In wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), cooperation cannot be an im- plicit assumption anymore. Each profit-oriented network node has the intention to be selfish due to limited resource possession. In this dissertation, we investigate the truthful resource management that induces network nodes to reveal true information and stimulate cooperation. We propose the Transmission Power Recursive Auction Mechanism routing pro- tocol (TEAM) and the Truthful Topology Control mechanism (TRUECON) to cope with the selfish intention and achieve resource effciency in a non-cooperative envi- ronment. We prove both are strategy-proof and have some theoretic bounds on the performance. Compared with the existing routing protocols and topology control al- gorithms, TEAM and TRUECON are more effcient when dealing with the selfishness in MANETs. We conduct a study on anonymity enhancement in MANETs by reducing trans- mission power of network nodes. A routing protocol - Whisper is presented. Simu- lation results show that it has desirable properties in terms of anonymity and power effciency.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 25 / Nenhuma / A presente pesquisa busca estabelecer a relação entre o biopoder e os direitos humanos com base na obra em Michel Foucault. Recuperando suas análises sobre o saber e o poder, nas quais o autor conclui sobre a profunda relação entre ambos e a necessidade da verdade para o exercício do poder no Ocidente, defendemos a tese de que os direitos humanos cumpriram e cumprem com uma função bipolar nas sociedades biopolíticas moderna e contemporânea; ou seja, os direitos humanos, no momento em que se constroem enquanto discurso verdadeiro no Ocidente, cumprem com a função de, por uma lado, legitimar as sociedades biopolíticas, no entanto, ao mesmo tempo, de lhe produzirem as principais resistências. Esta tese pretende ser uma contribuição teórica a mais para entendermos o amplo debate atual em torno dos direitos humanos e como o acionamento desse discurso pode contribuir para processos de resistência às sociedades de controle / This research tries to establish the relationship between the biopower and the human rights, based on Michel Foucault work´s. Reestablishing his analyses about the knowledge and the power, in which the author studies the deep relationship between both, and the need of the truth to the power exercise in the Occident, we will defend the thesis that human rights have been performing bipolar function on the modern and contemporary biopolitics societies; that is, the human rights, in the moment that it builds itself as a truthful speech in the Occident, it carries out the function of, on one side, legitimate the biopolitical societies, however, at the same time, to produce they substantial resistances. This these claims to be one more theoretic contribution to understand the actual ample discussion between human rights and how the activation of this speech can contribute to the resistance process to control societies

Algorithmic mechanism design deals with efficiently-computable algorithmic constructions in the presence of strategic players who hold the inputs to the problem and may misreport their input if doing so benefits them. Algorithmic mechanism design finds applications in a variety of internet settings such as resource allocation, facility location and e-commerce, such as sponsored search auctions. There is an extensive amount of work in algorithmic mechanism design on packing problems such as single-item auctions, multi-unit auctions and combinatorial auctions. But, surprisingly, covering problems, also called procurement auctions, have almost been completely unexplored, especially in the multidimensional setting. In this thesis, we systematically investigate multidimensional covering mechanism- design problems, wherein there are m items that need to be covered and n players who provide covering objects, with each player i having a private cost for the covering objects he provides. A feasible solution to the covering problem is a collection of covering objects (obtained from the various players) that together cover all items. Two widely considered objectives in mechanism design are: (i) cost-minimization (CM) which aims to minimize the total cost incurred by the players and the mechanism designer; and (ii) payment minimization (PayM), which aims to minimize the payment to players. Covering mechanism design problems turn out to behave quite differently from packing mechanism design problems. In particular, various techniques utilized successfully for packing problems do not perform well for covering mechanism design problems, and this necessitates new approaches and solution concepts. In this thesis we devise various techniques for handling covering mechanism design problems, which yield a variety of results for both the CM and PayM objectives. In our investigation of the CM objective, we focus on two representative covering problems: uncapacitated facility location (UFL) and vertex cover. For multi-dimensional UFL, we give a black-box method to transform any Lagrangian-multiplier-preserving ??