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In this dissertation, I aim to demonstrate that the debate between legal positivism and natural law theory cannot be settled through moral argumentation. To demonstrate this point, I lay out three criteria that must be fulfilled if a moral argument for a given theory is to succeed. I then examine arguments that have been put forth in the past in reference to the behaviour of citizens as well as judges. By showing the difficulty these arguments have in satisfying the three criteria, I simultaneously cast doubt on the possibility that future arguments of this kind will be successful. My aim is to put an end to a current trend in jurisprudence--choosing a conceptual theory of law on moral grounds. By doing so, I hope to refocus the debate on descriptive jurisprudence. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Healthcare ethics consultation has had a place in healthcare for many decades yet the nature of the work is not well understood by many of its critics as well as its defenders. Practicing healthcare ethicists (or PHEs) have been described as compromised and ineffectual; politicised and undemocratic; and their promise to offer sound advice has been deemed irredeemably incoherent in the context of value pluralism. I tease out what is instructive in these critiques and argue that they may be answered by reviewing the conflict of interest literature and by exploring what is distinctive about the PHE role. The most challenging aspect of any PHE’s role is to provide support for the management of so-called hard cases, therefore I introduce a typology of hard cases. Emphasis is placed on what I call (borrowing from the legal theoretical literature) penumbral ethical cases. Legal theory, especially that part of legal theory that deals with what H. L. A. Hart called penumbral cases, can help PHEs (and others) to appreciate the fact that theoretical disagreement need not signal that the field has little to offer, nor need it imply that all answers are equally defensible in the hardest of cases. Finally, I argue that legal theory can provide a jumping-off point for the study of insufficiently explored topics related to PHE professionalization. Legal theorists have long attended to the relationship between law and morality, the problem of obedience in wicked legal systems, and the supposed tension between democracy and the role of an expert judiciary. An appreciation that these debates are not unique to the practice of healthcare ethics may help PHEs to engage critics with a renewed confidence and some fresh approaches to perennial, and hitherto unproductive, arguments. / Dissertation / Candidate in Philosophy / Ethics consultation has had a place in healthcare for decades, however the nature of the work is not well understood by many critics and defenders. Practicing healthcare ethicists (PHEs) have been described as compromised and ineffectual; politicised and undemocratic; and their promise to offer sound advice has been deemed irredeemably incoherent in the context of value pluralism. I tease out what is instructive in these critiques and argue that they may be answered by reviewing the conflict of interest literature and by exploring what is distinctive about the PHE role. I introduce a typology of hard cases with an emphasis on penumbral ethical cases, and contend that legal theory, especially that part which deals with H. L. A. Hart’s penumbral cases, can help PHEs to describe theoretical disagreement in hard cases. I also argue that jurisprudence can be useful in the exploration of topics related to the professionalization of PHEs.

This thesis argues for a novel understanding of the relationship between law and coercion. One of the relationships H.L.A. Hart sought to clarify is between law and coercion. In his work, Hart denies that coercion is a conceptually necessary feature of law – denies that the existence of law is in some sense determined by the presence of coercive mechanisms. According to Hart, coercion is naturally necessary to our legal practices. We humans need our law to be backed by coercive mechanisms so that it can do what it is supposed to: serve as an authoritative guide for behaviour. Investigating the relationship between law and coercion not only depends on what one thinks about law, but also what one means by ‘coercion.’ I define an instance of coercion as a forced-choice. I also explain that understanding what it means to say, ‘law coerces’ is made difficult by the fact that what is coercive for one person may not be coercive for another. This subjective aspect of coercion means that more specific questions need to be asked in order to understand the relationship between law and coercion. This thesis asks: is there a conceptual relationship between law and the law’s institutionalisation and utilisation of coercive mechanisms? I argue that coercive mechanisms are not a conceptually necessary feature of law. I also argue that Hart’s work still leaves the relationship between law and coercion problematically undefined. Rather, I put forward the claim that law is coercion-apt. I expand this claim by distinguishing law from other normative systems, like morality. Unlike law, morality, I argue, is not coercion-apt. Therefore, this thesis not only refines our understanding of the relationship between law and coercion, but also between law and morality – which is another relationship Hart sought to clarify in his work. / Thesis / Candidate in Philosophy / This thesis explores the relationship between law and coercion. By ‘coercion’, I mean the way in which the law forces compliance with its prohibitions and requirements through the institutionalisation of sanctions (e.g., fines or prison sentences). A debate concerning the relationship between law and coercion has been present in jurisprudential literature for decades. Those who claim that that coercion is a conceptually necessary feature of law are essentially claiming that the existence of law is, in part, determined by the presence of coercive mechanisms. In this thesis I explain why such claims are erroneous. I then defend my own understanding of the relationship between law and coercion. I argue that it would be incorrect to call y ‘law’ if y is not coercion-apt. I explain what it means to say, ‘law is coercion-apt’ by distinguishing law from other normative systems like morality, religion, and voluntary associations and clubs.

