the ‘markedness’ hypothesis, or solely through social biofeedback mechanisms based on infant contingency detection. It demonstrates that the infant’s contingency detector (similarly to biofeedback training in adults) mediates the iv functions of sensitization, representation, and symbolization of an emotion through its processes of covariance-invariance detection, maximization, and the contingent control of the parental mirroring. It allows the emotion to be raised to consciousness, with the help of the parental mirror, whether it is ‘marked’ or not. The revised model thus becomes applicable to the therapy of adults. A clinical vignette analyzed with the Boston Change Process Study Group’s perspective on change is used to contrast and illustrate the processes of sensitization and representations of emotions, and their application in adult psychotherapy. The thesis considers the clinical implications of the new model and speculates on the consequences of parental difficulties with surrendering to the social biofeedback needs of the infant, and on the consequences of emotional trauma disconnecting sensitive emotion sensations from their representations. Finally, it suggest that both kinds of difficulties can be repaired through sensitive mirroring of emotions in therapy, and that the model might be used concurrently with other models of change, by facilitating the generation of felt and symbolized inner states that can be used for self and other communication in the repair of emotional and relational difficulties in children and adults.

Peu différenciées à la naissance, les émotions deviendraient intelligibles en étant élevées à la conscience par le développement d’une sensibilité aux sensations internes accompagnant l’émotion, sa représentation et sa symbolisation (Gergely & Watson, 1996). La théorie du miroir affectif-parental du biofeedback social de Gergely & Watson (1996), poussée plus loin par Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist et Target (2002), explique comment une interaction de biofeedback social complexe, innée, et probablement implicite, s’établit entre parent et nouveau-né pour aider ce dernier à différencier les somatosensations accompagnant l’expérience d’une émotion, au travers d’un comportement parental de miroir. Le but de cette thèse est de réviser cette théorie, et plus particulièrement l’hypothèse du miroir « marqué » (markedness), qui serait nécessaire pour dissocier le miroir parental du parent, et permettre l’appropriation de son contenu informationnel par l’enfant. Ce processus de sensibilisation est conçu comme partie intégrante du travail de symbolisation des émotions chez les enfants autant que chez les adultes. Cependant, le miroir marqué se manifestant par une expression exagérée ou « voix de bébé » (motherese) nécessiterait l’utilisation par le thérapeute d’une « voix de patient » (therapese) (Fonagy, 2010) pour être appliqué à la psychothérapie adulte, une proposition difficile à soutenir. La révision examine comment la sensibilisation d’une émotion est accomplie : par un mécanisme d’internalisation nécessitant un miroir « marqué » ou par un mécanisme de détection de la contingence de l’enfant. Elle démontre que le détecteur de contingence du nouveau-né (d’un fonctionnement semblable au système d’entraînement par biofeedback pour adultes) est le médiateur des fonctions de sensibilisation, de représentation, et de symbolisation de la ii sensation d’une émotion par ses processus de détection de la covariance-invariance, de la maximisation, et du contrôle contingent du miroir parental. Ces processus permettent à l’émotion de devenir consciente, que le miroir parental soit ‘marqué’ ou non. Le modèle révisé devient donc applicable à la thérapie des adultes. Une vignette clinique analysée à l’aide de la perspective du Boston Change Process Study Group sur le changement est utilisée pour contraster et illustrer les processus de sensibilisation et de symbolisation des émotions, et leur application à la psychothérapie adulte. Cette thèse considère les implications cliniques du nouveau modèle, et elle spécule sur les conséquences de difficultés parentales vis-à-vis de la disponibilité requise par les besoins de biofeedback social du nouveau-né, et sur les conséquences de traumatismes déconnectant des émotions déjà sensibilisées de leurs représentations. Finalement, elle suggère que le miroir sensible des émotions en thérapie puisse remédier à ces deux sortes de difficultés, et que le modèle puisse être utilisé concurremment à d’autres modèles du changement, en facilitant la génération d’états internes ressentis et symbolisés pouvant être utilisés pour communiquer avec soi-même et les autres pour la réparation de difficultés émotionnelles et relationnelles chez les enfants et les adultes. / Undifferentiated at birth, emotions would become intelligible by being raised to consciousness through the development of sensitivity to the inner sensations accompanying the emotion, their representation and symbolization (Gergely & Watson, 1996). The social biofeedback theory of parental affect-mirroring of Gergely and Watson (1996), furthered by Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target (2002), explains how these somatosensory signals are so important that a complex, probably implicit, and possibly innate social biofeedback interaction exists between caregiver and infant, where the latter learns to differentiate between emotions through the parent’s mirroring of his emotion expression. The aim of this thesis is to revise this theory, and more precisely the ‘markedness’ hypothesis, which would be necessary to dissociate the parental mirroring from the parent and allow appropriation of its informational content as pertaining to the infant. The process of sensitization to these sensations is conceived to be integral to the symbolization of emotions in children and adults. However, ‘motherese’, the singsong prosody of markedness hypothesized to be necessary to foster successful social biofeedback interactions between caregivers and infants, requires that therapists use ‘therapese’ in the clinical setting (Fonagy, 2010), a proposition difficult to reconcile with the therapy of adults. The revision investigates whether the sensitization and symbolization of an emotion is accomplished through an internalization mechanism requiring the ‘markedness’ hypothesis, or solely through social biofeedback mechanisms based on infant contingency detection. It demonstrates that the infant’s contingency detector (similarly to biofeedback training in adults) mediates the iv functions of sensitization, representation, and symbolization of an emotion through its processes of covariance-invariance detection, maximization, and the contingent control of the parental mirroring. It allows the emotion to be raised to consciousness, with the help of the parental mirror, whether it is ‘marked’ or not. The revised model thus becomes applicable to the therapy of adults. A clinical vignette analyzed with the Boston Change Process Study Group’s perspective on change is used to contrast and illustrate the processes of sensitization and representations of emotions, and their application in adult psychotherapy. The thesis considers the clinical implications of the new model and speculates on the consequences of parental difficulties with surrendering to the social biofeedback needs of the infant, and on the consequences of emotional trauma disconnecting sensitive emotion sensations from their representations. Finally, it suggest that both kinds of difficulties can be repaired through sensitive mirroring of emotions in therapy, and that the model might be used concurrently with other models of change, by facilitating the generation of felt and symbolized inner states that can be used for self and other communication in the repair of emotional and relational difficulties in children and adults.