-approximation algorithm for UFL into a truthful-in-expectation, ??-approximation mechanism. This yields the first result for multi-dimensional UFL, namely a truthful-in-expectation 2-approximation mechanism. For multi-dimensional VCP (Multi-VCP), we develop a decomposition method that reduces the mechanism-design problem into the simpler task of constructing threshold mechanisms, which are a restricted class of truthful mechanisms, for simpler (in terms of graph structure or problem dimension) instances of Multi-VCP. By suitably designing the decomposition and the threshold mechanisms it uses as building blocks, we obtain truthful mechanisms with approximation ratios (n is the number of nodes): (1) O(r2 log n) for r-dimensional VCP; and (2) O(r log n) for r-dimensional VCP on any proper minor-closed family of graphs (which improves to O(log n) if no two neighbors of a node belong to the same player). These are the first truthful mechanisms for Multi-VCP with non-trivial approximation guarantees. For the PayM objective, we work in the oft-used Bayesian setting, where players??? types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated, and the goal is to minimize the expected total payment made by the mechanism. We consider the problem of designing incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the above model. The standard notion of incentive compatibility (IC) in such settings is Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), but this notion is over-reliant on having precise knowledge of the underlying distribution, which makes it a rather non- robust notion. We formulate a notion of IC that we call robust Bayesian IC (robust BIC) that is substantially more robust than BIC, and develop black-box reductions from robust BIC-mechanism design to algorithm design. This black-box reduction applies to single- dimensional settings even when we only have an LP-relative approximation algorithm for the algorithmic problem. We obtain near-optimal mechanisms for various covering settings including single- and multi-item procurement auctions, various single-dimensional covering problems, and multidimensional facility location problems. Finally, we study the notion of frugality, which considers the PayM objective but in a worst-case setting, where one does not have prior information about the players??? types. We show that some of our mechanisms developed for the CM objective are also good with respect to certain oft-used frugality benchmarks proposed in the literature. We also introduce an alternate benchmark for frugality, which more directly reflects the goal that the mechanism???s payment be close to the best possible payment, and obtain some preliminary results with respect to this benchmark.

[pt] Este trabalho se concentra no desenvolvimento de mecanismos de leilões reveladores aleatorizados que buscam maximizar simultaneamente a receita e a eficiência econômica, ou função social, de leilões de demanda unitária. Em um leilão de demanda unitária, um conjunto de k bens é leiloado para um conjunto de n consumidores, com a restrição de que nenhum consumidor pode comprar mais de um bem. É apresentado um arcabouço para o desenvolvimento de mecanismos reveladores aleatorizados de complexidade polinomial derivados do mecanismo de Vickrey-Clarke- Groves, ou VCG. Ao invés de utilizar preços de reserva, estas variantes do VCG utilizam como parâmetro o número de bens que devem ser efetivamente vendidos. Os mecanismos se diferenciam entre si pela maneira como é feito o cálculo do número de bens que devem ser vendidos e permitem um balanço interessante entre receita e eficiência econômica, ao mesmo tempo que melhoram os resultados teóricos alcançados para o problema de Leilões de Demanda Unitária. / [en] This work focuses on the development of randomized truthful mechanisms that seek to maximize both the revenue and the economic efficiency, or social welfare, of unit-demand auctions. In a unit-demand auction a set of k items is auctioned to a set of n consumers and no consumer can purchase more than one item. A framework is presented for devising polynomial-time randomized truthful mechanisms that are based on a new variant of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Instead of using reserve prices, this variant of VCG uses the number of objects that we wish to sell as a parameter. The mechanisms obtained differ er from each other in the way they select the number of items to be sold and allow an interesting trade-off between revenue and economic effciency, while improving upon the stateof- the-art results for the Unit-Demand Auction problem (09).

