In A White Wedding? The Racial Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, I examine the inter-locking relations of power that constitute the lesbian/gay subject recognized by the Canadian nation-state as deserving of access to civil marriage. Through analysis of legal documents, Parliamentary and Senate debates, and interviews with lawyers, I argue that this lesbian/gay subject achieves intelligibility in the law by trading in on and shoring up the terms of racialized neo-liberal citizenship. I also argue that the victory of same-sex marriage is implicated in reproducing and securing a racialized Canadian national identity as well as a racialized civilizational logic, where “gay rights” are the newest manifestation of the modernity of the “West” in a post-9/11 historical context. By centring a critical race/queer conceptual framework, this research project follows the discursive practices of respectability, freedom and civility that circulate both widely and deeply in this legal struggle. I contend that in order to successfully shed its historical markers of degeneracy, the lesbian/gay subject must be constituted not as a sexed citizen but rather as a neoliberal citizen, one who is intimately tied to notions of privacy, property, autonomy and freedom of choice, and hence one who is racialized as white. The critical race/queer analytic also attends to the temporal and spatial registers framing this legal struggle that re-install various troubling racial hierarchies in a “gay rights” project often lauded as progressive. This analysis of the discursive terrain of same-sex marriage reveals the race shadow that lies at the heart of this equality-rights struggle. The conclusion of this thesis provides reflections for developing an ethics of activism that dislodges and resists the (re)production of racialized relations of power in lesbian and gay equality rights activism. In so doing, I seek to provoke, question and re-draw the landscape of our thinking, not only about same-sex marriage but also about the terms with which we conceive, articulate and practice racial and sexual justice.

This thesis examines the role of the legal profession in Upper Canada from 1791 to 1867. In particular it focuses on whether or not the legal profession became the elite that they were set up to be. It examines the reasons behind choosing the legal profession as the elite. Between the creation of Upper Canada and Confederation there were several political and economic changes and I examine how these changes impacted the legal profession and the role that they had to play in the legal profession. I argue that while the legal profession failed to become the aristocratic elite that the early Upper Canadian leaders hoped for, it did become distinctively Upper Canadian.

This paper concerns the dominant conceptual or formal accounts of legal rights: the Interest and Will Theories. Section II clarifies the minimal necessary conditions for a rights model to count as a Will Theory. It also explores Kant’s Will Theory of rights and the difficulties posed to it by Hohfeld’s schema of jural relations. Kant has three alternatives: reject the schema’s utility or demonstrate his theory’s compatibility with it via molecularist or basic models of Hohfeldian rights. Although his best option is to disavow Hohfeld, Kant’s theory is ultimately undesirable on other grounds. Section III shall analyze the modern Will and Interest Theories’ biggest weaknesses according to a test proposed in Section I, which should generate bases for preferring one theory to another. It will offer a counterargument to the Inalienability charge levied against the Will Theory, and demonstrate why Interest Theory responses to the Third Party Beneficiary argument are inadequate.

The concepts of sovereignty and legal personality in Islamic Law and Western Law are fundamentally different. Under Islamic law sovereignty belongs to Allah and the ruler is the agent of the Ummah. His function is to implement, rather than make the law. Western law assigns sovereignty to the state. The state has complete monopoly over the law making process, giving validity to which under Islamic law was the domain of the doctrinal schools. Furthermore, the birth of the nation-state has changed the structure in which traditional Islamic law operated which has now been forcefully restricted in its scope. The concept of ‘asabiyya is different from the concept of nation. The former is a natural phenomenon while the latter has been imposed upon the Ummah. If certain changes are made to the way that the modern state operates, it can function as an administrative tool that serves the Ummah.

