In recent decades, a debate has arisen within analytic philosophy concerning the nature, validity and possible uses of Kantian transcendental arguments. This thesis examines two of the main questions within this debate: (i) what is a transcendental argument, and (ii) could there be a successful transcendental argument. The first chapter surveys some recent attempts at definition. A general lack of consistency in the literature makes it impossible to reach any precise conclusion about what a transcendental argument is, but a two-fold working definition is proposed on the basis of two identifiable general approaches to this question. The second chapter looks at two forms of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world in order to set up in a Kantian way the two epistemological problems to which transcendental arguments have been proposed as solutions. One problem concerns how it can be known that the external world exists; the other concerns conceptual relativism and the possibility of transcendental justification of a particular conceptual scheme. The third chapter examines and expands upon Stephan Korner's forceful argument to show that transcendental arguments are impossible. This argument counts decisively against the possibility of a transcendental solution to the problem of conceptual relativism, but does not touch arguments to demonstrate that we have knowledge of the existence of the external world. The fourth chapter examines several transcendental arguments which attempt the latter demonstration, beginning with Kant's Refutation of Idealism and then turning to some recent variations on this argument. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

The purpose of this study is to assess the cogency of Francis Schaeffer‘s apologetic in light of John Frame‘s triperspectival epistemology, giving special attention to the existential perspective evident throughout Schaeffer‘s trilogy. The study achieves this aim by employing the instrumental case study method to meet five specific objectives. First, the study determines the extent to which Schaeffer‘s existential perspective is recognized within the apologetic literature that critically engages with his ideas. Based on these sources, the study determines that this perspective is recognized in Schaeffer‘s work but not as an integral component within a broader perspectival approach to apologetics. Second, the study discovers the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism may be used in analyzing apologetic systems to reveal their strengths, weaknesses and cogency. By giving attention to Frame‘s system as a meta-apologetic, it is evident that this tool is applicable to Schaeffer and to other apologists. This establishes Frame‘s perspectivalism as an appropriate theoretical model to use in an instrumental case study on apologetics. Third, the study analyzes the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism is reflected in Schaeffer‘s trilogy, highlighting the existential perspective. Meeting this objective establishes the central theoretical argument of the study, showing that Frame‘s epistemology reveals the underlying cogency of Schaeffer‘s apologetic credibly (?) and does so most profoundly with respect to the existential perspective. Fourth, the study compares Schaeffer‘s existential perspective with that of E.J. Carnell and secular existentialism, which both apologists confronted. On the basis of Carnell‘s critique of existentialism and his existential apologetic of personal rectitude, credible support is offered for Schaeffer‘s engagement with this philosophical movement and his own existential perspective. Fifth, support is offered for the current relevance of Schaeffer‘s apologetic of personal rectitude by showing how the postmodern situation he anticipated is best addressed using the apologetic tools he offers. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

The purpose of this study is to assess the cogency of Francis Schaeffer‘s apologetic in light of John Frame‘s triperspectival epistemology, giving special attention to the existential perspective evident throughout Schaeffer‘s trilogy. The study achieves this aim by employing the instrumental case study method to meet five specific objectives. First, the study determines the extent to which Schaeffer‘s existential perspective is recognized within the apologetic literature that critically engages with his ideas. Based on these sources, the study determines that this perspective is recognized in Schaeffer‘s work but not as an integral component within a broader perspectival approach to apologetics. Second, the study discovers the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism may be used in analyzing apologetic systems to reveal their strengths, weaknesses and cogency. By giving attention to Frame‘s system as a meta-apologetic, it is evident that this tool is applicable to Schaeffer and to other apologists. This establishes Frame‘s perspectivalism as an appropriate theoretical model to use in an instrumental case study on apologetics. Third, the study analyzes the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism is reflected in Schaeffer‘s trilogy, highlighting the existential perspective. Meeting this objective establishes the central theoretical argument of the study, showing that Frame‘s epistemology reveals the underlying cogency of Schaeffer‘s apologetic credibly (?) and does so most profoundly with respect to the existential perspective. Fourth, the study compares Schaeffer‘s existential perspective with that of E.J. Carnell and secular existentialism, which both apologists confronted. On the basis of Carnell‘s critique of existentialism and his existential apologetic of personal rectitude, credible support is offered for Schaeffer‘s engagement with this philosophical movement and his own existential perspective. Fifth, support is offered for the current relevance of Schaeffer‘s apologetic of personal rectitude by showing how the postmodern situation he anticipated is best addressed using the apologetic tools he offers. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

Kant is famous for his use of transcendental arguments in the transcendental deduction. This thesis examines how such a transcendental argument is used within Kant’s methodological framework. Following the work of Henrich and Walker, the paper asks whether transcendental arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason are compatible with Kant’s methodology in general. We find that these arguments and Kant’s methodology are compatible, and that transcendental arguments are indeed very weak arguments by Walker’s standards. However, the entire transcendental deduction should be understood as a deduction writing that uses transcendental arguments particularly effectively according to Kant’s own methodological standards.

