Bakgrund: Tidigare forskning har visat att insynspersoner tenderar att överavkasta på investeringar i eget bolag. Det råder dock delade meningar kring varför insynspersoner tenderar att överavkasta. Vid genomgång av tidigare studier påträffades ingen kvalitativ studie, varav vi ansåg det vara av intresse att studera fenomenet genom intervjuer med insynspersoner. Syfte: Uppsatsen syftar till att studera och kartlägga motiven bakom insynspersoners köp- och säljtransaktioner i eget bolag. Med hjälp av tidigare forskning samt en ny infallsvinkel i form av teorier inom behavioural finance analyseras varför insynspersoner tenderar att uppnå överavkastning på investeringar i eget bolag. Genomförande: Studien har genomförts med utgångspunkt i åtta intervjuer med insynspersoner. Resultat från tidigare studier på området låg till grund för vilken information vi med intervjuerna ville uppnå djupare förståelse kring. Den insamlade empirin har analyserats utifrån empirisk forskning och teorier inom behavioural finance. Slutsats: I studien presenteras en ny hypotes vilken förklarar insynspersoners överavkastning som en följd av befintlig lagstiftning. Vi menar att lagstiftningen förhindrar ofördelaktiga handlingar, vilket i sin tur leder till att insynspersoner i större utsträckning än övriga investerare tenderar att undvika psykologiska fallgropar. / Background: Previous researches have shown that insiders tend to achieve excess returns on investments in own companies. However there are still disagreements regarding possible explanations for this phenomenon. In our review of previous research we did not discover any qualitative studies in the area and therefore we found it interesting to study the phenomenon by interviews with insiders. Aim: The purpose of this paper is to study and identify the motives behind insider buy and sell transactions in own companies. By using previous research and also create a new approach through apply theories within behavioural finance we aim to analyze why insiders tend to achieve excess returns on investments in own companies. Completion: This study was conducted based on eight interviews with insiders. Results from previous research formed the basis of what information we wanted to achieve a deeper understanding of through our interviews. The empirical data has been analyzed based on empirical research in the area and theories within behavioural finance. Conclusion: In this paper a new hypothesis is formed which try to explain insiders excess return as an indirect result from the regulations of insider transactions. Thanks to the regulations, impulsive actions are prevented and insiders thereby tend to avoid psychological pitfalls to a greater extent than other investors.

<p>Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral <i>gambling</i> has become legitimate financial <i>trade</i>. This book explores the<i> genealogy</i> of the coexisting<i> insider trading laws</i>. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is <i>misleading</i> and that the regulation is best understood as a <i>game rule</i> aiming to <i>stimulate</i> financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. </p><p>The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the <i>risks</i> involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system<i> itself</i> rather than being naturally given. This places <i>desire</i> rather than rational <i>needs</i> as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game? </p>

Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral gambling has become legitimate financial trade. This book explores the genealogy of the coexisting insider trading laws. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is misleading and that the regulation is best understood as a game rule aiming to stimulate financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the risks involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system itself rather than being naturally given. This places desire rather than rational needs as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game?