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The United States emerged from the Second World War determined to play a leading role in the maintenance of international order. Increasing levels of tension between the United States and the forces of communism after 1945, however, slowly forced a redefinition of what might be more distinctly termed America's "global" responsibilities, such that by 1961 John F. Kennedy declared that the United States would "pay any price. . .in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." An identifiable Cold War consensus took shape based on the assumption that it was America's responsibility to lead, protect, and defend, the "free-world." Since America was effectively waging a battle to ensure the successful spread of its own values, the Cold War consensus also served to severely limit debate—dissent essentially implied disloyalty. By the mid-1960s, however, the Cold War consensus began to crack and a debate over American foreign policy began to emerge. That debate is the focus of this dissertation, which looks at the opposition to Cold War policies which emerged in the Senate, most notably among the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee --many of whom had once played a role in developing the very foreign policies they now protested. The war in Vietnam provided the focal point for much of the dissent, but the foreign aid program also became heavily criticized, as did America's NATO policy, particularly the size of the American military presence in Europe. More important, however, Senate dissenters came to question the United States' very position as the principle defender of the free world. They did not dispute the idea that America had a significant role to play in the global arena, but they did not believe that role should consist of being the world's policeman, the self-appointed arbiter of other’s affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. Because of their views, the so-called dissenters were labelled as "neo-isolationists." They saw themselves the true "internationalists," however, believing that the Cold War had led to confusion between internationalism and indiscriminate global involvement.

This essay is a textbook study where I aim to review four textbooks regarding some historical events in the subject History. The textbooks are used in junior high school and the historical events are as follows: the genocide that happened in Congo during the leadership of king Leopold II, the genocide on Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the Holocaust and the Vietnam War. By performing this study I wanted to answer these three questions: What differences and similarities can be found in how the events circumscribed? How much space do the various events have and has it evolved through the years 1980-2009? How can this be explained? The study has been analyzed from a post-colonial perspective and the recurring patterns that appear show how the texts are post-colonial. This means that the authors of the textbooks are writing about the same subjects, but in very different ways.

Despite the fact that many countries participated in the Vietnam War, their war stories tend to marginalize one another. In this study, I use a transnationalist critical lens to compare the ethnocentric stories of the U.S. and South Korea. Instead of presenting transnationalism as a focus on the changes that arise through travel between different cultures, I rely on another meaning of transnationalism as a form of consciousness. In order to compare differing perspectives on the Vietnam War as represented in the U.S. and South Korea, I compare Tim O’Brien’s In the Lake of the Woods and Suk-Yong Hwang’s The Shadow of Arms, based on the writing style of the texts, the shared theme of friendly fire, and representation of the My Lai massacre. As a result, this comparison challenges readers in each nation to recognize perspectives on the Vietnam War which they may have missed.

The present study was designed to investigate possible situational determinants of anxiety (state and trait) as a function of either a stress provoking situation or a non-stress provoking situation. Also under investigation were possible differences that would emerge on measures of anxiety between subjects labeled as having an internal or external locus of control. Time was a third variable under consideration. This factor was manipulated as a repeated measures variable as a function of whether anxiety scores would increase or decrease when measured at two different points in time. A state measure of anxiety, a trait measure of anxiety, an internal-external locus of control scale and a questionnaire were administered to forty-five undergraduates. An analysis of variance for a 2X2X2 factorial design with repeated measures was used to analyze the data. A significant main effect was found for the factor Time on the dependent measure of trait anxiety. A correlational analysis was also performed.The significant effect of Time on trait measurements of anxiety suggest that this variable may fluctuate more frequently than previously considered by other researchers or that the state/trait dichotomy of anxiety may not be a discriminant variable and that, therefore, only one anxiety component exists. Another viable hypothesis in regards to the state measure of anxiety, is that the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) is not as sensitive to day-to-day fluctuations of anxiety as reported in previous research (Zuckerman, 1974).

This study examines the use of graduated escalation in Vietnam under the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson and attempts to discover the underlying causes that led to the enactment and the continuation of this policy throughout his administration.Factors studied include Johnson's perception of his place in history, his personal style of control, his dual loyalties to expanding "The Great Society" as well as stopping communism through military pressure, and his limited cultural understanding of the needs of the Vietnamese people and the intentions of their leaders.The conclusion is that, while Johnson was a canny politician in his own arena, his controlling personality probably prevented him from considering all of the options open to him in resolving the Vietnam problem and his simplistic, frontier type of diplomacy closed other doors and forced him along a path of frustration and defeat. / Department of Political Science

I have presented in this thesis a selective, descriptive analysis of fifteen Indiana anti-war radicals in leadership roles during the spring of 1971. After placing the radicals within a specific social movement, I have described selected background characteristics of the radicals, their beliefs on various aspects of confrontation politics, their structural form for grouping themselves for confrontation, their participation in an attempted traffic stoppage in Washington, D.C. during the first week of May, 1971, and other sociological material related to these young radicals.I have concluded in the thesis, in part, that a “new breed” of radical was to be found in leadership roles during 1971. This new breed of radical was found to come from a distinctly middle class background.Finally, I looked at the radicals’ thoughts about the future of the anti-war movement in relation to their participation in the future of that movement.

The United States emerged from the Second World War determined to play a leading role in the maintenance of international order. Increasing levels of tension between the United States and the forces of communism after 1945, however, slowly forced a redefinition of what might be more distinctly termed America's "global" responsibilities, such that by 1961 John F. Kennedy declared that the United States would "pay any price. . .in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." An identifiable Cold War consensus took shape based on the assumption that it was America's responsibility to lead, protect, and defend, the "free-world." Since America was effectively waging a battle to ensure the successful spread of its own values, the Cold War consensus also served to severely limit debate—dissent essentially implied disloyalty. By the mid-1960s, however, the Cold War consensus began to crack and a debate over American foreign policy began to emerge. That debate is the focus of this dissertation, which looks at the opposition to Cold War policies which emerged in the Senate, most notably among the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee --many of whom had once played a role in developing the very foreign policies they now protested. The war in Vietnam provided the focal point for much of the dissent, but the foreign aid program also became heavily criticized, as did America's NATO policy, particularly the size of the American military presence in Europe. More important, however, Senate dissenters came to question the United States' very position as the principle defender of the free world. They did not dispute the idea that America had a significant role to play in the global arena, but they did not believe that role should consist of being the world's policeman, the self-appointed arbiter of other’s affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. Because of their views, the so-called dissenters were labelled as "neo-isolationists." They saw themselves the true "internationalists," however, believing that the Cold War had led to confusion between internationalism and indiscriminate global involvement.

This thesis examines Jane Fonda’s antiwar activism during the Vietnam War, focusing on the period from late 1969 through 1973. Her early activism was characterized by frequent protests against the war, speeches at antiwar rallies and college campuses, and involvement with the organization Vietnam Veterans Against the War. In 1971 Fonda organized an antiwar troupe, FTA, which performed antiwar songs and sketches to active-duty servicemen in America and Southeast Asia. Fonda’s notorious trip to North Vietnam is examined in detail, as are her comments in 1973 regarding American POWs. Negative reaction to Fonda’s activism is examined, and the myth of “Hanoi Jane” is traced from its wartime origins through its postwar evolution. The John Kerry-Jane Fonda photograph incident of 2004 is reviewed, and treated as a symptom of decades-long anti-Hanoi Jane ideas, rather than an isolated incident. Fonda’s gender, the media’s treatment of her at various stages, and her own missteps all receive consideration in determining where Jane Fonda ends and the myth of Hanoi Jane begins.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Georgia, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 217-223).