Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:32:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arnaldo Marques de Oliveira Neto.pdf: 1598527 bytes, checksum: 8104a68cdbf512e23b9838a45791d86e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-11 / The objective of this research was to investigate how the companies of ABC Group use management information system (SIG) to identify tax risks. The exploratory , literature and documental researches were adopted, with qualitative approach and content analysis technique to analyze the data and information collected. After reviewing and criticizing the theoretical framework and verify the existence of a gap related to the lack of a model for managing tax risks (GRTrib), the researcher, based on the theoretical framework of enterprise risk management (GRCorp) model, developed a framework of deployment, management and monitoring of a GRCorp and a GRTrib and tested it in the companies of ABC Group. Such structure can be tested, criticized, validated and improved in other companies. Based on respondents' answers to questions prepared in reliance on that structure the researcher was able to verify that companies of ABC Group used the SIG to identify tax risks through adequate resources and independent procedures. However, he noted the absence of specific map management of tax risks (MEGRT) and of enterprise risk management (MGRC) developed in a written and structured way. The MEGRT must be contained in the GRTrib, which must be contained in the GRCorp, along the lines of that structure. Thus, companies that do not have such MEGRT and MGRC can study, develop and implement the mentioned structure for having their SIG more consistent, structured and complete for purposes of identification, classification, evaluation, measurement, treatment, management, information and communication of tax risks. These recommendations derive from the need for identification of tax risks , from the point of view of good corporate governance practices. / O objetivo desta pesquisa foi verificar como as empresas do Grupo ABC utilizam o sistema de informações gerenciais (SIG) para identificar riscos tributários . Foram adotadas as pesquisas exploratória , bibliográfica e documental, com abordagem qualitativa e técnica de análise de conteúdo para a análise dos dados e informações coletados. Após revisar e criticar o referencial teórico e constatar a existência de lacuna relacionada com a inexistência de um modelo de gestão de riscos tributários (GRTrib), o pesquisador, baseado no referencial teórico do modelo de gestão de riscos corporativos (GRCorp), elaborou uma estrutura de implantação, gerenciamento e monitoramento de um GRCorp e de um GRTrib e a testou nas empresas do Grupo ABC . Tal estrutura poderá ser testada, criticada, validada e aperfeiçoada em outras empresas. Com base nas respostas dos entrevistados às perguntas elaboradas com respaldo na referida estrutura o pesquisador pôde constatar que as empresas do Grupo ABC utilizam o (SIG) para identificar riscos tributários, através de recursos e procedimentos independentes adequados. Entretanto, constatou a ausência de mapa específico de gestão de riscos tributários (MEGRT) e de mapa de gestão de riscos corporativos (MGRC), elaborados por escrito e de maneira estruturada. O MEGRT deve estar contido no GRTrib, que deve estar contido no GRCorp, nos moldes da referida estrutura. Dessa forma, as empresas que não possuem os referidos MEGRT e MGRC podem estudar, desenvolver e implementar a mencionada estrutura para que passem a dispor de SIG mais consistente, estruturado e completo, para fins de identificação, classificação, avaliação, mensuração, tratamento, gerenciamento, informação e comunicação de riscos tributários. Essas recomendações derivam da necessidade de identificação de riscos tributários, sob o ponto de vista das boas práticas de governança corporativa.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) under Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 2 indicated that tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatch arrangements "result in a substantial erosion of the taxable bases of the countries concerned" and "have an overall negative impact on competition, efficiency, transparency and fairness." The relevant action allowing for neutralising the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements is therefore needed and justified. To achieve that purpose, the OECD developed different anti-hybrid rules under BEPS Action 2. In that regard, however, one may ask whether addressing tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches as proposed by the OECD is of interest and relevance for developing countries. This paper aims to map that unexplored research area by means of a comparative analysis in four developing countries - Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, and South Africa. / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

