Precipitation patterns in semi-arid river systems of the southwestern U.S. make stream-aquifer exchanges an important source of water in perennial rivers. Nonetheless, the spatial and temporal evolution of surface and ground water interaction are not fully understood. This research utilizes diurnal temperature oscillations as a tracer of vertical water fluxes by applying Stallman's analytical solution to a series of temperature time series recorded in the stream and in the streambed of the San Pedro River. Temperature measurements were recorded at four spatial extents using a nested hierarchy during four different periods since last flood. Time since last flood did not affect vertical fluxes significantly, but fluxes exhibited spatial dependence at lengths of 6-24 m. Stream geomorphic features influenced the magnitude of vertical fluxes; runs were more downwelling than riffles. The data suggests that the spatial distribution of vertical fluxes becomes more homogeneous as time since last flood increases.

Vertical wind shear is computed between the 28 possible pairs of the first 8 mandatory radiosonde levels. A hail severity index is defined. Statistically significant correlations between strong shear and hail-free days are found in 11 shear layers. Strong shears are also found to occur more frequently with low and high severity indices than with intermediate severity indices. [...]

Avregleringen av Sveriges järnväg ledde till att Statens Järnvägar delades upp i olika företag, SJ AB bildades som har i uppgift att bedriva lönsam persontrafik. Avregleringen har haft en stor påverkan på hur SJ bedriver sin verksamhet idag samt lett till att komplicerade ägarförhållanden har uppstått i Hagalund. Hagalund är SJ’s största depåanläggning för underhåll av fordon. I samråd med SJ’s Division Fordon och Divisionen för Planering och Trafikledning har vi fått i uppdrag att undersöka hur SJ påverkas om de införskaffar en depå i egen regi. Vi har valt att undersöka SJ ur ett värdekedjeperspektiv. Studien bygger sedan på hur SJ’s värdekedja påverkas om en ny depåanläggning införskaffas. Vi har använt Porters värdekedja som grund till vår studie, det är en analysmetod som kartlägger en organisations värdeskapande aktiviteter. Vi har även tagit del av forskning som gjorts på Porters värdekedja med fokus på resurshantering och informationsprocesser. För att kunna undersöka problemområdet har vi även undersökt och analyserat forskning inom det teoretisk omtrådet vertikal integration. Vertikal integration innebär att en organisation införskaffar en verksamhet till egen regi. Den här studiens syfte är att undersöka hur en organisations värdekedja påverkas om en vertikal integration utförs. För att besvara syftet har vi undersökt hur de sekundära aktiviteterna i SJ’s värdekedja påverkas om en primär värdeskapande aktivitet vertikalt integreras. Vi har även i delsyfte att undersöka vilka effekter den nya depåanläggningen skulle ha på SJ’s produkt tågresor som säljs till kund. Vi besvarar både syftet och delsyftet genom en deduktiv kvalitativ undersökning. Vi använde oss av en semistrukturerad intervjumetod där vi intervjuade respondenter från SJ’s Division Fordon och Divisionen för Planering och Trafikledning. Vår övergripliga slutsats av studien är att en vertikal integration har en inverkan på SJ’s värdekedja. Den vertikala integrationen medför en förbättrad kommunikation samt kontroll av depåverksamheten och dess resurser. SJ’s depåverksamhet blir mer flexibel vilket kan leda till snabbare reaktioner vid oväntade händelser. Kvalitén av produkten tågresor påverkas även positivt. Förutsättningen till dessa fördelar är att SJ har en god kommunikation med nya depån samt införskaffar de resurser som krävs.

Šis darbas skirtas išnagrinėti esminiams vertikaliųjų susitarimų nekonkuruoti reguliavimo bei vertinimo aspektams pagal EB konkurencijos teisę. Siekiant, kad tai būtų padaryta išsamiai, pirmoje darbo dalyje pateikiama vertikalaus susitarimo samprata. Antrojoje dalyje išanalizuota vertikalaus susitarimo nekonkuruoti samprata bei ekonominis poveikis, o trečiojoje ištirti EB Steigimo sutarties 81 straipsnio taikymo jiems ypatumai. / The purpose of this work is to examine the main aspects of regulation and legal assessment of vertical non-compete obligations under EC competition law. For this reason in the first part of the work the legal concept of vertical agreement is analysed. In the second part the definition and economic effects of non-competition agreements are examined and in the third part – the legal aspects of the application of article 81 of the EC Treaty to non-compete obligations.

