This essay discusses, departing from Kant’s deontological ethics, and deals with the ques- tion of which types of pre-birth genetic modification are acceptable from the perspective of Kant’s ethics theory? The conclusion is that Kant’s ethics can be in line with certain thera- peutic interventions. Yet the same ethics disapproves with any sort of pre-birth modifica- tion based on personal design, preferences and commodification of the process.

Transhumanism is an emerging philosophical and social movement that aims, through technology, to extend human life and radically expand intellectual, physical, and psychological capabilities. Many of transhumanism's goals overlap the eschatological hopes of Christians, such as the elimination of sickness and death. Yet observers who see transhumanism and Christianity in monolithic terms often portray them as adversaries. Against this view, I argue that within each community are factions that have comparable, but contested, views on God, the divine attributes, and human origins, responsibility, and destiny. As a result, an emerging dialog between particular transhumanists and Christians seeks to shape the future of humanity by integrating the basic commitments of transhumanism and Christianity. Bruno Latour's concept of modes of existence offers a framework for both developing and analyzing diplomacy between and within Christian and transhumanist communities. Specifically, Latour's work allows for the identification of category mistakes that set the terms of intermodal conflicts and dialog. Some transhumanists and most Christians hold beliefs about the nature and meaning of God. Christians believe in a Trinitarian God that is the preexistent, eternal, and personal creator of the universe. By contrast, elements of the transhumanist movement believe that in the future an artificial God will inevitably emerge as an omniscient and omnipotent supercomputer. The attributes, concepts and purposes of God and, by extension, nature lend a basis for developing diplomatic relationships between factions of transhumanism and Christianity. Diplomacy between transhumanism and Christianity exists via social media and virtual meeting places. At the forefront of this movement is a new Christian Transhumanist Association that I analyze in some depth. It is only a couple of years old, but its leaders have already attracted international attention. Their strategy of theological minimalism seeks to reduce friction among stakeholders. I show that this strategy sacrifices the insights that Christian theology and philosophy could bring to the development of transhumanism. I conclude that in order to affect transhumanism Christians must find ways to apply their insights into personal creator-creature relationships to the challenges of safely developing artificial superintelligence. / Ph. D. / Progress in science and technology raises the possibility that essential elements of human life could be transformed and enhanced by applications of science and technology. <i>Transhumanism</i> is a philosophical and social movement that believes that such transformations are both possible and desirable. In several respects, transhumanism’s goals overlap with the hopes of Christians, who long for a Second Coming of Christ and the subsequent elimination of sin, suffering, and death for all eternity. Based on Bruno Latour’s work, I analyze the superficial similarities between transhumanism and Christianity to argue that diplomacy between Christians and transhumanists is both possible and potentially beneficial. In developing this argument, I examine a new <i>Christian Transhumanist Association</i>, its leaders, and their diplomatic strategy of “theological minimalism.” I argue that this strategy is flawed because it does not apply the rich insights of orthodox, biblical theology to the most vexing problem of transhumanism development: the threat that an artificial superintelligence could be hostile to human life.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The transhumanist movement propounds the view that the evolution of humanity must be extricated from the contingencies of blind natural selection and actively directed by human beings themselves, utilising existing as well as nascent technologies, in order to radically enhance and thus transform individual human capabilities to levels which far surpass current capacities. Transhumanism has elicited vehement critique, however, due to the claim that the transformations it proposes will result in a new posthuman species; and thus, that its aims represent a violation of human dignity. In order to assess this claim it is necessary to firstly investigate the aims and values of the transhumanist movement, as well as the technological means through which it proposes these aims will be fulfilled. This task is the focus of the first half of this thesis. Secondly, the concept of dignity itself must be examined in order to ascertain its status as a means of critiquing transhumanism. The second half of this thesis therefore