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This dissertation explores the notion of objective chance as reasonable degree of belief given what might loosely be called our ultimate evidence. The goal is to develop a notion of objective chance that is broadly Humean: where chance ascriptions are construed as projected, De Dicto, physical modalities. It builds, in large part, on the work of David Lewis on objective chance and the metaphysics of indeterminism. It is argued that Lewis and the sciences take objective chance to measure the degree to which a proposition/sentence is physically determined true. These measures of determinacy are analysed in the Lewisian manner as a special kind of credence, an analysis justified by Lewis’ Principal Principle. This analysis faces several problems: the Principal Principle may not be generally applicable due to vicious circularities, chances so conceived may be incompatible with Humean supervenience, and the analysis itself may be uninformative. This dissertation addresses each of these concerns in turn. It proposes a novel trivial chance solution to the first problem and then extends this to solve the second problem, often referred to as the Bug. The aim of this text with respect to the Bug is not to provide a novel cure, but to increase our understanding of the Bug and why the standard medicine is the best on offer. Toward the end of the dissertation the informativity of the analysis is increased by an in depth study of the analysans. This study culminates in moving from Lewis’ objectified credences to credence conditional on an indexical as the analysans for objective chance.

<p>This study deals with the thesis that conceivability implies possibility. Confronted with alleged counterexamples to this thesis, some philosophers have turned to what may be called “idealized” or “more demanding” notions of conceivability. I argue that in turning to such notions, they have made the thesis useless to limited beings like us for attaining modal knowledge. However, in refusing to identify conceivability with demanding or idealized notions, we cannot maintain that conceivability always implies possibility. Essentially, there are two ways to proceed: to view conceivability as a mere guide to possibility, or to argue that the conceivability thesis is a local truth, i.e., a truth with respect to a certain class of statements. I defend the latter alternative. This class of statements employs concepts with respect to which doubt concerning the conceivability thesis is to be regarded as general skepticism, not as skepticism relating to the conceivability thesis itself.</p><p>I proceed by outlining an interpretation of strict possibility—i.e., the kind of possibility that I take the conceivability thesis to be about—according to which modal truths depend essentially on conceptual relations, as opposed to obtaining purely in virtue of properties of things themselves. Given this account, on which both ideal conceivability and strict possibility have a conceptual ground, I argue that these notions are not only coextensional but relate to one and the same property of statements. I further argue that the impossible is unimaginable, but that it is conceivable in the sense that one can misdescribe the contents of imagination.</p>

This study deals with the thesis that conceivability implies possibility. Confronted with alleged counterexamples to this thesis, some philosophers have turned to what may be called “idealized” or “more demanding” notions of conceivability. I argue that in turning to such notions, they have made the thesis useless to limited beings like us for attaining modal knowledge. However, in refusing to identify conceivability with demanding or idealized notions, we cannot maintain that conceivability always implies possibility. Essentially, there are two ways to proceed: to view conceivability as a mere guide to possibility, or to argue that the conceivability thesis is a local truth, i.e., a truth with respect to a certain class of statements. I defend the latter alternative. This class of statements employs concepts with respect to which doubt concerning the conceivability thesis is to be regarded as general skepticism, not as skepticism relating to the conceivability thesis itself. I proceed by outlining an interpretation of strict possibility—i.e., the kind of possibility that I take the conceivability thesis to be about—according to which modal truths depend essentially on conceptual relations, as opposed to obtaining purely in virtue of properties of things themselves. Given this account, on which both ideal conceivability and strict possibility have a conceptual ground, I argue that these notions are not only coextensional but relate to one and the same property of statements. I further argue that the impossible is unimaginable, but that it is conceivable in the sense that one can misdescribe the contents of imagination.

<p>This essay is a study that takes interest in technical and technological change essential to philosophy of science. What is shown is the importance of an active attitude towards this change, by the articulation of the question: Does technical development lead to new ontological questions for science? - and by the answer that such questions do appear.</p><p>It is clear that passive assumptions in this matter might prohibit science in the proceeding search for truth.</p><p>By examples of ways in which technical development helps and challenges science, it is concluded that scrutiny of the relationship between technical development and ontological suppositions and hypotheses within science is well motivated.</p> / <p>Denna uppsats är en studie vilken intresserar sig för teknisk och teknologisk förändring essentiell för vetenskapsfilosofi. Det som påvisas är betydelsen av ett aktivt förhållningssätt till denna förändring, genom formuleringen av frågan: Leder teknisk utveckling till nya ontologiska frågor för vetenskapen? - och genom svaret att sådana frågor uppstår.</p><p>Det framgår att passiva antaganden angående detta kan förhindra vetenskapen i det fortskridande sanningssökandet.</p><p>Genom exempel på sätt som teknisk utveckling hjälper och utmanar vetenskapen, framträder slutsatsen att granskning av förhållandet mellan teknisk utveckling och de ontologiska antagandena och hypoteserna inom vetenskapen är väl motiverad.</p>

