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Yes / This briefing paper is the second in a series to be published during 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre¿s programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability.

Yes / Richard Guthrie describes the central pillars of the verification regime for the Chemical Weapons Convention and assesses the relevance of a similar verification architecture for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Yes / Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, Civil Society Organisations and the BWC speech given at launch of the Bio-Weapons Prevention Project, during the Resumed Session of the 5th Review Conference of the BWC, United Nations, Geneva, 12 November 2002.

Technology tends to evolve over time, leading over things to evolve with it. One example may be the evolution of weapons with technological advancement. When these weapons change, it changes how war is conducted. This paper seeks to delve into the specifics of this phenomena. With technological advancement, the world has seen new threats such as lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) and cyber weapons. New weapons have been, at times, too threatening. They have created so much stigma around themselves the international community ultimately decided against their use. These weapons may then receive a weapon taboo, discouraging their use. This paper seeks to analyze whether the aforementioned emerging technology weapons – LAWs and cyber weapons – may deserve a taboo. The paper will utilize case studies by examining weapons which were previously given a taboo. By determining why other weapons - specifically chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) and nuclear weapons - received a taboo, this paper will determine whether LAWs and cyber weapons also meet the criteria.

This research investigates the strategic intentions behind the Iranian state's programs for acquiring nuclear weapons. Using Graham Allison's Rational Actor Model of national decision-making, this thesis investigates three questions: 1) Iran's motivations for obtaining nuclear weapons; 2) Iran's strategies for actual use of nuclear weapons; and, 3) alternative political frameworks for the U.S. to use with Iran to minimize the negative effects of a nuclearized Iran. This study asserts that Iran would most likely acquire nuclear weapons for the purposes of self-reliance, a greater international voice, to make up for deficiencies in conventional weapons, and for deterrence. Some scholars argue that since Iran should be designated a "rogue" state, it may become aggressive or hostile once obtaining nuclear weapons. Yet, Iran's political actions actually seem to have become increasingly pragmatic. Hence, it appears that Iran would use this arsenal to induce caution among its rivals to avoid major wars, as well as a tool for deterrence. While current political differences between Iran and America are considerable, this research recommends pursuing greater political engagement with Tehran, focusing on mutual benefits. American policymakers should implement policies which rely on positive inducements for change as well as sanctions for non-compliance. If no rapprochement takes place prior to Iran's nuclearization, however, the U.S. will need to employ tactics for minimizing the significance of Iran having nuclear weapons. This research suggests that Washington could begin by implementing economic, technical and material sanctions, establishing a Middle East missile defense system, and beefing-up U.S. coastal defenses. / Master of Arts

Yes / Stark illustrations of the dangers from chemical weapons can be seen in attacks using toxic industrial chemicals and sarin against civilians and combatants in Syria and toxic industrial chemicals in Iraq, as well as more targeted assassination operations in Malaysia and the United Kingdom, employing VX and novichok nerve agents, respectively. Concerns about such malign applications of chemical technology are exacerbated by the unstable international security environment and the changing nature of armed conflict, “where borderlines between war, civil war, large-scale violations of human rights, revolutions and uprisings, insurgencies and terrorism as well as organized crime are blurred” (1). It is thus essential that the global community regularly review the nature and implications of developments in chemistry, and its convergence with the life and associated sciences, and establish appropriate measures to prevent their misuse. With the parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) convening a Review Conference to address such issues beginning 21 November 2018, we highlight important scientific aspects (2)

No / The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Current concerns largely relate to the threat of weapons acquisition and use by rogue states or by terrorists. But the threat has deeper roots--it has been evident for fifty years that biological agents could be used to cause mass casualties and large-scale economic damage. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century. Deadly Cultures sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: Why have states continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons? Why have states terminated biological weapons programs? How have states demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs? We now live in a world in which the basic knowledge needed to develop biological weapons is more widely available than ever before. Deadly Cultures provides the lessons from history that we urgently need in order to strengthen the long-standing prohibition of biological weapons.

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Yes / In this report, we identify some of the key technical and political challenges currently facing the broader Chemical and Biological Weapon (CBW) regime- with a particular emphasis on major forthcoming diplomatic meetings. Most significantly the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (1972) (BTWC) which will take place in 2022 and preparations for the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) (CWC), expected in 2023. This report is an output of an ongoing project, designed to stimulate thinking and discussion about these issues, within relevant stakeholder communities. The report provides an introduction to this issue area for the general reader before surveying key issues and developing a series of practical policy suggestions for further consideration.