explicates the notion of dignity by tracing its historical interpretations and uses, as well as the way in which it has been employed to uphold human rights and to adjudicate bioethical dilemmas in the contemporary milieu. This investigation enables the assessment of the two most renowned dignity arguments, namely, the arguments of the bioconservative thinkers Leon Kass and Francis Fukuyama which have been lodged against transhumanism, as well as the counter-argument of the transhumanist Nick Bostrom. In light of this discussion, the conclusion is that the notion of dignity is plagued by irrevocable ambiguity, vagueness and inconsistencies, due to the presence of conflicting interpretations. These findings have implications for the concept’s efficacy to adjudicate the complex ethical conundrums posed, not only by transhumanism, but in the bioethics arena in general. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die transhumanistiese beweging verteenwoordig die standpunt dat die evolusie van die mensdom losgemaak moet word van die toevallighede van blinde, natuurlike seleksie en aktief gerig moet word deur die mens self, deur van bestaande sowel as ontwikkelende tegnologieë gebruik te maak ten einde individuele menslike vermoëns radikaal te verbeter en dus te transformeer tot op vlakke wat huidige vermoëns ver oorskry. Transhumanisme het egter hewige kritiek ontlok weens die aanspraak dat die transformasies wat dit voorstel ‘n nuwe post-menslike spesie tot gevolg sal hê en dus dat die oogmerke daarvan ‘n skending van menswaardigheid verteenwoordig. Ten einde hierdie aanspraak te beoordeel, was dit eerstens nodig om die oogmerke en waardes van die transhumanistiese beweging te ondersoek, sowel as die tegnologiese middele wat voorgestel word as dit waardeur hierdie oogmerke verwesenlik sal word. Hierdie taak is onderneem in die eerste helfte van die tesis. Tweedens is die konsep van waardigheid self krities onder die loep geneem ten einde die status daarvan as ‘n middel om transhumanisme te kritiseer, te beoordeel. Die tweede helfte van hierdie tesis verhelder dus die idee van waardigheid deur die historiese interpretasies en gebruike daarvan na te gaan, sowel as die manier waarop dit aangewend is om menseregte te ondersteun en om dilemmas in die bioetiek in die hedendaagse milieu te bereg. Hierdie ondersoek maak die beoordeling van die drie mees bekende waardigheidsargumente wat teen transhumanisme gebring is, naamlik die argumente van die biokonserwatiewe denkers Leon Kass en Francis Fukuyama, sowel as die teenargument van die transhumanis Nick Bostrom, moontlik. Na aanleiding van hierdie bespreking is die gevolgtrekking van die skrywer dat die idee van menswaardigheid deurspek is met onvermydelike dubbelsinnigheid, vaagheid en teenstrydighede as gevolg van teenstrydige interpretasies. Hierdie bevindinge het implikasies vir die doeltreffendheid van die konsep om die komplekse etiese probleme wat gestel word, nie net deur transhumanisme nie, maar deur die bioetiek arena oor die algemeen, te beoordeel.

This essay attempts to study transhumanism and its role in the anthropogenic pandemic at the center of the novel, in order to show that transhumanist thought was a driving factor behind it. By looking at transhumanist concerns in the portrayed society, and the beliefs of Crake, one uncovers that Crake was able to exploit the desire for enhancement of humanity as a whole in order to achieve the ultimate transhumanist goal: the near-perfect and immortal posthuman Crakers. Analyzing the intentions behind the creation of the posthuman, and Snowman’s relationship to them, it becomes clear that the posthuman is a replacement of existing humanity, since the sought after qualities of the posthuman can only be attained through genetic engineering before birth and not by altering individual humans. I hope to have shown that the novel contains a warning about transhumanism and the potential misuse of science when one person think things through to its logical conclusion. / Denna uppsats ämnar studera transhumanism och dess roll I den antropogeniska pandemi som står I centrum I romanen, med avsikt att visa att transhumanistiska tankesätt var en drivande kraft bakom den. Genom att titta på transhumanistiska intressen i det beskrivna samhället och Crakes egna idéer, upptäcker en att Crake lyckades exploatera önskan om en förbättrad mänsklighet för att uppnå det ultimata transhumanistiska målet: det nästan perfekta och odödliga posthumana varelserna Crakers. Genom att analysera avsikterna bakom skapandet av dessa posthumana, och Snowmans förhållande till dem, blir det tydligt att the posthumana är en ersättning för redan existerande människor, eftersom de begärliga förmågor och egenskaper som de posthumana besitter endast kan anskaffas genom genteknik och inte genom att förändra individuella människor. Jag hoppas att ha visat att romanen innehåller en varning om transhumanism och det potentiella missbruket av vetenskap när en person tänker igenom något tills dess logiska slutpunkt.

