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This dissertation seeks to explain the puzzle in the state politics literature which expects females to benefit from the enactment of term limits, but initial research finds the number of female in office decreases after the implementation of term limits. Examining this puzzle involves three separate stand-alone chapters which explore female candidate emergence (1), success rates (2), and women-friendly state legislative districts (3). The goal of the dissertation is to reconcile the puzzle while adding insight into how female candidates behave at the state-level. Overall, I find that term limits increases female descriptive representation by increasing the likelihood a female candidate will run and win an election.

Thesis (M.A.), Political Science--University of Central Oklahoma, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 51-55).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oklahoma, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 210-216).

No abstract available. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / gm2014 / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 248-269).

The waves of democratisation in Africa gave hope to the continent. Democracy was becoming a reality and legal instruments were being put in place at the domestic level through constitutional clauses which were imposed to strengthen a democratic culture. However, regional trends in Africa proved that even constitutional clauses were not enough to regulate democracy. Presidents from African countries were still as autocratic as they previously were. Linked to its history and poor governance, political dynasty was entrenched in the political system in many African countries. Currently, many African countries still experience one-party rule in the form of political dynasty. Mauritius, though considered as a model of democracy, is a good example to show how political dynasty has undermined its democratic values. A way of consolidating its democracy can be to impose term limits on the Prime Minister's mandates, which are currently unlimited. This study analyses the effectiveness of imposing term limits in the Mauritian political system to control political dynasties to some extent. It however acknowledges that term limits alone cannot be an effective solution. It therefore proposes other recommendations such as having a youth quota, involving the civil society organisations and reviewing electoral procedures, which can help to consolidate democracy in Mauritius. / Mini Dissertation (MPhil (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa))--University of Pretoria, 2021. / European Union / Government of Flanders / Centre for Human Rights / MPhil (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa) / Unrestricted

A literatura empírica de ciclos políticos orçamentários pouco aborda a influência da limitação de mandato na existência do oportunismo fiscal por parte do ocupante do poder executivo nas finanças dos vários entes da federação. Nesse sentido, à luz da Nova Economia Política, o objetivo desta pesquisa foi investigar o impacto dos diferentes incentivos enfrentados no Brasil por prefeitos em primeiro mandato - aqueles que são elegíveis para a reeleição - e em segundo mandato - aqueles que não podem candidatar-se à reeleição - na gestão fiscal dos municípios. Para além da avaliação de todo o mandato eletivo, também foi analisado o impacto da diferenciação dos dois tipos de incumbentes na inscrição de valores em restos a pagar nos anos eleitorais. Os resultados obtidos via painel clássico sugerem uma efetiva diferenciação entre prefeitos em primeiro e segundo mandato em anos não eleitorais, com prefeitos em primeiro mandato inscrevendo maiores valores em restos a pagar processados e total em relação aos prefeitos de segundo mandato. Ademais, seguindo a legislação de responsabilidade fiscal brasileira, prefeitos em segundo mandato reduziram a inscrição de valores nessas rubricas em ano eleitoral, embora prefeitos em primeiro mandato tenham aumentado a inscrição de valores em restos a pagar não processados. / The empirical literature on political budget cycles has not studied all the influences of term limitations in the existence of fiscal opportunism by politicians in the various levels of government. In this sense, regarding the Political Economy, the objective of this research was to investigate the impact of different incentives faced by first-term mayors in Brazil - those who are eligible for re-election - and second-term mayors - those who cannot apply for re-election - in the fiscal management at the local level. Beyond the assessment of the entire mandate, it was also evaluated the impact of differentiation of the two types of incumbents in the management of the unpaid spending obligations in election years. Results obtained via classic panel suggest an effective differentiation between first and second-term mayors in non-election years, as first-term mayors exhibit higher unpaind recognized spending obligations and total unpaid spending obligations values in comparison to second-term mayors. Moreover, following the Brazilian fiscal responsability law, second-term mayors reduced values in these items in election year, although first-term mayors had higher values on average for unpaid and unrecognized spending obligations.

