Uppsats undersöker tvåklassaktier, där olika aktieklasser representerar samma tillgång men med olika rösträtt. Trots liknande risk och avkastning har A-aktien historiskt sett haft ett högre värde än B-aktien, vilket resulterar i en prisskillnad som forskning har visat variera över olika marknader. Ägarkontroll och likviditet har identifierats som faktorer som påverkar röstpremiet. Genom att undersöka ägarkontrollens inverkan tillsammans med likviditetens effekt avser uppsatsen att identifiera orsaken till prissättningen av tvåklassaktier. I studien undersöks företag noterade på Nasdaq Stockholm med minst två aktietyper under perioden 2002 till 2023. Totalt 36 företag inkluderas, dock exkluderas vissa av dem på grund av avsaknad av data eller olikheter i aktieklasserna. Undersökningen är avgränsad till den svenska marknaden och inkluderar endast företag med noteringar där. Uppsatsen visar att det har funnits ett genomsnittligt röstpremium på 5,42 % på den svenska börsmarknaden mellan 2002 och 2023, vilket är relativt lågt jämfört med andra marknader. Utländskt ägande och likviditet tycks inte ha en signifikant direkt påverkan på röstpremiet. Koncentrerat ägarskap, där den största ägaren innehar mer än 50 % av rösterna tenderar att minska röstpremiet. Emellertid har modellen en låg förklaringsgrad, vilket antyder att andra faktorer, såsom makroekonomiska händelser och specifika företagsförhållanden, också kan påverka röstpremiet. / This paper investigates dual-class shares, where different classes of shares represent the same asset but have different voting rights. Despite similar risk and return, the A-share has historically had a higher value than the B-share, resulting in a price difference that research has shown varies across different markets. Ownership control and liquidity have been identified as factors influencing the voting premium. By examining the impact of ownership control together with the effect of liquidity, this essay aims to identify the cause of the pricing of dual-class shares. The study examines companies listed on Nasdaq Stockholm with at least two types of shares during the period 2002 to 2023. A total of 36 companies are included, though some are excluded due to lack of necessary data or differences in share classes. The study is limited to the Swedish market and includes only companies with listings there. The paper shows that there has been an average voting premium of 5,42% on the Swedish stock market between 2002 and 2023, which is relatively low compared to other markets. Foreign ownership and liquidity do not seem to have a significant direct impact on the voting premium. Concentrated ownership, where the largest owner holds more than 50% of the votes tends to reduce the voting premium. However, the model has a low explanatory power, suggesting that other factors, such as macroeconomic events and specific company conditions, may also influence the voting premium.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Göteborg : Univ., 2004. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

This paper examines the relative price spreads between dual-class shares issued by the same firm on the Swedish market in order to investigate if a voting premium exists and what factors contribute to it. Previous research has found diverging explanations for the variation in price spreads between dual-class shares. Some find explanatory power in the concentration of ownership whilst others find trading costs and liquidity to determine the size and direction of the voting premium. This study tests factors of control and liquidity against the relative price spread in the Swedish market and in accordance with earlier research, the results indicate that a statistically significant voting premium exists in Sweden, although it is relatively small in comparison to many other markets. The paper contributes to the current pool of research by the choice of market, and by adding up-to-date information regarding the voting premium as well as evidence that increased domestic institutional ownership affects the voting premium negatively. At the same time, foreign institutional ownership has an opposite effect and leads to increased price differences between share classes. The general conclusion of this paper is that while some factors related to control and ownership concentration show significance long-term, other unobserved aspects could provide greater explanatory power of the voting premium in the short term.

Submitted by Diogo Anunciação Reis (diogoanunreis@gmail.com) on 2015-02-24T02:27:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 007293707_MPE_Dissertacao_V10.pdf: 747515 bytes, checksum: 91e13be0bac80e71972e87a4567cbc0b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2015-02-24T16:06:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 007293707_MPE_Dissertacao_V10.pdf: 747515 bytes, checksum: 91e13be0bac80e71972e87a4567cbc0b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-24T16:11:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 007293707_MPE_Dissertacao_V10.pdf: 747515 bytes, checksum: 91e13be0bac80e71972e87a4567cbc0b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-01-26 / Este trabalho tem por objetivo contribuir para a discussão acerca do diferencial relativo de preços entre duas classes de ações - ordinárias nominativas (ON) e preferenciais nominativas (PN) - no Brasil e os seus determinantes no período compreendido entre 2002 e 2014. Considerando-se a disseminada utilização de duas classes de ações (com e sem direito de voto) por empresas listadas na BMFBovespa – permitindo a separação entre controle e propriedade - e a elevada concentração do controle, este trabalho contribui para o entendimento dos potenciais conflitos de interesse entre acionistas majoritários e minoritários. Utilizou-se o método de mínimos quadrados ordinários (MQO) e os procedimentos de efeitos fixos (EF) e aleatórios (EA) para um painel formado por 46 companhias listadas resultando em 1.653 observações. Foram encontradas evidências de que as ações ON (com direito a voto) são negociadas com prêmio em relação às PN (sem direito a voto) e de que o prêmio (pelo voto) apresenta leve tendência de alta durante o período. Por fim, em relação aos determinantes, foram encontradas evidências de que o maior grau de proteção aos acionistas minoritários, o tamanho da empresa e a maior proporção de ativos tangíveis (imobilizados) estão negativamente associados ao prêmio pelo voto. / This paper aims to contribute to the discussion about dual-class premium (voting and non-voting shares) and its determinants in Brazil from 2002 to 2014. Considering the disseminated issuance of voting and non-voting shares by Brazilian listed firms – allowing the separation of ownership and control – and concentrated ownership, this paper contributes to the understanding of potencial conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders. This paper applies the ordinary least square (OLS) method and the procedures of fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) for a panel of 46 listed companies resulting in 1.653 observations. We found evidence that supports a premium of voting shares over non-voting shares (voting Premium). Furthermore, this premium presented a slight upward trend during the period. Finally, regarding the determinants, we found evidence that higher protection levels of minority shareholders rights, firm’s size and higher proportion of tangible assets are negatively associated to voting premium.