<p>The spinal cord is an information highway continuously transmitting afferent and efferent signals to and from the brain. Although spinal cord stimulation has been used for the treatment of chronic pain for decades, its potential has not been fully explored. Spinal cord stimulation has never been used with the aim to transmit relevant information to the brain. Although, various locations along the sensory pathway have been explored for generating electrical stimulation induced sensory percepts, right from peripheral nerves, to thalamus to primary somatosensory cortex, the role of spinal cord has been largely neglected. In this dissertation, I have attempted to investigate if, electrical stimulation of dorsal columns of spinal cord called as Dorsal Column Stimulation (DCS) can be used as an effective technique to communicate therapeutic and somatosensory information to the brain. </p><p>To study the long term effects of DCS, I employed the 6-hydroxydopamine (6-OHDA) rodent model of Parkinson’s Disease (PD). Twice a week DCS for 30 minutes resulted in a dramatic recovery of weight and behavioral symptoms in rats treated with striatal infusions of 6-OHDA. The improvement in motor symptoms was accompanied by higher dopaminergic innervation in the striatum and increased cell count of dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc). These results suggest that DCS has a chronic therapeutic and neuroprotective effect, increasing its potential as a new clinical option for treating PD patients. Thus, I was able to demonstrate the long-term efficacy of DCS, as a technique for therapeutic intervention.</p><p>Subsequently, I investigated if DCS can be used as a technique to transmit artificial somatosensory information to the cortex and trained rats to discriminate multiple artificial tactile sensations. Rats were able to successfully differentiate 4 different tactile percepts generated by varying temporal patterns of DCS. As the rats learnt the task, significant changes in the encoding of this artificial information were observed in multiple brain areas. Finally, I created a Brainet that interconnected two rats: an encoder and a decoder, whereby, cortical signals from the encoder rat were processed by a neural decoder while it performed a tactile discrimination task and transmitted to the spinal cord of the decoder using DCS. My study demonstrated for the first time, a cortico-spinal communication between different organisms. </p><p>My obtained results suggest that DCS, a semi-invasive technique, can be used in the future to send prosthetic somatosensory information to the brain or to enable a healthy brain to directly modulate neural activity in the nervous system of a patient, facilitating plasticity mechanism needed for efficient recovery.</p> / Dissertation