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Este estudo tem por objeto o documentário de Thomas Harlan, Torre Bela (1978), filmado durante o processo revolucionário português (1974-1975). A película insere-se na raiz cinematográfica do cinema-verdade, destacando-se do debate em torno deste conceito desenvolvido por Jean Rouch e Edgar Morin no decênio de 1960, na medida em que propõe antes, uma abordagem materialista aos processos sociais, retomando a perspectiva desenvolvida por Dziga Vertov (1896-1954), cineasta russo autor do filme Kinoglaz (1924), que Thomas Harlan cita em diferentes cenas de Torre Bela. Harlan constrói de forma crítica e reflexiva uma síntese da atualidade, proveniente do recorte histórico, resultante da combinação sistematizada entre o fragmento do filme e a visão histórica sobre o processo revolucionário que o cineasta insere na montagem do filme. Ao concretizá-la, Harlan acaba por colocar luz nas contradições do processo português, alumiando, por exemplo, como o acordo militar para uma \"nova política social\", que defendia os direitos da classe trabalhadora como anunciado no Programa do Movimento das Forças Armadas, consolida-se apenas em direitos para a classe dominante, os proprietários dos meios de produção, excluindo-se o trabalhador do modelo de sociedade democrática. O filme é emblemático também, para compreender a forma como o trabalhador se torna sujeito político da Revolução, histórico, por isso, objetivando as suas utopias através da película, até o momento da intervenção da força militar contrarrevolucionária como mostra o final do filme. Em tese, o trabalho investiga como a reintrodução da perspectiva histórica sobre a forma como uma dada sociedade se organiza, bem como o ponto de vista do cineasta sobre o fenômeno social abordado torna-se, no caso da película Torre Bela, uma forma de resistência e de oposição ao movimento de desmanche e declínio das grandes utopias que marcou a segunda metade do século XX, e que na atualidade se reinventa no fenômeno da pós-verdade. / The subject of this study is the Thomas Harlan documentary Torre Bela (1978), filmed during the Portuguese Revolution of 1974 - 1975. The movie is implanted in the cinematographic roots of the truthful-cinema (cinéma vérité), outdistancing from the 1960´s debate surrounding Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin´s concept since it proposes instead, a materialistic view of the social processes, recollecting the same perspective developed by Dziga Vertov (1896-1954), Russian filmmaker creator of Kinoglaz movie (1924), and in which Thomas Harlan references it in several scenes of Torre Bela. Based on a historical approach, Harlan elaborates a critically reflexive summary of the actuality, resultant from the systematic combination between frames and the historical perception of the revolutionary process and in which the creator inserts in the film. Whilst producing it, Harlan focus on the contradictory facts in the Portuguese process highlighting for example, how the military agreement for the new social politic, which defended the workers\' rights, as announced by the Military Forces Program, primarily focuses on the dominant classes (owners) excluding the workers from the social-democratic model. The movie is emblematic and historical leading you to understand how the worker became a politic individual of the revolution, presenting its utopias trough the movie up until the contra revolutionary intervention by the military force as exposed in the end of the movie. In theses, the study investigates how a reintroduction of the historical perspective of a society organization as well as the filmmaker´s understanding and approach of the social singularity becomes, in Torre Bela, a way of resistance and opposition to the destruction and decline of the utopias which characterized the second half of the 20th century and in present time reinventing itself within the post-truth concept.

The main objective of my dissertation is to research and to introduce hellenistic skepticism of postclassical Greece and methodical skepticism of modern times thinker Rene Descartes. There are differences between the ancient Pyrrhonism and the younger skepticism of Academy, which I would like to clear up. I have in view Descartes' skepticism too, which create a methodological technique of cognition in new way. Rene Descartes, contrary to hellenistic skeptics, doesn't accept the "epoche", which means a certain bliss, but he moves on in his research, when he believes in a possibility of truthful cognition. Purpose of my thesis is to critically take account of historical and philosophical context, from which both of skepticisms have been created, to put a question, what kind of meaning they had in history of philosophy and also to think about fundamental question of connection between hellenistic and Descartes doubt. I try to accent common characteristics and differences of both concepts. key words - skepticism, methodical skepticism, truthful cognition, probability, phenomena, senses, intellect, bliss

