The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) provides added emphasis to the development of portfolio credit risk models. An important regulatory change in Basel II is the differentiated treatment in measuring capital requirements for the corporate exposures and retail exposures. Basel II allows agricultural loans to be categorized and treated as the retail exposures. However, portfolio credit risk model for agricultural loans is still in their infancy. Most portfolio credit risk models being used have been developed for corporate exposures, and are not generally applicable to agricultural loan portfolio. The objective of this study is to develop a credit risk model for agricultural loan portfolios. The model developed in this study reflects characteristics of the agricultural sector, loans and borrowers and designed to be consistent with Basel II, including consideration given to forecasting accuracy and model applicability. This study conceptualizes a theory of loan default for farm borrowers. A theoretical model is developed based on the default theory with several assumptions to simplify the model. An annual default model is specified using FDIC state level data over the 1985 to 2003. Five state models covering Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and Nebraska areestimated as a logistic function. Explanatory variables for the model are a three-year moving average of net cash income per acre from crops, net cash income per cwt from livestock, government payments per acre, the unemployment rate, and a trend. Net cash income generated by state reflects the five major commodities: corn, soybeans, wheat, fed cattle, and hogs. A simulation model is developed to generate the stochastic default rates by state over the 2004 to 2007 period, providing the probability of default and the loan loss distribution in a pro forma context that facilitates proactive decision making. The model also generates expected loan loss, VaR, and capital requirements. This study suggests two key conclusions helpful to future credit risk modeling efforts for agricultural loan portfolios: (1) net cash income is a significant leading indicator to default, and (2) the credit risk model should be segmented by commodity and geographical location.

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2005年，消費金融卡等小額貸款、現金卡以及信用卡的循環利息借貸因發卡浮濫、信用擴張過快而引發了卡債風暴，這個風暴不僅影響金融機構的財務風險，也因為小額債務人人數眾多，因而引發了嚴重的社會經濟問題。在發卡銀行深受打擊之際，金管會規定台灣金融機構於2006年底開始實施新巴塞爾資本協定（the New Basel Capital Accord），要求各銀行必須具備足夠的資本適足性及風險管理能力，並建立內部評等系統和風險預警機制。本研究即是針對信用風險，在符合新巴塞爾資本協定下運用商業智慧技術建立一套完善的控管制度，期望在潛在風險客戶在發生違約的行為前即能及時預警並採取相關措施。 / 本研究是以國內某家發卡銀行為研究對象，針對其信用卡持有人建構一套預警模型。建模資料是信用卡持有人部分基本資料以及在某年一整年的交易行為。原始資料共有47,888筆，總共有64個變數。分別利用羅吉斯迴歸、決策樹和類神經網路三種方法建模，最後以羅吉斯迴歸表現最好，以學歷、信用額度、最近一次逾期至今月份數、最近十二個月平均餘額、最近十二個月預借現金次數、最近十二個月循環動用月份數和最近十二個月平均繳款率七個預測變數對於影響客戶需要預警與否較為顯著，結果本模型的整體預測率為86.29%；而對於預警客戶中可以準確預測的比率為69.98%。

The term procyclicality refers to the ability of a system to amplify business cycles. The recent financial crisis has revealed that the current regulatory framework, Basel II, affects the business cycle in exactly that manner. The newly published Basel III therefore sought to include tools that would mitigate the procyclical nature of regulatory framework. The aim of the thesis is to analyze whether such tools are effective and whether the procyclicality under Basel III has been mitigated when compared to Basel II. In order to conduct such analysis we employ a simple model with the households and firms sector. Using the OLS estimation method we estimate the sensitivity of Basel risk weights to the business cycle under both Basel II and Basel III conditions. As the Basel III framework has been published only recently, there are few studies that would analyze its effect on procyclicality. The main contribution of this thesis consists of implementation of Basel III countercyclical tools and the comparison between both frameworks. The thesis further contributes to the existing literature by conducting the analysis on the data for the Visegrád Group, that is for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. JEL Classification E32, E44, E58, G21 Keywords procyclicality, Basel II, Basel III, banking...

