This essay attempts to examine whether it is possible to find a mutual understanding of the concept of drive between Spinoza’s philosophy and Freud’s psychoanalytical theory. Former texts on this subject have given a variety of conclusions: from a radical separation between the two authors to a complete identification between the two. The drive, or the desire which is the term Spinoza uses, has in Spinoza’s philosophy its foundation in the concept of conatus. Conatus is every thing’s strive to persevere in its being and is the expression of God’s, or the only substance’s, force and action in a here and a now. In the Freudian theory the term trieb, drive, is defined by it’s variation regarding object, source and aim. The late Freudian theory of drives separates the life drive, also called Eros, from the death drive. Eros is the strive of every being to maintain life but also to procreate and create stronger unities of life. It is, as the strive of conatus, a persevering strive. However, in examining the strive of conatus to persevere in its being, which could be said to strive by the guidance of a principle of joy, the distinction between the concept of conatus and the Freudian Eros is made visible through the comparison to the Freudian pleasure principle.

<p>Gilles Deleuze's definition of the other as the expression of a possible world has introduced a novel ontological organization into philosophy. It makes possible the conception of a singular being which may be expressed by a potentially infinite number of possible worlds. This, in turn, has lead Deleuze to propound the idea of "a life," immanent and impersonal but singularly determinate, as different from the universe of subjects, objects, and the transcendence that appears as their concomitant. This study resituates Wallace Stevens in the ontological universe of "a life" as opposed to the common practice of associating him with the questions of subject, object, and transcendence. It observes that Stevens's poetry primarily invests the field of the other, which functions as the structure of the perceptible. The result is a poetry predominated by a yearning for the immanence of "a life," an outside, that escapes the limits of the subject and is "disappointed" with the function of transcendence, rather than being explained by them. The study argues that Stevens's poetry can be read as a dramatization, itself regulated by an affective charge, of the passion for an outside, which goes beyond the framework of subjectivity and "feels" the inhuman stirring beneath the human.</p> / Dissertation

<p>While both intuitive knowledge (<italic>scientia intuitiva</italic>) and reason (<italic>ratio</italic>) are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. "The greatest virtue of the mind" and "the greatest human perfection" consist in understanding things by intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza regards as superior to reason. Understanding why on Spinoza's account intuition is superior to reason is crucial for understanding his epistemological and ethical theories. Yet, the nature of this superiority has been the subject of some controversy due to Spinoza's parsimonious treatment of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in the Ethics. In my dissertation, I explore this fundamental but relatively unexplored issue in Spinoza scholarship by investigating the nature of this distinction and its ethical implications. I suggest that these two kinds of adequate knowledge differ not only in terms of their method, but also with respect to their representative content. More specifically, I hold that unlike reason, which is a universal knowledge, intuitive knowledge descends to a level of particularity, including an adequate knowledge of one's own essence as it follows directly from God, which represents a superior form of self-knowledge. Attaining this superior self-knowledge makes intuitive knowledge the culmination of not only understanding but also happiness. Since, for Spinoza, there is an intrinsic relationship between the pursuit of knowledge and how we live our lives, I argue that these two ways of knowing are at the same time two ways of living.</p> / Dissertation

Diss.--Philosophisches Seminar--Heidelberg--Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, 2002. / Bibliogr. p. 303-316.

Reproduction de : Thèse doctorat : Philosophie politique et sociale : Poitiers : 2008. / Titre provenant de l'écran titre. Bibliogr. f. 406-417. Notes bibliogr. Index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

The increasing importance of religious and moral issues in American politics makes salient once again the question of the relationship between religion and democracy. The United States is in the midst of a debate pitting secularists and those who adapt their faith to progressive outlooks against conservatives who see a need to ground liberal-democracy in something Biblical. Taking up this debate, I argue that the viewpoints of both secular progressives and religious conservatives suffer from key oversights. While the former fail to notice that their commitment to toleration rests on certain absolute claims, the latter overlook the extent to which religion has been transformed and liberalized. Seeking a more nuanced version of this debate, I compare the Enlightenment’s case for toleration to Tocqueville’s claim that democracy requires religion for moral support. Examining Locke and Spinoza, I argue that the Enlightenment sought to achieve freedom, prosperity, and a rich cultural and intellectual life through the weakening or liberalization of religious belief. I then turn to Tocqueville’s friendly critique of the Enlightenment and try to elucidate his solution for preserving, in times of liberalism and equality, the great human devotions which he saw as inextricably linked to religion. I conclude that that by describing a civil religion capacious enough to permit tolerance but substantive enough to encourage real devotion, Tocqueville gives us a kind of moderate politics seldom found in today’s debates. / text