For many centuries, homosexual behavior has been viewed differently by many cultures. The Greeks and Romans practiced homosexuality openly while other cultures, such as our own, condemn the practice because of religious and moral beliefs. The decision of Lawrence v. Texas has had a hefty impact on homosexual rights because it was the first instance in which the Supreme Court recognized the rights of same-sex partners to be intimate. This thesis will explore the new rights given (although not expressly) to same· sex couples in Lawrence, the decriminalization of intimate homosexual behavior, and how these rights relate to the possible future rights of same-sex marriages or civil unions.

Euthanasia, known in its active form as assisted suicide, is rapidly becoming one of the most heatedly debated moral, ethical, social, and legal issues to face the American public in some time. Because of its complexity, there are many arguments for and against euthanasia, and until all aspects of this highly controversial topic are explored and understood, this practice will continue to cause misunderstanding and suffering for those who both oppose and support it. It seems as if everyone has an opinion about euthanasia even though it affects a minute percentage of the U.S. population directly. All of us deal with death in one form or another, should it be the death of a loved one, friend, pet, or of one's own impending demise. Death as a reality is not remotely controversial as with the aspects of murder and suicide. Euthanasia touch on both areas. Is euthanasia just another term for murder, and a politically excusable one at that, or is euthanasia a way to assist the terminally ill out of their cocoon of pain?

This thesis contains a historical overview of Florida's education program with an examination of legislation, policy development, and case law. Legal disputes result in policy and code changes in Florida school districts. The purpose of this study is to ascertain the dominant weak link leading to the circumstances upon which Florida schools are compelled to litigate. The roles of administrators, faculty, staff, parents, students, and those who are contracted to provide services are examined, as well as policy issues. The methodology consists of relevant literature review of statutes, cases, and articles within the past ten years and a survey circulated to school board attorneys requesting key information about the five most recent cases that have either settled or been adjudicated. Documentation reviewed reflects that the legislature, in cooperation with the Florida Department of Education, has' built an infrastructure creating better communication with school communities in order to identify and make necessary changes for school improvement. The data collected from this study is aimed at assisting administrators and school board attorneys, as well as other interested parties, to identify major issues commonly litigated against Florida K-12 public schools, determine the problematic circumstances causing the litigation, and formulate suggestions for resolution.

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Traditional legal education is sorely imbalanced. A law student receives rigorous training in legal doctrine and analytical skills—he learns to "think like a lawyer"—but is left with little training in practical skills or his ethical role in society. Moreover, law schools rely almost exclusively on the ineffectual pedagogy of the case-dialogue, or "Socratic," method. Several factors explain this entrenched imbalance, most notably the academy's top-down power structure and its budget constraints. Increasingly, however, the marketplace is demanding practice-ready lawyers who have strong training not only in doctrine but in practical skills and ethics. Law schools, responding to this market pressure, are beginning to implement pedagogies that foster this balanced legal training. Toward this end, I advocate implementing into law school curricula three specific, workable pedagogies: using group learning models, using writing as a learning tool, and using assessment as a formative and ongoing component of the learning process.