Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-06-30T11:55:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1535462 bytes, checksum: 687de72e828e46b218bdfeac98271fb9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-30T11:55:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1535462 bytes, checksum: 687de72e828e46b218bdfeac98271fb9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-11-03 / This work intends to present an overview of the medieval Quarrel of Universal. The debate about the status of universals has its conceptual basis in the thought of the ancient philosophers and traditionally opens with the formulation of Porphyry. During the Middle Ages there were several hypotheses about what state of universal, among which we highlight the realism of Duns Scotus and Bonaventure, the extreme nominalism of Roscellinus and the anti-realism of Peter Abelard. Finally, we present the William of Ockham’s solution to the problem of universals. With a nominalist position, which is against the existence of any universal entity out of mind, Ockham develops an theory of supposition in which universals are taken as mentally that according to a semantic function, take the place of individuals referred to in a propositional context. Thus, we try to show how Ockham's perspective brings the problem of universal from the ontological scope for the logical. / Este trabalho pretende apresentar um panorama geral da Querela dos Universais do medievo. O debate acerca do estado dos universais tem suas bases conceituais no pensamento dos filósofos antigos e se inaugura tradicionalmente com a formulação de Porfírio de Tiro. Durante a Idade Média surgiram várias hipóteses acerca de qual estado dos universais, dentre as quais destacamos o realismo de Duns Scotus e Boaventura, o nominalismo extremo de Roscelino e o anti-realismo de Pedro Abelardo. Finalmente, apresentamos a solução de Guilherme de Ockham ao problema dos universais. Com um posicionamento nominalista, que é contrário a existência de qualquer entidade universal fora da mente, Ockham desenvolve uma teoria da suposição na qual os universais são tomados como termos mentais que, de acordo com uma função semântica, ocupam o lugar dos particulares a que se referem num contexto proposicional. Deste modo, procuramos mostrar como a perspectiva de Ockham traz o problema dos universais do âmbito ontológico para o lógico.

My research focuses on the philosophy of imagination. Within the analytic tradition, there recently has been a growing interest in imagination. The current research lies at the crossroads of various sub-disciplines of philosophy, including aesthetics, moral psychology, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. My work joins this choir as a voice from within philosophy of mind. My dissertation addresses two questions within philosophy of imagination. What I call the Relation Question asks what is the proper relation between supposition and imagination, and what I call the Unification Question asks what is the imagination. With regards to the Relation Question, philosophers answer it in one of two ways: either supposition and imagination are distinct mental capacities (what I call two-nature views) or supposition is a kind of imagination (what I call one-nature views). I argue that both views fail to explain all of the features central to the relation. With regards to the Unification Question, many philosophers doubt it has an answer because there is no clear way to unify the disparate activities of imagination. I argue that this skepticism is the result of mischaracterizing the relation between imagining and supposing. Thus, I answer both the Relation and Unification Questions by arguing that both imagining and supposing (as we typically understand these terms) are both instances of what I call the as-if-true attitude. I call this the as-if-true attitude view of imagining. The explanatory payoff of this is that my view can explain all of the features central to the relation without positing two distinct mental capacities (as two-nature views do) and without getting facts about supposition wrong (as one-nature views do). It also gives us a way of seeing how we might unify the different activities of imagination. Finally, I demonstrate that my view has application to what is known in the literature as the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. This phenomenon has to do with competent imaginers failing to comply with invitations to imagine certain propositions. It has been noted in the literature that there is variation to this phenomenon, where some people experience it and some do not. Some philosophers attempt to explain this by appealing to contextual factors. Thus, I call them Contextual Variant Views. I argue that these views fail to account for all of variation. I show that from my as-if-true attitude view comes another view that I call Constraint Variant View. I argue that this view can account for all of the variation of imaginative resistance.

Der Unterstellungsbegriff ist ein zentraler Begriff innerhalb transzendentaler Argumente. Transzendentale Argumente sind Versuche, empirische Erkenntnis stabiler zu sichern als durch empirische Erkenntnis selbst. Dabei müssten, heißt es immer wieder, bestimmte grundlegende Sachverhalte unterstellt werden. Was genau bedeutet hier „unterstellen“? Exemplarisch wird in dieser Arbeit Habermas’ Verwendung des Unterstellungsbegriffs und des eng verwandten Voraussetzungsbegriffs nachvollzogen und interpretiertHabermas verwendet seinen Kernbegriff nicht einheitlich, insbesondere unterscheidet er nicht zwischen semantischem und epistemischem Voraussetzungsbegriff. Im Gegensatz zum semantischen Voraussetzungsbegriff, der eine Relation zwischen Sachverhalten beschreibt, kennzeichnet der epistemische Voraussetzungsbegriff eine Relation zwischen einem epistemischen Subjekt und einem Sachverhalt. Mit der Verwendung des Ausdrucks Unterstellung konstruiert Habermas einen internen, konstitutiven Zusammenhang zwischen unserer Kommunikationsfähigkeit und grundlegend verschiedenen propositionalen, epistemischen Einstellungen, ohne dass diese terminologisch voneinander abgegrenzt werden. Handelt es sich um Fiktionen, Hypothesen oder um handfeste Überzeugungen? Der rekonstruierte Zusammenhang erweist sich in Abhängigkeit von der durch das Verb unterstellen jeweils ausgedrückten propositionalen Einstellung – doxastisch-affirmativ, doxastisch-negierende oder nicht-doxastisch - entweder als unverständlich oder als trivial. Die als notwendige Voraussetzungen benannten Unterstellungen haben aufgrund der Semantik des Ausdrucks unterstellen hinsichtlich ihres epistemischen Status’ also keinen klaren Sinn. Damit scheitert a fortiori auch Habermas’ Versuch, notwendige Unterstellungen als schwach transzendentale Grundlage kommunikativen Handelns zu bestimmen. Die Inakzeptanz transzendentaler Argumente – auch in ihrer nicht-metaphysischen, von Habermas favorisierten „schwachen“ Lesart – wird durch die Formulierung „unterstellen müssen“ als Bestandteil des Schlussprinzips oder einer Prämisse transzendentaler Argumente systematisch verschleiert. / The concept of presuppositions is central for transcendental arguments. Transcendental arguments are efforts to validate empirical knowledge more effectively than through empirical knowledge itself. According to widely held views some fundamental propositions have to be presupposed for that purpose. But what – precisely – does “to presuppose something” mean? This paper will exemplarily reconstruct and interpret the use of the concept of presupposition in Jürgen Habermas’ work: Habermas doesn’t use this central concept in a homogeneous, standardized way: In particular he does not distinguish between the semantic and the epistemological concept. In contrast to the semantic concept, which describes a relationship between propositions, the epistemological concept characterizes a relationship between an epistemological subject and a proposition. Moreover, using the term “presupposition”, Habermas constructs an internal, constitutive connection between our ability to communicate and fundamentally different propositional, epistemological attitudes, without distinguishing them from each other. Is it a matter of fictions, hypotheses or beliefs? The reconstructed connection appears to be either incomprehensible or trivial given its dependence on the verb “to presuppose”, which can imply the propositional attitude of doxastic-affirmative, doxastic-negating or non-doxastic. The presuppositions claimed to be essential are not clearly defined in terms of their epistemological status because of the semantics of the term to presuppose. Therefore, Habermas’ attempt to determine essential presuppositions as a transcendental basis for communication also fails a fortiori. The non-acceptance of transcendental arguments – even in their non-metaphysic interpretation favoured by Habermas – is disguised as constituent of the premise of the corpus by the phrase “to have to presuppose”.