Recent years have seen increased interest in using theism (the perspective that assumes that God is currently actively in the world) as a conceptual framework for scientific inquiry. This interest has built particular momentum in psychology where several scholars have expressed that traditional naturalistic approaches limit understanding and investigation of psychology's subject matter and thus are insufficient to fully account for human phenomena. Others have previously made the case for the consideration of theism as a legitimate alternative basis for psychological theory, research, and practice. This dissertation begins with that consideration and examines what would be required to move a theistic approach to psychology forward. In other words, if God is assumed to be active in the world (including the psychological world-theism), what difference would that make for the ideas, methods, and practices of psychology? As the current activity of God is the foundational assumption of theism, clarity about what that activity would entail is especially essential for those seeking to develop a theistic approach to psychology and to describe how their discipline would be different from that perspective. Unfortunately, there is currently a lack of clear and explicitly articulated conceptions of God's actions in and for psychology. This dissertation provides a conceptual analysis of the activity of God that synthesizes disparate approaches to divine action into a tentative conceptualization or taxonomic schema. This schema organizes the scholarly literature from across several major traditions into six major heads and elucidates multiple subordinate concepts. The conceptualization serves as an orientation to important issues such as strong v weak theisms, the limitations of naturalism, and practical theistic applications for psychology. Detailed illustrations of these concepts as applied to psychological theory, research (both in the qualitative and quantitative modes), and practice further demonstrate the utility of such a conceptualization. These examples provide a specific focus on the unique contributions of a theistic perspective over and against those of naturalism.

This thesis examines how ethics and various conceptualizations of the divine are explored and expressed in contemporary fiction, and in this particular case, in Star Wars and Warhammer 40,000. It is meant to highlight the philosophical underpinnings within these works, and to discuss how readers and consumers of such fiction and media may be affected in their views regarding religiosity and ethics. This exploration is mainly done through the lens of virtue ethics, specifically Aristotelian and Nietzschean schools of thought, with the primary focus being on the heroes and villains of the respective works. This essay argues that in the case of both Star Wars and Warhammer 40,000, the Aristotelian tendency appears to be more clearly present in both works, while a Nietzschean perspective appears to be driving the villains of Star Wars and to some degree those of Warhammer 40,000 as well. How these ethical frameworks are linked to the transcendent reality described in both works is also discussed, with concepts such as Classical Theism being weighed against that of Pantheism. While fiction such as Star Wars has been the subject of research before, it has not been examined as closely through the lens of ethics. Warhammer 40,000 has only received limited attention, and this essay argues that the similarities between Star Wars and Warhammer 40,000 can most likely be established between other works of fiction as well, opening up for further exploration.

God expresses Himself with emotions. This is well attested in Scripture, with statements of love (1Jn 4:8), anger (Ex 4:14), and delight (Isa 62:4). But the real question is not whether God has emotions, but what is the source of those emotions. If God emotes in the context of our suffering, and our suffering is not abated, does this mean that God is impotent or indifferent? Both possibilities yield a frightening conclusion. Rightly understanding the character and nature of God in this regard is paramount. For the past two thousand years, the prevailing doctrine was that God was in some way impassible, in that He is without passions or emotions with respect to his creation. This means that God does not change his feelings or thoughts about events on the earth. Even though certain passages called the “divine repentance” passages in the Old Testament (Ge 6:6-7; Ex 32:12-14; 1Sa 15:11, 35; Nu 23:19) appeared to contradict God’s impassibility, this was solved through the idea of anthropopathism, that is, the belief that God describes Himself with emotional terms. Prior to 1930, most of the English Bible renderings of the divine repentance passages preferred the word “repent,” because the prevailing theology was rooted in the impassibility of God, and these passages were deemed to be anthropopathic. But with the doctrine of God’s impassibility now in question, English Bible translations began to reflect the view that God actually reacts to our suffering with strong emotion. Words such as “sorry,” “grief,” “regret,” and even “changed his mind” were now used to describe the reaction of God whenever God appeared to be disappointed with his creation, or worse, if He was disappointed with his own plan. The purpose of this study is to provide an exegetical solution to the problem of God’s response in the divine repentance passages in four Old Testament historical texts. These passages are labelled as such because of the use of the Hebrew verb ~xn which describe God as “sorry” or “repenting.” For those who hold to God’s full immutability, the preferred view through the ages was that the Hebrew ~xn was to be taken as anthropopathically. This study will want to explore the possibilities of an alternative view for the Hebrew ~xn in the divine repentance passages which allow for God’s passibility while holding to his full immutability. Specifically, this study not only strives to answer the question “Does God repent?”, but through a sound methodology also wants to answer the larger question of the source of God’s emotion when his judgment or grace is in view. The methodology followed in this study is two-fold. First, it is biblical-theological, meaning that it utilises a whole-Bible theology, and following the work of Walter Kaiser and James Hamilton, posits that the Old Testament contains a theme or centre of grace within judgment. At the Fall in Ge 3, God simultaneously introduced judgment and grace into the world. That judgment and grace has never left. As one looks through the Bible, these are the two unbroken strands that weave their way through every chapter and every book. In addition, this study is also an exegetical study, and follows the grammaticalhistorical- lexical-syntactical methodology of Walter Kaiser. God disclosed Himself objectively through the words of a book. This book records actual historical events, as well as specific declarations and commands from God Himself. It is necessary that the words of this book be correctly understood in their context so that a correct understanding of God will result. Using this methodology, this study will explore the meaning of God’s ~xn in each divine repentance passage. The lexical study will be combined with the biblical-theological approach of a theme or centre of “grace within judgment” that flows through the Old Testament. Because of this, is it possible that God, who is fully immutable, provide us everything that we need to navigate a world of sin, suffering and uncertainty? The answer could very well be in the understanding of God’s ~xn in light of our suffering and sin. / PhD (Old Testament), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