This essay is a study that takes interest in technical and technological change essential to philosophy of science. What is shown is the importance of an active attitude towards this change, by the articulation of the question: Does technical development lead to new ontological questions for science? - and by the answer that such questions do appear. It is clear that passive assumptions in this matter might prohibit science in the proceeding search for truth. By examples of ways in which technical development helps and challenges science, it is concluded that scrutiny of the relationship between technical development and ontological suppositions and hypotheses within science is well motivated. / Denna uppsats är en studie vilken intresserar sig för teknisk och teknologisk förändring essentiell för vetenskapsfilosofi. Det som påvisas är betydelsen av ett aktivt förhållningssätt till denna förändring, genom formuleringen av frågan: Leder teknisk utveckling till nya ontologiska frågor för vetenskapen? - och genom svaret att sådana frågor uppstår. Det framgår att passiva antaganden angående detta kan förhindra vetenskapen i det fortskridande sanningssökandet. Genom exempel på sätt som teknisk utveckling hjälper och utmanar vetenskapen, framträder slutsatsen att granskning av förhållandet mellan teknisk utveckling och de ontologiska antagandena och hypoteserna inom vetenskapen är väl motiverad.

<p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Uppsatsen "En utredning av filosofins möjligheter" inleds med ett konstaterande av den bitande kritik som tidvis framförts mot filosofins olika dogmer och traditioner bland andra av Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore och Richard Rorty. Det sägs vidare att all denna kritik hotar att förinta den positiva upptäckarlusten. En föresats görs därför att i funderingar och kritik se möjligheter för filosofin för att på så sätt bidraga till att föra denna framåt i något som förhoppningsvis blir ett konstruktivt inslag i debatten. I uppsatsens första del diskuteras vad filosofi är, filosofins universalitet, nyttan med filosofi och det konstateras att filosofin grundar sig på undran och spekulation och är universell i den meningen att den frågar istället för att påstå samt att nyttan med filosofi är uppenbar om man tittar på de insatser som gjorts av exempelvis Platon, Aristoteles, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Thomas Hobbes och Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I den andra delen analyseras samhället och vetenskapen och dess kopplingar till filosofin och det konstateras bland annat att det är skillnad på principer och tillämpningar inom dessa olika områden samt att även om tillämpningarna inom olika områden ständigt är nya så är principerna desamma och att detta är något att ta fasta på beträffande filosofins möjligheter och trovärdighet. I den tredje mer avhandlande delen "En utredning av filosofins möjligheter" behandlas filosofins principer och nutiden jämförs i ett historiskt perspektiv och filosofin för framtiden diskuteras i meningen att filosofins principer är dess styrka samt att ett moment av klarsyn och precisering kan vara en möjlighet för filosofin att överbrygga sin svårförståelighet men dock innebär en risk för att själva filosofins styrka och särart därmed försvinner. Den slutsats som ges formuleras så att filosofins möjligheter inte så mycket ligger i skapandet av några för den nya principer utan i ett klarsynt användande av dess befintliga.</p> / <p>Abstract</p><p>This paper aims at investing the possibilities for philosophical thinking through a speculative and critical examination of different ideas from various philosophers, such as Moore, Wittgenstein and Rorty. The aim is that philosophy can be a constructive part of the contemporary debate. In the first part, it is argued that philosophy is a speculative and universal business, and has had a great importance for society; examples of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and different political philosophers as Marx, Mill, Rousseau and Hobbes are given. In the second part, society and science are investigated in relation to philosophy, and it is concluded that there is a fundamental difference between method and principles, in that methods always change while principles always are the same and this, it is said, is something fruitful for the possibilities and for the confidence in, philosophy. In the third part, the principles of philosophy are treated, and the contemporary world is treated in a historical perspective. The future of philosophy is discussed, and its strenght is said to lie in its own principles. It is argued that clearsightedness and precision can be the solution to philosophocal obscurity, but that there also thereby will be a risk of losing the genuine character and strenght of philosophy. The conclusion of the paper is that the possibilities of philosophy not are achieved by some new philosophical principles, but in a clearsighted use of the existing.</p>