As science races to keep up with science fiction, many scientists are beginning to believe that the next step in human evolution will be a combination of human and machine and look a lot like something out of Star Trek. The constant pursuit of perfection is a part of the human condition, but if we begin to stretch beyond the natural human form can we still consider ourselves human? Transhumanism and posthumanism are only theories for now, but they are theories that threaten to permanently displace the human race, possibly pushing it into extinction. This thesis will look at the theories of transhumanism and posthumanism through the lens of science fiction and ask the question of whether or not technology holds the key to humanities next evolutionary step or its demise.

Members of People Unlimited Inc, maintain that they are proof that physical immortality is possible, despite the death of their founder. In this dissertation, I address the paradox of immortalist lifeworlds: how can members of People Unlimited maintain that they are immortal, yet also claim that members are still susceptible to death? This dissertation is about how imagined futures make up the present for radical life extension (RLE) activists, who form part of an emergent immortalist biosocial landscape where anticipation acts as a way of recognizing the future as a model for the present. Understanding how immortalists can claim to be physically immortal in the present, yet always working toward immortality, requires consideration of the cultures and communities within the broader RLE movement, human relationships to finitude, relationships between science and religion, and biomedical imaginaries. Since little ethnographic data exists on these communities, the goal of my research is to provide a general overview of the contemporary social phenomena of immortality, with an ethnographic focus on People Unlimited and Alcor Life Extension, both in Scottsdale, Arizona, and the broader RLE community that attends the yearly Revolution Against Aging and Death Festival (RAADfest) in Las Vegas, Nevada. The dissertation argues that RLE is an emergent form of biosocial citizenship among healthy individuals, whose present biological limitations are overcome by an orientation towards the future. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Members of People Unlimited Inc, maintain that they are proof that physical immortality is possible, despite the death of their founder. In this dissertation, I address the paradox of immortalist lifeworlds: how can members of People Unlimited maintain that they are immortal, yet also claim that members are still susceptible to death? I argue that for many immortalists, anticipation acts as a way of recognizing the future as a model for the present. I explore how radical life extension activists, including immortalists, transhumanist, cryonicists, and others, create immortal futures through self-care regimens in the present. I connect their future and present by examining the promissory and hopeful discourses of modern bioeconomies, and the forms of affect used in the creation of immortal biosocial worlds.

This essay discusses the futuristic view of radical human enhancement through the lenses of the transhumanist project. The focus of the essay is on the transhumanistic values proposed by Nick Bostrom, and the technological progress that transhumanism proposes. In this essay I ask if the transhumanist project is a desirable project and in our long-term interests as humans. I propose that at least two of three criteria must be fulfilled in order for any radical human enhancement project to be a desirable project. Of these 3 criteria, two will be addressed in this essay. The two criteria discussed is named “The worthwhile criterion”, and “The obsolescence criterion”. The thirds criteria regarding feasibility will not be addressed in this essay. The conclusion is that transhumanist project cannot fulfill these two criteria and thus it is not a desirable project. / Den här uppsatsen diskuterar den futuristiska synen på radikal mänsklig förbättring genom linserna av det transhumanistiska projektet. Fokuset i uppsatsen ligger på de transhumanistiska värderingar som förslagits av Nick Boström, och det de tekniska framstegen som transhumanism föreslår. I denna uppsats ställer jag frågan om det transhumanistiska projektet är ett önskvärt projekt i våra långsiktiga intressen som människor. Jag föreslår att åtminstone två av tre kriterier måste uppfyllas för att ett radikalt mänskligt förbättringsprojekt ska vara ett önskvärt projekt. Av dessa tre kriterier så kommer två att behandlas i denna uppsats. De två kriterierna som diskuteras heter ”Det värdefulla kriteriet” och ”Föråldrande kriteriet”. Det tredje kriteriet angående genomförbarhet kommer inte att behandlas i denna uppsats. Slutsatsen är att det transhumanistiska projektet inte kan uppfylla dessa två kriterier och därför inte är ett önskvärt projekt.