Το πρόβλημα της δίκαιης κατανομής είναι ένα πολύ σημαντικό πρόβλημα που έχει ανακύψει στον τομέα της επιστήμης των υπολογιστών και όχι μόνο. Κάποιες από τις μορφές που έχει εμφανιστεί είναι π.χ. στην κατανομή πόρων σε δίκτυα υπολογιστών, στο διακανονισμό συνόρων σε διεθνείς διαφωνίες, στο οικογενειακό δίκαιο και ως πρόβλημα της μείωσης των εκπομπών αερίων του θερμοκηπίου. Θεωρούμε προβλήματα αναθέσεων στα οποία ένα σύνολο αγαθών είτε αγγαρειών πρέπει να ανατεθεί σε κάποιους παίκτες. Κάθε παίκτης έχει μία συνάρτηση κέρδους (κόστους) που δείχνει πόσο εκτιμά κάθε αγαθό (αγγαρεία, αντίστοιχα) και το κέρδος (κόστος) του παίκτη για κάθε πιθανό σύνολο αντικειμένων προκύπτει αθροιστικά. Στόχος του προβλήματος είναι, φυσικά, η αποδοτικότητα και η δικαιοσύνη της ανάθεσης, περιορισμοί όμως, όπως η εγωιστική συμπεριφορά των παικτών οδηγούν σε πολύ ενδιαφέρουσες παραλλαγές του προβλήματος. Το πρώτο αποτέλεσμα της εργασίας προκύπτει από τη μελέτη του προβλήματος ανάθεσης ενός συνόλου αδιαίρετων αγαθών σε παίκτες όταν μας ενδιαφέρει να μην υπάρχει μεγάλη ζήλεια μεταξύ των παικτών. Αδιαίρετα λέγονται τα αντικείμενα που δεν μπορούν να κοπούν σε κομμάτια και πρέπει να ανατεθούν ακέραια σε κάποιο παίκτη, ενώ ζήλεια, διαισθητικά, είναι η προτίμηση που έχει κάποιος παίκτης για το σύνολο αγαθών που ανατέθηκαν σε κάποιον άλλον σε σχέση με τα αγαθά που ανατέθηκαν στον ίδιο. Όπως έχουμε αναφέρει, στην πράξη οι παίκτες έχουν εγωιστική συμπεριφορά, υπό την έννοια ότι προσπαθούν να μεγιστοποιήσουν το κέρδος τους. Για αυτό το λόγο, μπορεί να αναφέρουν εσφαλμένες συναρτήσεις κέρδους για να πετύχουν μία καλύτερη ανάθεση. Ως ειλικρινής χαρακτηρίζεται ένας μηχανισμός ανάθεσης ο οποίος εγγυάται ότι η ανάθεση των αντικειμένων βασίζεται στις σωστές συναρτήσεις κέρδους των παικτών. Υπό μία έννοια, ένας ειλικρινής μηχανισμός ανάθεσης αναγκάζει τους παίκτες να πουν την αλήθεια για τις συναρτήσεις κέρδους τους, ή αλλιώς, εγγυάται πως το κέρδος ενός παίκτη από την ανάθεση που βασίζεται σε εσφαλμένη συνάρτηση κέρδους δεν είναι μεγαλύτερο από το κέρδος που θα είχε αν η ανάθεση είχε βασιστεί στην πραγματική συνάρτηση κέρδους του, δεδομένου του ότι οι υπόλοιποι παίκτες λένε την αλήθεια. Παρουσιάζουμε μία απλή απόδειξη ότι ειλικρινείς ντετερμινιστικοί μηχανισμοί ανάθεσης δεν ελαχιστοποιούν τη ζήλεια, χαρακτηρίζοντας τέτοιους μηχανισμούς για δύο παίκτες και δύο αντικείμενα. Συγκεκριμένα, στην απόδειξη μας φαίνεται ότι για κάθε τέτοιο ειλικρινή μηχανισμό υπάρχουν στιγμιότυπα για τα οποία η ζήλεια σχεδόν μεγιστοποιείται. Επίσης, παρουσιάζουμε μία ανάλυση για ομοιόμορφα τυχαίες αναθέσεις οι οποίες είναι ειλικρινείς μηχανισμοί κατά μέσο όρο. Τα αποτελέσματα αυτά απλοποιούν και βελτιώνουν προηγούμενα αποτελέσματα των Lipton, Markakis, Mossel και Saberi. Συγκεκριμένα, δείχνουμε ότι η ζήλεια φράσσεται εκ των άνω από την ποσότητα O(a√(m ln n)) με μεγάλη πιθανότητα, όπου a είναι το μέγιστο κέρδος για κάθε αντικείμενο για κάθε παίκτη, n είναι ο αριθμός των παικτών και m ο αριθμός των αντικειμένων. Για την περίπτωση που το κέρδος κάθε παίκτη στο σύνολο των αντικειμένων είναι 1, το φράγμα γίνεται O(√(a ln n)). Στη συνέχεια μελετούμε την επίπτωση της δικαιοσύνης στην αποδοτικότητα των αναθέσεων. Στα ακόλουθα θα θεωρούμε ότι όντως είναι γνωστές οι πραγματικές συναρτήσεις κέρδους των παικτών. Επίσης, θεωρούμε και αναθέσεις αγγαρειών εκτός από αγαθών, καθώς επίσης και αναθέσεις διαιρετών εκτός από αδιαίρετων αντικειμένων. Ασχολούμαστε με τρείς διαφορετικές έννοιες δικαιοσύνης ανάμεσα στους παίκτες, συγκεκριμένα την αναλογικότητα, τη μη ύπαρξη ζήλειας και την ισοτιμία για αναθέσεις διαιρετών και αδιαίρετων αγαθών και αγγαρειών. Γενικά, μία ανάθεση αντικειμένων σε n παίκτες είναι αναλογική εάν σε κάθε παίκτη δίνεται η εντύπωση ότι παίρνει ένα σύνολο αντικειμένων “καλύτερο” από ποσοστό 1/n του συνόλου των αντικειμένων προς ανάθεση. Μία ανάθεση είναι χωρίς-ζήλεια εάν κάε παίκτης προτιμά όσα του έχουν ανατεθεί σε σύγκριση με το τι έχει πάρει οποιοσδήποτε άλλος παίκτης, ενώ μία ανάθεση είναι ισότιμη όταν όλοι οι παίκτες είναι εξ'ίσου ικανοποιημένοι με αυτά που τους έχουν ανατεθεί. Τέλος, μία ανάθεση είναι βέλτιστη εάν μεγιστοποιεί το κέρδος (ελαχιστοποιεί το κόστος, αντίστοιχα) του συνόλου των παικτών, δηλ. κάθε αντικείμενο ανατίθεται σε εκείνον τον παίκτη που το εκτιμά