George Eliot's early novels Scenes of Clerical Life, Adam Bede, The Mill on the Floss, and Silas Marner, resist or rewrite English cultural myths that embody shame as a method of social control, especially myths from the Bible related to the doctrine of election. Eliot employs a two-level structure suggested by her reading of Feuerbach, Spinoza, and R.W. Mackay, in which the novels follow biblical plotlines, while she presents a positivist understanding of moral motivation derived from Spinoza, in which repressed shame must be acknowledged in order to attain moral freedom. In Chapter One, I argue that her favorite book as a child--The Linnet's Life--forecasts the psychic work of Eliot's protagonists. I also read Rousseau's Confessions--a book that she claimed had great influence on her--and demonstrate how Rousseau's understanding of shame as a corrupting influence shaped her treatment of shame in her novels. In Chapter Two, I discuss Scenes of Clerical Life in the context of English mythologies of the French Revolution. Deploying the gothic mode, Eliot rewrites characters from Carlyle's History of the French Revolution, and Dickens's Little Dorrit, to interrogate the tendency of the English to view all people like themselves as the elect, and to vilify and shame those who differ. In Chapters Three and Four, I argue that Eliot structures the plots of Adam Bede and The Mill on the Floss from the Genesis story of Cain and Abel, which is the type of election. Eliot uses this mythological structure to interrogate the power of shame to produce the very evil behavior it condemns, in Hetty, Maggie, and Mr. Tulliver. I discuss Romantic and Victorian versions of the Cain and Abel story, such as Byron's closet drama Cain compared to Eliot's own extension of the story in her poem The Legend of Jubal. I also discuss the treatment of the story of Cain and Abel in various theological treatises, by Bede, Augustine and Calvin. In Chapter Five, I argue Silas Marner's history parallels the history of the Hebrews from the flood, to the Babylonian exile and return. Eliot's treatment suggests that whether Silas is wicked or elect, the narrative is about the vindication of God, not Silas. In contrast, Silas himself is vindicated in the plot with Godfrey because of his choice to care for Eppie. Eppie represents the positive development of Christianity from the ancient Hebrew religion, as it was influenced and purified by Babylonian monotheistic religion. For Eliot (following Feuerbach and Mackay), the "Essence of Christianity" was not the shaming doctrine of election, but rather the doctrine of Christ, who offered forgiveness rather than blame and shame.

Michael Della Rocca has provided an influential interpretation of Spinoza relying heavily on the principle of sufficient reason. In order to challenge this interpretation, I identify three assumptions Della Rocca makes about the PSR and demonstrate that it is not clear Spinoza shares them. First, Della Rocca contends that the PSR is unlimited in scope. I show that the scope of Spinoza’s version of the PSR is ambiguous. While it is clear that substances and modes are included, it is unclear just how widely the scope extends. Second, Della Rocca argues that the PSR demands there are no illegitimate bifurcations. I argue that Della Rocca’s account of illegitimate bifurcations is too strong. I show that Spinoza offers a distinction in explanatory types that should be considered illegitimate and inexplicable according to Della Rocca’s definition of illegitimate bifurcations. Third, Della Rocca argues that explanations which satisfy the demands of the PSR must be in terms of the concepts involved. I show that Spinoza does not use conceptual explanations. Instead, in almost all cases, the explanations Spinoza relies on to satisfy the demands of the PSR are in terms of a thing’s cause. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2014-03-28 11:35:29.035

In the first chapter, I examine the definitions and axioms in Part One of Spinoza's Ethics. From there, I discuss five interpretations of Spinoza's notion of `axiom' in order to strengthen our understanding of the role Spinoza took axioms to play in his work. In the second chapter, I move from the discussion of what an axiom is to a consideration of the precise meaning of the fourth axiom of the first part (1A4). A key move in this chapter is to show that Spinoza does not separate causation and conception. In the third chapter, I defend the truth of 1A4 by showing that it follows from the definitions of Substance and Mode. I argue that in virtue of the conclusions of the previous two chapters, the axiom can be regarded as true for its relevant magnitude (in a way akin to the 'common notions' of Euclid's Elements). / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-04 13:22:27.876