Denna uppsats ämnar med hjälp av av teorier från ekokritik och posthumanism besvara frågorna hur Mary Shelley i sin roman skildrar relationen mellan natur och människa, samt hur man med utgångspunkt i Frankensteins monster (i uppsatsen refererad till som Skapelsen) kan diskutera begreppet människa. Med ekokritik menas här att studera det mänskliga jämfört med det ickemänskliga samt att också diskutera detta mänskliga, vilket är en av huvudpoängerna inom posthumanism. Den vetenskapssyn och natursyn som var gällande på Mary Shelleys tid var antropocentrisk, en världsåskådning som alltid utgår ifrån människan, och som oftast ger människan högre status än allt annat. I romanen skildras detta genom Kapten Waltons syn på sitt upptäcktsresande, och Victor Frankensteins önskan att besegra döden, eller naturen, genom att skapa en ny varelse, för vilket han får plikta med sitt liv, då han inte klarar det hårda klimatet vid Nordpolen. Det blir alltså naturen som dödar honom. I detta kan ses Mary Shelleys kritik mot ett oansvarigt utforskande av naturen och dess processer. Vid försök att diskutera konceptet människa kan upptäckas att en definition lätt motarbetas genom att inte alla människor passar in på denna definition, och att det också kan finnas andra varelser som helt eller delvis gör det. Saken kompliceras dessutom av att en maskin, en robot, eller en artificiell intelligens, numera kan fungera mycket likt en hjärna, och att den mänskliga hjärnan beskrivs som en serie elektrokemiska impulser. Vi leds att acceptera Derridas tanke att människa inte är något som går att definiera. Även denna diskussion kan ses som antropocentrisk, vilket är en av svårigheterna; att bortse från sin egen kulturs världsåskådning. / The main focus of this essay is to attempt to answer the questions of how Mary Shelley, in her novel Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus, portrays the relationship between man and nature, and how Frankensteins creature can serve as a starting point in a discussion of the term human. The theories of ecocriticism - here described as the study of the relationship between human and nonhuman - and poshumanism, which contains the premisses for discussing this human, reveal many interesting things about the novel. The scientific approach to the world, and by extension, nature, can in Shelleys novel be considered anthropocentric, which is portrayed as a damaging world-view. Attempts to discuss the concept of human reveals that any definition can be met with resistence and objections. Not all humans meet the criteria of a certain definition, and there may be other creatures that do. The conclusion here may be that the human simply cannot be defined properly.

In Frank Herbert’s Dune Saga, we find a transhumanist and Nietzschean argument about the evolution of humans achieved as a result of the triggering effect of the Butlerian Jihad against thinking machines. I claim that the metamorphoses of the selected characters reflect the central tenants of the transformation of Nietzsche’s overhuman, or transhumanism’s posthuman. By extending these metamorphoses to include the standpoint of a fictional counterpart such as Dune’s Kwisatz Haderach, this study claims that in Science Fiction we find a possible ground for conceptualizing difficult problems that deal with the future of humanity. This investigation into the need to overcome the human condition will be held in order to see what drives human enhancement, what triggers the need for change, and how this enhancement is realised. Moreover, I claim that the Dune Saga dramatizes a future scenario that furthers the discussion on what is human by questioning the boundary between human and nonhuman.

