Master of Arts / Department of History / Charles W. Sanders / On September 13, 1950, in a culmination of three years of efforts by organizations and individuals inside and outside the Harry S. Truman administration, 69 captured battle flags from the Mexican-American War were formally returned to the Mexican government at a ceremony in Mexico City. The events surrounding the return of flags to Mexico occurred in two distinct phases. The first was a small, secretive, and largely symbolic return of three flags conceived and carried out by high-ranking U.S. government officials in June 1947. The second large-scale, public return of the remaining flags in the custody of the War Department was initiated by the American Legion and enacted by the United States Congress. Despite their differences, both returns were heavily influenced by contemporary events, primarily the presidential election of 1948 and the escalation of the Cold War. Also, although the second return was much more extensive than the President originally intended, it was only through his full support that either return was accomplished. In the decades since 1950, historians have either ignored the return of Mexican battle flags or focused instead on Truman’s wreath laying at the monument to the niños héroes in Mexico City in March 1947. This study, for the first time, provides an in-depth description of the efforts to return captured Mexican battle flags and explains why these war trophies were returned while others have remained in the United States. The goal of this investigation is to present the efforts of the Truman administration for what they truly were: an unprecedented act of international friendship. Although the actions of the U.S. government and private organizations were partially influenced by self-interest and Cold War fears, their primary motivation was a sincere desire to erase the painful memories surrounding the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848 in an effort to improve future relations between the two countries. Many historians point to the Truman administration as the end of the Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America. This study, however, argues that the return of captured Mexican battle flags represents the true pinnacle of the United States’ Good Neighbor Policy toward its southern neighbor.

Without knowing it, a professor of mine, Dr. Emma Lou Thornbrough, stimulated my interest in President Truman when she stated in a freshman history course that Harry S. Truman would go down in history as one of the greatest American Presidents if not the greatest because of his ingenuity in foreign policy. The exact purporse of this paper is to examine these programs.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Texas, May, 2008. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

On May 9, 1950, President Truman declared that “all our international policies, taken together, form a program designed to strengthen and unite the free world.” My dissertation is the first history of the “free world,” a crucial concept that identified the object of U.S. leadership, drove the country to seek global preeminence, and shaped the American understanding of the Cold War. For much of the nineteenth century, American policymakers had envisioned a globe divided into a “new world” of freedom and an “old world” of tyranny. In 1917, Woodrow Wilson proposed a new global dichotomy, arguing for the creation of a trans-Atlantic coalition of democracies against aggressive autocracies whose very existence threatened the survival of freedom everywhere. A revised version of this logic prevailed during the Second World War. But it was only after the start of the Cold War in the late 1940s that American policymakers embraced the concept of an enduring and extra-hemispheric “free world.” Their efforts to lead, unite and strengthen this spatially defined “free world” prompted a massive expansion of American foreign policy and fundamentally transformed the country’s position in the international arena.

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This thesis examines the factors affecting the outcome of the 1948 presidential election. The factors which will be take up are not a complete list of all those influences on the election but will be those which appeared most frequently in writings on the subject and those which, in the writer's opinion, exerted the strongest influence. By combining specific studies of the tree large pivotal states, with the investigation of general factors affecting the election, it is believed that certain rather definite conclusions can be drawn concerning what happened in the country as a whole.

On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur as Commander of United Nations forces in Korea. Since the dismissal, contemporaries of the Truman-MacArthur era and historians have tried to make sense of Truman's momentous decision to relieve one of America's greatest military heroes. While a great number of studies have devoted attention to the controversy, few if any have placed the Truman-MacArthur conflict within the context of the unprecedented militarization of American foreign policy that took place during the early cold war. This study departs from the traditional "blame-casting" that has dominated Truman-MacArthur scholarship in the past and concludes that General MacArthur was a casualty who was dismissed because he failed to grasp the global nature of the post-World War II American foreign policy agenda.Chapter One analyzes the literature dealing with the Truman-Macarthur controversy and illustrates why historical scholarship has failed to grasp the larger forces at work in American foreign policy while MacArthur was UN Commander in Korea. Chapter Two traces the tumultuous events of the controversy from the outbreak of war in Korea to MacArthur's April 11 dismissal. Finally, Chapter Three analyzes the Senate hearings that followed MacArthur's dismissal, illustrates the importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's testimony, and explores the broader, global issues the Truman Administration faced in transforming its foreign policy while General MacArthur failed to grasp the nature of this transformation. / Department of History

The dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur on April 11, 1951, from all of his commands by President Truman furnished the impetus for this survey of editorial opinion and reaction. The newspaper editorial opinion represents five major daily newspapers with broad geographic coverage of the State of Indiana, plus a wide range of political reaction to the topic. The editorial opinion is also representative ofea diverse socio-economic base.Of the five newspapers, the Evansville Courier was one of two that retained a consistently rational outlook toward the American scene during the Truman-MacArthur conflict. It took the position early that the Korean War should not be expanded, that the chance of an expanding war with China was to be avoided. The Courier expressed its dissatisfaction with the Truman foreign policy record, including the loss of China. It supported executive privilege and roundly attacked MacArthur.The Fort Wayne News Sentinel was very conservative, expertly vindictive, and at times somewhat irrational in its editorial opinion. At other times, its tenor was completely opposite. After fighting had been stabilized at the 38th parallel, it advised moving no further north,thus supporting limitation of the war. The News Sentinel supported MacArthur to the hilt and generally, deplored American negotiations and her "cringing" under Russian communism.The Gary Post Tribune's record in regard to the Truman Administration was that it had failed in its Far Eastern foreign policy and that the policy was unclear. It called MacArthur's dismissal unfortunate, but added that the move was supported in the interest of preserving civilian supremacy and the western alliances. Early in the Senate hearings, it applauded the conduct of those proceedings but as they ground on, pleaded for their end. Imploring its readers to rational thinking, the Post Tribune insisted "Cold Reason Must Rule" and deplored the fact that it felt that negotiation was becoming synonymous with appeasement.The Indianapolis Star's production of editorial opinion was prolific, in comparison to the other newspapers. The Star maintained a consistent conservative Republican approach to all issues. The Truman Administration was condemned for loss of the World War II "Pacific victory," for appeasement and defeatism, and for the formulation and execution of its Far Eastern foreign policy. Russia was seen as the real enemy of America, and early in the Korean War, military limitations were supported but later those same limitations were attacked vigorously. The concept of limiting the war was said to encourage further aggression. The Star advocated the protection of executive privilege, and as the Senate hearings progressed, informed its readers that no new information could be gained from the testimony.Of the five newspapers, the Palladium Item was the most reactionary and irrational. Although, at times, emotionalism and an occasional case of irrationality overcame the News Sentinel and Star, the Palladium Item made a steady diet of those "entrees." In describing the toll of American lives in the Korean War, the paper revealed its nature in the editorial, the "Truman Meat Grinder." Allies were seen as worthless and Truman as a "puppet" of England. The paper insisted that Truman's "hatchet-men" were trying to smear the General's character, because he was a "champion" against "traitorous" elements in America.The editorial reaction of the five papers was conservative and condemned the Truman Administration foreign policy, especially in the Far East. The Evansville Courier and the Gary Post Tribune presented well thought-out opinions based on a rational approach to the frustrations of Americans in the Korean War and adherence to the concept of limited war. The Republican newspapers, the Indianapolis Star, the Fort Wayne News Sentinel, and the Richmond Palladium Item, adhered to the Republican condemnation of the Truman Administration.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis is dedicated to the rupture between Henry A. Wallace and Truman's administration during the forties of the twentieth century, that is mainly to the Wallace's disagreement with the Democratic Party regarding U. S.-Soviet relations. Disapproval of the former Roosevelt's vicepresident with the official standing of the American foreign policy ultimately lead to his presidency candidacy in 1948 and to the creation of protest Progressive Party, which was supposed to shield this candidacy. The purpose of the thesis was to ascertain to what degree these events had been formed by the commencing Cold War and on the contrary which role was played by Wallace and his followers. In the thesis, I analyzed Wallace's shift in opinion towards Soviet Union, determinants of his viewpoint and direct causes of his leave from Democratic Party. I devoted to the circumstances leading to creation of the Progressive Party, its structure and the role of communists in this process. The core theme is presidential campaign in 1948 and analysis of the reasons behind Wallace's defeat; one chapter is devoted to the reflection of this campaign in the forming Eastern Bloc, including its propaganda employment in the communist media press. Additionally, following evolvement of Progressive Party and the reasons of the Wallace's...