Bakgrund: För att skydda de aktieägare som berörs av uppköpserbjudanden finns detregler för processerna kring dessa. I vissa av dessa uppköpserbjudanden kräverreglerna att målbolaget inhämtar en så kallad fairness opinion där en oberoende partska uttala sig om budets finansiella skälighet för aktieägarna. Skeptikerna tillutlåtandet är många men forskningen på den svenska marknaden, obefintlig. Mycketav kritiken som lyfts fram gäller utgivarnas oberoende och revideringen av takeoverreglerna,som kom år 2009, skärpte kraven kring just oberoende, vilket aktualiserarfrågan kring hur dessa regler fungerar och hur oberoendet ser ut på den svenskamarknaden. Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka rollen och framtiden för fairnessopinion, på målbolagets sida, vid offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenskaaktiemarknaden. Genomförande: Studien är av explorativ karaktär och inkluderar 14 kvalitativaintervjuer med utgivare av fairness opinion och andra intressenter med erfarenhet avutlåtandet samt en sammanställning av offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenskamarknaden under åren 2007-2012. Slutsats: Revideringen av takeover-reglerna, år 2009, har haft stor påverkan påmarknaden och bidragit till en ny syn på utgivarnas oberoende och en prispress påfairness opinion. Reglerna lämnar dock en del att önska och vi anser att man börinföra en begreppsmässig distinktion kring utlåtandets användning i olika situationersamt en ökad transparens i utlåtandet för att öka värdet för aktieägarna.Nyckelord: Fairness opinion, uppköpserbjudanden, takeover-regler,värderingsutlåtande, företagstransaktioner / Background: In order to protect shareholders affected by public takeover offers,there are rules regarding the processes surrounding them. In some of these offers, therules require that the target company obtain a fairness opinion where an independentparty evaluates the financial fairness of the offer. The number of fairness opinionskeptics is high but the research on the Swedish market is non-existent. Much of thecriticism concerns the independence of the writers of fairness opinions and therevision of the takeover rules tightened these requirements, which raises questionsabout how these rules work and how independent the Swedish writers are. Aim: The objective of this study is to investigate the role and future of targetcompany fairness opinions in regards to public takeover offers on the Swedish stockmarket. Completion: This is an exploratory study, which includes 14 qualitative interviewswith writers of fairness opinions and stakeholders with experience from fairnessopinions and a compilation of public takeover offers on the Swedish stock marketduring the years 2007-2012. Conclusion: The revision of the takeover rules, in 2009, has had a major impact onthe market and contributed to a new view of the independence of publishers and apricing pressure of fairness opinions. The rules, however, leaves some things to bedesired and we reckon that there should be a conceptual distinction between thedifferent situations of fairness opinions, as well as greater transparency in thestatement to increase shareholder value.Keywords: Fairness opinion, public takeovers, takeover rules

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The stock market has proven to offer satisfactory means of raising capital for public companies. One behaviour that rather frequently can be observed is that companies on the stock market are becoming the subject of so-called takeover-offers. Immediately upon the commencement of a takeover-process the board of directors of a target-company is responsible for certain obligations stipulated in the legal framework for the stock market. An obligation of quite substantial significance for the shareholders in the target-company is the board of directors’ duty to make a statement on the takeover-offer. Since the said statement is of such significance for the shareholders, the question arises whether the board of directors can be held liable for irresponsible statements with regards to an imminent takeover-offer. This thesis aims to answer this question whilst examining closely related questions such as which obligations the board of directors has when making a statement on a takeover-offer as well as what basis of liability is applicable to the board of directors. Due to the nature of the Swedish capital market regulation the thesis also aims to illustrate and problematize the relationship between legislation and what is commonly referred to as self-regulation. By the means of a legal dogmatic method the thesis concludes that the boards of directors in some cases are liable for their statements on a takeover-offer. The conditions for which a basis of liability is applicable differs depending upon which ground of liability is chosen to establish said liability, this circumstance turns out to be of critical importance in a procedural sense. Although the basis of liability differs from one another the thesis displays that legitimate reasons speak for basing a claim for damages on the rule regarding tortious liability that the Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) has developed. In addition to how the board of directors can be held liable the research has also demonstrated the importance of the statements the board of directors make on a takeover-offer. This provides support to the belief that the board of directors should be able to be held responsible for careless statements with regards to an impending takeover-offer. Furthermore, the research shows that a lack of distinct conjunction between self-regulation and legislation could generate an inconsistent construction of what the content of the current law is at any given time.