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The operating performance of IPO firms: the case of Hong Kong.January 1996 (has links)
by Ching Chi Keung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-91). / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.3 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Data --- p.17 / Chapter 4. --- Profile of IPOs in Hong Kong --- p.24 / Chapter 5. --- Methodology --- p.27 / Chapter 6. --- Results --- p.43 / Chapter 7. --- Comparison with the study in U. S --- p.57 / Chapter 8. --- Summary --- p.61 / Chapter 9. --- Tables --- p.64 / Chapter 10. --- Results of statistical test --- p.70 / Chapter 11. --- Charts --- p.72 / Chapter 12. --- Appendixes --- p.79 / Chapter 13. --- Reference --- p.89
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A study on dividend policies of listing companies in China.January 2003 (has links)
by Cheung Ho-Wan Oswald, Kwok Tsz-Hong, Yeung Kwong-Yiu. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 37-42). / ABSTRACT --- p.I / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.II / LIST OF TABLES --- p.IV / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- HISTORY OF CHINA SECURITIES MARKETS --- p.3 / Chapter III. --- WHY FIRMS PAY DIVIDENDS --- p.6 / The Bird-in-the-Hand Explanation --- p.6 / The Signaling Explanation --- p.7 / The Tax-Preference Explanation --- p.9 / The Agency Explanation --- p.10 / Chapter IV. --- HOW TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF DIVIDENDS TO PAY --- p.13 / Methodology --- p.14 / Data Analysis --- p.14 / Model (L3) --- p.16 / Fama and Babiak Model --- p.16 / The Percentage Adjusted Model (PAM) --- p.17 / CAR Analysis --- p.20 / Chapter V. --- COMPANY CLASSIFICATIONS --- p.22 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSION --- p.25 / APPENDIX --- p.26 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.37
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Studies on the short-term market response and long-term impact of cumulative voting on China's listed companies.January 2010 (has links)
So, King Pui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 49-52). / Abstracts in English and Chinese; appendix II, III also in Chinese. / Cover Page --- p.1 / Abstract --- p.2 / Chinese Version --- p.3 / Acknowledgements --- p.4 / Contents --- p.5 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.7 / Chapter 2. --- Definition and basic idea of Cumulative Voting --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Literature Review --- p.11 / Chapter 4. --- History and Development --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1. --- Around the world --- p.12 / Chapter 4.2. --- Cumulative voting in listed companies in China --- p.13 / Chapter 5. --- Hypothesis --- p.15 / Chapter 5.1. --- Nature of cumulative voting --- p.15 / Chapter 5.2 --- Relationship of corporate governance mechanism and tunneling in signaling the effect of cumulative voting --- p.18 / Chapter 5.2.1. --- Ownership characteristics --- p.18 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- Activeness of minority shareholders --- p.20 / Chapter 5.2.3. --- Legal framework --- p.21 / Chapter 5.2.4. --- Ownership nature --- p.22 / Chapter 5.2.5. --- Board of directors and supervisors --- p.22 / Chapter 5.2.6. --- Compensations of top executives --- p.23 / Chapter 6. --- Methodology --- p.24 / Chapter 6.1. --- Cumulative voting in the election of the board of director --- p.24 / Chapter 6.2. --- Ownership concentration and characteristics --- p.24 / Chapter 6.3. --- Legal framework --- p.25 / Chapter 6.4. --- Firm Operation Policy --- p.25 / Chapter 6.5. --- Ownership Nature --- p.25 / Chapter 6.6. --- Board of directors and supervisors --- p.26 / Chapter 6.7. --- Top Executives' compensations --- p.27 / Chapter 6.8. --- Operating performance --- p.27 / Chapter 6.9. --- Industry sectors --- p.28 / Chapter 6.10. --- Market firm value --- p.28 / Chapter 6.11. --- Event study approach --- p.29 / Chapter 6.12. --- Matched Propensity Scores Approach --- p.32 / Chapter 6.13. --- Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivities --- p.34 / Chapter 6.14. --- Difference in differences approach --- p.35 / Chapter 7. --- Data --- p.39 / Chapter 7.1. --- Sources of Data --- p.39 / Chapter 7.2. --- Cumulative voting announcements and firm characteristics --- p.39 / Chapter 8. --- Empirical Results --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1. --- Short-term market response --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1.1. --- Event study --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1.2. --- Univariate test --- p.41 / Chapter 8.1.3. --- Multivate OLS regressions --- p.42 / Chapter 8.2. --- Long-term impact --- p.43 / Chapter 8.2.1. --- Matched Propensity Scores --- p.43 / Chapter 8.2.2. --- Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivities --- p.44 / Chapter 8.2.3. --- Univariate test --- p.45 / Chapter 8.2.4. --- Difference in Differences regressions --- p.46 / Chapter 9. --- Conclusions --- p.47 / References --- p.49 / Table 1: Descriptive statistics for firms announcing the implementation of cumulative voting in the election of board of directors --- p.53 / Table 2: Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics --- p.54 / Table 3: Descriptive statistics for annual shareholders' meetings from 2002-2008 --- p.56 / Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns for an event study of the information content of implementation of cumulative voting in election of board of directors announcements --- p.56 / Table 5: Abnormal returns for an event study of the information content of implementation of cumulative voting in election of board of directors announcements --- p.57 / Table 6: Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics --- p.57 / "Table 7: Mean comparison between above median/ ´ب´ب 1"" group and below median/ ""0"" group using t-test" --- p.59 / Table 8: OLS regression --- p.60 / Table 9: First stage Logistic Model --- p.62 / Table 10: Top Executives Pay-Performance sensitivities for salary and inside stock ownership --- p.64 / Table 11: Mean comparison between cumulative voting and straight voting group using t-test --- p.65 / Table 12: Difference in differences regressions (Corporate governance) --- p.66 / Table 13: Difference in differences regressions (Operating performance) --- p.67 / Table 14: Difference in differences regressions (Market firm value) --- p.68 / Appendix I --- p.68 / Appendix II --- p.71 / Appendix III --- p.72
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Dividend and growth financing strategies of large public companies in Hong KongMak, Kwai-ming, Simon., 麥桂明. January 1999 (has links)
published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Business / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy
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A comparative analysis of the regulation of demutualised stock exchanges : is South Africa lagging behind15 July 2015 (has links)
LL.M. (Commercial Law) / Please refer to full text to view abstract
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A Study on Application of Financial Ratio Analysis onto business Failure -Taking Emerging Stock Companies in Taiwan, for Instance-Tu, Chun-kai 22 August 2005 (has links)
None.