The purpose of this paper is to exam the philosophical development of Emanuel Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence and to note some of the more important parallels between Swedenborg's doctrine and the three contemporary most debated theories concerning the mind-body problem. These three theories was pre-established harmony, its opponent physical influx and finally occasionalism. Especially occasionalism has close connections to Descartes' dualism, but neither pre-established harmony or physical influxus, which in some ways can be dated before Descartes, would have looked the same, if it were not for the Cartesian way of thinking. Also Swedenborg initially inherited major influences from Descartes and that is the first approach in this paper. From there on the paper follows the development of the doctrine of correspondence and the parallels according Swedenborg's more contemporary philosophical writers, until Swedenborg gets to a point where he underwent a profound spiritual crisis and turned his focus on an all together theological approach.

Uppsatsen "En utredning av filosofins möjligheter" inleds med ett konstaterande av den bitande kritik som tidvis framförts mot filosofins olika dogmer och traditioner bland andra av Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore och Richard Rorty. Det sägs vidare att all denna kritik hotar att förinta den positiva upptäckarlusten. En föresats görs därför att i funderingar och kritik se möjligheter för filosofin för att på så sätt bidraga till att föra denna framåt i något som förhoppningsvis blir ett konstruktivt inslag i debatten. I uppsatsens första del diskuteras vad filosofi är, filosofins universalitet, nyttan med filosofi och det konstateras att filosofin grundar sig på undran och spekulation och är universell i den meningen att den frågar istället för att påstå samt att nyttan med filosofi är uppenbar om man tittar på de insatser som gjorts av exempelvis Platon, Aristoteles, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Thomas Hobbes och Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I den andra delen analyseras samhället och vetenskapen och dess kopplingar till filosofin och det konstateras bland annat att det är skillnad på principer och tillämpningar inom dessa olika områden samt att även om tillämpningarna inom olika områden ständigt är nya så är principerna desamma och att detta är något att ta fasta på beträffande filosofins möjligheter och trovärdighet. I den tredje mer avhandlande delen "En utredning av filosofins möjligheter" behandlas filosofins principer och nutiden jämförs i ett historiskt perspektiv och filosofin för framtiden diskuteras i meningen att filosofins principer är dess styrka samt att ett moment av klarsyn och precisering kan vara en möjlighet för filosofin att överbrygga sin svårförståelighet men dock innebär en risk för att själva filosofins styrka och särart därmed försvinner. Den slutsats som ges formuleras så att filosofins möjligheter inte så mycket ligger i skapandet av några för den nya principer utan i ett klarsynt användande av dess befintliga. / This paper aims at investing the possibilities for philosophical thinking through a speculative and critical examination of different ideas from various philosophers, such as Moore, Wittgenstein and Rorty. The aim is that philosophy can be a constructive part of the contemporary debate. In the first part, it is argued that philosophy is a speculative and universal business, and has had a great importance for society; examples of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and different political philosophers as Marx, Mill, Rousseau and Hobbes are given. In the second part, society and science are investigated in relation to philosophy, and it is concluded that there is a fundamental difference between method and principles, in that methods always change while principles always are the same and this, it is said, is something fruitful for the possibilities and for the confidence in, philosophy. In the third part, the principles of philosophy are treated, and the contemporary world is treated in a historical perspective. The future of philosophy is discussed, and its strenght is said to lie in its own principles. It is argued that clearsightedness and precision can be the solution to philosophocal obscurity, but that there also thereby will be a risk of losing the genuine character and strenght of philosophy. The conclusion of the paper is that the possibilities of philosophy not are achieved by some new philosophical principles, but in a clearsighted use of the existing.

<p> </p><p> </p><p>The purpose of this paper is to exam the philosophical development of Emanuel Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence and to note some of the more important parallels between Swedenborg's doctrine and the three contemporary most debated theories concerning the mind-body problem. These three theories was pre-established harmony, its opponent physical influx and finally occasionalism. Especially occasionalism has close connections to Descartes' dualism, but neither pre-established harmony or physical influxus, which in some ways can be dated before Descartes, would have looked the same, if it were not for the Cartesian way of thinking. Also Swedenborg initially inherited major influences from Descartes and that is the first approach in this paper. From there on the paper follows the development of the doctrine of correspondence and the parallels according Swedenborg's more contemporary philosophical writers, until Swedenborg gets to a point where he underwent a profound spiritual crisis and turned his focus on an all together theological approach.</p><p> </p>