Yes

Yes

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / November 04-07, 1991 / Riviera Hotel and Convention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada / The performance testing of underseas weapons involves many of the same challenges as for other “smart” systems. Data sets on the order of GigaBytes must be extracted, processed, analyzed, and stored. A few KiloBytes of significant information must be efficiently identified and accessed for analysis out of the great mass of data. Data from various sources must be time correlated and fused together to allow full analysis of the complex interactions which lead to a given test result. The fact that the various sources all use different formats and medias just adds to the fun. Testing of underseas weapons also involves some unique problems. Since real time data transmission is not practical; the vast bulk of the test data is recorded and then recovered with the vehicle at the end of the test. Acoustics are relied on for identification and ranging. As systems continue to get smarter; the rates, capacities, and “smarts” of the equipment and software used to process test data must similarly increase. The NUWES telemetry capabilities developed to test and analyze underseas weapons could be of use on other government related projects. “Key words: Telemetry, data processing, data analysis, undersea weapons, smart weapons, torpedoes, performance testing.”

This thesis analyzes the current intelligence reform initiatives in light of multiple recommendations from post-9/11 commissions tasked with studying intelligence shortcomings. Using North Korea as a case study, it examines how reform efforts will increase capabilities to better understand Pyongyang's WMD programs and affect U.S. strategy on North Korea. Three reform sets should significantly improve U.S. understanding of North Korea's WMD programs. Collection reforms should allow intelligence agencies to gather more information to gain increased insight into Pyongyang's WMD programs. Analysis reforms will develop alternative methods and create streamlined procedures to avoid failures such as those witnessed in Iraq. Collaboration reforms should enable the Intelligence Community to shed its "stovepipe" mentality, facilitating unity of effort in reducing intelligence gaps on North Korea's dangerous programs. Intelligence reform, while necessary, is insufficient to deal with the North Korean threat. An engagement strategy could help the Intelligence Community better understand North Korea and its WMD programs by bringing Pyongyang into the international fold and lowering its isolationist tendencies. Engagement could increase intelligence collection opportunities and give decisionmakers more relevant information yielding better decisions and improved counterproliferation efforts. Finally, ongoing reforms should better equip policymakers to tackle broader issues such as terrorism and counterproliferation.

The current political fraction between Russia and the West has led to the breakdown of the cooperative post-Cold War security order. Russia’s dramatic reliance on its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal is of concern for how Moscow might shape its foreign policy. Based on the gap in the existing literature on the role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) and regional influence, this paper aims to examine the role of TNWs for Russia’s regional influence by answering the following research question: What changes in the nuclear doctrines, with regards to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s increased regional influence? This thesis uses the theoretical frame of Coercive Diplomacy, with focus on compellence, which provides an alternative explanation to one state’s behavior against another in the pursuit of influence. In order to test the hypothesis, offensive changes in the doctrines, with regard to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s likelihood of increasing its regional influence, this qualitative study examines the cases of Georgia and Armenia. The implementation of the analytical framework on the empirical material occurs through the method of structured focused comparison. The findings indicate that despite Russia’s engagement in compellence against Georgia and Armenia, the cases show very different outcomes.