This doctoral dissertation examines whether incumbency affects democracy, and if it does, how re-election impacts on the political system. This thesis links and extends two theoretical traditions that hardly ever have been combined: political support theory and incumbency theory. Political support theory is used as a proxy to examine democracy from a multidimensional perspective. In this theoretical tradition, there has been a considerable concentration of studies on developed nations, and which take a comparative approach. Also, there is persistently inadequate attention given to measuring the form of a government, with a strong predominance of parliamentarian systems. Likewise, most of the research is focused at the individual level, in where the use of statistical techniques is prevailing, and the mixed methods are, nearly, non-existent. On the other hand, there are no studies that explain incumbency effects on democracy directly. Despite there being plenty of inferences which can be taken from incumbency analysis and its extrapolations about democracy and elections, there is a scarcity of studies that associate both political phenomena. In most cases, scholars analyse incumbency as an advantage in popular elections in developed countries, mainly the U.S. The main argument of this thesis proposes that incumbency has effects on democracy and that those impacts will have adverse consequences on the democratic system. Taking Chile as a case-study, a developing country with a presidential system and with similarities to Western party systems, this research seeks to respond three hypotheses. 1) The categories of support identified by Booth and Seligson in 2009 could, to an extent, be modified by including questions that gauge the role of the presidential institution in the Chilean political system. 2) It is expected that incumbency will be shown to have distinct impacts on democratic political legitimacy. 3) The effect of deputies' re-election on political legitimacy dimensions will depend on the composition of legislative pairs at the electoral district level in Chile: two newcomers, one newcomer and one incumbent, or two incumbents. This investigation uses a mixed method strategy. From a qualitative perspective, I characterise all law bills proposed to the NC to limit the re-elections of public authorities in Chile, between 11th March 1990 and 31st December 2016. In line with this doctoral dissertation's aims, a context analysis is used to analyse the content of draft laws related to incumbency. From a quantitative approach, I examine the legislative incumbency effects on political legitimacy dimensions in Chile, from 2008 to 2014. In line with this doctoral dissertation's aim, a series of statistical techniques are used to analyse the effects of incumbency on political support. The findings suggest that: 1) The effects of incumbency are distributed differently according to the component of political legitimacy. 2) The rotation of political elites (seniority and the circulation of elected deputies) is the most substantial incumbency dimension to explain political support in comparison with the competition dimension. 3) The three indicators based on the margin of victory are only related negatively to support for government management. 4) The HDI has effects on political support, but they were inconsistent. 5) The legislative pair composition produces a moderator effect on incumbency indicators. 6) Politics and ideology play a pivotal role in understanding and explaining political support theory. This research concludes that is necessary to keep expanding studies that relate incumbency and democracy by taking other countries with different electoral systems, that arguments hold by politicians should be adjusted considering evidence, and it is imperative to reduce the perception-facts gap in citizens.

My dissertation focuses on the effect of several variables on two key forms of political participation -- voting and candidacy. First, I examine how voter turnout is impacted by differences in the intensity of political beliefs across the electorate and the resulting impact on candidate issue choice. Next, I examine the role of term limits and political party recruitment policies in determining the quality of the political class. Finally, I examine the impact of term limits at the lower rungs of the political ladder on the quality of individuals seeking higher office. In Chapter 2, I present a modified version of Downs’ spatial model to analyze the effect on candidates’ policy choices when there is a positive relationship between political extremism and conviction. I assume that alienation and lack of conviction affect voter turnout negatively. I find that the positive relationship between political extremism and conviction leads candidates away from the center and describe the conditions under which segments of the electorate will abstain in equilibrium. Incorporating candidate asymmetry through differences in valence and campaign finances resulted in the strategy of the disadvantaged candidate being unrestricted. Meanwhile, the advantaged candidate can afford to be more centrist or extremist than his opponent in order to win the election. In Chapter 3, I present a multi-period model analyzing the impact of political party recruitment and retention policies and the implementation of term limits on the quality of individuals seeking a career in politics. Candidates differ in political skill and their political skill directly affects the provision of a public good. Term limits lead to a restructuring of the timing of rewards for political careers. I find that term limits increase the probability of entry of those of lesser quality. Under certain conditions, term limits reduce the expected ability of those entering the political arena, as those of higher ability are more adversely affected by the restructuring of rewards. In Chapter 4, I explore the extent to which term limits alter the average quality of office-seekers for higher-level political positions. In addition, I determine whether improvement in quality in upper level political positions comes at the expense of lower level positions. The results suggest that term limits on lower level elected offices reduce the expected political skill of officeholders at this level. Under limited circumstances, term limits will also reduce the expected political skill of those seeking upper level political positions. Under most conditions, term limitation at lower level offices lead to an improvement in the quality of elected officials in upper level offices. / text