περισσότερο (του κοστίζει λιγότερο, αντίστοιχα). Παρουσιάζουμε μία σειρά αποτελεσμάτων για το κόστος της δικαιοσύνης όσον αφορά σε κάθε μία από τις τρείς έννοιες δικαιοσύνης που αναφέρθηκαν παραπάνω, πάνω σε διαιρετά και αδιαίρετα αντικείμενα αγαθών και αγγαρειών και ποσοτικοποιούμε την απώλεια αποδοτικότητας σε δίκαιες αναθέσεις σε σύγκριση με τις βέλτιστες. Παρουσιάζουμε άνω και κάτω φράγματα για κάθε περίπτωση, τα περισσότερα από τα οποία είτε συμπίπτουν είτε απέχουν κατά σταθερούς πολλαπλασιαστικούς παράγοντες. / Fair division (or fair allocation) dates back to the ancient times and has found applications such as border settlement in international disputes, greenhouse gas emissions reduction, allocation of mineral riches in the ocean bed, inheritance, divorces, etc. In the era of the Internet, it appears regularly in distributed resource allocation and cost sharing in communication networks. We consider allocation problems in which a set of goods or chores has to be allocated among several players. Each player has a utility (disutility) function indicating the happiness (regret) of the player if she is allocated the particular good (chore, respectively); this function is non-negative and additive. The objective of the problem is the efficiency and the fairness of the allocation, but restrictions like the selfish nature of the players lead to very interesting variants of the problem. Our first result stems from the study of the problem where a set of indivisible items has to be allocated to some players and where allocations in which no player envies the bundle of items allocated to the other players too much are considered. Indivisibility implies that an item cannot be broken into parts and must be allocated to a single player, and envy, intuitively implies the preference of a player for the bundle of items allocated to another player compared to that of the items allocated to her. As we stated above, in practice, players are usually selfish in the sense that they aim to increase their benefit, i.e., their total utility on the bundle of items the algorithm allocates to them. In order to do so, they may report false valuations of items to the algorithm (i.e., different than their true utilities). Truthful allocation functions guarantee that the allocation is based on the true utilities of the players. In a sense, a truthful allocation function motivates the players to be truthful, or, put differently, guarantees that the benefit obtained by a player when reporting false valuations on the items is not greater than the benefit she would have obtained by telling the truth, given that the rest of the players are truthful. We present a simple proof that deterministic truthful allocations do not minimize envy by characterizing the truthful mechanisms for two players and two items. Our proof actually shows that for any truthful allocation function, there are instances in which the envy is almost maximized. We also present an improved analysis of uniformly random allocations of m items over n players, which are truthful in expectation. We show that the envy is at most O(a√(mln n)) with high probability, where a is the maximum utility per item over all players and items. For the case where the sum of utilities of each player is 1, we prove a bound of O(√(aln n)). This improves the previous bound of O(√a n^{1/2+e}) for any e>0. We also study the impact of fairness on the efficiency of allocations. For this part of the paper, we assume that the true utility functions of the players are public knowledge. We consider both goods and chores, as well as divisible and indivisible items. Furthermore, we consider three different notions of fairness, namely proportionality, envy-freeness, and equitability. Informally, an allocation among n players is proportional if each player has the impression that she gets a better share than a fraction of 1/n of the items to be allocated. An allocation is envy-free if no player envies some other player, whereas an allocation is equitable when all players are equally happy with their shares. Finally, an allocation is optimal when it maximizes the total utility (minimizes the total disutility, respectively) of the set of players, i.e., each item is allocated to the player that values it the most (costs her the least). We present a series of results on the price of fairness under the three aforementioned different notions of fairness, for the cases of divisible and indivisible goods and chores, and quantify the efficiency loss in fair allocations compared to optimal ones. We present upper and lower bounds on each case, most of which are either exact or tight within constant factors.