The main purpose of this dissertation is to answer the question of how one can understand the fact that we mean very different things when we say that God exists and when we say that chairs, mountains and trees exist, and that it is still a matter of existence. On the one hand it seems that we talk about the same thing when we say that something exists, irrespective of what it is, on the other hand it seems to be a question of very different things depending on what it is we are talking about as existing. This dissertation seeks to give an understanding of the relation between the concept of truth and the concept of reality. The conclusion is not only that we presuppose these concepts in everything we do, say, believe and think, but that we presuppose a specific understanding of these concepts, namely a concept of objective truth and a concept of an external and mind independent reality. In this dissertation it is also argued that our use of these concepts and that we use them in everything we do – that they are as basic as they are – says something about how it is, about reality. The use of these concepts does not only say something of what we conceptually presuppose but it also says something about what we assume in relation to reality. The conceptual aspect, in this way, has consequences ontologi.

Der Unterstellungsbegriff ist ein zentraler Begriff innerhalb transzendentaler Argumente. Transzendentale Argumente sind Versuche, empirische Erkenntnis stabiler zu sichern als durch empirische Erkenntnis selbst. Dabei müssten, heißt es immer wieder, bestimmte grundlegende Sachverhalte unterstellt werden. Was genau bedeutet hier „unterstellen“? Exemplarisch wird in dieser Arbeit Habermas’ Verwendung des Unterstellungsbegriffs und des eng verwandten Voraussetzungsbegriffs nachvollzogen und interpretiertHabermas verwendet seinen Kernbegriff nicht einheitlich, insbesondere unterscheidet er nicht zwischen semantischem und epistemischem Voraussetzungsbegriff. Im Gegensatz zum semantischen Voraussetzungsbegriff, der eine Relation zwischen Sachverhalten beschreibt, kennzeichnet der epistemische Voraussetzungsbegriff eine Relation zwischen einem epistemischen Subjekt und einem Sachverhalt. Mit der Verwendung des Ausdrucks Unterstellung konstruiert Habermas einen internen, konstitutiven Zusammenhang zwischen unserer Kommunikationsfähigkeit und grundlegend verschiedenen propositionalen, epistemischen Einstellungen, ohne dass diese terminologisch voneinander abgegrenzt werden. Handelt es sich um Fiktionen, Hypothesen oder um handfeste Überzeugungen? Der rekonstruierte Zusammenhang erweist sich in Abhängigkeit von der durch das Verb unterstellen jeweils ausgedrückten propositionalen Einstellung – doxastisch-affirmativ, doxastisch-negierende oder nicht-doxastisch - entweder als unverständlich oder als trivial. Die als notwendige Voraussetzungen benannten Unterstellungen haben aufgrund der Semantik des Ausdrucks unterstellen hinsichtlich ihres epistemischen Status’ also keinen klaren Sinn. Damit scheitert a fortiori auch Habermas’ Versuch, notwendige Unterstellungen als schwach transzendentale Grundlage kommunikativen Handelns zu bestimmen. Die Inakzeptanz transzendentaler Argumente – auch in ihrer nicht-metaphysischen, von Habermas favorisierten „schwachen“ Lesart – wird durch die Formulierung „unterstellen müssen“ als Bestandteil des Schlussprinzips oder einer Prämisse transzendentaler Argumente systematisch verschleiert. / The concept of presuppositions is central for transcendental arguments. Transcendental arguments are efforts to validate empirical knowledge more effectively than through empirical knowledge itself. According to widely held views some fundamental propositions have to be presupposed for that purpose. But what – precisely – does “to presuppose something” mean? This paper will exemplarily reconstruct and interpret the use of the concept of presupposition in Jürgen Habermas’ work: Habermas doesn’t use this central concept in a homogeneous, standardized way: In particular he does not distinguish between the semantic and the epistemological concept. In contrast to the semantic concept, which describes a relationship between propositions, the epistemological concept characterizes a relationship between an epistemological subject and a proposition. Moreover, using the term “presupposition”, Habermas constructs an internal, constitutive connection between our ability to communicate and fundamentally different propositional, epistemological attitudes, without distinguishing them from each other. Is it a matter of fictions, hypotheses or beliefs? The reconstructed connection appears to be either incomprehensible or trivial given its dependence on the verb “to presuppose”, which can imply the propositional attitude of doxastic-affirmative, doxastic-negating or non-doxastic. The presuppositions claimed to be essential are not clearly defined in terms of their epistemological status because of the semantics of the term to presuppose. Therefore, Habermas’ attempt to determine essential presuppositions as a transcendental basis for communication also fails a fortiori. The non-acceptance of transcendental arguments – even in their non-metaphysic interpretation favoured by Habermas – is disguised as constituent of the premise of the corpus by the phrase “to have to presuppose”.