The last decade has witnessed substantial changes in organizational structure, inter-organizational relations and the nature of competition. In particular, the realization of interdependencies across firm boundaries has brought forth a range of mechanisms for coordination among firms in vertically related stages of production, or among direct competitors in the same industry. Our objective is to study inter-organizational relations in an oligopolistic setting to explore the interactions between efficiency and strategic incentives for organizations to engage in various forms of coordination, vertically or horizontally. Specifically, we employ a game-theoretic approach to analyze organizational structure and coordination incentives in relation to process innovation, transfer pricing, and degree of competition between products. This study is divided into four parts. / In the first part, we look at the impact of manufacturer's investments in process innovation to reduce production costs on distribution channel structure, and vice versa. We show that the optimal channel structure decision depends on interactions between two parameters: degree of product differentiation and the extent of production cost reduction. These parameters represent the two primary 'generic strategies' that most organizations follow in order to gain competitive advantage. Second, we show that decentralized manufacturers invest less in process innovation than integrated manufacturers do. However, manufacturers may prefer decentralized, non-coordinated channels to perfectly coordinated channels when product substitutability is high, contrary to efficiency and transaction-cost based arguments for increased coordination. / In the second part, we relax the assumption that a manufacturer has a choice only between integration (or 'hierarchy') and decentralization (or 'market'). Various means of channel coordination are analyzed, and ownership is assumed to be distinct from the particular coordination mechanism employed. It is shown that the consideration of the competitive environment changes incentives for, and benefits to, coordination in various Production, Inventory, and Pricing decisions among members of a supply chain. / In the third part, we focus on horizontal cooperation among firms, ignoring the vertical relations. We consider the possibility of technological spillovers in the process innovation efforts of the manufacturers, and their incentives to engage in cooperative R&D agreements with rivals in the same industry. We develop a two-stage game model with manufacturers producing differentiated products, and establish fairly general conditions under which different cooperative arrangements would be beneficial both for manufacturers and consumers. / In the fourth part, we merge the above two dimensions, i.e., we investigate the interactions between horizontal cooperative agreements among rival manufacturers and vertical coordination arrangements along the supply chain. The models above are extended to incorporate the triple influence of technological spillovers and research joint ventures, along with demand and cost side parameters, on supply chain coordination incentives. We argue that a better understanding of such interactions is crucial in explicating a more relevant theory of the firm.

In this paper a vertically structured duopolistic market with unionized price setting firms is analyzed. The form of the contract of the transactions between upstream and downstream firms can be linear pricing, franchising or vertical integration. It is known from literature (Irmen 1997) that the price elasticity of the industry demand and the degree of product differentiation are the decisive factors in the determination of the profit maximizing form of the contract. In this paper it is shown that the bargaining power of the union is an additional factor. With a higher bargaining power linear pricing becomes less preferable. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

No description available.

Strength training is safe and effective for children according to a position statement by the National Strength and Conditioning Association (2009). One such effect or benefit can be increased vertical jump ability. Due to methodological inconsistencies, determining whether strength training consistently leads to increased vertical jump has been difficult to do. This randomized study involved a 12-week, two-time per week lower body strength training program for the intervention group, and an upper body strength training program for the control group. A countermovement jump tested at baseline and post-intervention by a blinded observer measured the effect of this training intervention on the vertical jump ability of 10-14 year old athletic females (n=36). The results revealed no significant changes within each group from baseline to post-intervention and no significant differences between each group. It appears that a number of factors may have influenced the results of this study not the least of which was the high baseline ability of the participants. More research using strong methods, a sufficient training stimulus and female children is needed in order to clarify the response of vertical jump to a resistance training intervention.

Abstrakt Det finns blandade åsikter om att en grad av rörlighet över det normala skulle vara främjande eller hämmande för prestationen och därför var syftet i denna studie att mäta rörlighet och den maximala hoppförmågan hos gymnaster, cheerleaders och individer som utövar parkour för att undersöka om rörligheten har någon betydelse för spänst/ explosivitet. Undersökningsgruppen bestod av 15 friska deltagare varav 8 män och 7 kvinnor i åldrarna 18-32 år. Deltagarna genomförde tre Countermovement jump hopp (CMJ) och static jump där markering gjordes på en vägg för att mäta hopphöjd. Enbens längdhopp mättes också. Aktiv rörlighet mättes i fotled vid både dorsalflexion, plantarflexion och sit and reach (bakre rörelsekedjan). Databearbetning gjordes i datorprogrammet IBM SPSS Statistics 21. Männen hoppade högre och längre än kvinnorna där skillnaden var signifikant vid alla hopptest. En signifikant skillnad i rörlighet fanns mellan kön där kvinnorna var rörligare i vänster dorsalflexion. Parkour gruppen hoppade högre än övriga gruppen (Gymnastik & Cheerleading) där skillnaden var signifikant vid samtliga hopptest. Skillnad i rörlighet mellan parkour och övriga var endast signifikant vid vänster plantarflexion. Sambandsanalys visade starkast korrelation mellan plantarflexion och hoppförmåga där endast vänster plantarflexion och static jump var statistiskt säkerställt. Det finns indikationer som visar att spänst och explosivitet har ett samband med rörlighet men det saknas bevis för detta i den aktuella studien. Flera faktorer kan ha betydelse för hoppförmågan som bland annat teknik, disciplin och kön.

In this paper I analyze a vertically structured monopolized market with unionized firms. I compare two types of contracts: vertical integration and franchising. With franchising and wage bargaining at the firm level the union in the downstream firm is either very powerful or has no bargaining power at all, depending on the specific time structure of the model. These arguments could make integration preferable for the profit owners even if integration is accompanied by small transaction costs. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series