北韓核問題引起世界各國的關注，更觸動了中國的神經。雖然，中國領導人一貫強調支持朝鮮半島無核化及希望朝鮮半島能夠保持和平穩定，但中國在處理兩次核問題的方式及舉措卻完全不同。在第一次核危機(1991至1994年)爆發時，中國主要採取不介入的政策；但在第二次核危機(2002至2005年)時，中國卻完全擺脫被動的角色，主動擔當核危機的調停者。 / 正因為中國處理兩次北韓核問題採取完全不同的外交方針及策略，而且兩次核危機橫跨十多年的時間，無論是國際格局及中國國力也有重大的改變。因此，筆者會嘗試從東北亞的國際體系及權力分配、中國參與國際組織及多邊機制的情況和中國的身份認同及對國家利益及安全的看法這三方面去探討中國主動舉辦「六方會談」以解決第二次北韓核問題的主要原因。 / 為了更能有效檢視研究論題，筆者也會分析中國90年代末參與的「四方會談」、中國所構建的上海合作組織及九一一事件，以評估這些中介變項對中國主動舉辦「六方會談」的影響。筆者希望能夠從是項研究去瞭解中國外交政策的走向，以評估及預測未來中國對其他國際事務的取態及方針。 / As the North Korea Nuclear Crisis is one of the most critical security issues for China, the Chinese leaders always claim to maintain peace, prosperity, stability and a nuclear-free status on the Korean Peninsula. But in the two nuclear crises, China presented different attitudes and used different strategies to deal with this issue. / In the first nuclear crisis (1991-1994), China served as neither a mediator nor a peacemaker, and claimed that Washington and Pyongyang should settle the dispute bilaterally. However, in the second nuclear crisis (2002-2005), China started to play a proactive role and acted as a chief mediator and an honest broker for initiating a multilateral dialogue - Six-Party Talks as a method to settle the crisis. / Since China played different roles and used different strategies in these two nuclear crises within 10 years, this thesis aims to investigate this change and explain the reasonsfrom mainly three angles, including the power structure of Northeast Asia, China’s participation in multilateral institutions, and China’s self-identity and views on national interests and security. / In order to strengthen the analysis, this thesis will also investigate the influence of the Four-Party talks, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and September 11 Attack on the initiatives of the Six-Party Talks. Through this research, the author aims to illustrate the dynamics of China’s foreign policy and predict the trend of China’s diplomatic behavior towards different international affairs. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 李建忠. / "2012年9月". / "2012 nian 9 yue". / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 257-285). / Abstract in Chinese and English. / Li Jianzhong. / Chapter 第一章 --- ：研究目的及方法 --- p.p.1-28 / Chapter 1.1 --- 擬題動機/研究目的 --- p.p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 研究途徑及框架 --- p.p.11 / Chapter 1.3 --- 研究假設 --- p.p.16 / Chapter 1.4 --- 研究方法 --- p.p.19 / Chapter 1.5 --- p.p.26 / Chapter 第二章 --- ：文獻回顧 --- p.p.29-57 / Chapter 2.1 --- 問題層面 --- p.p.29 / Chapter 2.2 --- 理論層面 --- p.p.37 / Chapter 第三章 --- ：中國的硬權力與軟權力 --- p.p.58-107 / 引言 --- p.p.58 / Chapter 3.1 --- 硬權力 / Chapter 3.11 --- 經濟方面 --- p.p.65 / Chapter 3.12 --- 軍事方面 --- p.p.72 / Chapter 3.13 --- 科技方面 --- p.p.77 / Chapter 3.2 --- 軟權力 --- p.p.81 / Chapter 3.21 --- ：政治價值觀 --- p.p.83 / Chapter 3.22 --- ：外交政策及國際制度 --- p.p.89 / Chapter 3.23 --- 文化 --- p.p.99 / 小結 --- p.p.103 / Chapter 第四章 --- ：中國外交政策的轉型 ── 由雙邊到多邊 --- p.p.108-148 / 引言 --- p.p.108 / Chapter 4.1 --- 中國參與國際組織/制度的數量 --- p.p.109 / Chapter 4.2 --- 中國簽署多邊條約的數量 --- p.p.119 / Chapter 4.3 --- 中國參與國際組織/制度的質量 --- p.p.123 / Chapter 4.31 --- 中國參與國際組織/制度的動機與類型 --- p.p.128 / Chapter 4.32 --- 有否積極參與國際組織/制度的行動 --- p.p.132 / Chapter 4.33 --- 簽署多邊條約的類型 --- p.p.136 / Chapter 4.34 --- 有否創立及建設國際組織/制度 --- p.p.140 / 小結 --- p.p.143 / Chapter 第五章 --- ：中國的身份認同的改變 --- p.p.149-190 / 引言 --- p.p.149 / Chapter 5.1 --- 中國的具體行為 --- p.p.150 / Chapter 5.2 --- 國際社會對中國的看法 --- p.p.160 / Chapter 5.3 --- 中國自身的定位：從發展中國家到負責任大國 --- p.p.166 / Chapter 5.4 --- 觀念的改變 ── 從新安全觀到上海合作組織 --- p.p.174 / Chapter 5.5 --- 對國際核不擴散機制的態度 --- p.p.181 / p.p.186 / Chapter 第六章 --- ：東北亞大國關係框架的轉變與「六方會談」 --- p.p.191-240 / 引言 --- p.p.191 / Chapter 6.1 --- 美國外交政策及與北韓關係的改變 --- p.p.193 / Chapter 6.2 --- 進入新世紀的中美關係 --- p.p.204 / Chapter 6.3 --- 北韓核問題對中國及東北亞各國的挑戰 --- p.p.215 / 小結 --- p.p.234 / Chapter 第七章 --- ：總結 --- p.p.241-256 / Chapter 7.1 --- 研究發現 --- p.p.241 / Chapter 7.2 --- 研究貢獻 --- p.p.249 / Chapter 7.3 --- 研究局限及展望 --- p.p.255 / 參考文獻 --- p.p.257-285

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. / Title from title screen (viewed Jan. 22, 2004). Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.S. in Applied Physics)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): William Colson, Robert Armstead. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-68). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D. in Political Science)--Vanderbilt University, 2003. / Title from PDF title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

One of the most critical tasks facing the world in the post-cold war era is to eliminate nuclear proliferation. With the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the subject of nuclear proliferation has returned to the forefront of international politics. Taking issue with the complacent belief that only a few states unnecessarily jeopardize international peace by acquiring nuclear weapons, I argue that many states in territorial protracted conflict are generally proliferants because of their specific security concerns. Demonstrating how individual and domestic level motivations are not the key determinants of the nuclear choices of the South Asian and Middle Eastern states, I emphasize the role of systemic level motivation, particularly security, in their nuclear decisions. Through a close examination of these states' nuclear weapons choices, I develop a new appraisal of the territorial protracted conflict states' potential to proliferate. While high war-probability has provoked virtually all of these protracted conflict states to seek nuclear deterrent capability and become proliferants, the variations in the type of conflict, regional power structure and geographical proximity have brought about variations in the pace of proliferation among these states. Finally, I expand the implications of this study for IR theory, especially with regard to Realist theory, nuclear deterrence, post-cold war world order, and nuclear arms control treaties. I conclude that the resolution of the roots of regional conflicts will most effectively ensure that more states do not embark on a nuclear weapons program. It is, however, naive to expect the new nuclear states to roll back their weapons programs.