Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Universiẗat, Diss., 1999.

<p>During and after World War II Sweden was spying in the occupied Baltic countries which had been occupied, from 1943 by Nazi Germany and from 1944 by the Soviet Union. It began in 1943, with the Germans still occupying the Baltic countries, when Sweden and its intelligence service “C-byrån” recruited volunteers among the Baltic refugees in Sweden and sent them back to the countries they had fled from. Many of the Baltic refugees to Sweden were men aged 25-45 so the Swedish intelligence service had a good recruiting source. This started the first period of intelligence operations in the three Baltic countries. In 1946 Swedish intelligence was reorganized and Thede Palm was appointed head of, what was named, T-kontoret. He ran the T-kontoret until 1965. Palm transformed the intelligence to the situation needed for the Cold War and he expanded co-operation with the British Military Intelligence Service, MI6. This constitutes the second phase of Swedish intelligence operations in the Baltics. The first two years did not produce any exciting results. The reports from T-kontoret contained information mostly about the resistance movements in the three Baltic countries but not much about the military installations. The Swedish Defence Ministry and the Swedish High Commander of the Defence, Helge Jung, developed plans, based on a Soviet Union attack on Sweden, which was believed to be a real threat at that time. Besides, and in spite of Swedish neutrality, Helge Jung was very oriented to the West and often in opposition to parts of the Swedish Government which meant that the Government was not always fully informed about Swedish secret military operations in the Baltics and the Baltic Sea. When the Cold War intensified in 1948, the Swedes planned and carried out the setting-up of agents in the Baltics. This constitutes the third period of the operations. It all happened in co-operation with MI6. What they did not know about was that most of the operations were infiltrated by the Soviet MGB (the name of the Soviet secret police from 1946 to 1953) and therefore doomed to failure. This thesis focuses on the third period and the following questions: i) how did the results from the operations change between period 2 (1946-1948), and period 3 (1948-1953); ii) what was reported; and iii) did Swedish intelligence put the emphasis on special geographical areas and on specific targets? The results from the third period of intelligence operations in the Baltics were much better than before. The reports from the Baltics produced by T-kontoret increased from 10-20 per half-year to an average of 20-40 per half-year. The quality of the reports also improved (based on the scoring of the source and the message given by the Swedish Intelligence Service itself). The targets in the Baltics became more focused and the reports from Latvia followed by Estonia became more frequent than those from Lithuania, a fact that could have been influenced by Soviet immigration policies to the Baltic countries. In Latvia the focus was given to military targets, such as harbours and airports and the port in Liepaja and the airport Spilve outside Riga became top priorities. The thesis is based on documentation from the Swedish War Archives (Krigsarkivet) where access was given to the reports produced by T-kontoret from 1946 until 1953. We know from other sources that in 1957 the Soviet Union handed a protest note to the Swedish Government. The note was of course denied by the Swedes but after that the operations were ended both by the Swedes and the British Military Intelligence Services.</p>

During and after World War II Sweden was spying in the occupied Baltic countries which had been occupied, from 1943 by Nazi Germany and from 1944 by the Soviet Union. It began in 1943, with the Germans still occupying the Baltic countries, when Sweden and its intelligence service “C-byrån” recruited volunteers among the Baltic refugees in Sweden and sent them back to the countries they had fled from. Many of the Baltic refugees to Sweden were men aged 25-45 so the Swedish intelligence service had a good recruiting source. This started the first period of intelligence operations in the three Baltic countries. In 1946 Swedish intelligence was reorganized and Thede Palm was appointed head of, what was named, T-kontoret. He ran the T-kontoret until 1965. Palm transformed the intelligence to the situation needed for the Cold War and he expanded co-operation with the British Military Intelligence Service, MI6. This constitutes the second phase of Swedish intelligence operations in the Baltics. The first two years did not produce any exciting results. The reports from T-kontoret contained information mostly about the resistance movements in the three Baltic countries but not much about the military installations. The Swedish Defence Ministry and the Swedish High Commander of the Defence, Helge Jung, developed plans, based on a Soviet Union attack on Sweden, which was believed to be a real threat at that time. Besides, and in spite of Swedish neutrality, Helge Jung was very oriented to the West and often in opposition to parts of the Swedish Government which meant that the Government was not always fully informed about Swedish secret military operations in the Baltics and the Baltic Sea. When the Cold War intensified in 1948, the Swedes planned and carried out the setting-up of agents in the Baltics. This constitutes the third period of the operations. It all happened in co-operation with MI6. What they did not know about was that most of the operations were infiltrated by the Soviet MGB (the name of the Soviet secret police from 1946 to 1953) and therefore doomed to failure. This thesis focuses on the third period and the following questions: i) how did the results from the operations change between period 2 (1946-1948), and period 3 (1948-1953); ii) what was reported; and iii) did Swedish intelligence put the emphasis on special geographical areas and on specific targets? The results from the third period of intelligence operations in the Baltics were much better than before. The reports from the Baltics produced by T-kontoret increased from 10-20 per half-year to an average of 20-40 per half-year. The quality of the reports also improved (based on the scoring of the source and the message given by the Swedish Intelligence Service itself). The targets in the Baltics became more focused and the reports from Latvia followed by Estonia became more frequent than those from Lithuania, a fact that could have been influenced by Soviet immigration policies to the Baltic countries. In Latvia the focus was given to military targets, such as harbours and airports and the port in Liepaja and the airport Spilve outside Riga became top priorities. The thesis is based on documentation from the Swedish War Archives (Krigsarkivet) where access was given to the reports produced by T-kontoret from 1946 until 1953. We know from other sources that in 1957 the Soviet Union handed a protest note to the Swedish Government. The note was of course denied by the Swedes but after that the operations were ended both by the Swedes and the British Military Intelligence Services.

