Bakgrund och problem: Underprissättning har länge studerats, och fenomenet har konstaterats förekomma i en absolut majoritet av de studerade länderna. Trots detta råder ingen konsensus kring vilka teorier som förklarar underprissättning. Teorier för underprissättning är i huvudsak indelade i teorier baserade på symmetrisk eller asymmetrisk information, och de empiriska resultat som presenterats målar en spretig bild med resultat som går både emot och ger stöd för flera teorier. Mot bakgrund av den motstridighet som föreligger för teoretiska förklaringar till underprissättning har vi valt att studera ämnet noggrannare. Syfte: Studiens syfte är att, med utgångspunkt i motsägande empiriska resultat, utreda vilka olika teoretiska incitament som kan förklara underprissättning för att skapa en bättre förståelse för den komplexitet som föreligger inom teoribildningen för underprissättning. Metod: Vi applicerar i studien en kvantitativ forskningsmetodik där vi, i linje med internationella referensstudier, väljer att använda en multipel regressionsanalys med minstakvadrat-metoden för att kunna testa vilka teorier som är applicerbara för att förklara underprissättning. Vi approximerar teorierna via variabler med tillhörande hypoteser för att mäta dess individuella och ackumulerade effekt på underprissättning. Via hypotesprövning möjliggör vi en koppling mellan det statistiska resultatet och respektive teori. Slutsats: Studiens resultat stödjer såväl teorier baserade på symmetrisk som asymmetrisk information vilket illustrerar komplexiteten i fenomenet underprissättning. Med utgångspunkt i resultaten av den statistiska modellen förs en analys där teorier frikopplats från symmetri respektive asymmetri, och istället analyserats simultant. Denna analys presenterar en alternativ syn på teori kring underprissättning, där teorier tillhörande symmetrisk respektive asymmetrisk information inte är ömsesidigt uteslutande, vilket introducerar ett nytt sätt att se på teoretiska förklaringar för underprissättning. / Background and problem: Underpricing has been subject to studies for many years, and the phenomena have been observed on a vast majority of studied countries. Despite the fact that studies have been conducted, there is no consensus as to which theories might best explain underpricing. Theories explaining underpricing are mainly divided into either symmetric or asymmetric information, and the empirical results presented testifies to the theoretical discrepancy, with support for and against several theories. The theoretical discrepancy is the main reason as to why we choose to closer examine the phenomena. Purpose: The purpose of this study is, based upon contradictory empirical results, to investigate as to which different theoretical incentives can explain IPO underpricing in order to create a better understanding of the complexity regarding theory for IPO underpricing. Methodology: In the study we apply a quantitative research method in which we, similar to international reference studies, use a multiple regression analysis with an ordinary least squares approach in order to test which theories are applicable in order to explain underpricing. We approximate the theories using variables with belonging hypotheses to quantify the variables individual and accumulated effect on underpricing. Using hypothesis testing we enable a connection between the statistical results and theories explaining underpricing. Conclusions: The study’s result support both theories based upon symmetric and asymmetric information which illustrates the complexity of the phenomenon of underpricing. Based on the statistical results the authors conduct an analysis in which theories are discarded from the context of symmetric and asymmetric information and are instead analyzed simultaneously. This analysis presents an alternative view of underpricing theories, in which theories belonging to symmetric as well as asymmetric information no longer are mutually excluding, which introduces a new approach to theoretical explanations for IPO underpricing.

In this paper, we use the forward recursion BCJR algorithm to estimate the symmetric information rate for Two Dimensional Magnetic Recording (TDMR) channels. In particular, we consider a TDMR read/write channel whose all components, including recording medium, write and readback processes are modeled in software. Since the primary source of noise in TDMR arises from irregularities in the recording medium and leads to highly colored and data-dependent jitter, the pattern dependent noise predictive (PDNP) algorithm is implemented to improve the accuracy and performance of SIR estimation. Furthermore, we study the performance gain of using the PDNP algorithm in SIR estimation through simulations over the Voronoi based media model for different TDMR channel configurations.

<p>Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral <i>gambling</i> has become legitimate financial <i>trade</i>. This book explores the<i> genealogy</i> of the coexisting<i> insider trading laws</i>. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is <i>misleading</i> and that the regulation is best understood as a <i>game rule</i> aiming to <i>stimulate</i> financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. </p><p>The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the <i>risks</i> involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system<i> itself</i> rather than being naturally given. This places <i>desire</i> rather than rational <i>needs</i> as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game? </p>

Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral gambling has become legitimate financial trade. This book explores the genealogy of the coexisting insider trading laws. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is misleading and that the regulation is best understood as a game rule aiming to stimulate financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the risks involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system itself rather than being naturally given. This places desire rather than rational needs as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game?