This study assesses the impact of the Basel III regulatory framework on interbank contagion. It focuses on the direct interbank contagion that spreads via interbank foreign claims among national banking sectors. A balance sheet-based network model employs the quarterly consolidated banking statistics, collected by the Bank for International Settlements, to simulate the consequences of credit and funding shock under stressed market conditions. Compared to the Basel II, the Basel III regulatory framework reduces the probability of interbank contagion (following a simulated default of one banking sector) from 31% to 14% and lowers the impact of contagion by 63% in terms of average loss for a banking sector. The simulations under both regulatory frameworks show that relatively smaller banking sectors can trigger severe interbank contagion comparable to large banking sectors. Throughout the 2005-2009 period, the Basel III regulatory framework stabilizes the fluctuations of the scope of interbank contagion.

Le thème central de ma thèse de doctorat est le Règlement sous de multiples formes. Plus précisément, je me concentre sur les paramètres affectés par obligatoire, facultatif ou en auto-développés le règlement. Les trois chapitres de l'actuel document utilisent comme paramètre l'industrie bancaire dans les pays de l'Union européenne (UE). Au cours de la dernière décennie, le secteur bancaire a subi plusieurs transformations de réglementation qui ont influé sur la quantité et la qualité de l'information divulguée. En outre, la récente crise financière avait les banques dans le projecteur, compte tenu de leur rôle central dans la chute des marchés.Dans le premier chapitre, "Ne Bâle II affectent le marché Évaluation des provisions pour pertes sur prêts discrétionnaires?", j'étudie l'impact de l'Accord de capitaux lI de Bâle 2008 mise en oeuvre dans l'Union européenne. Bâle II était destiné à mettre un niveau accru de transparence concernant les opérations des banques. Par conséquent, Bâle II introduit une incitation pour les banques à (1) accroître leur approvisionnement prospectives et (2) de réduire leur approvisionnement opportunistes.Dans notre établissement, Bâle II introduit des mesures d'incitation pour les gestionnaires de reconnaître moins de revenu discrétionnaire croissant des provisions pour pertes sur prêts (DLLPs). Le revenu-DLLPs croissante sont importants puisqu'ils sont reconnus dans la littérature comme surtout opportuniste. Ces conclusions sont d'une importance particulière compte tenu de l'évolution réglementaire récentes et à venir dans le secteur bancaire. Je veux parler de l'introduction des IFRS 9 en 2018 et celui de Bâle III en 2019. Nos résultats soulignent la nécessité pour la comptabilité et les autorités de réglementation bancaire de coordonner leurs efforts avec mépris à leur façon innée des objectifs différents.Pour ma deuxième chapitre, "A Bâle II induit le conservatisme a réduit le niveau de la gestion des revenus des banques de l'UE?" Bâle II réduit le pouvoir discrétionnaire des provisions qui est utilisé dans la période de pré-adoption de rapports opportunistes (à reconnaître les recettes croissantes pour atteindre les gains gestion DLLPs objectifs).Le troisième chapitre, " l'impact de la Banque de l'UE 2010 Test de stress La divulgation des résultats sur les banques " gains " gestion analyse l'impact que la divulgation de la Prospective 2010 Test de stress macroéconomique (ST) a sur le niveau des banques participantes opportuniste reporting. Plus précisément, il teste si la divulgation diminue et par conséquent l'opacité de la banque gains (établie de façon approximative par gestion et régularisation du revenu de référence pour le battre) testé les banques par rapport aux non-banques testées.Nous constatons que les banques qui entrent dans l'ère de réduire le niveau de leurs coups de référence. Dans la corroboration avec les résultats précédents, nous documentons que la divulgation de la ST réduit probablement les résultats de l'opacité des banques et gestionnaires de réduire les rapports opportunistes en raison du renforcement l'examen public. Ce document est le premier d'analyser l'impact que la divulgation de la ST Résultats a sur le niveau des gains des banques des pratiques de gestion et qu'elle ajoute à la littérature ST émergents.Dans l'ensemble, ma thèse jette de la lumière sur les questions actuelles et pertinentes qui concernent l'un des plus minutieusement examiné et critiqué les industries dans le monde. En analysant l'effet de différents ensembles de règlements sur les rapports financiers et sur l'évaluation des nombres de comptabilité, cette thèse apporte de nombreuses contributions à la littérature académique et jette de la lumière sur les effets pratiques de chevauchement des règlements dans l'UE. / The central theme of my PhD thesis is regulation under multiple forms. Specifically, I focus on settings impacted by mandatory, optional or self-developed regulation. All three chapters in the current document use as setting the banking industry in countries from the European Union (EU). In the last decade, the banking industry has faced several regulatory transformations that impacted the quantity and quality of the disclosed information. Moreover, the recent financial crisis had banks in the spotlight, given their central role in the fall of the markets.In the first chapter, "Does Basel II affect the Market Valuation of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions?", I study the impact of the 2008 Basel lI Capital Accord implementation in the European Union. Basel II was intended to bring an enhanced level of transparency regarding banks' operations. Consequently, Basel II introduces an incentive for banks to (1) increase their forward-looking provisioning and (2) to reduce their opportunistic provisioning.In our setting, Basel II introduces incentives for managers to recognize less income-increasing discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs). The income-increasing DLLPs are important as they are recognized in the literature as especially opportunistic. These findings are of particular importance given the recent and forthcoming regulatory developments in the banking industry. I refer to the introduction of IFRS 9 in 2018 and that of Basel III in 2019. Our results highlight the need for accounting and banking regulators to coordinate their efforts with disregard to their innately different objectives.For my second chapter, "Has Basel II Induced Conservatism Reduced the Level of EU Banks' Earnings Management?" Basel II reduces discretion in provisioning that is used in the pre-adoption period for opportunistic reporting (to recognize income-increasing DLLPs for reaching earnings management objectives).The third chapter, "The Impact of the 2010 EU Bank Stress-test Results Disclosure on Banks' Earnings Management" analyzes the impact that the disclosure of the forward-looking 2010 macroeconomic stress-test (ST) has on the level of participating banks’ opportunistic reporting. Specifically, it tests if the disclosure reduces bank opacity and consequently earnings management (proxied by income smoothing and benchmark beating) for the tested banks relative to non-tested banks.We find that the banks which enter the ST reduce the level of their benchmark beating. In corroboration with the previous results, we document that the disclosure of the ST's results likely reduces banks' opacity and managers reduce the opportunistic reporting due to enhanced public scrutiny. This paper is the first to analyze the impact that the disclosure of the ST results has on the level of banks' earnings management practices and it adds to the emerging ST literature.Overall, my thesis sheds light on current and relevant issues that concern one of the most scrutinized and criticised industries in the world. By analyzing the effect of different sets of regulations on financial reporting and on the valuation of accounting numbers, this thesis brings numerous contributions to the academic literature and sheds light over the practical effects of overlapping regulations in the EU.

