Objectives: Most researchers have attributed observed cognitive differences between individuals with a traumatic brain injury (TBI) and ‘normal’ individuals to physiological changes to the brain. Lacking exploration has been the role of social context/environmental variables. One of the variables investigated in the social psychology literature is stereotypes. Research has shown that the presence of stereotypes in testing environments negatively interferes with test performance (called stereotype threat theory). This concept appears relevant to the TBI population given that empirical research has demonstrated that individuals tend to believe that traumatic brain injuries lead to cognitive deficits, as well as the fact that reminders of potential cognitive deficits are oftentimes present in neuropsychological testing settings (e.g., in pre-test instructions, etc.). It is argued that these cues exacerbate pre-existing negative beliefs regarding cognitive functioning for individuals with a mild-moderate TBI, thereby affecting neuropsychological test performance. Method: The sample consisted of 42 individuals who sustained a mild-to-moderate TBI at least 6 months earlier and 42 age-, gender-, and education-matched healthy adults below the age of 60. The study, similar to other stereotype threat research, consisted of ‘reduced threat’ and ‘heightened threat’ conditions. The purpose of the former condition was to reduce negative stereotypes and emphasize the notion of personal control over cognitive abilities. Questionnaires and neuropsychological tests were administered subsequent to the experimental manipulation. Results: TBI participants endorsed greater levels of anxiety, motivation, and dejection, but reduced feelings of memory self-efficacy compared to the control group. The most pivotal results to the research study revealed that the TBI heightened threat group displayed lower scores on the Initial Encoding and Attention composite variables (which were comprised of neuropsychological test measures) than the TBI reduced threat group. Furthermore, the head-injured heightened threat condition reported lower memory self-efficacy than the reduced threat condition, and the non-head-injured heightened threat group endorsed a greater degree of negative beliefs/stereotypes regarding TBI than the non-head-injured reduced threat group. The construct of memory self-efficacy was found to mediate the relation between threat condition and performance on encoding/attention measures. Conclusions: The findings highlight the role of negative stereotypes and expectations/beliefs to cognitive test performance in individuals who have sustained a mild/moderate TBI. To date, there have been few attempts to integrate social cognition with neuropsychology. Applying the information gleaned from previous stereotype threat studies to a TBI population bridges this gap and provides a prosperous avenue for future research.

The past two decades have seen a substantial increase in the availability of numerical data that individuals are faced with on a daily basis. In addition, research uncovering the multiple facets of statistical reasoning has become increasingly prominent. Both gender differences and the effect of experience or training have emerged as two key factors that influence performance in statistics. Surprisingly, though, the combined effects of these two variables have not been studied. This gap in understanding the joint effect of gender and experience on statistical reasoning is addressed in the present dissertation with six studies. In Study 1 (N = 201), participants with various levels of experience in statistics were asked to complete the Statistical Reasoning Assessment (SRA; Garfield, 2003). Although the performance of both genders improved with experience, the gender gap persisted across all experience levels. Multiple measures of individual differences were used in a confirmatory structural equation model. This model supported the idea that differences in statistical reasoning are not uniquely a matter of cognitive ability. In fact, gender was found to influence statistical reasoning directly, as well as indirectly through its influence on thinking dispositions. In Studies 2 (N = 67), 3 (N = 157), and 4 (N = 206), the role of stereotype threat was examined as a potential cause of the persisting gender gap in statistics, and value affirmation was tested as an intervention to overcome stereotype threat. Despite the fact that many women believed negative stereotypes about the ability of women in statistics, value affirmation had no significant impact on performance. To help explain this lack of effect, and in keeping with the results of the structural equation model suggesting a multi-pronged approach, efforts were turned towards a different (and potentially richer) cognitive factor. Specifically, mental representations were explored to help shed light on the root causes of those conceptual understanding differences in statistics. In Studies 5 and 6, gender differences in mental representations of statistical features were examined using a categorization paradigm. In Study 5 (N = 219), extending some of the key findings in Studies 1, 3 and 4, it was established that two courses in statistics are necessary to create a significant difference in the quality of mental representations of statistical concepts. More importantly, Study 6 (N = 208) demonstrated how constraining the task format particularly benefits women in that the quality of their reasoning significantly improved, where that of men was equal across tasks. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Stereotype threat refers to the pressure that individuals feel when they are at risk of confirming a demeaning stereotype about themselves. Research has found that stereotype threat impairs performance on cognitive-based tasks by inducing mental interference (e.g., Schmader & Johns, 2003). This thesis hypothesised that this finding would generalise to driving and that drivers who are better able to inhibit cognitive interference (i.e., with better inhibitory ability) would be less susceptible to the disruptive effect of stereotype threat than drivers who are less able (i.e., with poorer inhibitory ability). A series of three experiments conducted in a driving simulator tested the predictions using the gender stereotype of driving skills and investigated the interpretation of the results. The experiments revealed that stereotype threat exerted both a facilitative and debilitative influence on driving performance, as indicated by different performance measures. The facilitative effect diminished when drivers experienced increased mental demands or when they were assessed by an unexpected performance measure, while the debilitative effect was more likely observed among drivers who received negative feedback than drivers who received positive feedback. Moreover, the results supported the prediction that inhibitory ability would moderate the detrimental impact of stereotype threat as the performance of drivers with poorer inhibitory ability was impeded more than that of drivers with better inhibitory ability. Regarding the processes underlying the present findings, the experiments provided suggestive evidence that stereotype threat elicits cognitive interference and simultaneously motivates drivers to concentrate on particular performance areas in an attempt to refute the stereotype. In combination, these processes appear to be at least partly responsible for the performance deficits and boosts observed.