The overall aim of this article is to analyse the taxpayers' rights in relation to the emerging standard of transparency with specific reference to Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and Uruguay. Exchange of information between tax authorities is increasing rapidly all around the world. This global development is largely the result of the introduction of the standard of transparency by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") with the political mandate of the G20 and more recently, in 2013, the introduction of the global standard of automatic exchange of information. Governments have agreed that exchange of information is necessary to prevent tax evasion and to tackle tax avoidance including aggressive tax planning. All surveyed countries have accepted the standard of transparency including the standard of automatic exchange of information. Furthermore, it is evident that the development of such standards appears to have taken place in a coordinated manner, led mainly by international organizations comprising governmental officials. This article has first provided a comparative overview of the rules that Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and Uruguay have introduced to protect the taxpayers' rights in the exchange of information process being the right to access to public information, the right to confidentiality, the right to privacy, and the procedural rights (right to be informed, the right to be notified and right to object and appeal). Thereafter, this article has assessed whether the rules introduced by the surveyed countries to protect these rights are consistent with the fundamental taxpayers' rights that belong to the rule of law of these countries and with the principles of good governance and fiscal transparency. The main conclusion is that the countries have introduced to some extent similar rules to protect the right to confidentiality, right to privacy and the procedural rights in the exchange of information. However, some differences may be found in the detail level of protection of confidentiality in South Africa and in respect of the procedural rights in Uruguay. One of the drawbacks of these rules is that the rules introduced by the surveyed countries do not ensure that the protection of the right to confidentiality and the right to privacy is effectively guaranteed. The results of the analysis show that these rules do not protect the taxpayer in case of breach of confidentiality or misuse of the information exchanged. This article argues that the differences among rules and the lack of protection for taxpayer information may hinder the effective protection of the taxpayer and the tax administration should guarantee the protection of the taxpayer rights as part of the rule of law. Therefore, this article provides in Section 4 three recommendations addressing the right to confidentiality, the right to privacy and the taxpayers' procedural rights. These recommendations may be extended (as best practices) to other developing countries on a similar economic and legal scale. However, further research will be needed to see whether the conclusions of this article are also applicable to (other) developing countries. / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Symbole de la souveraineté de l’État, le droit fiscal est fortement éprouvé par la mondialisation.Les prix de transfert en sont un témoignage éloquent. Les règles en matière de détermination desprix de transfert ne garantissent pas un résultat exact. Le principe de pleine concurrence estd’application délicate. Les comparables qui en assurent la bonne application ne sont pas toujoursdisponibles. Dès lors, la justification des prix de transfert est souvent difficile et parfoisimpossible. À ce titre, la réglementation sénégalaise doit être mise à jour, notamment dans le sensde prévoir les méthodes nouvelles de détermination des prix de transfert et des obligationsdocumentaires spécifiques.Du fait du caractère limité du contrôle unilatéral des prix de transfert, les États développent deplus en plus la coopération internationale. Mais, pour utile qu’elle soit, la coopération fiscaledemeure elle aussi limitée. C’est pourquoi, le Sénégal doit s’inspirer de l’expérience des pays del’OCDE pour instituer une politique d’accords préalables en matière de prix de transfert. De lamême manière, il est nécessaire d’instituer, à titre transitoire, un régime de protection fiscale. Cesmécanismes de contractualisation et de facilitation fiscales sont très efficaces, mais demeurentégalement limités.Le meilleur moyen de contrôler les prix de transfert qui sont un phénomène transnational estd’adopter une stratégie au niveau supranational. La communauté des États ne saurait fairel’économie de la création d’un ordre fiscal mondial. Ce nouvel ordre devra reposer sur une lexfiscalia et une aequitas fiscalia vectrices d’un droit commun fiscal mondialisé élaboré et mis enoeuvre à travers une véritable gouvernance fiscale mondiale qui ne doit pas laisser en rade lespays en développement, sous la supervision d'un observatoire mondial des prix de transfert et lecontrôle d’un tribunal fiscal international. / As a symbol of State sovereignty, tax law is strongly afflicted by globalization and transferpricing are an eloquent testimony. The rules for determining transfer pricing do not guarantee anexact result. The arm’s length principle is difficult to apply and the comparables that ensure theproper implementation are not always available. Therefore, the justification for transfer pricing isoften difficult and sometimes impossible. Senegalese law must be updated, particularly in thesense of providing new methods of determining transfer pricing and specific documentationrequirements.Because of the limited nature of unilateral control, States are increasingly developinginternational cooperation. But, however useful it may be, tax cooperation remains limited.Therefore, Senegal must learn from the experience of OECD countries to institute a policy ofadvanced pricing agreements (APA). Similarly, it is necessary to establish, provisionally, asystem of tax protection. These contracting mechanisms and tax incentives are very effective, butremain also limited.The best way to control transfer pricing, which is a transnational phenomenon, is to adopt asupranational strategy. The community of States cannot do without creating a worldwide taxorder. This new order is based on both a lex fiscalia and an aequitas fiscalia as vectors of a globaltax law that is developed and implemented through truly global tax governance under thecontrol of an International Tax Tribunal, which should not leave stranded developing countries.