O Acordo de Capital ?Basiléia 2? traz importantes inovações à regulação prudencial do sistema bancário internacional. A principal delas é a possibilidade dos bancos desenvolverem e utilizarem modelos internos de adequação de capital. Contudo, esta possibilidade exige que estes modelos sejam validados, tanto pelas autoridades supervisoras, quanto pelos demais participantes do mercado. Em virtude disto, o referido Acordo está estruturado em três pilares: Pilar 1, dos requisitos mínimos de capital; Pilar 2, do processo de revisão do órgão supervisor; e Pilar 3, da disciplina de mercado. O Pilar 3 estabelece exigências mínimas e recomendações sobre as informações que devem ser divulgadas pelos bancos, a fim de garantir ao mercado as condições para avaliar os riscos incorridos pelo banco e sua adequação da quantidade de capital. Sob a luz das recomendações do Acordo ?Basiléia 2?, foi analisada a transparência das demonstrações contábeis dos principais bancos brasileiros. Concluiu-se que a divulgação dos bancos no Brasil encontra-se num estágio incipiente, uma vez que foram divulgados apenas 26% dos itens pesquisados, próximo ao mínimo exigido pela legislação brasileira em vigor, enquanto que os bancos internacionais, analisados em uma pesquisa conduzida pelo Comitê da Basiléia, divulgaram 63% dos itens. / The ?Basel 2? brings important innovations to prudential regulation of international banking system. The main innovation is the possibility of banks to develop and use internal models to capital adequacy. However, this possibility demands these models to be validated by both the supervisory authorities and the market participants. As a result, the Accord is structured into three pillars: pillar 1 ? minimum capital requirement, pillar 2 ? supervisory review process, and pillar 3 ? market discipline. The pillar 3 establishes minimum requirements and recommendations about the information ought to be disclosed by banks, in order to guarantee the market the conditions to assess the risks incurred by the bank and its capital adequacy. According to the recommendations of ?Basel 2?, the financial statements disclosure of the most important Brazilian banks was analyzed. It was concluded the disclosure of banks in Brazil is in a budding stage, since only 26% of the items surveyed were disclosed, nearly the minimum required by Brazilian legislation in effect, whereas the international banks analyzed in a survey conducted by the Basel Committee disclosed 63% of the items.