Our brains handle vast amounts of information incoming through our senses. Continuously exposed to sensory input, the sense of touch, however, may miss tactile stimuli, no matter how much attention we pay to them. In four empirical studies, this thesis tested (1) the feasibility of investigating undetectable stimulation by electrical finger nerve pulses, (2) how its neural correlates dissociate from detectable stimulation and (3) whether and how selective somatosensory attention nevertheless affects the neural representation of undetectable stimuli. The first two studies showed that there is a natural range of electrical stimulation intensities that cannot be detected. A rigorous statistical evaluation with Bayes factor analysis indicated that the evidence of chance performance after undetectable stimulation reliably outweighed evidence of above-chance performance. A subsequent study applying electroencephalography (EEG) revealed qualitative differences between the processing of detectable and undetectable stimulation, which is evident in altered event-related potentials (ERP). Specifically, undetectable stimulation evokes a single component that is not predictive of stimulus detectability but lacks a subsequent component, which correlates with upcoming stimulus detection. The final study showed that attention nevertheless affects neural processing of undetectable stimuli in a top-down manner as it does for detectable stimuli and fosters the view of attention and awareness being two separate and mostly independent mechanisms. The influence of the pre-stimulus oscillatory (~10 Hz) alpha amplitude—a putative marker of attentional deployment—on the ERP depended on the current attentional state and indicates that both processes are interacting but not functionally matching.:1 Touch, Consciousness, And Attention – Theoretical Considerations ........ 1-11 1.1 A Neural Account To (Un-) Consciousness ............................................ 1-12 1.2 Controlling detectability of external stimulation ...................................... 1-14 1.3 Thresholds in the light of signal detection theory ................................... 1-17 1.4 Selective attention in touch .................................................................... 1-19 1.5 Research questions ............................................................................... 1-21 2 Empirical Evidence .................................................................................... 2-25 2.1 General methods .................................................................................... 2-25 2.1.1 Stimulation ........................................................................................... 2-25 2.1.2 Threshold assessment procedure ....................................................... 2-25 2.1.3 Behavioral analysis .............................................................................. 2-26 2.1.4 Electrophysiological measurement ...................................................... 2-28 2.1.5 Analysis of event-related potentials ..................................................... 2-30 2.1.6 Spectral Analysis resolved over time ................................................... 2-30 2.2 Psychophysical assessment of subthreshold stimulation ........................ 2-33 2.2.1 A method for assessing the individual absolute detection threshold (ADTH) ......................................................................................................... 2-33 2.2.2 Validation of absolute detection threshold assessment by signal detection theory measures and Bayesian Null-Hypothesis testing ................ 2-39 2.3 Non-invasive neural markers of unconscious perception ....................... 2-47 2.3.1 Neural Correlates of Undetectable Somatosensory Stimulation in EEG and fMRI ...................................................................................................... 2-47 2.3.2 Prediction of stimulus perception by features of the evoked potential for different stimulation intensities along the psychometric function ................. 2-51 2.4 The role of Rolandic Alpha Activity in Somatosensation and its Relation to Attention ................................................................................................. 2-75 3 General Discussion and Conclusions ...................................................... 3-101 3.1 Summary of empirical results ................................................................ 3-101 3.2 Neural processing of undetectable stimulation ..................................... 3-102 3.3 Attention, awareness and neural oscillatory activity ............................. 3-104 3.4 Limits of the current studies and future perspectives ........................... 3-109 References .................................................................................................... 113 Summary ....................................................................................................... 137 Zusammenfassung ........................................................................................ 143 Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................ 151 Selbständigkeitserklärung ............................................................................. 155 Nachweis über die Anteile der Co-Autoren .................................................... 157

No description available.