Humboldt-Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 1999.

Zugl.: Braunschweig, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.

Der Artikel setzt sich mit Spionagetätigkeiten der CIA in Chemnitz auseinander.

Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.

Univ., Diss--Basel, 2007.

The purpose of this paper is to study how the discourse on risk, threat and national security has developed over time within the context of Swedish print news media. The articles we look at are from 1992-2023, and originate from four of Sweden’s largest national newspapers (Dagens Nyheter, Aftonbladet, Expressen, Svenska Dagbladet). By mapping out when and where something or someone is described as a “threat to national security”, and by whom, we want to analyze how the perceived threats against Sweden as a nation has changed and been communicated over time. Other than the foundational theory package that is media logic, our theoretical framework includes Ulrich Beck’s concept of risk and risk society, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman’s propaganda model and the theory of securitization as laid out by the Copenhagen school. Earlier works we have built upon include (among many others) Bakir &amp; Kitzinger’s extensive research on mediated risk, as well as Westberg’s interesting analysis of Sweden’s COVID-19 strategy and its elements of public shaming. Our study is a quantitative content analysis of a body of 301 articles, with occasional qualitative dives into specific parts of the material to give further context. The media archive and search engine Retriever was used to find every article from the four papers within the chosen timespan containing the phrases “hot mot rikets säkerhet”. (threat to national security) and “hot mot Sveriges säkerhet” (threat to Sweden’s security). The contents of the articles were encoded into several categories pertaining to our four questions, and graphed out to see patterns of frequency over time. We found a clear and dramatic increase in “threat reporting” from all four newspapers starting in 2017, peaking in 2019 and continuing at a higher level than before. A whole two-thirds of the 301 articles were published in or after 2017. The 2019 peak largely centers on the case of several imams accused of being security threats, which Expressen wrote the most about using the phrases in question. Expressen generally appears the most (103 articles), and Aftonbladet the least (40). Islamism was most commonly pointed out as a threat overall, followed by terrorism and extraparliamentary political action. In almost half of the articles, the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) was the source designating something or someone as a threat. The most common countermeasure after investigation was deportation of the (foreign) threat in question, consistent with there being more articles that point to an individual as the threat (121) rather than another state actor (68).

This thesis is about a remarkable experience lived through by Latvian émigrés in the mid-1950s. They were the targets of a Soviet repatriation campaign, operated by the KGB, which not only envisioned their repatriation to the Soviet Latvian homeland, but also anticipated the destruction of their émigré society as they knew it. The purpose of this thesis is to portray and analyze this repatriation campaign and the émigré Latvian reactions to it. By looking at the activities of the Committee For Return to the Motherland in East Berlin, the contents of the Latvian language repatriation newspaper Par atgriešanos Dzimtenē (For Return to the Motherland), and the reactions to the campaign in contemporary émigré press, this study shows how highly developed strategies and tactics were implemented in order to elicit certain behaviors from émigrés, and how émigrés advanced their own counter-strategies to offset the effects of the campaign. More specifically, this study examines the standardized narratives in Par atgriešanos Dzimtenē that were meant for émigré self-identification and emulation. This thesis proposes that the repatriation campaign was a highly complex Soviet propaganda effort. The publicly announced goal of repatriation included several parallel goals, aims, and purposes and encompassed many types of activities. Above all, deception was used to cover the actions undertaken against émigrés and to mislead host country governments and agencies. This thesis concludes that notwithstanding the Soviet superiority in organization and resources, a small, unprotected, and internally divided community could withstand the concerted efforts of Soviet propaganda if the group’s sense of mission was sufficiently strong and firm. / Denna avhandling behandlar de lettiska flyktingarna från andra världskriget och deras erfarenheter av ofrivilliga kontakter med Sovjetlettland vid mitten av 1950-talet, då flyktingarna blev måltavla för en sovjetisk repatrieringskampanj. Målet för denna kampanj var repatriering, dvs att få flyktingarna att återvända till hemlandet, det av Sovjet ockuperade Lettland. Ett annat mål var att splittra flyktingarnas sammanhållning. Avhandlingen beskriver och analyserar den sovjetiska repatrieringskampanjen och de lettiska flyktingarnas reaktioner. Studien bygger på källmaterial från kampanjverkamheten Committee For Return to the Motherland, som hade sin bas i Östberlin, samt från artiklar i den lettiskspråkiga tidskriften Par atgriešanos Dzimtenē (For Return to the Motherland) som riktade sig till de lettiska flyktingarna. Flyktingarnas reaktioner studeras genom en rad lettiska tidningar som utgavs i Väst. Min avhandling visar hur väl utvecklade strategier användes i syfte att framkalla önskade reaktioner från flyktingarna, samt vilka motåtgärder flyktingar själva utvecklade mot repatrieringskampanjen. Mer specifikt analyseras standardberättelser i Par atgriešanos Dzimtenē som var avsedda för flyktingarnas självidentifiering och igenkännande. Avhandlingen pekar på att den sovjetiska repatrieringskampanjen var en mycket komplex propagandaverksamhet. Utöver det offentligt tillkännagivna kampanjmålet fanns flera parallella målsättningar och avsikter som omfattade en stor mängd skiftande aktiviteter. En strategi som användes aktivt var vilseledning, bl a för att dölja verksamheter riktade mot flyktingarna, och för att förvilla statsledningar och myndigheter i de nationer där flyktingarna vistades. Avhandlingens slutsats är att trots den sovjetiska överlägsenheten i organisation och resurser kunde en liten oförsvarad och inom sig splittrad lettisk gemenskap motstå de samordnade ansträngningar från den sovjetiska propagandan.