O Acordo de Capital ?Basiléia 2? traz importantes inovações à regulação prudencial do sistema bancário internacional. A principal delas é a possibilidade dos bancos desenvolverem e utilizarem modelos internos de adequação de capital. Contudo, esta possibilidade exige que estes modelos sejam validados, tanto pelas autoridades supervisoras, quanto pelos demais participantes do mercado. Em virtude disto, o referido Acordo está estruturado em três pilares: Pilar 1, dos requisitos mínimos de capital; Pilar 2, do processo de revisão do órgão supervisor; e Pilar 3, da disciplina de mercado. O Pilar 3 estabelece exigências mínimas e recomendações sobre as informações que devem ser divulgadas pelos bancos, a fim de garantir ao mercado as condições para avaliar os riscos incorridos pelo banco e sua adequação da quantidade de capital. Sob a luz das recomendações do Acordo ?Basiléia 2?, foi analisada a transparência das demonstrações contábeis dos principais bancos brasileiros. Concluiu-se que a divulgação dos bancos no Brasil encontra-se num estágio incipiente, uma vez que foram divulgados apenas 26% dos itens pesquisados, próximo ao mínimo exigido pela legislação brasileira em vigor, enquanto que os bancos internacionais, analisados em uma pesquisa conduzida pelo Comitê da Basiléia, divulgaram 63% dos itens. / The ?Basel 2? brings important innovations to prudential regulation of international banking system. The main innovation is the possibility of banks to develop and use internal models to capital adequacy. However, this possibility demands these models to be validated by both the supervisory authorities and the market participants. As a result, the Accord is structured into three pillars: pillar 1 ? minimum capital requirement, pillar 2 ? supervisory review process, and pillar 3 ? market discipline. The pillar 3 establishes minimum requirements and recommendations about the information ought to be disclosed by banks, in order to guarantee the market the conditions to assess the risks incurred by the bank and its capital adequacy. According to the recommendations of ?Basel 2?, the financial statements disclosure of the most important Brazilian banks was analyzed. It was concluded the disclosure of banks in Brazil is in a budding stage, since only 26% of the items surveyed were disclosed, nearly the minimum required by Brazilian legislation in effect, whereas the international banks analyzed in a survey conducted by the Basel Committee disclosed 63% of the items.

För att förhindra uppkomsten av bankkriser och stärka förtroendet för kreditmarknaden beslutade Basel-kommittén den 1 januari 1993 införa Basel I-systemet. Systemet hade som mål att skärpa kapitaltäckningsreglerna, dock har Basel I-systemet ansetts otillräckligt. Basel-kommittén utarbetade nya rekommendationer, som togs i bruk 1 februari, 2007, under benämningen Basel II. Förutom att skapa mer transparent kreditmarknad förändrades även beräkningen av bankernas kapitaltäckningsgrad. Vid starten av vår uppsats hade bankerna varit tvungna att följa Basel II rekommendationerna sedan två månader tillbaka. De visade sig dock att bankerna arbetat med införandet av systemet sedan lång tid tillbaka, för att vara väl förbereda vid införandet. Vi har i vår uppsats valt att inrikta oss på förändringen i Pelare I, beräkningen av kapitaltäckningsgranden, och vad detta har för påverkan på kreditgivningen till små och medelstora företag. Uppsatsen är skriven med en abduktiv metod, där växelverkan mellan teorin och empirin ligger till grund. För att beskriva förändringen av kapitaltäckningsgraden och kreditgivningen, har vi utgått ifrån teorin om dessa för att sedan jämföra i empirin hur bankerna gör. Empirin är uppbyggd efter hur intervjurespondenter på Swedbank och Danske Bank anser förändringen har påverkat banken och deras egna arbetsuppgifter. Undersökningen har visat att inga större förändringar har skett sedan införandet av Basel II. Tre faktorer som påverkat detta är att inga banker har blivit godkända att använda den avancerade metoden för beräkning av den operativa risken, den hårda konkurrens som råder på kreditmarknaden samt att bankerna länge arbetat enligt Basel II-systemet. Bankerna är ändå väldigt positivt inställda till införandet av Basel II, trots merarbetet som införandet fört med sig. / Uppsatsnivå: C