Ratten verwenden Schnurrhaare (Vibrissen) zur Berührungswahrnehmung, und die Leitungsbahn von den Vibrissen zum primären somatosensorischen Areal (Barrel Cortex, BC) ist gut untersucht. Ratten zeigen auch vielfältiges Sozialverhalten, u.a. Berührung von Artgenossen mit ihren Vibrissen. Es ist jedoch unbekannt, wie diese sozialen Berührungssignale im Gehirn repräsentiert sind. Deshalb hatte die vorliegende Studie zum Ziel, die neuronale Repräsentation von sozialen Berührungen im BC zu untersuchen und mit anderer somatosensorischer Stimulation zu vergleichen. Mit extrazellulären Einzelzellableitungen in sich frei bewegenden Ratten habe ich gezeigt, dass die Aktivität eines Großteils von Neuronen im BC durch soziale Berührungen moduliert wird. Antworten waren meist erregend und Feuerraten während sozialer Interaktionen unterschieden sich zwischen kortikalen Schichten. Ratten bevorzugten Interaktionen mit Artgenossen gegenüber unbelebten Stimuli. Auch die Berührungsstrategien unterschieden sich, dabei wurden Objekte mit regelmäßigeren Bewegungen abgetastet, und die Vibrissen weiter vorgestreckt. Neuronale Antworten unterschieden sich ebenso, mit leicht aber konsistent schwächeren Antworten auf Objekte. Interessanterweise habe ich geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede in neuronalen Antworten beobachtet. Der ausgeprägteste war die stärkere Modulation regulär-feuernder (RF) Zellen in Männchen während sozialer Berührungen. Dieser Unterschied konnte nicht mit sozialem Berührungsverhalten erklärt werden, was eventuell auf eine neurale Grundlage dieser Differenz hindeutet. Zudem feuerten RF-Zellen von Weibchen deutlich seltener, wenn das Weibchen im Östrus war. Zusammenfassend ist dies die erste Studie, die soziale Signale in einem primären sensorischen Areal bei sich frei bewegenden Tieren auf zellulärer Ebene untersuchte. Sie legt nahe, dass die Repräsentationen sensorischer Hirnrinde weniger stimulusabhängig und stärker top-down-moduliert sein könnten, als zuvor angenommen. / Rats use their stiff facial hairs (whiskers) for somatosensation, and the pathway from the whiskers to the primary somatosensory cortex (barrel cortex, BC) is well known. Rats also show diverse social behaviors, including touch of conspecifics with their whiskers. The representation of these social touch signals in the brain is however unknown. Thus, the present study aimed at characterizing the neuronal representation of social touch signals in BC and comparing them with non-social somatosensory stimulation. Using extracellular single-cell recordings in freely-moving rats, I could show that the activity of a large fraction of BC neurons is modulated by social touch. Responses were typically excitatory and the pattern of firing rates during interactions differed between cortical layers. Rats preferred interactions with alive conspecifics over inanimate stimuli. Whisking strategies also differed in that inanimate stimuli were whisked at with more regular movements from more protracted set angles. Neuronal responses were also different, such that objects elicited slightly but consistently weaker responses than alive rats. Interestingly, I observed sex-specific differences in neuronal responses. Prominently, there was stronger modulation by social touch in regular-spikers (RS) recorded from males. This could not be explained by behavioral measures, possibly indicating a neural origin of this difference. Further, RS from females fired much more weakly when females were in estrus. In summary, this is the first study that investigated social signals in a primary sensory area of freely-moving animals at the cellular level. It suggests that representations in sensory cortices might be less stimulus-driven and more top-down modulated than previously thought.

No description available.

No description available.