This paper concerns the dominant conceptual or formal accounts of legal rights: the Interest and Will Theories. Section II clarifies the minimal necessary conditions for a rights model to count as a Will Theory. It also explores Kant’s Will Theory of rights and the difficulties posed to it by Hohfeld’s schema of jural relations. Kant has three alternatives: reject the schema’s utility or demonstrate his theory’s compatibility with it via molecularist or basic models of Hohfeldian rights. Although his best option is to disavow Hohfeld, Kant’s theory is ultimately undesirable on other grounds. Section III shall analyze the modern Will and Interest Theories’ biggest weaknesses according to a test proposed in Section I, which should generate bases for preferring one theory to another. It will offer a counterargument to the Inalienability charge levied against the Will Theory, and demonstrate why Interest Theory responses to the Third Party Beneficiary argument are inadequate.

The concepts of sovereignty and legal personality in Islamic Law and Western Law are fundamentally different. Under Islamic law sovereignty belongs to Allah and the ruler is the agent of the Ummah. His function is to implement, rather than make the law. Western law assigns sovereignty to the state. The state has complete monopoly over the law making process, giving validity to which under Islamic law was the domain of the doctrinal schools. Furthermore, the birth of the nation-state has changed the structure in which traditional Islamic law operated which has now been forcefully restricted in its scope. The concept of ‘asabiyya is different from the concept of nation. The former is a natural phenomenon while the latter has been imposed upon the Ummah. If certain changes are made to the way that the modern state operates, it can function as an administrative tool that serves the Ummah.

This thesis examines the role of the legal profession in Upper Canada from 1791 to 1867. In particular it focuses on whether or not the legal profession became the elite that they were set up to be. It examines the reasons behind choosing the legal profession as the elite. Between the creation of Upper Canada and Confederation there were several political and economic changes and I examine how these changes impacted the legal profession and the role that they had to play in the legal profession. I argue that while the legal profession failed to become the aristocratic elite that the early Upper Canadian leaders hoped for, it did become distinctively Upper Canadian.

In A White Wedding? The Racial Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, I examine the inter-locking relations of power that constitute the lesbian/gay subject recognized by the Canadian nation-state as deserving of access to civil marriage. Through analysis of legal documents, Parliamentary and Senate debates, and interviews with lawyers, I argue that this lesbian/gay subject achieves intelligibility in the law by trading in on and shoring up the terms of racialized neo-liberal citizenship. I also argue that the victory of same-sex marriage is implicated in reproducing and securing a racialized Canadian national identity as well as a racialized civilizational logic, where “gay rights” are the newest manifestation of the modernity of the “West” in a post-9/11 historical context. By centring a critical race/queer conceptual framework, this research project follows the discursive practices of respectability, freedom and civility that circulate both widely and deeply in this legal struggle. I contend that in order to successfully shed its historical markers of degeneracy, the lesbian/gay subject must be constituted not as a sexed citizen but rather as a neoliberal citizen, one who is intimately tied to notions of privacy, property, autonomy and freedom of choice, and hence one who is racialized as white. The critical race/queer analytic also attends to the temporal and spatial registers framing this legal struggle that re-install various troubling racial hierarchies in a “gay rights” project often lauded as progressive. This analysis of the discursive terrain of same-sex marriage reveals the race shadow that lies at the heart of this equality-rights struggle. The conclusion of this thesis provides reflections for developing an ethics of activism that dislodges and resists the (re)production of racialized relations of power in lesbian and gay equality rights activism. In so doing, I seek to provoke, question and re-draw the landscape of our thinking, not only about same-sex marriage but also about the terms with which we conceive, articulate and practice racial and sexual justice.

This thesis examines the factors that influence perceptions of judicial corruption. A statistical analysis using data from such sources as Transparency International, the World Bank, and Freedom House demonstrates that aspects of accountability (the ability to remove judges) and transparency (freedom of the press) are only weakly related to perceptions of judicial corruption. A systematic country comparison shows that the structure of the judicial system explains variations in perceived judicial corruption.

This thesis examines the consequences of taking a conversational approach to legal interpretation. This is meant to contrast with and improve the argument given in Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire.