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Thesis advisor: Stephen J. Pope / Thesis advisor: Dominic Doyle / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

Thesis advisor: Peter Kreeft / Thomas Aquinas is generally viewed as the chief proponent of the theory of delayed animation, the view that the human embryo does not at first have the rational soul proper to human beings. Thomas follows Aristotle's embryology, in which an embryo is animated by a succession of souls. The first is a nutritive soul, having the powers of growth, nutrition, and generation. The second is a sensitive soul, having the additional powers of locomotion and sensing. The third and final soul is the human, or rational soul, which virtually includes the nutritive and sensitive souls. Because Thomas holds that there is only one substantial form of a composite, none of these forms overlap to provide continuity. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to speak of the embryo as one enduring subject through the succession of souls. Moreover, because of the way that the nutritive soul is associated with plants, and the sensitive soul is associated with animals, interpreters generally hold that for Thomas the embryo is first a plant, then an animal, and with the advent of the rational soul, finally a human being. Those who write about the ontological status of the embryo assume that delayed animation necessarily entails delayed hominization, that is, that the embryo only becomes human at a later stage of its development, when it receives the rational soul. Those who hold a delayed animation view of the embryo often invoke Thomas' schedule of successive souls in the embryo as a model for viewing it as not yet human in early stages of development, linking hominization to the ability to perform intellectual operations. That Thomas specifies that a body must be sufficiently organized before the advent of the rational soul seems to them to solidify their view of the embryo as not sufficiently organized to be truly human. Additionally, even outside of an explicitly Thomist framework, Thomist metaphysical principles are often invoked in arguments that center on twinning and totipotency of blastomeres in the early embryo, and whether that early embryo is one individual if it is potentially many. Those who hold immediate animation views (i.e., the embryo receives the rational soul at once, with no mediate states) often adopt the strategy of importing modern data on the internal organization and self-directed development of the embryo, and argue that if only Thomas had known that the zygote was not unformed and undifferentiated, that it has within itself all it needs to become a mature adult human, he would have held that the embryo is immediately suited to receive the rational soul, and thus is human from conception. In this way they attempt to employ a change in scientific data to negate the need for a succession of forms in the embryo. The author identifies the being of the human embryo as a prior metaphysical problem within Thomas' work, and advances a different interpretation of his views: that the embryo, even before the advent of the rational soul, is human. To establish this claim, she traces the problems which emerge in the current debate about when the embryo becomes human, and argues that contrary to expectation, it is not necessary to equate immediate rational animation with immediate hominization, demonstrating that all other approaches yield results entirely untenable for Thomas. A survey of texts reveals that Thomas did in fact view the embryo as human before the rational soul, though he does not methodically work out the implications of that view in a number of areas. Moreover, a distinction based on a passage in Aristotle's Generation of Animals with regard to an additional meaning of generation may resolve the ambivalence in Thomas' account of the embryo as passive under the formative power of the father's semen. Finally, a third meaning of generation is offered to show that Thomas recognized and wished to resolve the difficulty of explaining the continuity and identify of the embryo in the succession of souls. What results is an immediate hominization view of the embryo that, because it accommodates Thomas' succession of souls and does not depend upon importing modern biological data on the embryo, is consistent with Thomas' account, and is thoroughly cognizant of the way Thomas viewed human nature and the final end of human being. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / The dissertation will contribute not only to an appreciation and critical evaluation of fortitude in the Philippine context, but has a wider significance for the practice of virtue ethics. The thesis is that (a) virtue must be analyzed contextually, in specific social contexts, as well as (b) in dependence upon the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the virtues, that (c) social virtue as well as individual virtue exists, and that (d) this social, contextual, Aristotelian-Thomistic approach to virtue provides a basis for a social-ethical critical evaluation and prescription for particular societies. If virtue ethics is to generate sound social normative claims, its argument needs to be based not merely upon the classical tradition, but also on a socially, historically and culturally aware analysis of the way virtues are fleshed out in context. This dissertation will argue that the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition still has much to teach us about courage or fortitude, and in dialogue with contemporary social science still provides legitimate moral insights into fortitude today. Second, it will argue that virtue takes on a particular color or texture in specific social contexts, and will argue this in relation to the Filipino context: Philippine fortitude is Thomistic, with unique attributes of resilience and joy. Third, it will argue that it is necessary to engage in a social-ethical critique of social virtue, arguing that there are deficiencies in Philippine fortitude in that it lacks a crucial link with justice. This critical evaluation will lead to the elaboration of an ethical and social imperative for the Filipino people to develop good anger to fuel a less passive, more assertive fortitude that is ordered to justice. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

This study argues that a comparison of human nature, divine grace, and theological virtue in the theologies of John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas provides resources for constructing iconic dignity as a vital theological perspective. Iconic dignity names a radiant-yet-reflected human worth rooted in the image of God, whose grace empowers response, transformation, and virtuous participation in God’s loving essence. The dissertation responds to the absence of a focused analysis of nature, grace, and virtue in Wesley-Aquinas studies—a nascent field with only three major publications (on historical-moral theology, Christian perfection, and pneumatology). The project’s contributions to theological reflection and practice have become especially clear in our current context of social-existential fragmentation and bigotry. Iconic dignity begins with an intuitional methodology and proceeds with textual analysis, critically comparative construction, and practical contributions. These methods characterize iconic dignity as participatory, incarnational, relational, dynamic, encompassing, transformational, and loving. These characteristics embrace our inter/personal nature, our development in grace, and our work with God toward virtuous flourishing. The dissertation’s explanatory power and generative potential capacitates constructive doctrinal reflection and practical embodiments of iconic dignity. After detailing “iconicity” and “dignity,” the theological comparison of Wesley and Aquinas traces general contours of their shared theological anthropology. As embodiments of God’s image, humans possess intellect, will, and volitional liberty, which together establish our moral capacity. This holistic anthropology is then analyzed with respect to human acts, their relation to habitus (Aquinas) and tempers (Wesley), and sin (actual and original). Following a constructive exploration of iconic dignity and ecological stewardship, the study shifts to grace. Close stereoscopic reading reveals the congruity of grace’s nature, divisions, and dynamics for Wesley and Aquinas. Throughout, the constructive comparison illustrates the strength of iconic dignity’s theological perspective. Wesley and Aquinas are shown to be similar enough to converse but different enough to contribute: to one another, out of their shared theological departures and destinations; and to our practical-theological conversations, including a repudiation of total depravity, an embrace of universal grace, joint ecological stewardship, radical hospitality, and ongoing Methodist-Catholic ecumenical dialogues. Still, many opportunities remain for developing iconic dignity in practice. First, more research is needed on the means of grace and the nature and exercise of theological virtue for Wesley and Aquinas. Second, future research should focus on additional topics like ecclesiology, moral virtue, sociality, and an expansion beyond Wesley and Aquinas. Finally, the need remains for further study into practices of iconic dignity, including the development of stereoscopic reading for local congregations and communities.

The central aim of this dissertation is to provide a conceptual framework for people wishing to consider how their desires are shaped by forces often unnoticed by them and how they can regain some degree of control over those desires. To this end, it offers a model for desire that acknowledges the importance of social forces in shaping a person's desire, and consequently moral character. It examines the specific social context of American capitalism, and American consumption, in order to understand how it is that many Americans seem to desire and act in ways that appear contrary to their well-being. This dissertation is a work of descriptive Christian virtue ethics, meaning that it considers the desire for and consumption of material goods in light of a person's commitment to a greater system of beliefs and values. Taking the approach of virtue ethics, it considers how a person's desires are shaped by what she takes to be constitutive of her well-being, or her telos. It argues that many Americans participate in practices that dispose them to acquire habits of desiring, consuming, and enjoying material goods in ways that tend over time to distort participants' abilities to judge and reason well about the ends that are really worth pursuing, both on the part of individuals and on the part of societies. When a person participates in a practice she acquires habits of thinking, feeling, and acting that enable her to engage in such practices effortlessly. A practice is often oriented by certain rules and standards of excellence that orient the practitioners to certain ways of thinking, feeling, and acting over others. Taking advertising as a key example, participants often acquire habits that lead them to accept a conception of well-being that is based on the ideas that growth is always to be pursued and more of a good thing is always better. Such an orientation, in turn, can direct a person's desires so that she becomes disposed to satisfy her immediate desires without seriously considering whether those desires will contribute to her well-being and, more broadly, whether the vision of the good life she has in mind is truly worth pursuing. This dissertation offers a way of engaging in critical reflection that can enable a person to bring to awareness many of these unseen social forces, and consider the ways in which participation in her many practices does or does not contribute to her well-being. It suggests that, for Christians in particular, a vision of the good life might focus on the cultivation of virtue--especially the virtues of temperance and justice. Considering a person's practices in light of virtue can be helpful for articulating clearly and strategizing effectively about how to engage in consumer activity in ways that contribute to her well-being.

Scope of the work - This research project involves two components. The first is a translation from Latin into English of St Thomas Aquinas’s Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis. This is an important, though largely neglected, work of St Thomas dating from 1267- 68, dealing with a range of issues relating to the two categories of created spirits recognised by Thomas, viz. angels and human souls. The perspective of the Angelic Doctor is principally, though not exclusively, that of philosophy rather than of theology. What is found in the disputed question is the development of a number of arguments, and the consequent taking up of a number of positions, that are the immediate source of what St Thomas has to say about angels and the human soul in the first part (prima pars) of his Summa Theologiae - a part which was completed by 1268. What he has to say about the Averroistic view that there is only one receptive intellect, and only one agent intellect, for all human beings (see Articles 9 and 10 of the disputed question) prepared the way for his crucially important polemical treatise of 1270, the De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. The project provides a complete translation of the Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis which extends across eleven ‘articles’ addressing selected questions concerning angels and/or human souls, viz. matter/form composition, modes of union with (or separation from) matter, specific differences between angels, receptive intellect and agent intellect in human beings, and the distinction between the soul and its powers. Pages vi- vii of the Introduction to the project discuss the way in which the translation of the text of St Thomas has been approached. To cite one sentence: “An attempt has been made at all times to use a style of translation that is pleasantly readable, non-jarring, and non-pedantic” - but one that is subject to total fidelity to expressing the philosophical meaning of St Thomas. The second component of the project is eleven sets of notes (one hundred and seven pages in all), each set of which belongs to one or other of the eleven articles making up the text of St Thomas as translated. There is a degree of cross-referencing between some of the notes belonging to particular articles. The notes are of varying length and are concerned to facilitate an understanding of what the Angelic Doctor has to say in his Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis. Most of the notes fall into one or other of the following categories: biographical (providing information about a number of persons whose names appear in Thomas’s text), historical (giving information about institutions and events connected with the time, or life, of St Thomas), exegetical (explaining why a particular English translation of Thomas’s Latin has been used, or illustrating a point in the text by citations from other works of the Saint, or on occasion taking issue with some feature of the critical Latin text of Leo Keeler, S.J., on which the translation has been based), and ‘philosophical extension’ notes (seeking to amplify what St Thomas has been arguing in the disputed question on created spirits by considering related issues in other works of his, or by further exploration of a concept or notion used in the text but not dwelt on by Thomas). 2 Aim of the work - The aim of the project has been to make available an accurate, and attractive, English translation from thirteenth century Latin of an important work of Thomas Aquinas, and to support this activity with accompanying sets of notes. The achievement of appropriate scholarly standards has been a pervasive intention in all that has been undertaken.

Thomas Hobbes insisted that he had set forth the "true and only moral philosophy" and that he was the founder of civil science. Yet, the character of Hobbes's moral and political theory and its role in his civil doctrines has been the subject of much controversy. In this dissertation I defend an interpretation as a properly natural law theorist in his accounts of the foundations of moral philosophy and civil science, morality, commonwealth, and positive law. I juxtapose Hobbes's thought to the Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law tradition and argue that Hobbes's novelty flows chiefly from his doctrine of the human good. / text

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2004. / Thesis directed by Alfred Freddoso for the Department of Philosophy. "April 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 200-204).