Note:

The present study sought to investigate the relationship between psychological reactance, as a component of paradoxical intention and locus of control.The Rotter I-E Scale, which measures individuals locus of control on a scale ranging from zero to 23, was utilized to determine subjects' external or internal ranking. A research design was developed which included a pilot study and an experiment which contained pretest and posttest conditions for examining subjects' choice change, From the pilot study two pictures were selected which were not biased towards internals or externals in the experimental conditions. Choice change was measured by subject's pretest choice against subject's posttest choice of the two pictures.The study was designed to answer the following research questions:1) Would there be a significant difference in the choices made by the experimental subjects from those made by the control subjects, thereby indicating that psychological reactance had occurred with the experimental group? 2) Would the findings of psychological the experimental reactance indicated in question one above, be significant if differences were compared by quartile scores on the I-E Scale?In the experiment, 122 experimental subjects were compared against 31 control subjects for choice change between pretest and posttest conditions, The experimental subjects were placed into four groups, which represented approximate quartile divisions of the I-E Scale and a comparison of the frequency of psychological reactance in the four quartiles was made.Previous studies in this area had used a mean or a median split on the I-E Scale or had used the extremes of the scale.Two null hypotheses were tested by using the Standard Normal Test and by using Chi-Square, The .05 level of significance was established as the critical probability level for the non-acceptance of hypotheses.Findings1) Reactance was exhibited by the experimental subjects. 2) Differences in reactance were not significant when compared by quartiles.ConclusionsBrehm's (1966) theory of psychological reactance was supported. Me findings do not support the conclusions of Cherulink and Citrin (1974).On the basis of the findings, conclusions were drawn and speculations were made concerning the utilization of paradoxical psychotherapy.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 1986. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 230-236).

The Liar Paradox and related semantic antinomies seem to challenge our deepest intuitions about language, truth and logic. Many philosophers believe that to solve them, we must give up either classical logic, or the expressive resources of natural language, or even the “naïve theory of truth” (according to which "P" and “it is true that 'P'” always entail each other). A particularly extreme form of radical surgery is proposed by figures like Graham Priest, who argues for “dialetheism”—the position that some contradictions are actually true—on the basis of the paradoxes. While Priest’s willingness to dispense with the Law of Non-Contradiction may be unpopular in contemporary analytic philosophy, figures as significant as Saul Kripke and Hartry Field have argued that, in light of the paradoxes, we can only save Non-Contradiction at the expense of the Law of the Excluded Middle, abandoning classical logic in favor of a “paracomplete” alternative in which P and ~P can simultaneously fail to hold. I believe that we can do better than that, and I argue for a more conservative approach, which retains not only “monaletheism” (the orthodox position that no sentence, either in natural languages or other language, can have more than one truth-value at a time), but the full inferential resources of classical logic.

According to orthodoxy the study of the Soritical and semantical paradoxes belongs to the domain of the philosophy of language. To solve these paradoxes we need to investigate the nature of words like `heap' and `true.' In this thesis I criticise linguistic explanations of the state of ignorance we find ourselves in when confronted with indeterminate cases and develop a classical non-linguistic theory of indeterminacy in its stead. The view places the study of vagueness and indeterminacy squarely in epistemological terms, situating it within a theory of rational propositional attitudes. The resulting view is applied to a number of problems in the philosophy of vagueness and the semantic paradoxes.

ABSTRACT WHERE WE CANNOT SPEAK The poetry collection Where We Cannot Speak and the accompanying critical essay “Borges and the Golem Paradox: a Rhetoric of Silence?” explore the theme of language and silence. The poetry collection is written in the voice of the imaginary (but published) poet, Gershon Holtz, who reflects my Jewish heritage and upbringing. The poems articulate the silences of those oppressed by war and persecution, and also the silences of meditation and the ineffable, which can reside in the presence, absence, and margins of the poet’s voice. The collection is comprised of two sections: (i) “The Mantelpiece”, which delves into culture, conflict, and memory; and (ii) “The Beautiful Salon”, which reflects upon themes of place, time, loss, and responses to silences represented in visual art and poetry. The critical essay is concerned with the cabalistic figure of the golem—a human being made in an artificial way by magic art, through the use of holy names. Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges (famous for creating fictitious authors and books) wished that, of all his work, the first stanza of his poem “The Golem”, might be remembered. The essay provides a reading that demonstrates how the poem embodies Borges’ views on the nature of signification, language, and knowledge. The paradoxical outcome is that, just as the golem did not have the power of speech, language conceived of as an instrument for textual golem-making is silent in its capacity to represent the world. The essay concludes with some thoughts on my own poetic practice and links the essay with the poetry collection via the figure of the textual golem, Gershon Holtz. This fictional poet becomes a symbol for the problem of language and representation—interpreted both as what we cannot speak about, and the silences inherent in language itself.

My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ Another principled division is intuitively anticipated. I coin the term 'hypodox' (adj.: 'hypodoxical') for a generalization of Truth-tellers across paradoxes of truth, satisfaction, membership, reference, and where else it may find applicability. I make and investigate a conjecture about paradox and hypodox duality: that each paradox (at least those in the scope of the classification) has a dual hypodox.¶ In my investigation, I focus on paradoxes that might intuitively be thought to be relatives of the Liar paradox, including Grelling’s (which I present as a paradox of satisfaction) and, by analogy with Grelling’s paradox, Russell’s paradox. I extend these into truth-functional and some non-truth-functional variations, beginning with the Epimenides, Curry’s paradox, and similar variations. There are circular and infinite variations, which I relate via lists. In short, I focus on paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and some paradoxes of membership. ¶ Among the new paradoxes, three are notable in advance. The first is a non-truth functional variation on the Epimenides. This helps put the Epimenides on a par with Curry’s as a paradox in its own right and not just a lesser version of the Liar. I find the second paradox by working through truth-functional variants of the paradoxes. This new paradox, call it ‘the ESP’, can be either true or false, but can still be used to prove some other arbitrary statement. The third new paradox is another paradox of satisfaction, distinctly different from Grelling’s paradox. On this basis, I make and investigate the new distinction between two different types of paradox of satisfaction, and map one type back by direct analogy to the Liar, and the other by direct analogy to Russell's paradox.

<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a proper treatment for two groups of logical paradoxes: semantic paradoxes and set-theoretic paradoxes. My main thesis is that the two different groups of paradoxes need different kinds of solution. Based on the analysis of the diagonal method and truth-gap theory, I propose a functional-deflationary interpretation for semantic notions such as ‘heterological’, ‘true’, ‘denote’, and ‘define’, and argue that the contradictions in semantic paradoxes are due to a misunderstanding of the non-representational nature of these semantic notions. Thus, they all can be solved by clarifying the relevant confusion: the liar sentence and the heterological sentence do not have truth values, and phrases generating paradoxes of definability (such as that in Berry’s paradox) do not denote an object. I also argue against three other leading approaches to the semantic paradoxes: the Tarskian hierarchy, contextualism, and the paraconsistent approach. I show that they fail to meet one or more criteria for a satisfactory solution to the semantic paradoxes. For the set-theoretic paradoxes, I argue that the criterion for a successful solution in the realm of set theory is mathematical usefulness. Since the standard solution, i.e. the axiomatic solution, meets this requirement, it should be accepted as a successful solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)