This thesis lays out a critique of the libertarian autonomy in Clark Pinnock's open theism. It contends that libertarian autonomy (defined as the choice to do otherwise) is unable to do justice to the fuller sense of freedom described in the biblical narrative. Offering more than a critique, this thesis suggests an alternative definition of freedom by qualifying Karl Barth's "freedom as obedience" as 'freedom as faithfulness'. As such, true freedom is contrasted to the autonomy that leads to evil, and is found beyond the false dichotomy of compatibilism and incompatibilism, heteronomy and autonomy. Freedom is recognized as a good gift of creation and a promise of the eschaton, and thus must be distanced from the shadow of evil which haunts human autonomy. Ultimately, this thesis contends that faithfulness to God as the source and call of life leads to responsive, transformative, and eschatologically unlimited freedom.

The discussion of worldviews is today dominated by two worldviews, Theism and Naturalism, each with its own advantages and problems. Theism has the advantage of accommodating the individual with existential answers whilst having problems with integrating more recent scientific understandings of the universe. Naturalism on the other hand does well by our developments of science, the problem being instead that this understanding meets difficulty in answering some of the essentials of our existence: questions of mentality and morality. These two views differ fundamentally in stances of ontology and epistemology, and seem not in any foreseeable future to be reconcilable. To deal with this issue, Panpsychism is presented here as the worldview that can accommodate for both existential issues and scientific understanding.

In this essay I examine the plausibility of theism and naturalism. I will do this by applying the principle of simplicity as a criterion for measuring the probability of these two worldviews. Theism is the view that God exist as a transcendent being and that the ultimate reality is personal. Naturalism on the other side opposes theism and postulate that only the natural world exist and that the ultimate reality is impersonal. The principle of simplicity measures which of competing theories is simpler and one aspect of simplicity is that if a theory F is simpler than a competing theory H, then F postulates none or fewer ad hoc hypotheses than H. Another aspect of simplicity is that if H means postulating an explanation that goes beyond necessity and F does not, then F is simpler than H.    It is easy to think that theism, because it postulate a supernatural being, is more complex than naturalism. It is tempting to make the fast conclusion that theism is more ad hoc than naturalism, and because we can understand nature by using the naturalistic method that assumes that God does not intervene in nature, has the conclusion that theism is unnecessary. One of the reasons for making the above conclusion is because theism does not correspond well with background knowledge i.e. facts we know by experience to be true. Some philosophers assumes that we can use background knowledge to measure whether F is simpler than H. They assume that simpler metaphysical theories are those with more background assumptions into the body of the metaphysical theory. A crucial task in this essay will be to evaluate that assumption.   I propose that it is problematic to apply background knowledge when assessing the simplicity of metaphysical theories because assuming that one can measure metaphysical simplicity with background knowledge is to assume that all that exist is relatively symmetrical. Also, I suggest that naturalism is more ad hoc than theism when it comes to explain diverse phenomena in the world.

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The aim of the thesis is to introduce the American process philosopher Charles Hartshorne and his philosophical theism and to relate his approach and his thoughts to the debate about the relationship of theology and philosophy. After introducing the basics of the career and work of Alfred North Whitehead, the better known representative of process thought, and then the career and achievements of Hartshorne himself, I proceed to make a survey of the main aspects of his neoclassical philosophical concept of the God-world relation. Special attention is paid to one of Hartshorne's specifics - his defense and interpretation of the ontological argument for the existence of God. I then deal with Hartshorne's attempts to engage some classical theistic concepts, namely that of Thomas Aquinas, and of the luminaries of Protestant theology, Paul Tillich and Karl Barth, into a kind of dialogue. Then I introduce briefly "process theology" and some significant examples of applying Hartshorne's ideas in theology, Christology, and moral theory. I survey some polemical reactions to process thought and to Hartshorne by German Protestant theologians and I consider the possibility of a certain kinship between Hartshorne's view of the God-world relation and the theology of nonviolence. In the conclusion I survey the outcomes of...

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [56]-68).