Este estudo tem por objeto o documentário de Thomas Harlan, Torre Bela (1978), filmado durante o processo revolucionário português (1974-1975). A película insere-se na raiz cinematográfica do cinema-verdade, destacando-se do debate em torno deste conceito desenvolvido por Jean Rouch e Edgar Morin no decênio de 1960, na medida em que propõe antes, uma abordagem materialista aos processos sociais, retomando a perspectiva desenvolvida por Dziga Vertov (1896-1954), cineasta russo autor do filme Kinoglaz (1924), que Thomas Harlan cita em diferentes cenas de Torre Bela. Harlan constrói de forma crítica e reflexiva uma síntese da atualidade, proveniente do recorte histórico, resultante da combinação sistematizada entre o fragmento do filme e a visão histórica sobre o processo revolucionário que o cineasta insere na montagem do filme. Ao concretizá-la, Harlan acaba por colocar luz nas contradições do processo português, alumiando, por exemplo, como o acordo militar para uma \"nova política social\", que defendia os direitos da classe trabalhadora como anunciado no Programa do Movimento das Forças Armadas, consolida-se apenas em direitos para a classe dominante, os proprietários dos meios de produção, excluindo-se o trabalhador do modelo de sociedade democrática. O filme é emblemático também, para compreender a forma como o trabalhador se torna sujeito político da Revolução, histórico, por isso, objetivando as suas utopias através da película, até o momento da intervenção da força militar contrarrevolucionária como mostra o final do filme. Em tese, o trabalho investiga como a reintrodução da perspectiva histórica sobre a forma como uma dada sociedade se organiza, bem como o ponto de vista do cineasta sobre o fenômeno social abordado torna-se, no caso da película Torre Bela, uma forma de resistência e de oposição ao movimento de desmanche e declínio das grandes utopias que marcou a segunda metade do século XX, e que na atualidade se reinventa no fenômeno da pós-verdade. / The subject of this study is the Thomas Harlan documentary Torre Bela (1978), filmed during the Portuguese Revolution of 1974 - 1975. The movie is implanted in the cinematographic roots of the truthful-cinema (cinéma vérité), outdistancing from the 1960´s debate surrounding Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin´s concept since it proposes instead, a materialistic view of the social processes, recollecting the same perspective developed by Dziga Vertov (1896-1954), Russian filmmaker creator of Kinoglaz movie (1924), and in which Thomas Harlan references it in several scenes of Torre Bela. Based on a historical approach, Harlan elaborates a critically reflexive summary of the actuality, resultant from the systematic combination between frames and the historical perception of the revolutionary process and in which the creator inserts in the film. Whilst producing it, Harlan focus on the contradictory facts in the Portuguese process highlighting for example, how the military agreement for the new social politic, which defended the workers\' rights, as announced by the Military Forces Program, primarily focuses on the dominant classes (owners) excluding the workers from the social-democratic model. The movie is emblematic and historical leading you to understand how the worker became a politic individual of the revolution, presenting its utopias trough the movie up until the contra revolutionary intervention by the military force as exposed in the end of the movie. In theses, the study investigates how a reintroduction of the historical perspective of a society organization as well as the filmmaker´s understanding and approach of the social singularity becomes, in Torre Bela, a way of resistance and opposition to the destruction and decline of the utopias which characterized the second half of the 20th century and in present time reinventing itself within the post-truth concept.

This paper seeks to find whether the spectrum auctions in Sweden have been conducted efficiently and if there is a de facto model that suits all auctions. The efficiency is conditions that emphasise truthful bidding, price discovery and limits collusive behaviour. The paper compares three different auction models used in Sweden, a beauty contest used in the allocation of 3G spectrums, and the auction model selected for the upcoming 5G spectrum auction. The auction models are as follows: first and second-price sealed-bid auction, SMRA and CCA. We found that beauty contests should not be used in any spectrum allocation as it did not meet the criteria of efficiency outlined in this paper. The first-price sealed-bid auction is not a suitable format for spectrum auctions. According to the theory, it generates equivalent revenues on average as the second-price format, which shows a higher degree of efficient allocation. We found that depending on the blocks sold, both SMRA and CCA can result in somewhat efficient results, but they are not suitable for a single object auction. We found that no de facto auction format is suitable for every spectrum auction to be conducted in the future, but instead that the auction format is dependent on the characteristics of the individual auctions.