Stereotype threat refers to the pressure that individuals feel when they are at risk of confirming a demeaning stereotype about themselves. Research has found that stereotype threat impairs performance on cognitive-based tasks by inducing mental interference (e.g., Schmader & Johns, 2003). This thesis hypothesised that this finding would generalise to driving and that drivers who are better able to inhibit cognitive interference (i.e., with better inhibitory ability) would be less susceptible to the disruptive effect of stereotype threat than drivers who are less able (i.e., with poorer inhibitory ability). A series of three experiments conducted in a driving simulator tested the predictions using the gender stereotype of driving skills and investigated the interpretation of the results. The experiments revealed that stereotype threat exerted both a facilitative and debilitative influence on driving performance, as indicated by different performance measures. The facilitative effect diminished when drivers experienced increased mental demands or when they were assessed by an unexpected performance measure, while the debilitative effect was more likely observed among drivers who received negative feedback than drivers who received positive feedback. Moreover, the results supported the prediction that inhibitory ability would moderate the detrimental impact of stereotype threat as the performance of drivers with poorer inhibitory ability was impeded more than that of drivers with better inhibitory ability. Regarding the processes underlying the present findings, the experiments provided suggestive evidence that stereotype threat elicits cognitive interference and simultaneously motivates drivers to concentrate on particular performance areas in an attempt to refute the stereotype. In combination, these processes appear to be at least partly responsible for the performance deficits and boosts observed.

[Truncated abstract] The anxiety-assimilation hypothesis (Wilder, 1993) and the capacity constraint plus control motivation model (Fiske & Morling, 1996) predict that anxiety causes people to form more stereotypic impressions of others. Affect-as-information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and affect-priming (Bower, 1991) theories predict that anxiety causes people to form affect-congruent (i.e., more threatening) impressions of others. A novel research paradigm was used in Experiment 1 to separate the predictions of these two classes of theories, recognizing that their predictions were not mutually exclusive. Experiment 1 found that anxious persons formed more threatening, but not more stereotypic, impressions of a target person. This result replicated in Experiment 2, with a different population and a different anxiety manipulation. In addition, Experiment 2 found that the anxiety-congruent bias in impression formation was limited to participants? ratings of traits that corresponded to the information presented about the target. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 were taken as support for an affect-priming rather than affect-as-information account of the effect of anxiety on impression formation. Experiments 3 and 4 investigated anxiety effects on encoding and recall that underlie affect-priming explanation of affect-congruent impression judgment biases. Experiment 3 found that anxious participants spent more time encoding non-stereotypic information and recalled less stereotypic information than non-anxious participants. In Experiment 4 anxious participants again recalled less stereotypic information. This study also found that anxious participants? recall and impression judgments were affect-congruent. ... As predicted by the modified affect-as-information theory, the affect-attribution manipulation left participants? anxiety levels unaltered but it did attenuate the anxiety-congruent impression bias. In addition, anxious participants in this study recalled less stereotypic than non-stereotypic information. The findings of this thesis raised several new questions and theoretical challenges. The new experimental paradigms that were used to examine the questions in this thesis will also allow the examination of the interplay of stereotypes and valence in judgments in future research for persons in affective states other than anxiety. Such research would allow for the continued revision and development of theories of affect and social cognition.

Thesis (master's)--Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, 2002, Frankfurt am Main. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 92-98).

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 379-401).

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 379-401).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Michigan, 1980. / "A research report submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree ..."

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 78-84).