La libre disposition de soi doit-elle accueillir des limites imposées par le Droit ? Une première approche, instinctive,est de répondre par la négative car le Droit n’aurait pas vocation à s’ingérer dans les rapports intimes que l’on entretient avec soi et qui ne concernent en conséquence pas la société. Il faut pourtant se rendre à l’évidence : le Droit est légitime à intervenir dans la libre disposition de soi car l’intimité est poreuse, et laisse passer entre ses mailles la présence d’autrui, ce qui autorise les pouvoirs publics à intervenir ponctuellement dans ce domaine a priori dédié à la vie privée. C’est à l’aune de l’ordre public que le législateur ou les juges déterminent si la libre disposition de soi peut s’épanouir sans danger pour autrui ou pour l’intérêt général. Cet ordre public, dans ses composantes classiques de direction et de protection, paraît néanmoins actuellement à la peine pour contenir les volontés individuelles qui s’expriment avec force conviction. Tant le juge que le législateur se sont en conséquence tournés vers un autre instrument juridique de nature à encadrer la libre disposition de soi. De facture plus récente, la dignité de la personne humaine vient soit protéger la libre disposition d’individus en situation de faiblesse ; soit au contraire limiter la libre disposition de soi, protégeant la personne contre son gré. La deuxième acception de la dignité est celle qui prédomine entre les mains du législateur et des juges, laissant la libre disposition de soi à la merci d’un instrument peu nuancé.Il faut donc rechercher un instrument juridique qui permette d’assurer la cohésion sociale sans pour autant éteindre les aspirations individuelles. C’est un équilibre particulièrement délicat à trouver en ce que ces deux objectifs sont le plus souvent diamétralement opposés. La recherche doit s’orienter vers l’ordre public car celui-ci est un concept éminemment évolutif. C’est un ordre public qui doit être de direction, eu égard aux faits qu’il accompagne, avec toute la fermeté requise, les individus dans la découverte des options qui leur sont les plus favorables et qu’il n’a pas vocation à protéger à tout prix la libre disposition de soi. Son adaptabilité aux circonstances de l’espèce est rendue possible grâce à l’application du principe de proportionnalité in concreto. Ce nouvel ordre public ne serait enfin qu’une coquille vide, sans l’objectif du Bien commun, qui permet de discriminer entre les usages licites et illicites de la libre disposition de soi. Encadrée par l’ordre public de direction de la personne, cette dernière peut s’exprimer sans verser dans des extrêmes dommageables à l’individu ou à la société. / Must free self-determination accept limits imposed by law? A first approach, instinctive, is to answer in the negative because the Law would not have vocation to interfere in the intimate relations that one maintains with oneself and which consequently does not concern the society. However, we must face the obvious: the law is legitimate to intervene in the free disposition of oneself because the intimacy is porous, and leaves between the meshes the presence of others, which authorizes the public authorities to intervene punctually in this area a priori dedicated to privacy. It is on the basis of public order that the legislator or judges determine whether free self-determination can flourish without danger for others or for the general interest. This public order, in its classical components ofleadership and protection, nevertheless appears to be struggling to contain the individual wishes that express themselves with conviction. Both the judge and the legislator have accordingly turned to another legal instrument ofa nature to regulate the free disposition of oneself. More recent, the dignity of the human person comes to protect thefree disposition of individuals in situation of weakness; or on the contrary, to limit the free disposition of oneself,protecting the person against his will. The second meaning of dignity is the one that predominates in the hands of thelegislator and the judges, leaving the free disposition of oneself at the mercy of a little nuanced instrument. We musttherefore look for a legal instrument that will ensure social cohesion without extinguishing individual aspirations. Itis a particularly delicate balance to find in that these two objectives are most often diametrically opposed. Research must be oriented towards public order because it is an eminently evolving concept. It is a public order that must beof direction, given the facts that it accompanies, with all the firmness required, individuals in the discovery of the options that are most favorable to them and that it is not intended to to protect at all costs the free disposition ofoneself. Its adaptability to the circumstances of the case is made possible by the application of the principle of proportionality in concreto. This new public order would finally be nothing but an empty shell, without the objectiveof the common good, which makes it possible to discriminate between the licit and unlawful uses of free self determination.Framed by the public order of direction of the person, the latter can express himself without endangering the individual or the society.