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Interessenwahrung und Rechtsschutz der Aktionäre beim Bezugsrechtsausschluss im Rahmen des genehmigten Kapitals /Maslo, Armin. January 2006 (has links)
Universiẗat, Diss., 2005--Osnabrück. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [266]-281) and index.
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Povinnosti tzv. kótovaných akciových společností / Duties of so-called quoted joint stock companiesKráľ, Štefan January 2016 (has links)
Duties of so-called quoted joint-stock companies This diploma thesis draws attention to information duties of the so-called listed joint- stock companies. The goal of this thesis is to introduce the legal regulation of selected information duties of the so-called listed joint-stock companies and to analyse the development of the selected duties with regard to harmonization of capital markets regulation. The goal of this thesis is also to analyse whether the selected information duties help the capital market to function more efficiently. The thesis is divided into seven chapters, introduction and conclusion. The introduction defines which goals are to be achieved by this thesis and which methods are used by the author. The first chapter defines what a so-called quoted joint-stock company means under the Czech law. The second chapter introduces the importance of capital markets for the whole economy and briefly explains the specific evolution of the capital market in the Czech Republic since the 1990s until now, which was influenced by privatization and transformation. The third chapter follows the second chapter and introduces the evolution of legal environment of capital market protection. The third chapter also includes several important terms such as regulated market or quotation. The fourth...
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The process and procedures of public listing in Hong Kong by initial public offer.January 1988 (has links)
by Nip Yun Wing. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1988. / Bibliography: leaf 75.
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Board structure and corporate performance: a comparision of agency theroy and stewardship theory.January 2001 (has links)
Jie Jenny Tian. / Thesis submitted in 2000. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-137). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Acknowledgements --- p.i / Abstract --- p.iii / Chapter CHAPTER 1. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER 2. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Agency Theory Approach to Corporate Governance --- p.4 / Chapter 2.2 --- Stewardship Theory Approach to Corporate Governance --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3 --- Research on Board of Directors: Prescriptions and Empirical Evidence --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Board Composition Studies --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Board Leadership Structure Studies --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.24 / Chapter CHAPTER 3. --- REFORM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CHINESE CASE --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1 --- China's Enterprise Reform: An Overview --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2 --- State as Shareholder: The State Assets Management System --- p.30 / Chapter 3.3 --- Asset Restructuring before IPO --- p.35 / Chapter 3.4 --- Corporate Governance Research in China: Theories and Empirical Evidence --- p.43 / Chapter 3.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.46 / Chapter CHAPTER 4. --- THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES --- p.47 / Chapter 4.1 --- Theoretical Background and Research Questions --- p.47 / Chapter 4.2 --- A New Approach to Understanding Board Composition in China --- p.51 / Chapter 4.3 --- Board Composition and Firm Performance --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Agency Theory Hypotheses --- p.57 / Independent Directors and Firm Performance --- p.57 / Affiliated Directors and Firm Performance --- p.59 / Board Size and Firm Performance --- p.61 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Stewardship Theory Hypotheses --- p.62 / Independent Directors and Firm Performance --- p.62 / Affiliated Directors and Firm Performance --- p.65 / Board Size and Firm Performance --- p.71 / Chapter 4.4 --- Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance --- p.72 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Agency Theory Hypothesis --- p.72 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Stewardship Theory Hypothesis --- p.74 / Chapter 4.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.77 / Chapter CHAPTER 5. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.78 / Chapter 5.1 --- Sample Selection --- p.78 / Chapter 5.2 --- Variables and Measurement --- p.82 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Independent Variables (IVs) --- p.82 / Board Composition --- p.82 / Board Leadership Structure --- p.84 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Dependent Variables (DVs) --- p.84 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Control Variables --- p.86 / Chapter CHAPTER 6. --- RESULTS --- p.94 / Chapter 6.1 --- Results based on the Full Sample (N=203) --- p.94 / Chapter 6.2 --- Results based on the Streamlined Sample (N = 197) --- p.101 / Chapter CHAPTER 7. --- "DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION" --- p.107 / Chapter 7.1 --- Discussion --- p.107 / Chapter 7.2 --- Limitations --- p.116 / Chapter 7.3 --- Conclusion and Future Research Direction --- p.118 / References --- p.121
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